• Journal of Korea Technology Innovation Society
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• v.15 no.3
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• pp.700-721
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• 2012

This paper deals with methods for determining the reasonable royalty rates in the valuation of patents. To calculate the reliable reasonable royalty rate of a patent, we review pros and cons of the 25% rule royalty calculating method and the recent trend of this method. We also review the game theory of Nash Bargaining equation and review the Investment of Rate of Return Method according to the financial analysis. Next, we refer to the reasonable royalty damage cases among the recent patent infringement cases in USA and analyze the corresponding patents. We extract the patent indicators from the patent bibliographic information. Finally, we obtain a regression model for calculating a reasonable royalty rate using the patent indicators and the reasonable royalty rates in the recent patent infringement cases.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.14 no.3
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• pp.248-274
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• 2015

This study discusses a contract to promote collection and recycling of used products in a green supply chain (GSC). A collection incentive contract is combined with a reward-penalty contract. The collection incentive contract for used products is made between a retailer and a manufacturer. The reward-penalty contract for recycling used products is made between a manufacturer and an external institution. A retailer pays an incentive for collecting used products from customers and delivers them to a manufacturer with a product order quantity under uncertainty in product demand. A manufacturer remanufactures products using recyclable parts with acceptable quality levels and covers a part of the retailer's incentive from the recycled parts by sharing the reward from an external institution. Product demand information is assumed as (i) the distribution is known (ii) mean and variance are known. Besides, the optimal decisions for product quantity, collection incentive of used products and lower limit of quality level for recyclable parts under decentralized integrated GSCs. The analysis numerically investigates how (1) contract for recycling activity, (ii) product demand information and (iii) quality of recyclable parts affect the optimal operation for each GSC. Supply chain coordination to shift IGSC is discussed by adopting Nash Bargaining solution.

• Proceedings of the Korean Operations and Management Science Society Conference
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• 2004.10a
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• pp.535-538
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• 2004

Coordination between supply chain partners is viewed critical to effective supply chain management. Depending on the bargaining power balance between them, it is determined who will be able to exert more influence in making decisions related with such coordination. We consider two cases of the decision-making structure in the context of a simple supply chain consisting of two players, i.e., (1) the first case in which a supply chain partner dominates the decision-making process and the other passively follows the dominant player's decision, and (2) the other case in which the two players share the decision-making process equally. In this paper, we examine which of the cases is better for the companies and where comes the value of the better case. To answer the research questions, we set up an optimal control theory model and derive an analytical solution. The analysis outcome indicates that the shared decision-making in general produces better results for both companies in the supply chain, and the value of the shared decision-making comes from more effective resource utilization than the dominated case.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.129-147
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• 2014

This study proposes an optimal operational policy for a green supply chain (GSC) where a retailer pays an incentive for collection of used products from customers and determines the optimal order quantity of a single product under uncertainty in product demand. A manufacturer produces the optimal order quantity of product using recyclable parts with acceptable quality levels and covers a part of the retailer's incentive from the recycled parts. Here, two scenarios for the product demand are assumed as: the distribution of product demand is known, and only both mean and variance are known. This paper develops mathematical models to find how order quantity, collection incentive of used products and lower limit of quality level for recycling affect the expected profits of each member and the whole supply chain under both a decentralized GSC (DGSC) and an integrated GSC (IGSC). The analysis numerically compares the results under DGSC with those under IGSC for each scenario of product demand. Also, the effect of the quality of the recyclable parts on the optimal decisions is shown. Moreover, supply chain coordination to shift the optimal decisions of IGSC is discussed based on: I) profit ratio, II) Nash bargaining solution, and III) Combination of (I) and (II).

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.10 no.8
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• pp.3474-3497
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• 2016

Network Function Virtualization (NFV) and Software Defined Networking (SDN) are recently considered as very promising drivers of the evolution of existing middlebox services, which play intrinsic and fundamental roles in today's networks. To address the virtual service deployment issues that caused by introducing NFV or SDN to networks, this paper proposes an optimal solution by combining quantum genetic algorithm with cooperative game theory. Specifically, we first state the concrete content of the service deployment problem and describe the system framework based on the architecture of SDN. Second, for the service location placement sub-problem, an integer linear programming model is built, which aims at minimizing the network transport delay by selecting suitable service locations, and then a heuristic solution is designed based on the improved quantum genetic algorithm. Third, for the service amount placement sub-problem, we apply the rigorous cooperative game-theoretic approach to build the mathematical model, and implement a distributed algorithm corresponding to Nash bargaining solution. Finally, experimental results show that our proposed method can calculate automatically the optimized placement locations, which reduces 30% of the average traffic delay compared to that of the random placement scheme. Meanwhile, the service amount placement approach can achieve the performance that the average metric values of satisfaction degree and fairness index reach above 90%. And evaluation results demonstrate that our proposed mechanism has a comprehensive advantage for network application.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.13 no.3
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• pp.266-276
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• 2011

In wireless networks, it is well-known that intermediate nodes can be used as cooperative relays to reduce the transmission energy required to reliably deliver a message to an intended destination. When the network is under a central authority, energy allocations and cooperative pairings can be assigned to optimize the overall energy efficiency of the network. In networks with autonomous selfish nodes, however, nodes may not be willing to expend energy to relay messages for others. This problem has been previously addressed through the development of extrinsic incentive mechanisms, e.g., virtual currency, or the insertion of altruistic nodes in the network to enforce cooperative behavior. This paper considers the problem of how selfish nodes can decide on an efficient energy allocation and endogenously form cooperative partnerships in wireless networks without extrinsic incentive mechanisms or altruistic nodes. Using tools from both cooperative and non-cooperative game theory, the three main contributions of this paper are (i) the development of Pareto-efficient cooperative energy allocations that can be agreed upon by selfish nodes, based on axiomatic bargaining techniques, (ii) the development of necessary and sufficient conditions under which "natural" cooperation is possible in systems with fading and non-fading channels without extrinsic incentive mechanisms or altruistic nodes, and (iii) the development of techniques to endogenously form cooperative partnerships without central control. Numerical results with orthogonal amplify-and-forward cooperation are also provided to quantify the energy efficiency of a wireless network with sources selfishly allocating transmission/relaying energy and endogenously forming cooperative partnerships with respect to a network with centrally optimized energy allocations and pairing assignments.

