• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
• /
• v.9 no.9
• /
• pp.3312-3334
• /
• 2015

In this paper, a mechanism for spectrum allocation in overlay cognitive radio networks is proposed. In overlay cognitive radio networks, the secondary users (SUs) must first sense the activity of primary users (PUs) to identify unoccupied spectrum bands. Based on their different contributions for the spectrum sensing, the SUs get payoffs that are computed by the fusion center (FC). The unoccupied bands will be auctioned and SUs are asked to bid using payoffs they earned or saved. Coalitions are allowed to form among SUs because each SU may only need a portion of the bands. We formulate the coalition forming process as a coalition forming game and analyze it by game theory. In the coalition formation game, debtor-creditor relationship may occur among the SUs because of their limited payoff storage. A debtor asks a creditor for payoff help, and in return provides the creditor with a portion of transmission time to relay data for the creditor. The negotiations between debtors and creditors can be modeled as a Bayesian game because they lack complete information of each other, and the equilibria of the game is investigated. Theoretical analysis and numerical results show that the proposed auction yields data rate improvement and certain fairness among all SUs.

• Journal of Korea Society of Industrial Information Systems
• /
• v.23 no.6
• /
• pp.9-19
• /
• 2018

As the recent developments in the game industry and people's interest in game streaming become more popular, non-professional gamers are also interested in games and buying them. However, it is difficult to judge which game is the most enjoyable among the games released in dozens every day. Although the game sales platform is equipped with the game recommendation function, it is not accurate because it is used as a means of increasing their sales and recommending users with a focus on their discount products or new products. For this reason, in this paper, we propose a game recommendation system based on the users ratings, which raises the recommendation satisfaction level of users and appropriately reflect their experience. In the system, we implement the rate prediction function using collaborative filtering and the game recommendation function using Naive Bayesian classifier to provide users with quick and accurate recommendations. As the result, the rate prediction algorithm achieved a throughput of 2.4 seconds and an average of 72.1 percent accuracy. For the game recommendation algorithm, we obtained 75.187 percent accuracy and were able to provide users with fast and accurate recommendations.

• Journal of Internet Computing and Services
• /
• v.9 no.6
• /
• pp.165-177
• /
• 2008

An important issue in Multiagent reinforcement learning is how an agent should learn its optimal policy in a dynamic environment where there exist other agents able to influence its own performance. Most previous works for Multiagent reinforcement learning tend to apply single-agent reinforcement learning techniques without any extensions or require some unrealistic assumptions even though they use explicit models of other agents. In this paper, a Naive Bayesian based policy model of the opponent agent is introduced and then the Multiagent reinforcement learning method using this model is explained. Unlike previous works, the proposed Multiagent reinforcement learning method utilizes the Naive Bayesian based policy model, not the Q function model of the opponent agent. Moreover, this learning method can improve learning efficiency by using a simpler one than other richer but time-consuming policy models such as Finite State Machines(FSM) and Markov chains. In this paper, the Cat and Mouse game is introduced as an adversarial Multiagent environment. And then effectiveness of the proposed Naive Bayesian based policy model is analyzed through experiments using this game as test-bed.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
• /
• v.38B no.7
• /
• pp.543-552
• /
• 2013

For the safety messages in IEEE 802.11p/WAVE vehicles network environment, strict periodic beacon broadcasting requires status advertisement to assist the driver for safety. In crowded networks where beacon message are broadcasted at a high number of frequencies by many vehicles, which used for beacon sending, will be congested by the wireless medium due to the contention-window based IEEE 802.11p MAC. To resolve the congestion, we consider a MAC scheme based on slotted p-persistent CSMA as a simple non-cooperative Bayesian game which involves payoffs reflecting the attempt probability. Then, we derive Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) in a closed form. Using the BNE, we propose new congestion control algorithm to improve the performance of the beacon rate under saturation condition in IEEE 802.11p/WAVE vehicular networks. This algorithm explicitly computes packet delivery probability as a function of contention window (CW) size and number of vehicles. The proposed algorithm is validated against numerical simulation results to demonstrate its stability.

