

# North Korean Nuclear & Ballistic Missile Threats and U.S. Strategy: Shaping the Strategic Environment by Synchronizing Sticky and Sharp Power with Allies

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## I . Introduction

*In war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory – Sun Tzu*

The shocking news that Pyongyang had successfully test-fired a submarine-launched ballistic missile thrust North Korea into the world's spotlight again.<sup>1)</sup> Despite the international community's warnings and sanctions, North Korea continues to commit provocative actions, including nuclear and ballistic missile tests.<sup>2)</sup> Since its third nuclear test in 2013, Pyongyang has committed ballistic missile and rocket provocations ever more frequently up to 2015. These provocations negatively impact not only the stability of the Korean peninsula and the Northeast Asian region but also U.S. homeland security.

Most current studies on North Korean nuclear and missile threats focus on the viability of economic sanctions or military deterrent options as means to solve these problems.<sup>3)</sup> These studies have found fault with the incentive-oriented approach which has failed for several decades, but provide several options for preventing North Korea from pursuing nuclear and ballistic programs. Economic sanctions or military deterrent options, however, are not sufficient to deal with the overarching North Korean threat if those options are not synchronized with each other. To

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1) James Hardy, "North Korean SLBM Test Leaves More Questions Than Answers," *IHS Jane's Defence Weekly*, May 12, 2015, <http://www.janes.com/article/51356/north-korean-slbm-test-leaves-more-questions-than-answers>.

2) Anna Fifield, "North Korea, Angry over Human Rights Pressures, Threatens Another Nuclear Test," *The Washington Post*, November 20, 2014.

3) House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific Hearing, "The Shocking Truth about North Korean Tyranny," Testimony by Bruce Klingner, The Heritage Foundation Congressional Documents and Publications, March 26, 2014; Hwee-rhak Park, "Options and Preparations for South Korea against the Threat of North Korean Nuclear Missile Attack," *Journal of National Defense Studies*, Vol 56 No. 1, March 2, 2013.

deal with North Korea effectively, the United States needs to shape the strategic environment by synchronizing all possible economic and military options that can influence the North Korean regime's strategic choices, since its young leader Kim Jong-un has still not given up his dream of acquiring nuclear ballistic missiles.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the Obama administration's strategy for addressing North Korean nuclear and missile threats and to recommend an alternative strategy for the desired end state: North Korea's denuclearization. Emphasis will be on shaping the strategic environment with the United States synchronizing "Sticky and Sharp Power" options alongside its allies.<sup>4)</sup> Walter Russell Mead divides hard power into "Sticky Power" and "Sharp Power" in his book *Power, Terror, Peace, and War: American Grand Strategy in a World at Risk*; the former refers to economic power, and the latter to military power. The framework for the research is depicted below Picture The risks of applying this alternative strategy and negotiations to North Korea will also be considered.




Figure 1. Research Framework

4) Walter Russell Mead, *Power, Terror, Peace, and War: America's Grand Strategy in World at Risk*, (New York: A division of Random House), 2004, 26-36.

## II. North Korean Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Threats: Content and Context

North Korea has likely made greater progress than is commonly believed in warhead miniaturization, the ability to place nuclear weapons on its existing missiles, and basic capabilities to attack the U.S. homeland. The United States, South Korea, and Japan face a greater threat today than just a few years ago.<sup>5)</sup> Determining what constitutes the content and context of North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile capability is a necessary first step in deriving an alternative U.S. strategy for dealing with them.

### 1. Content: Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Capability

North Korea began its plutonium-based nuclear program in the 1960s. Even as North Korea signed several agreements never to pursue a nuclear weapons program, it started in the late 1980s to develop a second, parallel path to acquire nuclear weapons using enriched uranium.<sup>6)</sup> Since then, Pyongyang has conducted nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, and most recently, in February 2013. North Korea continues to develop its nuclear infrastructure and could conduct additional tests at any time. Pyongyang revealed a uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon, which is possibly used to produce highly enriched uranium for weapons purposes, and in April 2013, announced its intent to re-start and refurbish its

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5) Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Military and Security Developments Involving The Democratic People's Republic of Korea," *Annual Report to Congress*, 2013, 10–11.

6) "North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Programs," International Crisis Group Asia Report N°168, June 18, 2009, <http://www.crisisgroup.org>; Smith R. Jeffrey and Warrick Jobby, "Pakistan scientist depicts more advanced nuclear program in North Korea," *The Washington Post*, December 28, 2009.

plutonium-based nuclear facilities.<sup>7)</sup> In April 2015, Admiral Samuel Locklear, Commander of Pacific Command, and General Curtis M. Scaparrotti, commander of U.S. Forces Korea, testified to the Senate Armed Service Committee (SASC) that North Korea has the ability to fit a nuclear warhead on the KN-08, a long-range missile capable of hitting the U.S. mainland.<sup>8)</sup>

With regard to ballistic missile programs, North Korea began development in the 1970s and had tested a ballistic missile by 1984. Pyongyang then extrapolated this technology to build an extended-range Scud (SRBM), No Dong (MRBM), Musudan (IRBM), and Taepodong (ICBM) missiles. Since early 2012, North Korea has made efforts to raise the public profile of its ballistic missile command, called the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF). In March 2013, North Korea made the SRF the focus of its threat to launch a nuclear attack on U.S. and South Korean targets. The targets included the U.S. mainland, Hawaii, Guam, and U.S. bases in South Korea.<sup>9)</sup> North Korea currently has allegedly deployed roughly 700 Scud, 300 No Dong, and 50 Musudan missiles. Pyongyang continues to develop the Taepodong-2, which could reach the U. S. homeland.<sup>10)</sup>

Advances in ballistic missile delivery systems, coupled with developments in nuclear technology, are in line with North Korea's stated objective of being able to strike the U.S. homeland.<sup>11)</sup> In April 2015 U.S. Admiral Bill Gortney, Commander of Northern Command,

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7) Siegfried S. Hecker, "A Return Trip to North Korea's Yongbyon Nuclear Complex," Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, November 20, 2013, <http://iis-db.stanford.edu>.

