This paper examines the characteristics and determinants of welfare attitudes in Korea. Based on Survey data, this study focuses mainly on how social-economic position variables, welfare status and welfare compliances influence attitudes towards welfare. Welfare attitudes can be classified by five areas as follows: legitimacy of welfare functions, affordability of welfare costs, need-based welfare principles, responsibility of welfare provision and adequacy of welfare spending. There are the major findings. First, attitudes towards welfare is identified state-friendly or pro-welfare attitudes. Second, among the social-economic position variables, welfare status and welfare norms variables, welfare compliance has statistically the most significant effects on welfare attitudes. Third, the level of pro-welfare attitudes is largely determined by welfare norms and images espoused by individuals. These findings suggest that we can not apply cleavages thesis which are developed by studies on the support for welfare state.
The core of Ahn Jaihong's 'Bulhamdo(不咸道)' is the principle of 'bark(?) bal(?) baer(배어)', and it forms the basis of the 'Dasarism.' Ahn Jaihong's 'Dasarism' explains the meaning of the Korean number by its etymology, and give it a political philosophical significance. He pays attention to the number of 'five (다섯)' especially, and his 'Dasarism' is based on this as well. According to him, 'five(다섯)' means 'Dasari(다사리)', and 'Dasari' means both 'everyone says what they think' and 'makes everyone live well' simultaneously. Ahn Jaihong tries to establish a unified nation state with Dasarism through which conflicts of right and left could be sublated. In order to do this, he had to offer 'a doctrine that can unite the opposing factions' and 'the prospect of a new country.' He discovered these two elements in interpreting the etymology of Han-gul, and organized these things into 'Chosun political philosophy.'
The purpose of this study is to observe whether intergenerational differences exist in support among major Korean political parties and, if so, how they exist, based on the results of the survey conducted nationwide. To achieve the purpose of the study, a questionnaire was prepared based on conjoint analysis, and the collected data was analyzed by applying a random parameter logit model. The main results of model analysis are summarized as follows. First, among the policy variables, statistically significant results were observed in the generation of 20s and 30s for the education variable. It was found that both 20s and 30s aimed for equal education at a higher level than other generations. Especially, the highest intensity aim for equal education culture was observed in the 20s. Second, the coefficients of major political parties were observed with a high level of statistical significance. This appears to be a result suggesting that voters decide on their voting behavior through thorough policy comparisons in addition to comprehensive consideration on various current issues. Third, a clear support for conservative parties was observed in the generation of 20s. A clear and intense distribution of preference for political parties classified as conservatives was observed in the 20s generation, which can be said to be mainly college students. This seems to be a profound founding related to the issue of "conservatization of the 20s," which has recently become a hot topic in Korean society. Fourth, a high level of support for progressive parties was observed in the 30s and 40s. The Justice Party can be classified as a minority party in the National Assembly House as of January 2019. Nevertheless, it was maintained at a relatively high level in national recognition, and it is presumed that the background was high level of support from the 30s and 40s. Fifth, a large level of standard deviation was observed in the preference for conservative parties in the 50s. This means that some respondents who are in their 50s or older strongly support the Liberty Korea Party, and some respondents in the same generation strongly disapprove it. Due to this countervailing power, it seems that the average support level for the Liberal Korean Party is low in the generations of 50s and older.?
