• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.5
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• pp.53-75
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• 1993

This article is concerned with the comment on "Some New Problems of International Aviation Security-Considerations Forcused on its Legal Aspects". Ever since 1970, in addition to the problem of failure to accept the Tokyo, Hague and Montreal Conventions, there has been also the problem of parties to them, failing to comply with their obligations under the respective treaties, in the form especially of nominal penalties or the lack of any effort to prosecute after blank refusals to extradite. There have also been cases of prolonged detention of aircraft, passengers and hostages. In this regard, all three conventions contain identical clauses which submit disputes between two or more contracting States concerning the interpretation or application of the respective conventions to arbitration or failing agreement on the organization of the arbitration, to the International Court of Justice. To the extent to which contracting States have not contracted out of this undertaking, as I fear they are expressly allowed to do, this promision can be used by contracting States to ensure compliance. But to date, this avenue does not appear to have been used. From this point of view, it may be worth mentioning that there appears to be an alarming trend towards the view that the defeat of terrorism is such an overriding imperative that all means of doing so become, in international law, automatically lawful. In addition, in as far as aviation security is concerned, as in fact it has long been suggested, what is required is the "application of the strictest security measures by all concerned."In this regard, mention should be made of Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention on Security-Safeguarding International Civil Aviation against Acts of Unlawful Intereference. ICAO has, moreover, compiled, for restricted distribution, a Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference, which is highly useful. In this regard, it may well be argued that, unless States members of ICAO notify the ICAO Council of their inability to comply with opecific standards in Annex 17 or any of the related Annexes in accordance with Article 38 of the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, their failure to do so can involve State responsibility and, if damage were to insure, their liability. The same applies to breaches of any other treaty obligation. I hope to demonstrate that although modes of international violence may change, their underlying characteristics remain broadly similar, necessitating not simply the adoption of an adequate body of domestic legislation, firm in its content and fairly administered, but also an international network of communication, of cooperation and of coordination of policies. Afurther legal instrument is now being developed by the Legal Committee of ICAO with respect to unlawful acts at International airports. These instruments, however, are not very effective, because of the absence of universal acceptance and the deficiency I have already pointed out. Therefore, States, airports and international airlines have to concentrate on prevention. If the development of policies is important at the international level, it is equally important in the domestic setting. For example, the recent experiences of France have prompted many changes in the State's legislation and in its policies towards terrorism, with higher penalties for terrorist offences and incentives which encourage accused terrorists to pass informations to the authorities. And our government has to tighten furthermore security measures. Particularly, in the case an unarmed hijacker who boards having no instrument in his possession with which to promote the hoax, a plaintiff-passenger would be hard-pressed to show that the airline was negligent in screening the hijacker prior to boarding. In light of the airline's duty to exercise a high degree of care to provide for the safety of all the passengers on board, an acquiescence to a hijacker's demands on the part of the air carrier could constitute a breach of duty only when it is clearly shown that the carrier's employees knew or plainly should have known that the hijacker was unarmed. The general opinion is that the legal oystem could be sufficient, provided that the political will is there to use and apply it effectively. All agreed that the main responsibility for security has to be borne by the governments. A state that supports aviation terrorism is responsible for violation of International Aviation Law. Generally speaking, terrorism is a violation of international law. It violates the sovereign rights of states, and the human rights of the individuals. We have to contribute more to the creation of a general consensus amongst all states about the need to combat the threat of aviation terrorism. I think that aviation terrorism as becoming an ever more serious issue, has to be solved by internationally agreed and closely co - ordinated measures.

• Journal of the Korean Society for Aviation and Aeronautics
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• v.17 no.2
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• pp.31-40
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• 2009

South Korea opened Incheon international airport(IIA) in march 29, 2001, with high expectations of becoming the distribution hub of Northeast Asia and aiming at a world best air hub. IIA compares quite well with any other leading airports in the world in it's facilities for the movement of people and vehicles. However, with the sequence of events following the September, 2001. terrorist attack and the war in Iraq, South Korea, an ally of the US, cannot be considered a safe haven from terrorism. At a point in time when national security is given utmost importance, it is necessary to reevaluate the security of airports, because international terrorism can only occur via air and seaports. Nowadays all the countries of the world have entered into competition for their national interests and innovation of their images. with the increasing role of international airports also comes an increased likelihood as a terrorist target, because it can affect so many people and countries. From the condition of current international terrorism, we can realize that our IIA is not completely safe from a terrorist attack. The major part of counterterrorism is event control process. It's very important for quickly saves an accident and rescues a life of person, In addition for the normalization which the airport operation is prompt. In conclusion, we should secure the legal responsibility and establish and establish a system under which we can work actively in order to implement counter terror activities from being taken an airport.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.24 no.1
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• pp.59-89
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• 2009