8) Richard Sisk, "US General Tells Senate North Korea Can Hit US with Nuclear ICBM," *Military.com Daily News*, April 16, 2015, <http://www.military.com/daily-news/2015/04/06/us-general-tells-senate-north-korea-can-hit-us-with-nuclear-icbm>.

9) North Korean National Defense Commission warned that its strategic rocket forces can hit U.S. bases in South Korea, Japan, and Guam, as well as the mainland: "North Korea Says Its Rockets Could Hit Continental US," *Chosun Ilbo*, October 12, 2013.

10) Sang-ho Song, "U.S. warns of N.Korea Nuke, Missile Capabilities," *The Korea Herald*, April 24, 2015, <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20150408001205>.

11) Nick Hansen, "North Korea's Sohae Satellite Launching Station: Major Upgrade Program Completed; Facility Operational Again," *38 North*, October 1, 2014, <http://www.38north.org>.

stated that North Korea has deployed its new road-mobile KN-08 intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of up to 5,625 miles, enough to reach the West Coast of the United States and is tipped with a nuclear warhead.<sup>12)</sup>

## 2. Context: Driver of Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Capability

The familiarity of these nuclear and ballistic missile threat dynamics strongly suggests that Kim Jong-un is committed to following the path of his grandfather and father.<sup>13)</sup> What, then, drives North Korea to acquire a nuclear and ballistic missile capability? First, fostering deterrence seems to be the utmost aim of the North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Survival has long dominated the thinking of the Kim regime.<sup>14)</sup> North Korean leaders take seriously the notion that the United States and South Korea may someday attack North Korea, aiming to destroy the regime. In the name of national defense, Pyongyang has maintained in relative terms a level of military preparedness unmatched by any other state in the world.

Second, North Korea demonstrates the regime's legitimacy by pursuing nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Kim Jong-un has fulfilled the final act of his father Kim Jong-il's policy. The rocket test and satellite launch in December 2012 clearly demonstrated that Kim's regime is on a credible path to further improving its long-range ballistic missile

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12) Anthony Capaccio, "North Korea Can Miniaturize a Nuclear Weapon, U.S. Says," *Bloomberg Business*, April 7, 2015, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-07/n-korea-can-mount-miniature-nuclear-weapon-us-says>.

13) Nicholas Hamisevicz, "No Illusions for North Korea: What Recent Provocations Tell Us about Kim Jong-Un," *The National Bureau of Asian Research*, February 12, 2013, <http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=308>.

14) Jonathan D. Pollack, *No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons and International Security*, (New York: Routledge, 2011), 15.

capabilities.<sup>15)</sup> Conducting a third nuclear test in 2013 also fulfilled Pyongyang's sustained ambition to gain legitimacy through retaining a nuclear deterrent.

Third, "military first politics" is also a driver of the nuclear and ballistic missile threats. Kim's regime emphasizes the primacy of the military, even as the leadership tries to create the appearance of a government structure controlled by the Workers' Party of North Korea. Reports suggested a heightened state of military mobilization in North Korea following Pyongyang's 2013 rhetoric.<sup>16)</sup> Moreover, the statements by the National Defense Commission suggested that the leadership understood it had a variety of military options available to provoke the United States and its allies.

Finally, fostering leverage in future negotiations also could be a driving force. Pyongyang's escalation of tensions around the Korean peninsula has created the potential for policy rifts between the United States and South Korea in terms of how to deal with North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile provocations. Traditionally, Seoul has supported engagement with Pyongyang, whereas Washington has opposed such engagement.<sup>17)</sup> Because Kim Jong-un believes he gains more negotiating power when the two countries are not closely coordinating their policies, he will continue to strive to separate the two allies through nuclear and missile threats.<sup>18)</sup>

Kim Jong-un has maintained his father's foreign policy but appears to be implementing it in a more volatile, reckless, and unpredictable manner. Kim has justified his approach as being the most appropriate, given North Korea's situation, allowing the regime to reduce its

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15) John S. Park, "The Leap in North Korea's Ballistic Missile Program: The Iran Factor," *The National Bureau of Asian Research*, December 19, 2012, [http://www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/pdf/Brief/121812\\_Park\\_NKoreaMissile.pdf](http://www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/pdf/Brief/121812_Park_NKoreaMissile.pdf).

16) Kwang jin Kim, "Military Combat Readiness Level Raised," *DailyNK*, January 30, 2013.

17) Leon V. Sigal, "North Korea Is No Iraq: Pyongyang's Negotiating Strategy," *Arms Control Today*, December 12, 2002.

18) U.S. Department of Defense, "Department of Defense Press Briefing by General Scaparrotti," October 24, 2014.

military expenditures while strengthening its defense capabilities with nuclear and ballistic missiles.<sup>19)</sup> He has publicly announced his new strategic line as the simultaneous development of nuclear and economic capabilities.<sup>20)</sup>

### III. Limitations of U.S. Strategy for North Korean Threats under the Obama Administration

Pyongyang's defiance seems to be a particularly bitter pill for the Obama administration. President Obama came into office in January 2009 offering dialogue with North Korea, but in May 2009, North Korea conducted its second nuclear test without giving talks a chance.<sup>21)</sup> Pyongyang's announcement in May 2012 that it would conduct a satellite test came only sixteen days after the Obama administration's "Leap Day Agreement" in which North Korea pledged to not conduct a long-range missile launch or nuclear test and to allow the return of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to Yongbyon in exchange for U.S. food aid.<sup>22)</sup> The agreement was never implemented and failed to constrain Pyongyang from continuing nuclear and missile tests.<sup>23)</sup> Responding to Pyongyang's third nuclear test in 2013, President Obama announced that Pyongyang's nuclear test was a "threat to the U.S.

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19) Richard Engel, "Will North Korea Follow Through on Nuclear Threats?" *NBC Nightly News*, April 3, 2013.

20) Hong yung Lee, "North Korea in 2013: Economy, Executions, and Nuclear Brinkmanship," *Asian Survey* 54, No.1, Jan/Feb, 2014, 90.

