대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A (The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A)

대한전기학회 (The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers)
권호 표지

게임이론을 이용한 전력시장 발전입찰에서의 거래가격 결정에 관한 연구

A Study on Transaction Pricing of Generation Bidding in Electricity Market by Using Game Theory

  • 이광호 (단국대 전기전자컴퓨터공학부)
  • 발행 : 2003.06.01
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⟨ 이전 논문 다음 논문 ⟩

초록

Competition among electric generation companies is a major goal of restructuring in the electricity industry. In electricity market, a huge volume of commodities will be traded through competitive bidding. The choice between uniform and pay-as-bid pricing for electricity auction has been one of most important issues in deregulated electricity market. This paper proposes a constrained Bertrand model for analyzing the electricity auction market of price competition model. The issue of the two pricing rules of uniform and pay-as-bid is studied from the viewpoint of consumer's benefit. This paper also shows that transmission congestion depends on the pricing mechanism. Pay-as-bid pricing gives less possibility of transmission congestion by price competition, and less burden to consumers in the simulation results.

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참고문헌

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