• 기술혁신학회지
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• 제15권3호
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• pp.700-721
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• 2012

본 연구는 특허권의 경제적 가치를 산정하는데 있어서, 합리적인 로열티율을 구하기 위한 방법에 관한 것이다. 특허권 자체의 합리적인 로열티율을 산정하기 위해, 기존의 25% 룰의 장단점과 최근 동향을 살펴보았으며, 내쉬 협상 방정식의 게임이론을 이용한 산정방법과 재무분석을 통한 투자수익률 방법을 적용하여 합리적인 로열티율을 산출하였다. 손해액 산정 모형에서는 최근의 미국 특허침해 손해액 산정 시 실시료 상당액으로 판결한 미국 법원의 판례를 이용하여 당해 침해 관련 특허를 분석하고, 각 특허의 서지(書誌)사항 항목에서 특허지표를 추출해서 이를 회귀분석을 이용하여 개별 특허권의 합리적인 로열티율을 산정하는 모형을 제시하고 미국의 판례자료를 이용한 분석결과를 제시하였다.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• 제14권3호
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• pp.248-274
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• 2015

This study discusses a contract to promote collection and recycling of used products in a green supply chain (GSC). A collection incentive contract is combined with a reward-penalty contract. The collection incentive contract for used products is made between a retailer and a manufacturer. The reward-penalty contract for recycling used products is made between a manufacturer and an external institution. A retailer pays an incentive for collecting used products from customers and delivers them to a manufacturer with a product order quantity under uncertainty in product demand. A manufacturer remanufactures products using recyclable parts with acceptable quality levels and covers a part of the retailer's incentive from the recycled parts by sharing the reward from an external institution. Product demand information is assumed as (i) the distribution is known (ii) mean and variance are known. Besides, the optimal decisions for product quantity, collection incentive of used products and lower limit of quality level for recyclable parts under decentralized integrated GSCs. The analysis numerically investigates how (1) contract for recycling activity, (ii) product demand information and (iii) quality of recyclable parts affect the optimal operation for each GSC. Supply chain coordination to shift IGSC is discussed by adopting Nash Bargaining solution.

• 한국경영과학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국경영과학회 2004년도 추계학술대회 및 정기총회
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• pp.535-538
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• 2004

Coordination between supply chain partners is viewed critical to effective supply chain management. Depending on the bargaining power balance between them, it is determined who will be able to exert more influence in making decisions related with such coordination. We consider two cases of the decision-making structure in the context of a simple supply chain consisting of two players, i.e., (1) the first case in which a supply chain partner dominates the decision-making process and the other passively follows the dominant player's decision, and (2) the other case in which the two players share the decision-making process equally. In this paper, we examine which of the cases is better for the companies and where comes the value of the better case. To answer the research questions, we set up an optimal control theory model and derive an analytical solution. The analysis outcome indicates that the shared decision-making in general produces better results for both companies in the supply chain, and the value of the shared decision-making comes from more effective resource utilization than the dominated case.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• 제13권2호
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• pp.129-147
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• 2014

This study proposes an optimal operational policy for a green supply chain (GSC) where a retailer pays an incentive for collection of used products from customers and determines the optimal order quantity of a single product under uncertainty in product demand. A manufacturer produces the optimal order quantity of product using recyclable parts with acceptable quality levels and covers a part of the retailer's incentive from the recycled parts. Here, two scenarios for the product demand are assumed as: the distribution of product demand is known, and only both mean and variance are known. This paper develops mathematical models to find how order quantity, collection incentive of used products and lower limit of quality level for recycling affect the expected profits of each member and the whole supply chain under both a decentralized GSC (DGSC) and an integrated GSC (IGSC). The analysis numerically compares the results under DGSC with those under IGSC for each scenario of product demand. Also, the effect of the quality of the recyclable parts on the optimal decisions is shown. Moreover, supply chain coordination to shift the optimal decisions of IGSC is discussed based on: I) profit ratio, II) Nash bargaining solution, and III) Combination of (I) and (II).