21) Sang hun Choe, "North Korea Claims to Conduct 2nd Nuclear Test," *The New York Times*, May 24, 2009, [http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/25/world/asia/25nuke.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/25/world/asia/25nuke.html?_r=0).

22) Steven Lee Myers and Sang-hun Choe, "North Koreans Agree to Freeze Nuclear Work: U.S. to Give Aid," *The New York Times*, February 29, 2012.

23) David E. Sanger, "U.S. Confronts Consequences of Underestimating North Korean Leader," *The New York Times*, April 24, 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/25/world/asia/wrong-guesses-about-north-korea-leave-us-struggle>.



national security and international peace and security.”<sup>24)</sup>

Despite those clear warnings, the United States continues to implement mild economic sanctions that only incrementally increase punishment on Pyongyang for its repeated provocations of nuclear and ballistic missile threats.<sup>25)</sup> The United States is still hesitant when targeting financial measures against Pyongyang and its supporting entities. By contrast, the United States has taken far stronger measures against Iran, despite Teheran’s greater diplomatic and economic interaction with the rest of the world.

Unfortunately, the U.S. and its allies are now largely accustomed to Pyongyang’s nuclear and ballistic missile tests along with continuous violations of Security Council resolutions. Whenever there is any North Korean provocation or violation, the United States has returned to the UN to demand much stronger measures but has usually been obstructed by China, so the result has been only incrementally punitive measures. Instead, the United States should have imposed synchronized “Sticky and Sharp Power” options with its allies just after Pyongyang’s provocations when international fury and support was the strongest. The Obama administration’s policy of “Strategic Patience” was mostly passive because it failed to impose large-scale coercion to effectively reduce Pyongyang’s nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities or alter its behavior.<sup>26)</sup> The United States had sufficient “Sticky and Sharp Power”; it just lacked the resolve to use them in the name of “Strategic Patience”.

By applying mild economic sanctions and military policy, Washington seemed to waste the opportunity to more effectively block Pyongyang’s progress on nuclear and missile programs. The Obama administration

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24) Calum MacLeod and Sunny Yang, “U.N. Condemns North Korea Nuclear Test, Promises Action,” *USA Today*, February 12, 2013, <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/02/11/earthquake-north-korea-nuclear-test/1911587/>.

25) Margaret Brennan, “U.S. Urges Nations to Cut North Korea’s Financial Link,” *CBS News*, April 5, 2013.

26) Scott A. Snyder, “U.S. Policy Toward North Korea,” *Council on Foreign Affairs*, January 2013, <http://www.cfr.org/north-korea/us-policy-toward-north-korea/p29962>.

coordinated successively weaker international sanctions in response to North Korea's provocations and no military response to the sinking of the South Korean warship *Cheonan* and the artillery shelling of Yeonpyeong-do in 2010. Consequently, Pyongyang probably felt it could outlast Washington's policy of "Strategic Patience."<sup>27)</sup> The collective international promises to be tougher the "next time" allowed Pyongyang additional years to develop its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

#### IV. Shaping the Strategic Environment: Synchronizing Sticky and Sharp Power

As discussed above, the Obama administration failed to capitalize on its initial efforts to shape the strategic environment. The policy of "Strategic Patience" was too easily interpreted to mean tabling the North Korean nuclear and missile issues and waiting for North Korea to change its mind, assuming that a North Korean change of regime would be inevitable. By the time the Obama administration resumed direct dialog with North Korea in 2011, there was no accompanying strategy designed to shape the strategic environment that could limit Kim Jong-un's alternatives to negotiation such as in the Iran case.<sup>28)</sup>

The United States should shape the strategic environment in which North Korea recognizes that its only way forward will require the abandonment of its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Changing North Korea's strategic choices will be exceedingly difficult.<sup>29)</sup> It will

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27) Scott A. Snyder, "North Korea's Missiles, Nukes, and False Promises: How to Respond," *Council on Foreign Relations*, April 18, 2012, 2-5.

28) Mohammad Ali Shabani, "Broaden the Talks With Iran," *The New York Times*, April 27, 2015.

29) Robert L. Gallucci and Joel S. Wit, "North Korea's Real Lessons for Iran," *The New York Times*, April 10, 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/11/opinion/north-koreas-real-lessons-for-iran.html>.

require even more careful coordination with allies to synchronize large-scale “Sticky and Sharp Power” and a willingness to make North Korea’s denuclearization a top-tier foreign policy priority over a sustained period.

## 1. Sticky Power Options

The United States should apply the large-scale punitive “Sticky Power” options against North Korea, including more severe economic sanctions than have been implemented against other rogue regimes such as Iran.<sup>30)</sup> First, the United States should designate North Korea as a principal money-laundering and currency counterfeiting country under Section 311 of the Patriot Act,<sup>31)</sup> and prohibit North Korean correspondent accounts in the United States.<sup>32)</sup> Such a designation would prevent North Korea from opening a correspondent account in the United States by any domestic financial institution or a foreign banking institution.<sup>33)</sup> Even financial institutions not doing business in the United States would likely be affected, since most of the dollar-denominated transactions pass through U.S. Treasury-related banks.<sup>34)</sup>

30) “Ahmadinejad: Hidden War on Global Scale Waged Against Iran’s Oil Sector,” *Iran Daily Brief*, October 8, 2012, <http://www.irandailybrief.com/2012/10/08/ahmadinejad-hidden-war-on-global-scale-waged-against-irans-oil-sector/>.

31) U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Fact Sheet: New Sanctions on Iran,” November 21, 2011, <http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1367.aspx>.

32) The use of financial power has revealed some fundamental policy issues and paved the way of thinking about national security; Bryan Burrough, “In ‘Treasury’s War,’ Missiles for a Financial Battlefield,” *The New York Times*, August 31, 2013, [http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/01/business/in-treasurys-war-missiles-for-a-financial-battlefield.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/01/business/in-treasurys-war-missiles-for-a-financial-battlefield.html?_r=0).

33) U.S. Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, “Section 311-Special Measures,” [http://www.fincen.gov/statutes\\_regs/patriot/section311.html](http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/patriot/section311.html).

