• Journal of the Korean Data and Information Science Society
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• v.28 no.2
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• pp.371-381
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• 2017

There has never been research on Chaos analysis using real estate auction sale price rate in Korea. In this study, three Chaos analysis methodologies - Hurst exponent, correlation dimension, and maximum Lyapunov exponent - in order to capture the nonlinear deterministic dynamic system characteristics. High level of Hurst exponent and the extremely low maximum Lyapunov exponent provide the tendency and the persistence of the data. The empirical results give two meaningful facts. First, monthly time lags of the correlation dimension are coincident with the time period from the approval auction start day to the sale price fixing day. Second, its weekly time lags correspond to the time period from the last day of request for sale price allocation to the sale price fixing day. Then, this study potentially examines the predictability of the real estate auction price rate time series.

• Journal of the Korea Society for Simulation
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• v.23 no.1
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• pp.1-10
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• 2014

A cloud computing is one of a parallel and distributed computing. The cloud computing provides some service for user with virtual resources. However, a user's service request does not show a time pattern. As a result, each resource also shows a different availability at the same time. This difference affects a quality of service (QoS) and a resource selection for users. Therefore, we propose the resource availability-based multi auction model for cloud service reservation and resource brokering system. The proposed system is to select the proper resource provider based on the users' request. The proposal adopts the multi phase of the auction to transact resources. The system evaluates the available factor of each resource on the auction phase, and finally reserves the service on the adaptive queue. The proposed model shows the better performance than other existing method.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.5A no.1
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• pp.85-92
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• 2005

In this paper, Nash equilibriums of generation markets are investigated using a game theory application for simplified competitive electricity markets. We analyze the characteristics of equilibrium states in N-company spot markets modeled by uniform pricing auctions and propose a new method for obtaining Nash equilibriums of the auction. We assume that spot markets are operated as uniform pricing auctions and that each generation company submits its bids into the auction in the form of a seal-bid. Depending on the bids of generation companies, market demands are allocated to each company accordingly. The uniform pricing auction in this analysis can be formulated as a non-cooperative and static game in which generation companies correspond to players of the game. The coefficient of the bidding function of company-n is the strategy of player-n (company-n) and the payoff of player-n is defined as its profit from the uniform price auction. The solution of this game can be obtained using the concept of the non-cooperative equilibrium originating from the Nash idea. Based on the so called residual demand curve, we can derive the best response function of each generation company in the uniform pricing auction with N companies, analytically. Finally, we present an efficient means to obtain all the possible equilibrium set pairs and to examine their feasibilities as Nash equilibriums. A simple numerical example with three generation companies is demonstrated to illustrate the basic idea of the proposed methodology. From this, we can see the applicability of the proposed method to the real-world problem, even though further future analysis is required.

• Korean Journal of Agricultural Science
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• v.46 no.3
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• pp.461-469
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• 2019

The aim of this study was to analyze the contribution of carcass traits (backfat thickness, eye muscle area, carcass weight and marbling score) and the season at slaughter to the price (auction and market) using squared semi-partial correlation. The season at slaughter (summer expressed as season_2, autumn as season_3, and winter as season_4) were added into the estimation as dummy variables, and spring was set as a default variable. In this study, the carcass grades of 22,298 Hanwoo steers slaughtered from 2012 to 2017 were used to performmultiple regression analysis. The rankings of the contribution of the carcass traits and the seasons at slaughter to the auction prices were in the order of marbling score (68.63%), season_4 (11.88%), backfat thickness (10.45%), eye muscle area (6.11%), season_3 (2.19%), season_2 (0.45%) and carcass weight (0.28%). (R-square of the regression = 0.4101). The rankings of the contribution to the total prices were in the order of carcass weight (51.74%), marbling score (32.12%), season_4 (6.04%), backfat thickness (5.54%), eye muscle area (3.22%), season_3 (1.14%), and season_2 (0.19%). (R-Square of the regression = 0.6486). As a result, season_3 and season_4 had a negative effect on the auction price and total price. Because of seasonal event such as Korean Thanksgiving Day and Korean New Year's Day on season_3 and season_4, much supply was needed to meet the high demand. Thus, the seasonal effect at slaughter could be another factor to be cosideredin when considering of slaughter or breeding.

