• Journal of Technology Innovation
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• v.17 no.1
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• pp.149-177
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• 2009

Today, the phase of modem war is very different from past war. That is, the winning of war depends on the ability to obtain information and high technology. The purposes of this research are to propose an effective R&D governance model in national defense sector and to present R&D strategy for obtaining core national defense technology. As a part of collaborative innovation, the strategy to exchange R&D results actively between the defense sector and the private sector will be discussed. The main contribution of this research is dearly defining the concept of R&D governance in national defense sector and applying it to an actual case. The national defense R&D governance model proposed in this paper is based on the characteristics of national defense R&D which are different from other industries. The analysis of business success factors for national defense R&D through the T-50 case study is presented in detail. The T-50 case study reveals the importance of strategic intent, core technology knowledge base, organizational structure, and project management.

• The Journal of Society for e-Business Studies
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• v.20 no.2
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• pp.27-36
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• 2015

Current leakage of industrial technologies with revealing state secret against nation is gradually increasing and scope of the spill is diversified from technology-oriented leakage to new economic security sector like information and communication, electrical and electronic, defense industry, illegal export of strategic material, economic order disturbance by foreign country, infringement of intellectual property, etc. So the spill damage can affect not only leaked company but also national interests and entire domestic industry. According to statistics from National Industrial Security Center of National Intelligence Service, a major cause of technology leakage is not only by external things about hacking and malignant code, but internal leakage of former and current employees account for about 80%. And technology leakage due to temptation of money and personal interests followed by technology leakage of subcontractor is steadily increased. Most studies in the field of security have tended to focus on measuring security capability of company in order to prevent leakage core assets or developing measurement Indicators for management rather than security activities of the company members that is most important. Therefore, this study analyzes the effect of most underlying security education in security activities on security capabilities of enterprise. As a result, it indicates that security education have a positive(+) correlation with security capabilities.

• Strategy21
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• s.41
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• pp.333-370
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• 2017

북한의 SLBM 위협이 대한민국 안보에 미치는 영향에 대해 그동안 많은 논의가 있어 왔지만, 북의 잠수함에서 발사하는 탄도미사일이 보유한 진정한 위협에 대한 인식은 아직도 부족한 듯하다. 그 이유는 대부분의 논의가 북 SLBM 기술의 성숙도와 완성시기 등 기술적 수준에 관심이 치우쳐져 있기 때문이다. 핵전략과 억제전략의 관점에서 본다면 북한의 SLBM 개발은 한미동맹의 제1격에 대한 완벽한 제2격 능력 보유에 그 핵심이 있다. 즉 향후 개발될 북한의 SLBM은 평양 김정은 정권의 생존을 보장할 직접적이고 핵심적인 전력이 될 것이다. 이는 궁극적으로 한미 군사동맹과 북한의 현 군사력 균형을 깨뜨리고 앞으로 북의 군사도발 가능성을 더욱 높이는 결과를 가지고 올 것이다. 북의 핵전략은 현재 확증보복(assured retaliation) 단계로 발전하고 있으며, 결국에는 전쟁에 사용될 전술적 핵무기 능력(war-fighting capability)을 갖게 될 것이다. 이에 대한민국 해군은 우리의 강점을 활용하여 적의 약점을 공략할 수 있는 상쇄전략(offset strategy)을 개발하여야 한다. 북한의 현 제한된 잠수함 기술력과 대잠작전 능력을 고려할 때 한국해군은 수중영역에서의 공세적 대잠전(offensive ASW) 개념을 보다 발전시켜야만 할 것이다. 이는 미 해군이 냉전기간 중 소련해군 핵추진전략잠수함(SSBN) 대응을 위해 발전시킨 전략대잠전(strategic ASW) 개념에서 교훈을 얻을 수 있다. 미 해군은 소련 해군의 SSBN 을 억제하기 위해 공세적인 전략대잠전을 수행했고 그 결과 소련해군은 자국의 연안에서 벗어나지 못하는 요새전략(bastion strategy)를 추구할 수밖에 없었다. 당시 미 해군의 전략대잠전은 공격잠수함(SSN), 대잠초계기, 수중 탐지체계(SOSUS), 공격기뢰 등의 전력으로 구성되었다. 따라서 북한 SLBM 에 대한 한국해군의 전략개념은 북의 핵전략(제 2 격능력)을 억제하는 방향으로 정립되어야 하며, 이를 위한 해군력 건설은 대잠전 능력 강화에 초점을 맞추어야 한다. 우리 해군은 장기적으로 핵추진잠수함을 비롯하여 성능이 향상된 대잠초계기, 한반도 해역을 중심으로 한 미 해군의 SOSUS 와 유사한 수중탐지장비 그리고 장시간 수중작전이 가능한 무인잠수정(UUV)을 도입해야만 한다. 단기적으로는 현재 추진되고 있는KAMD 체계에 SM-3 를 보유한 이지스함을 포함시켜, 북 SLBM 에 대한 요격능력을 강화해야 할 것이다. 한미동맹은 북 핵전략의 핵심전력인 SLBM 개발에 대한 위협인식을 공유해야만 하다. 작전적 수준에서는 양국 해군 간 대잠전 및 대유도탄전 작전운용성 증대에 우선순위를 두고, 기존의 한미 간 연합작전능력 강화뿐 아니라 위기시를 대비하여 미일 간 구축되어 있는 대잠전 및 대유도탄전 능력도 활용할 필요가 있을 것이다.

• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.93-112
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• 2018

The Pyeongchang 2018 Olympic Winter Games is a good example of functionalism in integration theories. President Moon Jae-in is extremely lucky to play host to the Winter Olympics. Moon should be particularly happy to have declared the 23rd Winter Games open, because a handful of North Korean athletes marched into the Pyeongchang Stadium as members of a joint team from "Corea," the result of his strenuous efforts to have the North participate in the world festival of sports on snow and ice. But the president of this divided nation hardly draws envy from other world leaders, as he is faced with the daunting task of accommodating the selfish positions of surrounding powers concerning North Korean nuclear and missile threats. North Korea, a trivial competitor in winter sports, scored big outside the games' sporting arenas by inviting President Moon to summit talks in Pyongyang. As a precondition for a 2018 summit, Pyongyang will first ask for the cessation of the annual joint Korea-US military exercises. President Moon invested a lot in the Olympic delegates from the North. Korea's leader will now have to start a truly difficult game which will require the best of best strategies as well as a great deal of wisdom and tenacity not only to deal with the weapons of mass destruction-toting North Koreans, but also with allies. On the other hand, Moon needs to make the effort to reset domestic politics with tolerance and compromise, so he can better concentrate on the conundrum of North Korean nuclear and missile threats.

• Strategy21
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• s.37
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• pp.242-274
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• 2015

2015년 5월 수중발사 탄도미사일(SLBM) 발사시험을 통해 북한은 전 세계의 이목을 또 다시 집중시켰다. 북한은 2013년 제3차 핵실험을 감행한 이후 최근까지도 탄도미사일과 로켓 발사 등의 무력도발을 지속해 왔다. 이와 같은 북한의 무력도발은 한반도의 안정뿐만 아니라 미국 본토의 안보에도 매우 부정적인 영향을 미치고 있다. 지금까지 미국은 북한의 핵미사일 개발 저지를 위해 경제적 또는 군사적 방안들을 선별적으로 적용해 왔다. 그러나, 이러한 미국의 노력에도 불구하고 북한은 여전히 핵미사일을 개발하겠다는 꿈을 포기하지 않고 있는 것이 사실이다. 본 논문은 북한의 핵미사일 개발에 대한 미국의 대안적 전략(Alternative Strategy)을 제시하는데 그 목적이 있다. 필자는 대안적 전략 제시에 앞서 북한의 핵과 탄도미사일 개발현황을 내용(Contents)과 맥락(Context) 차원에서 분석하고 미 오바마 행정부의 대북전략을 비판적으로 검토하였다. 그리고 대안적 전략으로 동맹국과 함께 경제적(Sticky Power), 군사적(Sharp Power) 수단의 동기화(Synchronizing)를 통해 북한이 감당하기 힘든 전략적 환경을 조성(Shaping the Strategic Environment)하는 것이 '북한의 핵개발 포기' 라는 전략목표를 달성하는 방안 임을 강조하고 있다. 미국이 대안적 전략목표를 달성하기 위해서는 경제적 수단으로 ① 북한의 자금세탁 및 위조지폐 발행국 지정, ② 북한을 지원하는 모든 해외자산에 대한 제재조치, ③ 북한의 테러지원국 재지정, ④ 북한 제재를 위한 미국의 입법추진, ⑤ 대량살상무기 관련 금수품목의 확대를 적용함과 동시에 군사적 수단으로 ① 대량살상무기 비확산 활동 강화, ② 대탄도미사일 전략 개발 및 정보(ISR: Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance) 공유, 맞춤형 억제전략(TDS: Tailored Deterrence Strategy)의 구체화 등을 통한 한·미 군사 억제방안의 강화, 그리고 ③ SM-3, THAAD(Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) 등 한·미·일 3자간 MD(Missile Defense)체제의 구축 등을 동기화하여 적용해야만 할 것이다. 미국의 대안적 전략은 ① 북한의 핵미사일 개발에 대한 중국의 협력방지, ② 한·중간 경제관계의 악화, ③ 한·일간의 역사적 긴장관계라는 위험요소를 내포하고 있는 것 또한 사실이다. 따라서 미국이 대안적 전략목표인 '북한의 비핵화' 달성을 위해서는 이와 같은 위험요소를 완화시키는 노력도 병행되어야 할 것이다. 끝으로, 미국은 북한의 김정은이 핵미사일 개발 포기라는 상이한 방향의 전략적 결정을 할 경우에 대비하여 한·미 연합훈련의 보류, 북한에 대한 경제제재조치 해제 등 북한과의 협상 가능성도 열어두고 이에 대해서도 철저하게 준비해 나가야 할 것이다.