34) Joshua Stanton, “Kaesong Investors Beware: Treasury Issues New Warning About N. Korea Money Laundering Risk,” September 21, 2013, <http://freekorea.us/2013/09/21/kaesong-investors-beware-treasury-issues-new-warning-about-n-korea-money>

Second, the United States should publicly identify and sanction all foreign financial institutions, companies, and governments assisting Pyongyang's nuclear or missile programs. Executive Orders 13551 and 13570 enable targeted financial measures, including freezing of assets, against any entities suspected of helping Pyongyang's nuclear or missile programs.<sup>35)</sup> The United States needs to coordinate with foreign banks, businesses, and governments to help U.S. actions against North Korea and compel the removal of North Korea from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) financial transfers.<sup>36)</sup> The United States and European Union already pressed SWIFT to disconnect sanctioned Iranian banks in 2012. The system is the hub of the world for electronic financial transactions. The United States also needs to persuade other countries and the European Union to break their links with North Korea's Foreign Trade Bank, North Korea's main financial portal for international trade. Efforts should target all of the North Korean government, not just individuals or departments.

Third, the United States should return North Korea back to the state Sponsors of Terrorism List.<sup>37)</sup> "Pyongyang has provided nuclear and missile support to Syria and Iran, two nations on the U.S. State Department's Sponsors of Terrorism List."<sup>38)</sup> North Korean weapons

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35) Sung-yoon Lee and Joshua Stanton, "Hit Kim Jong Eun Where It Hurts: His Wallet," *The Washington Post*, February 13, 2013; Barack Obama, "Blocking Property of Certain Persons with Respect to North Korea," Executive Order 13551, August 30, 2010, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/08/30/executive-order-president-blocking-property-certain-persons-with-respect>; Barack Obama, "Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to North Korea," Executive Order 13570, April 18, 2011, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/04/18/executive-order-13570-prohibiting-certain-transactions-respect-north-kor>.

36) SWIFT based in Brussels, is a member owned cooperative founded in 1973 to standardize the communication of global financial transactions, and it forms the communication backbone of the formal financial system.

37) On 11 October, 2008, the United States finally dropped North Korea from the terrorism list after reaching a deal in which North Korea agreed to resume the disabling of its nuclear facilities; U.S. Department of State, "State Sponsor Terrorism," <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm>.

38) U.S. Department of State, State Sponsors of Terrorism," <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm>.

confiscated in Thailand were destined for Islamist groups Hezbollah and Hamas.<sup>39)</sup> Two North Korean agents confessed that Pyongyang ordered them to assassinate Hwang Jang-yop, the highest-ranking North Korean defector who had bitterly criticized North Korean leader Kim Jong-il.<sup>40)</sup> Inclusion on the list requires the United States to oppose loans by international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.<sup>41)</sup>

Fourth, the United States must continue its law enforcement efforts against Pyongyang's illicit activities. Despite Washington's confidence that Pyongyang is involved in the counterfeiting of currency and money laundering, Washington apparently has not taken any law enforcement action since 2006 when the Banco Delta Asia money was returned.<sup>42)</sup> North Korea's involvement in illicit activities could trigger criminal cases against Kim Jong-un.

Finally, Washington should also press the UN Security Council into adopting a more comprehensive list of prohibited items and material transfers to North Korea. Although the UN Expert Group has identified several items and materials such as high-strength aluminum alloy, semi-hard magnetic alloys, ring magnets, and filament winding machines which are critical to the North Korean nuclear ballistic missile program, it has not yet added them to the list of banned items for transfer to North Korea.<sup>43)</sup>

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39) David E. Sanger, "Officials Seek Destination of North Korean Arms," *The New York Times*, December 13, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/14/world/asia/14thai.html?r=0&gwh=D5E2CDD17981D00B2C5BE5D9D32B1CE0&gwt=pay>.

40) So-hyun Kim, "Kim Visits Army Unit Spying on S.Korea," *The Korea Herald*, April 21, 2010, <http://www.koreaherald.com/national/Detail.jsp?newsMLId=20100427000663>.

41) Mark E. Manyin, "North Korea: Back on the Terrorism List?" Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, June 29, 2010, <http://www.nkeconwatch.com/nk-uploads/DPRK-back-on-terrorism-list.pdf>.

42) In 2005, Stuart Levey, undersecretary of the Treasury for terrorism and financial intelligence, had traveled to Singapore, China, Macao, Hong Kong, Vietnam and South Korea to press banks to break their ties with North Korea; Steven R. Weisman, "U.S. Pursues Tactic of Financial Isolation," *The New York Times*, October 16, 2006, <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/16/world/asia/16sanctions.html>.

43) Panel of Exports, "Report of the Panel of Exports Established Pursuant to Resolution," 2009,

## 2. Sharp Power Options

To shape the strategic environment most effectively and decisively, “Sticky Power” options must be synchronized with comprehensive “Sharp Power” options: maritime counter-proliferation, bilateral deterrence, and a trilateral missile defense system.

With regard to maritime counter-proliferation, the United States should coordinate closely with the UN to allow for enforcement by military means.<sup>44)</sup> The United States already seeks to strengthen and expand the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), ensuring that it remains a useful tool to stop WMD proliferation.<sup>45)</sup> PSI was established to monitor the trafficking of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation. Doing so would authorize naval ships to intercept, board, and inspect North Korean ships suspected of transporting prohibited nuclear and missile components or technology.<sup>46)</sup> Increasing the number of the PSI exercises and operations would improve U.S. capacity for combating the proliferation of North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile technology.

Second, the United States should consider using large-scale bilateral military deterrence against North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile threats. If Pyongyang strives to possess nuclear weapons, it is clear that the United States would need to take swift action to use military coercion to change the attitude of North Korea.<sup>47)</sup> The United States

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<http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA05201403226/101981/HHRG-113-FA05-Wstate-KlingnerB-20140326.pdf>.

44) U.N. Security Council, Resolution 2094, March 7, 2013, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2094](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2094).

45) U.S. Department of State, “Proliferation Security Initiative: 10th Anniversary High-Level Political Meeting,” <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm>.