The current state of performance halls in South Korea is closely related to the performance art and culture of the nation as the culture of putting on and enjoying a performance is deeply rooted in public culture and arts halls representing each area at the local government level. Today, public culture and arts halls have multiple management purposes, and the subjects of their management are in the public domain including the central and local governments or investment and donation foundations in overwhelming cases. Public culture and arts halls thus have close correlations with the institutional aspect of cultural policies as the objects of culture and art policies at the central and local government level. The full-blown era of public culture and arts halls opened up in the 1980s~1990s, during which multi-purpose performance halls of a similar structure became universal around the nation. Public culture and arts halls of the uniform shape were distributed around the nation with no premise of genre characteristics or local environments for arts, and this was attributed to the cultural policies of the military regime. The Park Chung-hee regime proclaimed Yusin that was beyond the Constitution and enacted the Culture and Arts Promotion Act(September, 1972), which was the first culture and arts act in the nation. Based on the act, a five-year plan for the promotion of culture and arts(1973) was made and led to the construction of cultural facilities. "Public culture and arts" halls or "culture" halls were built to serve multiple purposes around the nation because the Culture and Arts Promotion Act, which is called the starting point of the nation's legal system for culture and arts, defined "culture and arts" as "matters regarding literature, art, music, entertainment, and publications." The definition became a ground for the current "multi-purpose" concept. The organization of Ministry of Culture and Public Information set up a culture and administration system to state its supervision of "culture and arts" and distinguish popular culture from the promotion of arts. During the period, former President Park exhibited his perception of "culture=arts=culture and arts" in his speeches. Arts belonged to the category of culture, but it was considered as "culture and arts." There was no department devoted to arts policies when the act was enacted with a broad scope of culture accepted. This ambiguity worked as a mechanism to mobilize arts in ideological utilizations as a policy. Against this backdrop, the Sejong Center for the Performing Arts, a multi-purpose performance hall, was established in 1978 based on the Culture and Arts Promotion Act under the supervision of Ministry of Culture and Public Information. There were, however, conflicts of value over the issue of accepting the popular music among the "culture and arts = multiple purposes" of the system, "culture ≠ arts" of the cultural organization that pushed forward its establishment, and "culture and arts = arts" perceived by the powerful class. The new military regime seized power after Coup d'état of December 12, 1979 and failed at its culture policy of bringing the resistance force within the system. It tried to differentiate itself from the Park regime by converting the perception into "expansion of opportunities for the people to enjoy culture" to gain people's supports both from the side of resistance and that of support. For the Chun Doo-hwan regime, differentiating itself from the previous regime was to secure legitimacy. Expansion of opportunities to enjoy culture was pushed forward at the level of national distribution. This approach thus failed to settle down as a long-term policy of arts development, and the military regime tried to secure its legitimacy through the symbolism of hardware. During the period, the institutional ground for public culture and arts halls was based on the definition of "culture and arts" in the Culture and Arts Promotion Act enacted under the Yusin system of the Park regime. The "multi-purpose" concept, which was the management goal of public performance halls, was born based on this. In this context of the times, proscenium performance halls of a similar structure and public culture and arts halls with a similar management goal were established around the nation, leading to today's performance art and culture in the nation.
Lately a few of new ecological management policies have been developed and implemented to need objectives of national parks in effective ways. Examples include trail closing for preserving bears, no pets allowance for possible diesease expansion, and no fire in national parks. Such new policies can cause visitors and local residents inconvenience and dissatisfaction. Decision-making processes based on public participation became more important as a primary mean to decrease such undesirable reactions. This study examined conflicts between collective value and individual preference in process building an ecological management policy by analysis of questionnaire survey results. The subjects of the present study were 242 university students. The majority(93.%) accepted the need of public participation in decision-making processes, and the most important reason was that such processes can properly help decison makers understand what the public and local residents want(51.7%). They also answered that individual property right can be limited for preserving species but the limited right should be compensated by the government(93.0%). The great majority(97.1%) of respondents supported the trail closing policy designed to protect bears(Urus thibetanus) from being captured no matter what their personal preference is. On the contrary, more than half of the respondents answered that local residents should be allowed to gather herbs and plants even within national park area since they have been doing for a long time. The results of the present study seem to support major findings of some previous studies that it is critical for policy makers to encourage the public to consider issues under debate from the perspective of collective value rather than individual preference and provide them with necessary information and chances to discuss to each other in public participation processes.
The paper introduces US Indo-Pacific Strategy and discusses its meanings and implications for international security and our strategy. It tries to look at the Indo-Pacific strategy(IPS) through the lenses of international political theories. The paper provides three important observations. First, the US Indo-Pacific strategy is a declaration of the national identity of the US as an Indo-Pacific nation. The paper argues that the IPS reflects the US leadership that would facilitate the formation of, so called, the Indo-Pacific community. In arguing these points, the paper notes that the IPS has rich elements of constructivist approaches including norms and national identity. Second, the paper observes that the IPS report serves as an effective deterrent strategy. The IPS does not call out China as an enemy. But, it tries to deter against a range of actors including China by warning that whoever violates the rules-based order in the region would have consequences. Third, the paper maintains that the IPS is an effort by the US to mitigate the risk of a great power war between the US (an established power) and China (a challenging power) because the IPS articulates the United States's willingness to work with China as long as it plays by the rules. There will be challenges to the US and other countries in the region including South Korea particularly because of economic interdependence. However, the paper argues that the IPS stands for an optimistic sign of the future security in the Indo-Pacific region because it is a manifestation of the US for its national will to defend the status quo characterized as Pax Americana which has been maintained since the end of the Second World War. It also argues that South Korea also can, and should make the most of this opportunity by enhancing our capacity in national defense.
