• Journal of Advanced Navigation Technology
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• v.25 no.5
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• pp.344-356
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• 2021

In the field of civil aviation in Korea, inappropriate crew resources management(CRM) constantly occurs between captains and first officers during flight. Therefore, the active role of first officers is emphasized in pilot training for CRM, threat & error management(TEM), safety management system(SMS), fatigue risk management system(FRMS), and training in simulators. Thus, it is urgent for captains to change their transformational leadership to emotional leadership, advantages of which include horizontal interpersonal relationship, open-mindedness, leading by example, considerateness, mutual respect, and using informal language. For the direction to improve 'the cockpit culture' in civil aviation, the key idea of the current thesis paper is the influence of captains' transformational and emotional leadership on the emotions of first officers.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.33 no.2
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• pp.199-224
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• 2018

Aviation's safety record continues to improve yearly, especially with respect to passenger and crew injuries and deaths. However, although the number of accidents has decreased over the decades, there are still many events, such as landings short of the runway and runway excursions, both of which pose threats to passenger and crew safety. Surviving any kind of aviation accident depends on the physiological threat and stress of the impact(s), the extent to which the physical structure surrounding the passengers and crew remains intact, and the ability of the passengers and crew to be able to escape the wreckage. The one action that both passengers and crew can carry out to help decrease the likelihood of crash-related injury or death is to assume an emergency brace position. Doing so has been demonstrated over several decades to improve survivability. While cabin crew are taught (and then might have to teach passengers in an emergency about the emergency brace position), passengers in many parts of the world never learn about the brace position unless they are involved in an emergency in which there is time to prepare for the landing. This lack of provision of information is related to the fact that most airlines do not provide information in the preflight safety briefing and some do not even provide the information in the passenger safety cards. Many countries do not require their airlines to do so, a fact, which in turn, is related to the lack of mention of the brace position in ICAO's Annex 6. Until standards and recommended practices are changed at the highest world level, passengers will continue to be deprived of this vital, life-saving information that they can use, potentially to help save their own lives.

• Journal of Advanced Navigation Technology
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• v.24 no.6
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• pp.515-520
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• 2020

The development of autopilot system and flight management system (FMS) equipment in today's aircraft navigation can be attributed to the reduction of pilots' workload and the navigation safety. The effect of autopilot and FMS equipment is greater, especially in heavy airport traffic or complicated of the departure. However, some airport specific departure procedures result in an uncommanded turn event due to an error in the FMS, causing aircraft to deviate from the center line of the route. With most departure procedures requiring area navigation (RNAV) operation, pilot situation awareness and corrective action are the only ways to minimize aircraft deviation to maintain the safety of area navigation. Through analysis of the occurrence status of the uncommended turn event by aircraft type, airport and flight phase, and comparative analysis of the survey results of foreign airlines and the airlines self-reduction plan with the aircraft manufacturer's corrective action, it is intended to give implications for the need for more fundamental measures to prevent recurrence of such events.

• The Journal of Economics, Marketing and Management
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• v.6 no.4
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• pp.1-16
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• 2018

Purpose - This study will investigate and identify the relationship between brand image, brand attitude and intent to purchase based on subjects that have remembered or watched more than one storytelling marketing ad related to airlines. The purpose of the project is to secure market competitiveness by presenting the basis for and use of the marketing strategy using storytelling, which can capture the goodwill of the aerospace competition market in the future. Research, design, data, and methodology - Prior to the research model and hypothesis testing phase, a verification factor analysis was conducted to assess internal consistency among each measurement item and to ensure reliability and validity of the measurement tool. Further, the organization was assessed for validity by calculating the mean variance estimation (AVE) and the construction concept reliability (CCR) through a positive factor analysis. Hypothesis verification was analyzed through a structural equation model, and each concept set in the hypothesis was entered as a potential variable, and each measurement item was entered as an observation variable. Results - Airline's storytelling marketing has a significant impact on the brand image and two emotional and cognitive responses have been shown to influence the brand image. In addition, airline storytelling marketing has a significant impact on brand attitudes and airline storytelling marketing derived from factor analysis has shown two emotional and cognitive responses to brand attitudes. Conclusions - The parts derived based on the research results show that storytelling marketing has a strong influence on the airline's brand image and attitude, and that it is necessary for airlines to have a brand image and attitude. Also, forming a favorable brand image has a significant impact on brand attitudes. We believe that by presenting basic data to the aviation industry in future research on airline storytelling, we will be able to increase understanding and contribution to development of storytelling marketing in aviation.

• Journal of Advanced Navigation Technology
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• v.27 no.5
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• pp.534-539
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• 2023

Currently, in Korea, to obtain a jet type rating, you must receive training on a small business jet model. The reason is because of the law in the Aviation Safety Act Enforcement Rules 『Appendix 4』 that states, "You must receive at least 2 hours of flight training." In the end, it is acquiring type rating as a small business jet aircraft with relatively low operating costs. The qualifications acquired in this way are different from those for aircraft operated by airlines. However, if you have an initial jet type rating, you can acquire an airline aircraft qualification just by training on a simulator, so airlines want you to have at least a small-jet type rating. However, in the United States and Australia, there is a system in place to acquire initial jet type rating through simulator training without actual flight training.

• Journal of the Korea Society of Computer and Information
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• v.29 no.6
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• pp.201-209
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• 2024

The COVID-19 pandemic has significantly impacted the aviation industry, leading to worldwide changes in travel restrictions and security measures. This study analyzes 59,818 reviews of 147 airlines from the SKYTRAX website between 2016 and 2023 to understand the changes in airline service satisfaction before and after the pandemic. Using sentiment analysis, the study compares overall satisfaction, review sentiment, and attributes influencing satisfaction. The results show a statistically significant (p<0.001) decrease in overall satisfaction post-COVID-19, with reduced positive sentiment and increased negative sentiment for all airline selection attributes, except cabin and in-flight services. Flight operation services had the most significant impact on overall satisfaction during both periods. This quantitative analysis of global major airlines' satisfaction attributes before and after COVID-19 contributes to enhancing future service satisfaction in the airline industry.