46) Bruce Klingner, “Time to Get North Korean Sanctions Right,” *The Heritage Foundation*, November 4, 2013, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/11/time-to-get-north-korean-sanctions-right>.

47) House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense Hearing, “U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Forces Korea,” Testimony by Curtis Scaparrotti, United Nations Command, United States Forces Korea, March 26, 2014.

and South Korea need to implement a comprehensive alliance to counter North Korean missile strategy based on detecting, defending, disrupting, and destroying its nuclear ballistic missile threats. This approach requires the development of new South Korean ballistic missile capability as well as enhanced Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities including unmanned aerial vehicles. South Korea continues to implement the Revised Missile Guideline (RMG),<sup>48)</sup> an important element in increasing alliance capabilities to defend both countries. The United States should continue to work with South Korea toward enacting combined command and control processes to integrate South Korea's ballistic missile capabilities.

Third, the Tailored Deterrence Strategy (TDS), a significant milestone in the U.S.-ROK security relationship, has established an alliance framework for ensuring deterrence against North Korean WMD threat scenarios.<sup>49)</sup> However, the TDS is not an operational plan, nor does it call for preemptive strikes or specific responses to North Korean actions. The TDS must include combined preemptive strikes if there is clear evidence that North Korea is preparing to launch a nuclear missile. To accomplish this, Washington and Seoul need to identify all strategic targets related to nuclear and ballistic missile facilities, establish a priority for attack with strike weapons, designate the mission in advance, and conduct regular combined exercises. Furthermore, each country needs to establish a more detailed conventional and nuclear retaliation course of action in its OPLAN against North Korean nuclear ballistic missile attacks. In the future, if North Korea conducts another

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48) Sang-hun Choe, "U.S. Agrees to Let South Korea Extend Range of Ballistic Missiles," *The New York Times*, October 7, 2012; Under the revised guidelines, South Korea can deploy ballistic missiles with a range of up to 800 kilometers, or about 500 miles, enough to reach any target in North Korea as long as the payload does not exceed 500 kilograms.

49) In October 2013, the U.S. Secretary of Defense and ROK Minister of National Defense signed bilateral TDS; Jennifer Steinhauer, "U.S. and South Korea Set Defense Strategy for North Korean Threat," *The New York Times*, October 2, 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/03/world/asia/chuck-hagel-asia-trip.html>.

nuclear test or launches a ballistic missile, the United States can consider switching the U.S. force structure in South Korea to focus on responses to the nuclear and ballistic missile threats.<sup>50)</sup>

Finally, establishing a trilateral Missile Defense (MD) system is crucial for the United States, South Korea, and Japan. The increasing North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities could render traditional deterrence ineffective against a missile attack on the U.S. homeland, deployed military forces, and allies.<sup>51)</sup> An MD system can enhance existing non-proliferation activities and discourage Kim Jong-un from believing he can use nuclear ballistic missiles to coerce the United States and its allies. The U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is developing layered missile defense systems that could offer multiple opportunities to defeat limited ballistic missile attacks.<sup>52)</sup> There are four primary MD programs: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GBMD),<sup>53)</sup> Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (ABMD),<sup>54)</sup> Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD),<sup>55)</sup> and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3).<sup>56)</sup>

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50) Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, "The Next Korean War: Conflict With North Korea Could Go Nuclear – But Washington Can Reduce the Risk," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1, 2013, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2013-04-01/next-korean-war>.

51) U.S. Missile Defense Agency, "The Ballistic Missile Defense System," <http://www.mda.mil/system/threat>.

52) U.S. Department of Defense, "Secretary of Defense Speech: Missile Defense Announcement," March 15, 2013, <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1759>.

53) As of summer of 2014, 26 interceptors were located at Fort Greenly, Alaska, and four at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, with plans to increase this arsenal to 44 by 2017. In a June 2014 test, an interceptor launched from Vandenberg destroyed a target missile launched from the Marshall Islands.

54) ABMD, considered the most reliable component of missile defense, is designed to intercept short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. The MDA and Navy plan to increase the number of BMD-capable aegis warships from 33 in 2014 to 43 by 2019. As of June 2014, the system had 28 successful intercepts out of 34 four tests.

55) THAAD is a rapidly deployable, truck-mounted system capable of intercepting short- and medium-range ballistic missiles inside and just outside the atmosphere. Three THAAD systems were operational as of mid-2014. In April 2013, the Army deployed a THAAD battery to Guam to help defend the U.S. territory from North Korean IRBM.

56) The PAC-3 is vehicle-mounted and uses sensors to track and intercept incoming missiles in their terminal phase, at lower altitudes than the THAAD system. The PAC-3 batteries have been deployed to several nations, including South Korea.



According to the MDA, “the U.S. has spent roughly \$100 billion on missile defense since 2002, and plans to spend roughly \$8 billion per year through 2017, around two percent of the Pentagon’s base budget.”<sup>57)</sup> As the 2014 QDR focuses on “More Risk, Less Money,”<sup>58)</sup> the United States should now coordinate with South Korea and Japan to establish a trilateral MD system to save money. Japan has already procured a layered MD system including SM-3 and PAC-3. Moreover, the United States and Japan continue to collaboratively develop SM-3 IIA, which enable U.S. and Japanese Aegis BMD ships to engage more sophisticated ballistic missile threats.<sup>59)</sup> South Korea is independently establishing the Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) System.<sup>60)</sup> Even though the United States has provided MD technology to South Korea, the technology is not fully integrated with the U.S. MD system. If the United States expands the scope of a trilateral MD system among the United States, South Korea, and Japan, it would send a strong message of deterrence to Pyongyang.

While all three nations are wary of the looming ballistic missile threat from North Korea, deep-seated tensions between Seoul and Tokyo have kept them from cooperating on an MD system. However, in December 2014, and Japan pledged to share military intelligence about the North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile programs, in a three-way pact via the United States.<sup>61)</sup> The agreement is a small but symbolic breakthrough because it brought South Korea and Japan together. South Korea already has ballistic missile search and track assets and

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57) Jonathan Masters, “Ballistic Missile Defense,” Council on Foreign Relations, August 15, 2014.