The Cambodian People's Party swept all 125 assembly seats with 76.78% of the vote in 2018 general elections. The Cambodian National Rescue Party, having been dissolved by court, was excluded from the election and attempted to nullify the legitimacy of the election by demanding its supporters to boycott the election. The Cambodian People's Party launched a campaign encouraging to vote in a desperate need to thwart the boycott movement. The election then became an unprecedented kind of competition the winner of which is decided not by the percentage of the vote but by turnout. The Cambodian People's Party was the winner with the high turnout of 82.89%, securing the means to defend the legitimacy of the election. The potential supporters of the Cambodian National Rescue Party spread out with about a million voters switching to support the Cambodian People's Party. Over a half million invalid votes that unequivocally voiced opposition to the Cambodian People's Party were not sufficient to deny the legitimacy of the election. Having experienced the fierce competition in the 2013 general elections that threatened to end its rule, the Cambodian People's Party decided to secure its power in the upcoming election and executed a tactic designed to remove the rival party through legal means. Competition being removed, the Cambodian political system decayed back to hegemonic electoral authoritarianism from competitive electoral authoritarianism to which it had mad gradual progress through the general elections in the past.
Power and status are core elements that distinguish social classes and strongly influence social interaction. Although they are the foundation of social influence, they have different origins (Fragale et al., 2011). While power usually is based on personal ability or legal, institutional legitimacy, status is rooted in voluntary support from other people. Hence, whereas people with power often demonstrate egoistic behavior, those with high status show relationship-based altruism (Hasty & Maner, 2020). People recognize the difference between the two and have stereotypical beliefs or expectations about the people's behavior with high power or status (Magee, 2009). The current research tested how the judgment on social exclusion, the unique social influence of power and status, changes depending on the actor's power and status. We constructed social exclusion scenarios in which we manipulated actors' power and status and asked participants to rate an actor's pain and behavioral fairness. Participants' ratings showed that the actor's fairness and pain would differ depending on the actor's power and status (Expt. 1), which is consistent with the stereotypes above. In particular, the significant effects of the actor's anonymity in the cases of low power and high status (Expts. 2A, 2B) provide further evidence for the proposal that status but not power originates from voluntary support from others.
This study explores gender mechanism of welfare politics in Korea from the perspective of welfare status theory. In the simplistic analysis, it is found that there is no gender difference in welfare attitudes. In the more sophisticated analysis of welfare-status-beased SEM, however, it is found that Korean welfare politics is to be understood in terms of gender-related politics. Three major findings of this study are as follows. Firstly, Korean women possess less pro-welfare attitudes in terms of the status of welfare beneficiary. This is due to the visible gender segregation in the Korean labor market on the one hand and due to the centrality of social insurance programs in the structure of Korean public welfare system on the other hand. Secondly, Korean women have relatively higher level of pro-welfare attitude when it comes to the status of welfare service provider. Thirdly, Korean women tend to be more supportive to pro-welfare parties as they have less chance to be a higher taxpayer. Based on the above mentioned findings, this study concludes that it is possible to make Korean women be more pro-welfare if the Korean welfare state expands more social services that tend to meet urgent needs of women.
Smart work is deeply embedded in our contemporary lives. This is called Smart Life. The expansion of communication, caused by smart life is utilized for the political purposes of politicians, political candidates, and political policies. Chiefly, smart life includes improvement in awareness, personal relations, and policy advocacy. Socially, smart life leads the proliferation of issues and civil movement. In particular, smart life has a significant effect on culture. In the case of K-POP, it is disseminated going beyond space time. It enhances economic value added by joining and sharing at the same time. Smart life has numerous advantages such as improving the quality of life, but it might cause inconvenience depending on users because there are differences in acceptance according to generations. Due to the heavy weight on the device, there are some side-effects such as lacking in human thinking, disclosure in private life, lacking in basic securities, increase in information addicts who are anxious when they do not get on the Internet or SNS, and interference with work. However, this inconvenience can change into convenience when users are accustomed to it. Like this, smart life influences politics, economy, society, and culture a lot. Working environment of smart life is a new paradigm, which can generate high performance through working in an exciting and bright atmosphere with easy economy and putting value on results.
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