The objectives of the 1963 Tokyo Convention cover a variety of subjects, with the intention of providing safety in aircraft, protection of life and property on board, and promoting the security of civil aviation. These objectives will be treated as follows: first, the unification of rules on jurisdiction; second, the question of filling the gap in jurisdiction; third, the scheme of maintaining law and order on board aircraft; fourth, the protection of persons acting in accordance with the Convention; fifth, the protection of the interests of disembarked persons; sixth, the question of hijacking of aircraft; and finally some general remarks on the objectives of the Convention. The Tokyo Convention mainly deals with general crimes such as murder, violence, robbery on board aircraft rather than aviation terrorism. The Article 11 of the Convention deals with hijacking in a simple way. As far as aviation terrorism is concerned 1970 Hague Convention and 1971 Montreal Convention cover the hijacking and sabotage respectively. The Problem of national jurisdiction over the offence and the offender was as tangled at the Hague and Montreal Convention, as under the Tokyo Convention. Under the Tokyo Convention the prime base of jurisdiction is the law of the flag (Article 3), but concurrent jurisdiction is also allowed on grounds of: territorial principle, active nationality and passive personality principle, security of the state, breach of flight rules, and exercise of jurisdiction necessary for the performance of obligations under multilateral agreements (Article 4). No Criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law is excluded [Article 3(2)]. However, Article 4 of the Hague Convention(hereafter Hague Article 4) and Article 5 of the Montreal Convention(hereafter Montreal Article 5), dealing with jurisdiction have moved a step further, inasmuch as the opening part of both paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Hague Article 4 and the Montreal Article 5 impose an obligation on all contracting states to take measures to establish jurisdiction over the offence (i.e., to ensure that their law is such that their courts will have jurisdiction to try offender in all the circumstances covered by Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5). The state of registration and the state where the aircraft lands with the hijacker still on board will have the most interest, and would be in the best position to prosecute him; the paragraphs 1(a) and (b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraphs 1(b) and (c) of the Montreal Article 5 deal with it, respectively. However, paragraph 1(b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraph 1(c) of the Montreal Article 5 do not specify if the aircraft is still under the control of the hijacker or if the hijacker has been overpowered by the aircraft commander, or if the offence has at all occurred in the airspace of the state of landing. The language of the paragraph would probably cover all these cases. The weaknesses of Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5 are however, patent. The Jurisdictions of the state of registration, the state of landing, the state of the lessee and the state where the offender is present, are concurrent. No priorities have been fixed despite a proposal to this effect in the Legal Committee and the Diplomatic Conference, and despite the fact that it was pointed out that the difficulty in accepting the Tokyo Convention has been the question of multiple jurisdiction, for the reason that it would be too difficult to determine the priorities. Disputes over the exercise of jurisdiction can be endemic, more so when Article 8(4) of the Hague Convention and the Montreal Convention give every state mentioned in Hague Article 4(1) and Montreal Article 5(1) the right to seek extradition of the offender. A solution to the problem should not have been given up only because it was difficult. Hague Article 4(3) and Montreal Article 5(3) provide that they do not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law. Thus the provisions of the two Conventions create additional obligations on the state, and do not exclude those already existing under national laws. Although the two Conventions do not require a state to establish jurisdiction over, for example, hijacking or sabotage committed by its own nationals in a foreign aircraft anywhere in the world, they do not preclude any contracting state from doing so. However, it has be noted that any jurisdiction established merely under the national law would not make the offence an extraditable one under Article 8 of the Hague and Montreal Convention. As far as international aviation terrorism is concerned 1988 Montreal Protocol and 1991 Convention on Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detention are added. The former deals with airport terrorism and the latter plastic explosives. Compared to the other International Terrorism Conventions, the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions do not have clauses of the passive personality principle. If the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions need to be revised in the future, those clauses containing the passive personality principle have to be inserted for the suppression of the international aviation terrorism more effectively. Article 3 of the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Article 5 of the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages and Article 6 of the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation would be models that the revised International Aviation Terrorism Conventions could follow in the future.

• Journal of the Korean Society for Aviation and Aeronautics
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• v.26 no.3
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• pp.55-65
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• 2018

The SBD systems have made it possible that all boarding procedures are completed by passengers. With the SBD, air tickets can be issued and baggage can be consigned without the help of airline officers. This way, the SBD can improve the passenger circulation speed as well as decrease the time for passengers to wait for check-in, which is connected to the reduction of airlines' operaitonal costs. However, given that the SBD is a new technology, it has potentials to be used as a tool for air terrorism. This study purposes to determine methods to enhance the security and operation of SBD systems. With the aim, this paper investigated the existing literature on SBDs, self-check-in, airport security, air terrorism, risk management, aviation accidents, and information security. In order to compile real-time information about the SBD operations, twelve airports in North America, Europe, and Asia were analyzed based on existing studies on international SBD trends.

