• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.1-24
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• 2009

이 논문에서 우리는 집합의 두 점 사이의 관계를 소개하고, '가깝다'와 '충분히 가깝다'의 위상적인 개념을 다양하게 정의할 수 있음을 보인다. 또한 직관주의 논리와 관계가 있는 De Morgan frame을 소개하고 pre-order에 의하여 정의된 동치관계로 만들어진 동치류들의 집합을 기저로 생성된 위상 공간이 extremally disconnected 임을 보인다.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems Conference
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• 2008.04a
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• pp.311-312
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• 2008

Fuzzy logic is introduced by Zadeh in 1965. It has been continuously developed by many mathematicians and knowledge engineers all over the world. A lot of papers concerning with the history of mathematics and the mathematical education related with fuzzy logic, but there is no paper concerning with Zadeh. In this article, we investigate his life and papers about fuzzy logic. We also compare two-valued logic, three-valued logic, fuzzy logic, intuisionistic logic and intuitionistic fuzzy sets. Finally we discuss about the expression of intuitionistic fuzzy sets.

• Journal for History of Mathematics
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• v.21 no.1
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• pp.29-44
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• 2008

Fuzzy logic is introduced by Zadeh in 1965. It has been continuously developed by many mathematicians and knowledge engineers all over the world. A lot of papers concerning with the history of mathematics and the mathematical education related with fuzzy logic, but there is no paper concerning with Zadeh. In this article, we investigate his life and papers about fuzzy logic. We also compare two-valued logic, three-valued logic, fuzzy logic, intuisionistic logic and intuitionistic fuzzy sets. Finally we discuss about the expression of intuitionistic fuzzy sets.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.21 no.1
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• pp.59-96
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• 2018

${\bot}$It is often said that in a purely formal perspective, intuitionistic logic has no obvious advantage to deal with the liar-type paradoxes. In this paper, we will argue that the standard intuitionistic natural deduction systems are vulnerable to the liar-type paradoxes in the sense that the acceptance of the liar-type sentences results in inference to absurdity (${\perp}$). The result shows that the restriction of the Double Negation Elimination (DNE) fails to block the inference to ${\perp}$. It is, however, not the problem of the intuitionistic approaches to the liar-type paradoxes but the lack of expressive power of the standard intuitionistic natural deduction system. We introduce a meta-level negation, ⊬$_s$, for a given system S and a meta-level absurdity, ⋏, to the intuitionistic system. We shall show that in the system, the inference to ${\perp}$ is not given without the assumption that the system is complete. Moreover, we consider the Double Meta-Level Negation Elimination rules (DMNE) which implicitly assume the completeness of the system. Then, the restriction of DMNE can rule out the inference to ${\perp}$.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.14 no.2
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• pp.39-76
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• 2011

We explain some basic elements of Martin-L$\ddot{o}$f's type theory and examine the distinction between propositions and judgments. In section 1, we introduce the problem. In section 2, we explain the concept of proposition in the intuitionistic type theory as a development of the intuitionistic conception of proposition. In section 3, we explain the concept of judgment in the intuitionistic type theory. In section 4, we explain some basic inference rules and examine a particular derivation in the theory. In section 5, we examine one route from the Fregean distinction between propositions and judgments to the distinction between them in the intuitionistic type theory, paying attention to the alleged necessity for introducing different forms of judgments.

• Journal for History of Mathematics
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• v.20 no.3
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• pp.105-126
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• 2007

The present paper considers how to teach mathematical concepts. In particular, we aim to a balanced, unified achievement for three elements of concept loaming such as concept understanding, computation and application through one's mathematical intuition. In order to do this, we classify concepts into three patterns, that is, intuitive concepts, logical concepts and formal concepts. Such classification is based on three kinds of philosophy of mathematics : intuitionism, logicism, fomalism. We provide a concrete, practical investigation with important nine concepts in theory of vectors from the viewpoint of three patterns of concepts. As a consequence, we suggest certain solutions for an effective concept learning in teaching theory of vectors.

• Journal for History of Mathematics
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• v.24 no.4
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• pp.45-59
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• 2011

Constructionists believe that mathematical knowledge is obtained by a series of purely mental constructions, with all mathematical objects existing only in the mind of the mathematician. But constructivism runs the risk of rejecting the classical laws of logic, especially the principle of bivalence and L. E. M.(Law of the Excluded Middle). This philosophy of mathematics also does not take into account the external world, and when it is taken to extremes it can mean that there is no possibility of communication from one mind to another. Two constructionists, Brouwer and Dummett, are common in rejecting the L. E. M. as a basic law of logic. As indicated by Dummett, those who first realized that rejecting realism entailed rejecting classical logic were the intuitionists of the school of Brouwer. However for Dummett, the debate between realists and antirealists is in fact a debate about semantics - about how language gets its meaning. This difference of initial viewpoints between the two constructionists makes Brouwer the intuitionist and Dummettthe the semantic anti-realist. This paper is confined to show that Dummett's proposal in favor of intuitionism differs from that of Brouwer. Brouwer's intuitionism maintained that the meaning of a mathematical sentence is essentially private and incommunicable. In contrast, Dummett's semantic anti-realism argument stresses the public and communicable character of the meaning of mathematical sentences.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.16 no.3
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• pp.407-436
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• 2013

I examine the notion of truth in the intuitionistic type theory and provide a better explanation of the objective intuitionistic conception of mathematical truth than that of Dag Prawitz. After a brief explanation of the distinction among proposition, type and judgement in comparison with Frege's theory of judgement, I examine the judgements of the form 'A true' in the intuitionistic type theory and explain how the determinacy of the existence of proofs can be understood intuitionistically. I also examine how the existential judgements of the form 'Pf(A) exists' should be understood. In particular, I diagnose the reason why such existential judgements do not have propositional contents. I criticize an understanding of the existential judgements as elliptical judgements. I argue that, at least in two respects, the notion of truth explained in this paper is a more advanced version of the objective intuitionistic conception of mathematical truth than that provided by Prawitz. I briefly consider a subjectivist's objection to the conception of truth explained in this paper and provide an answer to it.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.2
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• pp.119-150
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• 1998

이 글의 기본적인 목적은 논리 체계의 근간이 되는 구조의 중요성을 부각시키는데 있다. 이를 위하여 여기서는 그러한 구조 논의가 격자를 통해 마련될 수 있다는 점을 논리, 철학적으로 예증하였다. 구체적으로 첫째로 그간 이질적인 체계로 간주되어 온 명제를 대상으로 한 고전 논리와 직관주의 논리, 다치 논리가 모두 격지 구조를 갖는다는 것을 형식적으로 증명하였다. 둘째로 격자 구조가 갖는 철학적 함의를 멱등법칙을 중심으로 검토하였다.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.5 no.1
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• pp.45-61
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• 2001

이 글에서 우리는 연관 명제계산과 무한다치 명제계산 사이의 관계를 살핀다. 구체적으로 우리는 연관 명제계산 $BN_{c1}$이 무한다치 명제계산 $L{\L}C^+$를 포함하는 확장 체계로 간주될 수 있다는 것을 보인다. 즉 $L{\L}C^+$에 직관주의 명제논리에 사용된 부정을 첨가한 후, $BN_{c1}$이 이 체계 $L{\L}C^+$로 변역될 수 있다는 것을 보인다.