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제10권8호
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• pp.3474-3497
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• 2016

Network Function Virtualization (NFV) and Software Defined Networking (SDN) are recently considered as very promising drivers of the evolution of existing middlebox services, which play intrinsic and fundamental roles in today's networks. To address the virtual service deployment issues that caused by introducing NFV or SDN to networks, this paper proposes an optimal solution by combining quantum genetic algorithm with cooperative game theory. Specifically, we first state the concrete content of the service deployment problem and describe the system framework based on the architecture of SDN. Second, for the service location placement sub-problem, an integer linear programming model is built, which aims at minimizing the network transport delay by selecting suitable service locations, and then a heuristic solution is designed based on the improved quantum genetic algorithm. Third, for the service amount placement sub-problem, we apply the rigorous cooperative game-theoretic approach to build the mathematical model, and implement a distributed algorithm corresponding to Nash bargaining solution. Finally, experimental results show that our proposed method can calculate automatically the optimized placement locations, which reduces 30% of the average traffic delay compared to that of the random placement scheme. Meanwhile, the service amount placement approach can achieve the performance that the average metric values of satisfaction degree and fairness index reach above 90%. And evaluation results demonstrate that our proposed mechanism has a comprehensive advantage for network application.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• 제13권3호
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• pp.266-276
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• 2011

In wireless networks, it is well-known that intermediate nodes can be used as cooperative relays to reduce the transmission energy required to reliably deliver a message to an intended destination. When the network is under a central authority, energy allocations and cooperative pairings can be assigned to optimize the overall energy efficiency of the network. In networks with autonomous selfish nodes, however, nodes may not be willing to expend energy to relay messages for others. This problem has been previously addressed through the development of extrinsic incentive mechanisms, e.g., virtual currency, or the insertion of altruistic nodes in the network to enforce cooperative behavior. This paper considers the problem of how selfish nodes can decide on an efficient energy allocation and endogenously form cooperative partnerships in wireless networks without extrinsic incentive mechanisms or altruistic nodes. Using tools from both cooperative and non-cooperative game theory, the three main contributions of this paper are (i) the development of Pareto-efficient cooperative energy allocations that can be agreed upon by selfish nodes, based on axiomatic bargaining techniques, (ii) the development of necessary and sufficient conditions under which "natural" cooperation is possible in systems with fading and non-fading channels without extrinsic incentive mechanisms or altruistic nodes, and (iii) the development of techniques to endogenously form cooperative partnerships without central control. Numerical results with orthogonal amplify-and-forward cooperation are also provided to quantify the energy efficiency of a wireless network with sources selfishly allocating transmission/relaying energy and endogenously forming cooperative partnerships with respect to a network with centrally optimized energy allocations and pairing assignments.

• 한국전자거래학회지
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• 제19권1호
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• pp.43-61
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• 2014

본 연구는 공급망 운영에서 가장 기본적이고 필수적인 연구 분야인 공급자의 선정과 수요의 할당 문제를 해결하기 위한 방법으로 게임이론을 적용하였다. 특히, 가장 보편적으로 사용되고 있는 점진적 역경매 메커니즘을 비율적 형평성을 보장하는 구매 게임 방식과 공급망 전체 운영의 수익성이라는 관점에서 비교 분석하였다. 서로 다른 두 메커니즘의 정교한 비교 분석을 위한 전체 알고리즘을 제시하였으며, 구매게임을 이용한 공급자 선정 및 주문 배분의 최적해는 유전자 알고리즘을 통해 도출하였다. 전체 공급망의 수익성은 공급자와 구매자의 수익함수와 수익-비용 비율을 통해 평가하였다. 실제 현실의 공급망을 단순화한 모형을 바탕으로 본 연구에서 제안하는 방법이 전체 공급망의 수익성을 어떻게 향상시킬 수 있는 지를 간단한 실험과 통계 분석을 통해 설명하였다. 이를 통해 구매게임의 해가 역경매 방식에 비해 구매자의 수익성 감소를 통해 공급자와 구매자를 모두 포함하는 공급망 전체의 수익성을 크게 향상시킬 수 있음을 보였다.