• Journal of Advanced Navigation Technology
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• v.28 no.1
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• pp.87-94
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• 2024

Despite the development of the aviation industry, aircraft accidents due to pilots' human errors continue to occur. The cause of aircraft accidents due to human errors is that they cannot remove hazard factors that hinder flight safety in advance, leading to accidents. This study examined how job stress, fatigue, and anxiety, which psychologically and physically affect flight safety among various hazard factors, affect pilots' safety behavior for flight crew and pilots of general aviation working in domestic airlines. In addition, an empirical analysis was conducted to confirm the mediating effect of safety culture between job stress and safety behavior. According to the results of the study, job stress not only directly affects the safety behavior of pilots, but also affects the safety culture of airlines such as safety atmosphere and reporting culture. The purpose of this study is to improve the performance of the safety management system through the correlation between the pilot's job stress and safety culture and safety behavior.

• Journal of Advanced Navigation Technology
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• v.28 no.2
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• pp.185-192
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• 2024

The aviation has improved safety through technological innovation and strengthened flight safety through safety regulations and supervision by aviation authorities. As the industry's safety approach has evolved into a systematic approach to the aircraft system, airlines have established a safety management system. Technical defects or abnormal data in an aircraft can be warning signs that could lead to an accident, and the risk of an accident can be reduced by identifying and responding to these signs early. Therefore, management of abnormal warning signs is an essential element in promoting data-based decision-making and enhancing the operational efficiency and safety level of airlines. In this study, we present a model to statistically analyze quick access recorder (QAR) flight data in the preliminary analysis stage to analyze the patterns and causes of crab landing events that can lead to runway departures when landing an aircraft, and provide a precursor to a landing event. We aim to identify signs and causes and contribute to increasing the efficiency of safety management.

• Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
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• v.25 no.5
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• pp.125-133
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• 2007

Through open-sky policy, USA and European selected market principle of multiuser. However, in Asian case, major airlines monopolize airports. It is purpose that analyzes fare competition of Asian Hub Airport and the position of Incheon airport in Asia. Passengers required longer time and distance to go to the destination because direct flights decreases. But passengers increased in airport every year. Because of routes that decrease, airlines provide more services of flights. So airlines prefer to Hub Airports. As a result, both passengers and airlines are profitable by various routs and the increased frequency. On the assumption that distance and fare are related, the final formula is as following that defined the air fare from hub(H) to destination(Z) by logarithm. Analysis showed that log Rdist is not 1 but 0.08. As distance increases, fare doesn't increase. If distance from hub to destination airports is longer, Log dist_HZ is negative. It is that fare decreases from origin to destination via hub or that fare increases from hub to destination. HHI_HZ and HHI_AZ are negative. It means that if the degree of monopolization of hub and origin airports is lager, fare decreases from origin to destination via hub. Or fare increases from hub to destination. And it compares the Incheon airport with the other Asian hub airports and it examines the competitive fare by market division. As compared with the Incheon airport, Singapore, Beijing and Narita airports are higher fares. They compete with the other ones by Asian hub airports. But Hong Kong and Taipei airports must have more passengers through fare competition yet.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.23 no.2
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• pp.137-172
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• 2008

The earliest safety data programs, the FDR and CVR, were electronic reporting systems that generate data "automatically." The FDR program, originally instituted in 1958, had no publicly available restrictions for protections against sanctions by the FAA or an airline, although there are agreements and union contracts forbidding the use of FDR data for FAA enforcement actions. This FDR program still has the least formalized protections. With the advent of the CVR program in 1966, the precursor to the current FAR 91.25 was already in place, having been promulgated in 1964. It stated that the FAA would not use CVR data for enforcement actions. In 1982, Congress began restricting the disclosure of the CVR tape and transcripts. Congress added further clarification of the availability of discovery in civil litigation in 1994. Thus, the CVR data have more definitive protections in place than do FDR data. The ASRS was the first non-automatic reporting system; and built into its original design in 1975 was a promise of limited protection from enforcement sanctions. That promise was further codified in an FAR in 1979. As with the CVR, from its inception, the ASRS had some protections built in for the person who might have had a safety problem. However, the program did not (and to this day does not) explicitly deal with issues of use by airlines, litigants, or the public media, although it appears that airlines will either take a non-punitive stance if an ASRS report is filed, or the airline may ignore the fact that it has been filed at all. The FAA worked with several U.S. airlines in the early 1990s on developing ASAP programs, and the FAA issued an Advisory Circular about the program in 1997. From its inception, the ASAP program contained some FAA enforcement protections and company discipline protections, although some protection against litigation disclosure and public disclosure was not added until 2003, when FAA Order 8000.82 was promulgated, placing the program under the protections of FAR 193, which had been added in 2001. The FOQA program, when it was first instituted through a demonstration program in 1995, did not contain protections against sanctions. Now, however, the FAA cannot take enforcement action based on FOQA safety data, and an airline is limited to "corrective action" under the program. Union contracts can exclude FOQA from the realm of disciplinary action, although airline practice may be for airlines to require retraining if there is no contract in place forbidding it. The data is protected against disclosure for litigation and public media purposes by FAA Order 8000.81, issued in 2003, which placed FOQA under the protections of FAR 193. The figure on the next page shows when each program began, and when each statute, regulation, or order became effective for that program.