58) Claudette Roulo, “2014 QDR Presumes Future Includes More Risk, Less Money,” *DoD News*, March 11, 2014, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=121811>.

59) Vice Admiral James D. Syring, Missile Defense Agency, “Hearing on Missile Defense Program,” House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, May 8, 2013.

60) Sang-ho Song, “Ministry to Invest W9 Trillion to Deter N.K. Nuke, Missiles,” *The Korea Herald*, April 20, 2015.

61) Martin Fackler, “Japan and South Korea Vow to Share Intelligence about North via the U.S.,” *The New York Times*, December 29, 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/30/world/asia/japan-south-korea-north-intelligence.html>.

capabilities, including Aegis warships and Green Pine radars. These will help not only Japan but also the United States. Therefore, the United States should seek to persuade the South Korean government that the North Korean nuclear ballistic missile threat is directly related to the survival of South Korea, and that it should join the U.S. MD system as soon as possible. And Seoul should not subjugate the defense of its citizens to economic blackmail by Beijing.<sup>62)</sup> China has repeatedly lobbied South Korea so hard against the THAAD deployment that Koreans, as a backlash, are now more in favor of it.<sup>63)</sup> In 2014, the South Korean Armed Services Committee also focused on an MD system including THAAD and SM-3.<sup>64)</sup> Trilateral MD exercises and operations will enhance the reliability and effectiveness of the MD system and maximize U.S. “Sharp Power” to force North Korea to change its strategic choices.<sup>65)</sup>

## V. Risks of Alternative U.S. Strategy

There could be risks in applying this alternative U.S. strategy. Most notably, the risks include securing Chinese cooperation on North Korea, South Korea–China economic relations, and South Korea–Japan tensions. All are potential obstacles that must be mitigated to reach the desired end state: North Korean denuclearization.

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62) John K. Warden and Brad Glosserman, “China’s THAAD Gamble Is Unlikely to Pay Off,” *The Diplomat*, April 15, 2015.

63) Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Save Our Seoul: South Korea Needs THAAD ASAP,” *Breaking Defense*, May 6, 2015, <http://breakingdefense.com/2015/05/save-our-seoul-south-korea-needs-thaad-asap-for-missile-defense/>.

64) Seung-min Yu, Chairman of South Korean Armed Services Committee, “How to Defend North Korean Ballistic Missile?” South Korean Armed Services Committee initiated Policy Discussion, January 15, 2014.

65) House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense Hearing, “U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Forces Korea,” Testimony by Samuel Locklear, Commander United States Navy, United Pacific Command, March 26, 2014.

First, securing Chinese cooperation on North Korea is paramount. China and the United States share strong common interests in keeping inter-Korean tensions under control and keeping the Korean peninsula non-nuclear. China cooperated closely with the United States in drafting Security Council Resolution 2094 after the third North Korean nuclear test.<sup>66)</sup> After joining the unanimous vote in favor, it appeared to implement sanctions against North Korea more vigorously.<sup>67)</sup> China seems to realize that its old comrade is becoming a burden to its security.<sup>68)</sup> Moreover, China recently rejected North Korea's request to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), due to the country's fragile economy.<sup>69)</sup> The China-led AIIB, with \$50 billion in available funds, expects to start operations by the end of 2015 and is attracting a growing list of countries; the bank focuses on "lean, clean, and green" projects.<sup>70)</sup> However, China still prioritizes regime stability over North Korean denuclearization and is suspicious of the United States and its allies' strategic intentions.<sup>71)</sup> The limited nature of these interests means that the United States ultimately cannot depend on China to ensure success in dealing with North Korea. In the absence of more effective U.S.-Sino cooperation, the United States can use missile defense programs like THAAD cooperation as leverage against China. If China feels directly threatened by such a system, it can reduce the threat by becoming more actively engaged in solving the North Korean nuclear

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66) Nathan Beauchamp Mustafaga, "China and UN Security Council Resolution 2094: Is the Third Time the Charm?" March 11, 2013, <http://www.sinonk.com>.

67) Victor Cha and Ellen Kim, "UN Security Council Passes New Resolution 2094 on North Korea," Centre for Strategic and International Studies, March 7, 2013.

68) Suk-hee Han, "China Offensive to Korea: A New Approach to Extend the Strategic Buffer," The Asian Forum, 2014, <http://www.theasianforum.org/china-charm-offensive-to-korea-a-new-approach-toextend-the-strategic-buffer>.

69) Sneha Shankar, "China Clueless About Rejecting North Korea's AIIB Application: Official," *International Business Times*, April 25, 2015, <http://www.ibtimes.com/china-clueless-about-rejecting-north-koreas-aiib-application-official-1865994>.

70) "China-Led AIIB Will Be Lean, Clean and Green-Official," *The New York Times*, April 15, 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2015/04/11/business/11reuters-asia-aiib.html>.

71) International Crisis Group, "Fire on the City Gate: Why China Keeps North Korea Close," *Asia Report*, No. 254, December 9, 2013, 13-14.

and ballistic missile problems.

Second, South Korea–China economic relations also could be a risk. Even with U.S. efforts toward a trilateral MD system, South Korea could refuse to cooperate with Japan for fear of alienating China, with whom it has close economic relations. China will undoubtedly remain important to South Korea’s strategic decisions, as their economic relationship will be a key factor for a long time. However, mutually beneficial relationships cannot be established when only one partner shows concern for the other. South Korea should appeal to China to pay greater attention to the security of South Korea if China is to truly become a strategic partner in the long term. According to a poll by the *Asan Daily* in May 2013, 75 percent of the South Korean public supported enhancing cooperation with the U.S. MD system.<sup>72)</sup> South Korea, therefore, should make clear its position on MD by emphasizing that national security issues are more vital to South Korea than economic relations with China. If the MD system is what South Korea needs to reinforce its defense posture against North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile threats, then South Korea should do its utmost to appeal to the rational side of public opinion and overcome emotional anxieties. Ambiguity cannot serve South Korea’s national security interests. Rather, it would bring about more confusion and problems.<sup>73)</sup>

Finally, historical tensions between South Korea and Japan are another obstacle to establishing a trilateral missile defense system. The greatest source of the current tension stems from the history of sexual slaves and forced laborers during the Second World War.<sup>74)</sup> The progress on historical issues is slow; however, any positive movements

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72) A summary of the Asan Daily Poll, May 26, 2013, <http://asaninst.org>; The nationwide poll surveyed 1,000 male and female adults above the age of 19.