• International Area Studies Review
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.311-368
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• 2009

In order to survive the on-going natural resource war, Korea needs various efforts such as enhancing self-exploitation ratio, increasing the supply of new-reuse energy, strengthening cooperation with resource rich countries. Central Asian countries are geometrically far away from Korea. However, Korea should try to develop political, economic and ethnic relationship with those countries into much higher dimension to secure various natural resources. Major countries including U.S., EU. Japan and China are approaching Central Asian countries with long term perspective. Improving country-image through enlargement of ODA is the first concern of those countries. Korea should try to follow their practices. Government should try to improve Korea's image in the first place and lead economic cooperation with very detailed supportive measures to induce Korean firms' investment into the Central Asian countries. In the due process, a lot of information about those countries' political climate, social situation, ethnical composition, major religions, educational system, current state and structure of economies and industries, etc should be made available to Korean firms.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.21 no.1
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• pp.201-208
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• 2021

The purpose of this study is to investigate reunification perception among groups with different cognitive bias(anchoring bias) through empirical studies. This study assumes that cognitive bias occurs according to the content of N. Korea provided in school education, and that the cognitive bias formed in youth creates a difference in perception of N. Korea and reunification. For empirical study, a survey of reunification awareness conducted by the Institute for Peace an Unification Studies-Seoul National University was used, and the two groups are divided into A-group that chose "anti-communism or security" and B-group that did "reunification interests, multi-culturalism and understanding North Korea" according to N. Korea content which was encountered in school education during adolescence. A-group recognized N. Korea as a hostile target even after becoming an adult, while B-group regarded N. Korea as a one of dialogue and cooperation. This analysis illustrates the existence of cognitive bias between the two groups because of N. Korea content which was given in school education. A-group had a lower percentage than B-group in terms of the benefits of reunification to S. Korea and the need for more dialogue and compromise with N. Korea. However, there was no difference between two groups in terms of acceptance of N. Korean defectors. This research result could be a reference to the direction of school education policies relating to reunification in that early school education affects reunification awareness and perception related with N. Korea even in adulthood.

• Maritime Security
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.1-42
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• 2021

Controversy continues over the offensive nature of China's naval strategy to become a maritime power. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to identify the characteristics of China's naval strategy to become a maritime power by using the three elements of strategy and predict China's military actions in the future. For this purpose, research was conducted by considering the three elements of strategy and the distinct characteristics of naval strategy, and it was found that China's naval strategy was overall aggressive, but there was an imbalance in the pursuit of aggression between each strategic element. Offensive nature was prominent in terms of the methods, but there were limitations in the goals and means, such as the need to cooperate with neighboring countries to become a maritime power and the lack of military technology and operational continuity. The prospects for China's future military actions derived from the imbalance between these strategic elements are as follows. ① The risk of all-out military conflict with the US is low for now. ② China may use its naval power to force or cause limited military clashes against neighboring countries within the first island chain. ③ Accidental military conflicts with the US and neighboring countries may occur over naval confrontation over territorial disputes.

• Journal of International Area Studies (JIAS)
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• v.14 no.3
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• pp.421-440
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• 2010

This paper examines middle powers' ODA policy in the post cold war era and discusses its implication for Korean aid strategy. Middle powers' ODA has been more successful than that of super powers in promoting donors' positive images and in stimulating recipient countries' development. Middle powers tend to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems often by taking a mediator role, and their ODA policies set them apart from the great players in international politics. Middle powers' ODA is primarily aimed at reducing poverty and protecting human rights in least developed countries where humanitarian aid needs the most rather than promoting donors' interests. Also, middle powers have provided bilateral untied aid in the sectors of food aid and emergency relief and steadily devoted about 0.7% of their gross national income to ODA. Meanwhile, Korea as an emerging middle power and a new donor has been implementing its own aid strategy under the name of the Korean development model since the post cold war period. The Korean ODA was not successful in building donors' positive images by simply following the short term strategies of US and Japan. Yet, its ODA policy has been quite effective in sustaining local development by creating specific niches in which the country can specialize in. In specific, Korea has focused on developing the sectors of information and communication technology and industry energy in recipients' countries by maximizing its comparative advantage.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.23 no.4
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• pp.141-151
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• 2023

Since the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, European countries have cut defense costs and reduced armaments as an era of peace without large-scale wars continues, and as a result, the West's defense industry base has gradually weakened. On the other hand, South Korea, the world's only divided country, was able to achieve high growth in the defense industry as a result of continuous arms strengthening in the face of North Korea's nuclear and missile threats. With the rapid increase in demand for conventional weapons systems and changes in the structure of the global defense market due to the Russia-Ukraine war, Korea's weapons system drew great attention as a large-scale defense export contract with Poland was signed in 2022. In 2023, K-Defense ranked ninth in the world's arms exports and aims to become the world's fourth-largest defense exporter by 2027. Therefore, this study analyzed the case of Korea-Poland defense exports to derive problems, and presented development strategies related to export revitalization of K-Defense, a national strategic industry. In order for the defense industry to become Korea's next growth engine, it is necessary to establish a defense organization, prepare government-level measures to protect defense industry technology, and expand military and security cooperation with allies linked to defense exports.