• Proceedings of the Korea Information Processing Society Conference
• /
• 2014.11a
• /
• pp.865-867
• /
• 2014

이 논문에서는 초등학생의 위험 상황을 자동으로 판단하기 위한 행위네트워크 설계 기법을 제안한다. 초등학생이 가지고 있는 스마트폰 센서로 주변 상황을 측정하고 측정한 값은 행위네트워크에 적용한다. 행위네트워크는 자동으로 위험상황을 인지하기 위해서 베이지안 확률을 도입한다. 반복적인 위험 상황을 학습함으로써 긴급시 빠르게 대처할 수 있다.

• Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
• /
• v.22 no.7 s.78
• /
• pp.71-78
• /
• 2004

This paper presents a game-theoretic model of information transmission for variable message sign(VMS) operations. There are one VMS operator and many drivers as players. Operator wants to minimize the total travel time while the drivers want to minimize their own travel time. The operator who knows the actual traffic situation offers information strategically. The drivers evaluate the information from operator, and then choose the route. We model this situation as a cheap-talk game which is a simplest form of Bayesian game. We show that there is a possibility that the operator can improve the traffic efficiency by manipulating the electric signs at times. Indeed, it is an equilibrium of the game. This suggests that the operator must consider the strategic use of VMS system seriously.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
• /
• v.10 no.3
• /
• pp.268-286
• /
• 2008

In this work, we review the routing models that use game theoretical methodologies. A very common assumption in the analysis and development of networking algorithms is the full cooperation of the participating nodes. Most of the analytical tools are based on this assumption. However, the reality may differ considerably. The existence of multiple domains belonging to different authorities or even the selfishness of the nodes themselves could result in a performance that significantly deviates from the expected one. Even though it is known to be extensively used in the fields of economics and biology, game theory has attracted the interest of researchers in the field of communication networking as well. Nowadays, game theory is used for the analysis and modeling of protocols in several layers, routing included. This review aims at providing an elucidation of the terminology and principles behind game theory and the most popular and recent routing models. The examined networks are both the traditional networks where latency is of paramount importance and the emerging ad hoc and sensor networks, where energy is the main concern.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
• /
• 2001.11b
• /
• pp.57-59
• /
• 2001

The restructuring of power industry is still going on all over the world for last several decades. Many kinds of restructuring model has been studied, proposed, and applied. Among those models, power pool is more popular than others. This paper assumes the power pool market structure having competitive generation sector and a new method is presented to build bidding strategy in that market. The utilities participating in the market have the perfect information on their cost and price functions, but they don't know the strategy to be chosen by others. To define one's strategy as a vector, we make utility's cost/price function into discrete step function. An utility knows only his own strategy, so he estimates the other's strategy using stochastic methods. For considering these conditions, we introduce the Bayesian rules and noncooperative game theory concepts. Also additional assumptions are included for simplification of solving process. Each utility builds the strategy to maximize his own expected profit function using noncooperative Bayesian game. A numerical example is given in case study to show essential features of this approach.

• Korea Trade Review
• /
• v.43 no.6
• /
• pp.1-24
• /
• 2018

This study analyzes the dispute settlement of between arbitration and litigation using a game theoretical approach. Many studies on arbitration have so far focused on the relevant institutions. However, there are few theoretical studies that have focused on the demand side of arbitration. The model presented here suggests conditions under which arbitration form a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium, provided that the players strategically choose a dispute settlement tool. Furthermore, the suggested model is used to analyze simple cases of international commercial dispute cases.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
• /
• v.33 no.3
• /
• pp.129-146
• /
• 2023

We construct a signaling game model between the arbitrator and claimants, in which the arbitrator's marketing amount is adopted as the signaling device. Assuming that the parties to the dispute select an arbitrator, and if there is a difference in the arbitrator's fee depending on the arbitrator's reputation, the arbitrator will pay to further enhance his reputation. We would like to analyze the cost differences between arbitrators who already have a high reputation and arbitrators who strive to further enhance their reputation using the signal model. From the Analysis of our study, We derive perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the signaling game and refine the equilibrium into a unique equilibrium by invoking the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987). Further, we characterize the refined equilibrium.