73) Kang Choi and Gi-bum Kim, “Breaking the Myth of Missile Defense,” The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, August 8, 2014, <http://en.asaninst.org/contents/breaking-the-myth-of-missile-defense/>.

74) Sue mi Terry, “Japan–South Korea–U.S. Relations,” *Joint U.S.–Korea Academic Studies: Asia’s Slippery Slope*, Vol. 25, (Korea Economic Institute of America, 2014), 8–10.

— including a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), counter-piracy exercises, or HA/DR — that change the atmosphere could create political space in which trilateral missile defense advancements can be made.<sup>75)</sup> Even after Japanese Prime Minister Abe visited the controversial Yasukuni War Shrine in December 2013, poll results released by the Asan Institute in March 2014, showed that 64 percent of Koreans stated that security cooperation with Japan would be necessary in the event of China's rise.<sup>76)</sup> Close cooperation and coordination between South Korea and Japan through the deployment of the THAAD system is the fail-safe way to ensure the system's reaction to North Korean nuclear ballistic missile attacks. Moreover, proactive South Korean participation in the MD system could check Japanese military developments in missile and space capabilities, and thus contain a potential arms race among the regional powers.

## VI. Counter-Argument: Is an Alternative Strategy Necessary and Realistic?

There are potential counter-arguments about the necessity and feasibility of this alternative strategy. First, some would say North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile threats ultimately do not matter, as long as the United States has a secure nuclear retaliation capability.<sup>77)</sup> However, a top Chinese nuclear expert has estimated that North

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75) Shane A. Jackson, "U.S., Japanese, S. Korean Navies Participate in Counter Piracy Exercise," U.S. Naval Forces Central Command Press Release, January 15, 2014, [http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/articles/2014/14011\\_006.html](http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/articles/2014/14011_006.html).

76) Ji-yoon Kim, Karl Fredhoff, Chung-ku Kang, and Eui-cheol Lee, "Challenges and Opportunities for Korea-Japan Relations in 2014," The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, March 13, 2014, <http://en.asaninst.org/contents/challenges-and-opportunities-for-korea-japan-relations-in-2014/>.

77) Robert Jervis, "Unipolarity," *World Politics*, Quarterly Journal of International Relations,

Korea already has 20 nuclear warheads and production will double by next year.<sup>78)</sup> A large arsenal of nuclear ballistic missiles in North Korea increase security fears in South Korea and Japan, which could push them to develop their own nuclear weapons. Moreover, an increase in the North Korean nuclear arsenal feeds international concern about proliferation in a country that previously exported nuclear technology to Syria and missile components to Iran, Yemen, and Egypt.<sup>79)</sup> North Korea supplied several shipments of missile components to Iran during recent nuclear talks, according to U.S. intelligence officials.<sup>80)</sup> If the United States and its allies fail to solve the North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile issues now, North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile knowhow could be transferred to terrorists such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) at any time.<sup>81)</sup>

Second, some may argue that “Sticky Power” options do not work against isolated countries like North Korea, and that China would never go along with increased targeted financial measures. However, the targeted financial measures against Iran were a critical factor in Teheran's return to the negotiating table.<sup>82)</sup> Even the most reclusive regime or terrorist group is tied to the global financial order. For banks and businesses, there are many risks to facilitating illicit transactions. The British bank HSBC has already been fined \$1.9 billion for money-laundering and sanctions violations, including financial

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Volume 61, January 2009, 188.

78) Jay Solomon, “China Warns North Korean Nuclear Threat Is Rising,” *The Wall Street Journal*, April 22, 2015.

79) Seigfried S. Hecker and William Liou, “Dangerous Dealings: North Korea's Nuclear Capabilities and the Threat of Export to Iran,” *Arms Control Today*, March 2007, <http://www.armscontrol.org/print/22290>.

80) Bill Gertz, “North Korea Transfers Missile Goods to Iran During Nuclear Talks,” *The Washington Free Beacon*, April 15, 2015, <http://freebeacon.com/national-security/north-korea-transfers-missile-goods-to-iran-during-nuclear-talks/>.

81) White House, “National Security Strategy,” Feb 2015, [http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015\\_national\\_security\\_strategy.pdf?page=1](http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf?page=1).

82) Bruce Klingner, “Time to Go Beyond Incremental North Korean Sanctions,” *38 North*, April 29, 2014.

dealings with Iran.<sup>83)</sup> A North Korean negotiator admitted to a senior White House official, “You finally found a way to hurt us.”<sup>84)</sup> Moreover, China-led AIIB already rejected North Korean application for entering into the system due to its poor financial conditions. As former Treasury Department official Juan Zarate commented in his book *Treasury’s War*, Chinese financial entities will follow international financial rules and act against their government’s own stated foreign policy when it is in their financial interest to do so.<sup>85)</sup>

Finally, this alternative strategy could push North Korea to a point at which war seems to be the only option. That would be a failure of the strategy, so Pyongyang needs to be given an option that does not place them in a corner that threatens the leadership’s survival. This criticism is reasonable. The United States, therefore, should also concurrently consider and prepare negotiations to deal with North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile programs. First of all, the United States could replace the armistice agreement with a peace agreement. In 2010, Pyongyang had already proposed it would not give up its nuclear weapons until Washington signed a peace agreement.<sup>86)</sup> The United States also needs to consider stopping the U.S.-ROK combined exercises and the reduction of U.S. forces in Korea. Moreover, the United States could promise the lifting of sanctions against North Korea if Kim Jong-un declares a nuclear moratorium. These measures would contribute not only to Pyongyang’s denuclearization but also to U.S. interests under tight budgets and another possible round of sequestration.