• Journal of Advanced Navigation Technology
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.16-22
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• 2023

Terrorists have been attacking in the vulnerable points of aviation sector with the diverse methods of attacks. Recently, Vulnerability is increasing because the Modus Operandi of Terrorism is carried out by exploitation of people in the form of employee working in aviation sector whose role provides them with privileged access to secured locations, secured items or security sensitive information. Furthermore, cases of insider threat are rising across the world with the phenomenon of personal radicalization through internet and social network service. The government of ROK must respond to insider threat could exploit to acts of unlawful interference and the security regulations should be established to prevent from insider threat in advance refer to the acts of unlawful interference carried out in foreign countries and the recommendations by USA, UK and ICAO.

• Journal of Advanced Navigation Technology
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• v.21 no.6
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• pp.633-637
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• 2017

Cyber attacks on aircraft and aeronautical networks are not much different from cyber attacks commonly found in the ground industry. Air traffic management infrastructure is being transformed into a digital infrastructure to secure air traffic. A wide variety of communication environments, information and communications, navigation, surveillance and inflight entertainment systems are increasingly threatening the threat posed by cyber terrorism threats. The emergence of unmanned aircraft systems also poses an uncontrollable risk with cyber terrorism. We have analyzed cyber security standards and response strategies in developed countries by recognizing the vulnerability of cyber threats to aircraft systems and aviation infrastructure in next generation data network systems. We discussed comprehensive measures for cybersecurity policies to consider in the domestic aviation environment, and discussed the concept of security environment and quick response strategies.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.14
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• pp.9-85
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• 2001

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.29 no.2
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• pp.183-204
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• 2014

US 911 incidents have changed all aviation security system in the world. Especially the US changed all existing system into new one. One of the most fundamental changes is aviation security acts, regulation and several programmes. Based on the new aviation security act enacted in 2001, several code of federal regulations have been amended to strengthen US aviation security system. These regulation also enable new aviation security programmes including several airline and airport security related programmes, K-9 programme, BDO programme and air marshall programmed. All the programmes enables US aviation security improvements. Also the creating of TSA based on the aviation and transportation security act has provided the enhancement of aviation security in US. The purpose of this thesis is studying the change of aviation security system in the US especiatly in terms of aviation security legislation perfective and comparing the system with Korean aviation security legal system and provides possible solution to enhance Korean aviation security legislation and structure.

• Journal of the Korean Society for Aviation and Aeronautics
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• v.30 no.4
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• pp.117-131
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• 2022

Human rights education is to acquire understanding and knowledge about human rights, to develop values, attitudes and character that respect human rights, to develop the ability to overcome human rights violations and discriminatory acts, and to protect and promote the human rights of others. In order to prevent human rights violations of the transportation vulnerable, such as the disabled, it is necessary to develop specialized human rights education plans for aviation security personnel to practice human rights perspectives. Therefore, in accordance with the 「National Civil Aviation Security Education and Training Guidelines」, specialized human rights education should be included in the initial aviation security education and regular education courses. The point is that there is a need to reexamine the aviation security education program for aviation security personnel based on the essential knowledge and educational contents for aviation security personnel to perform security screening tasks in the aviation security education course. When this happens, various efforts must be made to improve the human rights of the transportation vulnerable, such as the disabled, during the security screening process, so that human rights violations will be significantly reduced. In particular, it is necessary to enhance the ability to detect dangerous terrorist items such as weapons or explosives that can be used for illegal sabotage through practical security screening training. For aviation security and aircraft safety, efforts to improve the quality of aviation security personnel training, such as human rights training, must be continuously made while thoroughly preparing for terrorism in advance.

• Journal of the Korean Society for Aviation and Aeronautics
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• v.29 no.2
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• pp.100-105
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• 2021

The purpose of this study is to provide in-flight security in situations where aviation security is constantly threatened by the increase in illegal interference in aircraft and the threat of terrorism that still exists. It is to identify legal operational problems such as education and qualification of the original system and to propose improvement measures. To this end, the need for revision based on relevant laws and guidelines such as "Operation Guidelines for In-Flight Security Officers" is to be discussed based on international standards such as ICAO and Federal Air Marshal. The research method was based on interviews with SEMs such as cabin managers, which focused on ensuring the legal status of In-Flight Security Officer, establishing relationships with captains, and improving education and training.