• 한국경제지리학회지
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• 제26권3호
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• pp.274-288
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• 2023

농촌 개발 전략의 일환으로 글로벌 가치사슬로의 통합이 주목받고 있지만, 특정 통합이 성공 혹은 실패하는 원인과 메커니즘에 대해서는 알려진 바가 적다. 본 연구는 딸기 수출시장에서 진주지역의 농업인들이 생산자 주도적 가치사슬 거버넌스를 구축한 메커니즘과 그와 동반된 사회환경적 변화를 탐구했다. 이를 위해 딸기 가치 사슬의 특성을 분석했으며, 지대 이론에 의거해 진주와 논산을 비교 분석했다. 5개월에 걸친 현장조사와 이해관계자 심층 인터뷰 결과, 진주에서는 수출가능한 품종과 해당 품종에 적합한 지역 기후 조건으로 인해 자연적 진입장벽을 구축함으로써 수출시장에서의 경제적 지대를 창출했음을 확인했다. 또한 생산자 조직화를 통해 독점 지대와 국가 지원에서 비롯된 추가 수익을 유지했다. 수평적으로 연결된 농민들은 무역업체에 대한 협상력을 높이고 회원 가입을 통제하여 국가 지원에 대한 접근을 관리함으로써 생산자 주도적 가치사슬 내 지위를 공고화했다.

• 환경정책연구
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• 제9권2호
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• pp.3-19
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• 2010

안양천은 서울의 한강에 유입되는 대표적 도시하천이다. 도시화로 인한 안양천 하천수질 악화와 건천화 문제를 개선하기 위해 유역통합관리를 위한 여러 사업이 진행되고 있다. 유역통합관리를 위해서는 관련 지자체들의 공조가 필요하게 되며, 재정분담문제가 필연적으로 발생하게 된다. 본 연구에서는 유역통합관리를 위해 제안된 사업비 261억의 4개 소유역의 비용분담 방안을 Shapley Value를 이용하여 제안하고 이를 다른 2개 분담방안들과 비교하였다. '분담방안 1'은 수질개선시설이 설치되는 유역의 지자체가 비용을 부담하는 방안으로, 소유역 I지역은 0.58%, 소유역 II지역은 29.54%, 소유역 IV지역은 0%, 그리고 소유역 V지역은 69.88%의 비용을 분담하게 된다. '분담방안 2'는 각 소유역의 소하천길이에 따라 비용을 분담하는 것으로, 13개 지자체들의 교섭력이 동일하다는 것을 전제로 하고 있으며, 소유역 I지역은 13.76%, II지역은 7.34%, IV지역은 45.87%, V지역은 33.03%의 분담을 해야 한다. 하지만 하천의 물 흐름은 상중하류의 각 지자체에 서로 다른 교섭력을 부여하므로, 공조적 게임의 해(解)인 shapley Value를 이용하여 교섭력을 고려한 재정분담방안인 '분담방안 3'으로 비용분담체계를 설계하였다. 모든 가능한 공조체제에 있어 각 참여자들의 평균 한계기여도의 합으로 측정되는 Shapley Value에 의한 분담비율은 I지역 0.29%, II지역은 14.77%, IV지역 50.00%, V지역은 34.94%이며, 이를 지자체들이 수용 가능한, '공정한' 재정분담방안으로 제시하였다.

• 한국중재학회지:중재연구
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• 제17권1호
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• pp.57-75
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• 2007

Ever since franchising emerged in the industry of distribution, it has been growing explosively in the U.S.A. and all other countries as well. It is a method of expanding a business by licensing independent businessman to sell the franchiser's products and/or services or to follow a format and trade style created by the franchiser using the franchiser's trade marks and trade names. Franchising is a form of business that touches upon many different areas of law including, but not limited to, general contract law, general principles of commercial law, law of intellectual property, competition law, fair trade practices law and other industry specific laws e.g., the Fair Practices in Franchising Act in Korea. Arbitration is a long established, legally recognized procedure for submitting disputes to an outside person(s), mutually selected by the parties, for a final and binding decision. Despite its merits as an alternative dispute resolution, it has been criticized, on the other hand, particularly by franchisees' attorneys on the ground that even though it is required to protect the franchisees against the enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements because of the franchisees' paucity of bargaining power vis-a-vis the franchiser, arbitration cannot afford it. Until recently, however, little has been written about the legal issues pertaining to franchise agreement and arbitration clause contained therein in Korea. This treatise reviews the cases and arguments in relation to the subject especially of the U.S.A., which have been accumulated for decades. The issues addressed herein are the pre-emption by the FAA, the disputes to be arbitrated, the selection and qualification of arbitrators, the place of arbitration hearings and the evidentiary rules applicable, the expenses of arbitration, theory of fiduciary duty and the like, all of which are relevant to franchise agreement.