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83) Devlin Barrett and Evan Perez, “HSBC to Pay Record U.S. Penalty,” *The Wall Street Journal*, December 11, 2012.

84) Joshua Stanton and Sung-yoon Lee, “Financial Sanctions Could Force Reforms in North Korea,” *The Washington Post*, February 20, 2014, [http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/financial-sanctions-could-force-reforms-in-north-korea/2014/02/20/61d1a3a4-99ab-11e3-b931-0204122c514b\\_story.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/financial-sanctions-could-force-reforms-in-north-korea/2014/02/20/61d1a3a4-99ab-11e3-b931-0204122c514b_story.html).

85) Juan C. Zarate, *Treasury’s War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare*, (New York: Public Affairs), 2013, 424-425.

86) Sang-hun Choe, “North Korea Calls for Peace Treaty Talks With U.S.,” *The New York Times*, January 11, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/12/world/asia/12korea.html>.

## VII. Conclusion

Despite repeated calls for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, the behavior of North Korea for decades has been to move in precisely the opposite direction. Recently, Pyongyang has threatened Washington directly with nuclear ballistic missiles. As discussed above, responding to harsh rhetoric with minimal measures has only encouraged North Korea to remain on course.

With increasing economic isolation Pyongyang faces a “perfect storm” that makes it more vulnerable to a strategic environment, synchronized by large-scale “Sticky and Sharp Power” options. For this reason, Washington should impose more extensive punitive measures against Pyongyang and the foreign entities that assist its nuclear and missile programs. The United States and its allies have retained an array of strong punitive measures that can be levied on North Korea.

Washington also needs to make clear to Beijing that continued sheltering of Pyongyang only increases the potential for instability on the Korean peninsula. In accordance with Sun Tzu’s counsel in *The Art of War*,<sup>87)</sup> the United States should shape the strategic environment with its allies by synchronizing large-scale “Sticky and Sharp Power” to influence Pyongyang’s strategic choices. There will be little change until Kim Jong-un feels severe pain and Beijing feels real concern over the consequences of Pyongyang’s provocative actions. At the same time, however, negotiations with North Korea should also be considered and prepared for, in case Kim Jong-un makes a clear decision to move toward a denuclearization.

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87) Sun Tzu, “Tactical Disposition,” *The Art of War*, Pax Librorum Publishing House, 16, <http://www.SunTzu.PaxLibrorum.com>; Sun Tzu stated that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory.



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## 요 약

## 북한의 핵, 탄도미사일 위협과 미국의 전략: 동맹국과의 경제적, 군사적 수단의 동기화를 통한 전략적 환경의 조성

문 증 화\*

2015년 5월 수중발사 탄도미사일(SLBM) 발사시험을 통해 북한은 전 세계의 이목을 또 다시 집중시켰다. 북한은 2013년 제3차 핵실험을 감행한 이후 최근까지도 탄도미사일과 로켓 발사 등의 무력도발을 지속해 왔다. 이와 같은 북한의 무력도발은 한반도의 안정뿐만 아니라 미국 본토의 안보에도 매우 부정적인 영향을 미치고 있다. 지금까지 미국은 북한의 핵미사일 개발 저지를 위해 경제적 또는 군사적 방안들을 선별적으로 적용해 왔다. 그러나, 이러한 미국의 노력에도 불구하고 북한은 여전히 핵미사일을 개발하겠다는 꿈을 포기하지 않고 있는 것이 사실이다. 본 논문은 북한의 핵미사일 개발에 대한 미국의 대안적 전략(Alternative Strategy)을 제시하는데 그 목적이 있다. 필자는 대안적 전략 제시에 앞서 북한의 핵과 탄도미사일 개발현황을 내용(Contents)과 맥락(Context) 차원에서 분석하고 미 오바마 행정부의 대북전략을 비판적으로 검토하였다. 그리고 대안적 전략으로 동맹국과 함께 경제적(Sticky Power), 군사적(Sharp Power) 수단의 동기화(Synchronizing)를 통해 북한이 감당하기 힘든 전략적 환경을 조성(Shaping the Strategic Environment)하는 것이 ‘북한의 핵개발 포기’라는 전략목표를 달성하는 방안임을 강조하고 있다.

미국이 대안적 전략목표를 달성하기 위해서는 경제적 수단으로 ① 북한의 자금세탁 및 위조지폐 발행국 지정, ② 북한을 지원하는 모든 해외자산에 대한 제재조치, ③ 북한의 테러지원국 재지정, ④ 북한 제재를 위한 미국의 입법추진, ⑤ 대량살상무기 관련 금수품목의 확대를 적용함과 동시에 군사적 수단으로 ① 대량살상무기 비확산 활동 강화, ② 대탄도미사일 전략 개발 및 정보

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(ISR: Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance) 공유, 맞춤형 억제전략(TDS: Tailored Deterrence Strategy)의 구체화 등을 통한 한·미 군사 억제방안의 강화, 그리고 ③ SM-3, THAAD(Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) 등 한·미·일 3자간 MD(Missile Defense)체제의 구축 등을 동기화하여 적용해야만 할 것이다.

미국의 대안적 전략은 ① 북한의 핵미사일 개발에 대한 중국의 협력방지, ② 한·중간 경제관계의 악화, ③ 한·일간의 역사적 긴장관계라는 위험요소를 내포하고 있는 것 또한 사실이다. 따라서 미국이 대안적 전략목표인 ‘북한의 비핵화’ 달성을 위해서는 이와 같은 위험요소를 완화시키는 노력도 병행되어야 할 것이다.

끝으로, 미국은 북한의 김정은이 핵미사일 개발 포기라는 상이한 방향의 전략적 결정을 할 경우에 대비하여 한·미 연합훈련의 보류, 북한에 대한 경제제재조치 해제 등 북한과의 협상 가능성도 열어두고 이에 대해서도 철저하게 준비해 나가야 할 것이다.

**키워드: 북한, 핵, 탄도미사일, 동맹, 미사일 방어**