• 한국항만경제학회지
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• 제30권4호
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• pp.111-130
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• 2014

상법 제742조 제2항은 피해자 보호를 위해 책임보험계약의 경우 보험자에 대한 제3자의 직접청구권을 전면 허용하고 있다. 한편 선주는 선박의 운항과정에서 발생될 수 있는 각종 책임과 비용을 담보받기 위하여 선주상호보험조합과 선주상호보험계약을 체결하게 되는데, 본 계약규정에는 제3자의 직접청구권을 배제하는 소위, 선지급조항이 규정되어 있다. 최근 서울중앙지방법원은, 화주에게 보험금을 지급하고 대위권을 취득한 적하보험자가 선주상호보험조합을 상대로 직접청구권을 행사한 사안에서, 상법상 선지급조항의 효력에 대한 판단을 내렸다. 동 법원은 제3자의 직접청구권은 피보험자인 선주의 선주상호보험조합에 대한 보험금청구권이 아니라 제3자가 선주상호보험조합에 대하여 가지는 손해배상청구권이며, 상법 제742조 제2항에 규정된 직접청구권은 피해자 보호를 위해 인정된 강행규정이므로 이를 배제하는 보험계약규정상 선지급조항은 무효라고 판시하였다. 이번 판결은 하급심 판결이면서 분쟁금액도 소액이지만, 피해자이자 제3자인 화물이해관계자가 선주의 책임보험자인 선주상호보험조합에 대하여 직접청구권을 행사할 수 있는지와 선주상호보험조합이 피해자에게 책임보험계약상 각종 항변권을 주장할 수 있는지에 대한 최초의 판결로서 학계와 실무계에 시사하는 바가 크다. 따라서 본 논문의 목적은 해상보험업계에서 지도적 위치에 있는 영국법과 비교 분석을 통해 선주상호보험조합에 대한 적하보험자의 직접청구권의 법적 성질과 선지급조항의 효력이 주된 쟁점이 되었던 서울중앙법원 판결의 타당성을 평가하고, 향후 법률상 분쟁을 예방하기 위한 상법의 개정방향을 제시하는 것이다. 본 논문은 제3자의 직접청구권은 보험금청구권이므로 선지급조항이 유효하다는 입장에서 대상판결을 비판하고, 상법도 직접청구권이 보험금청구권이라는 점을 명확히 하도록 개정되어야 한다고 주장한다.

• 무역상무연구
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• 제33권
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• pp.191-219
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• 2007

Section 39(5) of Marine Insurance Act 1906 concerns the case where with the privity of the assured, the ship is sent to sea in an unseaworthy state. The underwriters argue that the assured had"blind-eye knowledge" of the particular respect in which the ship was unseaworthy. Blind-eye knowledge requires a conscious reason for blinding the eye. There must be at least a suspicion of a truth about which one do not want to know and which one refuse to investigate. What has caused greater difficulty is the broad provision in s.17 which appears to be unlimited in its scope. The expression "utmost good faith" appears to derive from the idea of uberrimae fidei, words which indeed appear in the sidenote. The concept of uberrima fides does not appear to have derived from civil law and it has been regarded as unnecessary in civilian systems. S.17 raises many questions. But only two of them are critical to the decision of the present appeal-the fraudulent claim question and the litigation question. It is however necessary to discuss them in the context of a consideration of the problematic character of s.17. In the Star Sea Case, for the defendants to succeed in their defence under this part of the case the defendants have to show that claim was made fraudulently. They have failed to obtain a finding of fraud. It is not enough that until part of the way through the trial the owners failed to disclose to the defendants would have wished to see in order to provide them with some, albeit inadequate, evidential support for their alleged defence under s.39(5). The defence under s.17 fails. The Purpose of this work is to analyze the Star Sea Case, and to explore problems of the MIA relating to the judgement of this case.