• The Journal of Society for e-Business Studies
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.43-61
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• 2014

This research is an application of game theory to developing the supplier selection and demand allocation mechanism, which are the essential and major research areas of supply chain planning and operation. In this research, the most popular and widely accepted mechanism, the progressive reverse auction is analyzed and compared with the other game theoretic approach, Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution in the viewpoint of holistic efficiency of supply chain operation. To logically and exquisitely compare the efficiencies, a heuristic algorithm based on Genetic Algorithm is devised to find the other optimal demand allocation plan. A well known metric, profit-cost ratio, as well as profit functions for both suppliers and buyer has been designed for evaluating the overall profitability of supply chain. The experimental results with synthesis data and supply chain model which were made to mimic practical supply chain are illustrated and analyzed to show how the proposed approach can enhance the profitability of supply chain planning. Based on the result, it can be said that the proposed mechanism using bargainging solution mayguarantee the better profitability for the whole supply chin including both suppliers and buyer, even though quite small portion of buyer's profitability should be sacrified.

• Journal of the Economic Geographical Society of Korea
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• v.26 no.3
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• pp.274-288
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• 2023

While the integration into global value chains has garnered attention as a rural development strategy, less is known about why some integrations are successful while others are not. This study draws on rent theory and on empirical examples from Jinju and Nonsan, the two biggest strawberry production regions in South Korea, to explore the mechanisms of Jinju creating and exclusively retaining monopoly rents from the exports. Based on five months of fieldwork and in-depth interviews with stakeholders, the findings show that a producer-driven chain integration into the overseas markets was possible in Jinju due to the natural barriers to entry based on an exportable variety, as well as the region's climate conditions being suitable to the variety. Moreover, the farmers have attempted to retain the monopoly rents and extra profits from public supports by associating producers. The horizontally associated farmers stabilized their positions by enhancing their bargaining power against exporters, as well as by managing access to the public supports by controlling memberships.

• Journal of Environmental Policy
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.3-19
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• 2010

Anyang-cheon(stream) runs through southern metropolitan area of Seoul to Han-river in Korea. Due to fast growth of Seoul, the water quality and quantity problems in Anyang-cheon have occurred. To cope with the problems, the Integrated Watershed Management program for Anyang-cheon was adopted and a KRW 26.1 billion (USD 21.8 million) pilot project (construction of 4 facilities such as reservoir) is suggested for 4 sub-watersheds of Anyang-cheon, which cost will be shared by the 12 local governments (LG). Three cost division schemes are compared. By Scheme 1, if the cost is borne by the LG in a watershed where the facilities are constructed (no cost division scheme), the LG in I is to bear 0.58% of the total construction cost, LG in watershed II 29.54%, LG in IV 0%, LG in V 69.88%. In particular, LG in IV in this scheme bears no cost because no facility is constructed, even though watershed IV is the major beneficiary of the facility construction. Scheme 2 is to share the cost by length of streams in each sub-watershed and the suggested cost share for each sub-watershed is 13.76% by I, 7.34% by II, 45.87% by IV, and 33.03% by V. However, this cost division scheme is fair only under the false assumption that the bargaining powers of group of LGs are identical. To suggest a better and fair division rule, Shapley Value, a cooperative game solution, is used to suggest Scheme 3. In Scheme 3, Shapley Value measures the summation of average marginal contribution of each player in all possible coalitions as cost division scheme and is known to provide a fair division considering bargaining power. In the context of Anyang-cheon, LGs in upper stream have superior bargaining position. The result suggests the cost division is fair under Scheme 3, when the cost shares are 0.29% by I, 14.77% by II, 50% by IV, and 34.94% by V, respectively.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.17 no.1
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• pp.57-75
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• 2007

Ever since franchising emerged in the industry of distribution, it has been growing explosively in the U.S.A. and all other countries as well. It is a method of expanding a business by licensing independent businessman to sell the franchiser's products and/or services or to follow a format and trade style created by the franchiser using the franchiser's trade marks and trade names. Franchising is a form of business that touches upon many different areas of law including, but not limited to, general contract law, general principles of commercial law, law of intellectual property, competition law, fair trade practices law and other industry specific laws e.g., the Fair Practices in Franchising Act in Korea. Arbitration is a long established, legally recognized procedure for submitting disputes to an outside person(s), mutually selected by the parties, for a final and binding decision. Despite its merits as an alternative dispute resolution, it has been criticized, on the other hand, particularly by franchisees' attorneys on the ground that even though it is required to protect the franchisees against the enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements because of the franchisees' paucity of bargaining power vis-a-vis the franchiser, arbitration cannot afford it. Until recently, however, little has been written about the legal issues pertaining to franchise agreement and arbitration clause contained therein in Korea. This treatise reviews the cases and arguments in relation to the subject especially of the U.S.A., which have been accumulated for decades. The issues addressed herein are the pre-emption by the FAA, the disputes to be arbitrated, the selection and qualification of arbitrators, the place of arbitration hearings and the evidentiary rules applicable, the expenses of arbitration, theory of fiduciary duty and the like, all of which are relevant to franchise agreement.