• Journal of Families and Better Life
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• v.25 no.2 s.86
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• pp.123-135
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• 2007

This study investigated the influence of values associated with internet auctions and risks associated with participating in internet auctions. The results of this study were as follows: First, the values associated with internet auctions consisted of hedonic value, information value, and practical value. Among these values, hedonic value was the highest, and information value was the lowest. Second, He risks consisted of functional risk, privacy risk, socio-psychological risk, md financial risk. Among these risks, functional risk was the highest, and socio-psychological risk was the lowest. Results of regression analysis using demographic elements to inspect risk factors revealed sex, age, and income were statistically significant finally, with respect to demographic characteristics and influences of the aforementioned values and risks, the factors influencing participation in internet auctions were sex, age, hedonic value, functional risk and financial risk.

• Proceedings of the Korean Information Science Society Conference
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• 1999.10b
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• pp.87-89
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• 1999

웹 상에서 인터넷 경매시스템은 일반적인 경매처럼 상품을 제시하고 그 상품에 대해 경매 입찰자가 입찰(bid)을 제시함으로 해서 최종적으로 경매 시간 내에 가장 높은 입찰을 제시하는 경매 입찰자에게 상품이 낙찰되는 형식이 사용되고 있다. 하지만 사용자 인터페이스 부분에 있어서 편리성을 고려하지 않을 뿐만 아니라 경매 참여자에게 지속적인 입찰제와 확인 등의 여러 가지의 사용자 행위를 요구함으로 인해 전자상거래의 고객 편의를 위한 One-step processing을 만족시키지 못하고 있다. 미시건 대학의 AuctionBot 시스템은 미국의 대표적인 인터넷 경매 시스템으로 여러 형태의 경매를 수용할 수 있다는 면에서 장점을 가지고 있지만 사용자를 위한 지능적인 에이전트를 이용한 사용자 인터페이스 부분은 거의 고려하지 않은 시스템이므로 사용자의 편의성 면에서 단점을 가지고 있다. 따라서 본 논문은 지능적 에이전트를 이용해 사용자가 상품 정보를 경매 서버로 보내면 에이전트가 자동적으로 사용자를 위해 모든 처리를 해주는 경매 시스템을 구현하여 기존에 사용되었던 일반적인 경매 시스템의 단점을 보완하여 효율적인 입찰 가격 정책을 이용한 경매 시스템을 구현하고자 한다.

• Proceedings of the IEEK Conference
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• 2000.06b
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• pp.213-216
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• 2000

Minimum-cost linear network flow problems could be transformed with equal to assignment problems. Traditional method to solve the linear network flow problems are improved source-cost by transform the simple cycle flow. Auction algorithm could be applied to same element using the initial target price and dispersion calculation. Also, each elements are obtained by $\varepsilon$-relaxation methods. In this paper we proposed; 1)minimum-cost flow problem, 2)minimum-cost flow problem by the mathematical equivalent and 3) extraction $\varepsilon$-relaxation & expand transfer problem with minimum-cost flow. It can be applicant to PCB design by above mentioned.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.32 no.3
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• pp.200-209
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• 2006

Load building is an important step to make the delivery supply chain efficient. We present a family of load makeup algorithms using market based control strategy, named LoadMarket, in order to build efficient loads where each load consists of a certain number of finished products having destinations. LoadMarket adopts Clark-Wright algorithm for generating initial endowment for Load Traders who cooperate to minimize either total travel distance or the variance with respect to the travel distances of loads by means of the spot market or double-sided auction market mechanism. The efficiency of the LoadMarket algorithms is illustrated using simulation based experiments.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.34 no.1
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• pp.85-100
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• 2009

An online marketplace, such as eBay, is an example of two-sided markets. In online marketplaces, there are transactions between sellers and buyers and direct competition effects among sellers and among buyers. Previous research on two-sided market has not handle these competition effects and mostly focused on indirect network externalities between sellers and buyers. We analyze the fee structure of an online marketplace considering direct competition effects among sellers and among buyers. We find that when fees for sellers and buyers can be imposed, an auction or fixed-pricing rule can be chosen according to the characteristics of a product traded. But when only fees for sellers can be imposed, an auction can be taken as a trading mechanism solely.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.6
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• pp.333-339
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• 2003

Competition among electric generation companies is a major goal of restructuring in the electricity industry. In electricity market, a huge volume of commodities will be traded through competitive bidding. The choice between uniform and pay-as-bid pricing for electricity auction has been one of most important issues in deregulated electricity market. This paper proposes a constrained Bertrand model for analyzing the electricity auction market of price competition model. The issue of the two pricing rules of uniform and pay-as-bid is studied from the viewpoint of consumer's benefit. This paper also shows that transmission congestion depends on the pricing mechanism. Pay-as-bid pricing gives less possibility of transmission congestion by price competition, and less burden to consumers in the simulation results.