• 무역학회지
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• 제44권2호
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• pp.83-94
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• 2019

Article 17 of the Marine Insurance Act (MIA) states that "A contract of marine insurance is a contract based upon the utmost good faith, and if the utmost good faith be not observed by either party, the contract may be avoided by the other party." In the Carter v. Boehm case, Lord Mansfield was the first to provide a comprehensive description of the duty of utmost good faith, which is analyzed here. This judgement not only laid the foundation for the Modern English Insurance Act, but it also influenced the draft of the English Insurance Act of 2015, which aimed at correcting distortions that occurred during the application of statue law and common law thereafter. The duty of utmost good faith, applied between Lord Mansfield's insured and insurer presents the context of information asymmetry of the insured and insurer entering contracts. In the absence of information asymmetry, in contrast to the effects of being in both sides of the duty of utmost good faith, alleviating the duty of disclosure of the insured, and it is also clear that the warning of the severity of the retrospective avoidance of the breach of duty of disclosure and the need for its limited application have already been pointed out. Furthermore, considering the principle of retrospective avoidance, the duty of utmost good faith should be understood as a concept limited to the duty of disclosure before a contract is concluded

• 무역상무연구
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• 제24권
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• pp.25-49
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• 2004

English contract law has traditionally taken the view that it is not the duty of the parties to a contract to give information voluntarily to each other. In English law, one of the principal distinctions between insurance contract law and general contract law is the existence of the duty of disclosure in insurance law. This article is, therefore, designed to analyse the scope or extent of the duty of disclosure and the remedy for breach of the duty in English marine insurance law. The main purpose of this article is also to seek the alternative remedy for the breach. The results of analysis are as following : First, the scope of the duty of disclosure is closely related to the test of materiality and the concept of a hypothetical prudent insurer. The assured is required to disclose only material circumstances subject to MIA 1906, s. 18(1). The test of materiality, which had caused a great deal of debate in English courts over 30 years, was finally settled by the House of Lords in Pan Atlantic and the House of Lords rejected the 'decisive influence' test and the 'increased risk' test, and the decision of the House of Lords is thought to accept the 'mere influence' test in subsequent case by the Court of Appeal. Secondly, an actual insurer is, in order to avoid contract, required to provide proof that he is induced to enter into the contract by reason of the non-disclosure of the assured. But this subjective test of actual inducement is somewhat meaningless in sense that English court takes the test of materiality as a starting point and assumes the presumption of inducement even in case of no clear proof on the inducement. Finally, MIA 1906, s. 18 provides expressly for the remedy of avoidance of the contract for breach of the duty of disclosure. This means rescission or retrospective avoidance of the entire contract, and the remedy is based upon a fairly crude 'all-or-nothing' approach. The remedy of rescission is too draconian from the point of view of the assured, because he can be deprived of all cover despite he is innocent perfectly. An inadvertent breach from an innocent mistake is as fatal as wilful concealment. What is, therefore, needed in English marine insurance law with respect to remedy for the breach is to introduce a more sophisticated or proportionate remedy ascertaining degrees of fault.

• 무역상무연구
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• 제42권
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• pp.275-305
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• 2009

Marine insurance contracts, which intended to provide indemnity against marine risks upon the payment of price, known as a premium, originated in Northern Italy in the late 12th and early 13th centuries. The law and practice were later introduced into England through the Continent. It is, therefore, quite exact that English and European marine insurance law have common roots. Nevertheless, significant divergences between English and European insurance systems occurred since the late 17th century, mainly due to different approaches adopted by English courts. The rule of warranty in English marine insurance was developed and clarified in the second part of the 18th century by Lord Mansfield, who laid the foundations of the modern English law of marine insurance, and developed different approaches, especially in the field of warranty in marine insurance law. Since the age of Lord Mansfield, English marine insurance law has a unique rule on warranty. This article is, therefore, designed to analyse the overall rule of the rule of warranty in English marine insurance law. The result of analysis are as following. First, warranties are incorporated to serve a very significant function in the law of insurance, that is, confining or determining the scope of the cover agreed by the insurer. From the insurer's point of view, such the function of warranties is crucial, because his liability, agreed on the contract of insurance, largely depend on in, and the warranties, incorporated in the contract play an essential role in assessing the risk. If the warranty is breached, the risk initially agreed is altered and that serves the reason why the insurer is allowed to discharge automatically further liability from the date of breach. Secondly, the term 'warranty' is used to describe a term of the contract in general and insurance contract law, but the breach of which affords different remedies between general contract law and insurance contract law. Thirdly, a express warranty may be in any form of words from which the intention to warrant is to be inferred. An express warranty must be included in, or written upon, the policy, or must be contained in some document incorporated by reference into the policy. It does not matter how this is done. Fourthly, a warranty is a condition precedent to the insurer's liability on the contract, and, therefore, once broken, the insurer automatically ceases to be liable. If the breach pre-dates the attachment of risk, the insurer will never put on risk, whereas if the breach occurs after inception of risk, the insurer remains liable for any losses within the scope of the policy, but has no liability for any subsequent losses. Finally, the requirements on the warranty must be determined in according to the rule of strict construction. As results, it is irrelevant: the reason that a certain warranty is introduced into the contract, whether the warranty is material to the insurer's decision to accept the contract, whether or not the warranty is irrelevant to the risk or a loss, the extent of compliance, that is, whether the requirements on the warranty is complied exactly or substantially, the unreasonableness or hardship of the rule of strict construction, and whether a breach of warranty has been remedied, and the warranty complied with, before loss.

• 무역상무연구
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• 제14권
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• pp.103-152
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• 2000

English contract law has traditionally taken the view that it is not the duty of the parties to a contract to give information voluntarily to each other. In English law, one of the principal distinctions between insurance contract law and general contract law is the existence of the doctrine of utmost good faith in insurance law. The doctrine gives rise to a variety of duties, some of which apply before formation of the contract while others apply post-formation. This article is, therefore, designed to analyse the overall structure and problems of the doctrine of utmost good faith in English marine insurance law. The results of analysis are as following : First, the requirement of utmost good faith in marine insurance law arises from the fact that many of the relevant circumstances are within the exclusive knowledge of the assured and it is impossible for the insurer to obtain the facts to make a appropriate calculation of the risk that he is asked to assume without this information. Secondly, the duty of utmost good faith provided in MIA 1906, s. 17 has the nature as a bilateral or reciprocal, overriding and absolute duty. Thirdly, the Court of Appeal in Skandia held that breach of the pre-formation duty of utmost good faith did not sound in damages since the duty did not arise out of an implied contractual term and the breach did not constitute a tort. Instead, the Court of Appeal held that the duty was an extra-contractual duty imposed by law in the form of a contingent condition precedent to the enforceability of the contract. Fourthly, the scope of the duty of utmost good faith is closely related to the test of materiality and the assured is required to disclose only material circumstances subject to MIA 1906, s. 18(1) and 20(1). The test of materiality, which had caused a great deal of debate in English courts over 30 years, was finally settled by the House of Lords in Pan Atlantic and the House of Lords rejected the 'decisive influence' test and the 'increased risk' test, and the decision of the House of Lords is thought to accept the 'mere influence' test in subsequent case by the Court of Appeal. Fifthly, the insurer is, in order to avoid contract, required to provide proof that he is induced to enter into the contract by reason of the non-disclosure or misrepresentation of the assured. Sixthly, the duty of utmost good faith is, in principle, terminated before contract is concluded, but it is undoubtful that the provision under MIA 1906, s. 17 is wide enough to include the post-formation duty. The post-formation duty is, however, based upon the terms of marine insurance contract, and the duty lies entirely outside s. 17. Finally, MIA 1906, s. 17 provides expressly for the remedy of avoidance of the contract for breach of the duty. This means rescission or retrospective avoidance of the entire contract, and the remedy is based upon a fairly crude 'all-or-nothing' approach. What is needed in English marine insurance law is to introduce a more sophiscated or proportionate remedy.