• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.137
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• pp.225-247
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• 2016

This research examines the philosophy of Toegye and Spinoza in the postneo-Confucian and post-modern perspective in emphasizing the activity of Ri(理) and reason beyond the similarities of system in their thought. There is no disagreement in viewing Toegye and Spinoza as balanced opposites in their attempts to harmonize man and nature. In this discussion, I will infer the similarities of Toegye and Spinoza in terms of an 'activity-passivity' thesis.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.123
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• pp.409-440
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• 2012

It is well known that Deleuze began his philosophical work from researching the biographies of many predecessors' such as D. Hume, Lucretius, I. Kant, B. Spinoza, F. W. Nietzsche, H. Bergson, and etc. Among them, especially Spinoza, Nietzsche, and Bergson constitute a foundation supporting the whole idea of Deleuze. He declared that the goal of his early biographical work is a theme converging the identity of two philosophers, Spinoza and Nietzsche, and it shows that these two philosophers had such a huge significance to Deleuze, at least by then. However, we may point out two issues here. The first is why Deleuze, who is recognized as a philosopher of 'difference', deals the identity. The other issue is, what kind of identity exists between the two philosophers, Spinoza and Nietzche. In a common sense, their ideas contradict to each other. Spinoza puts God at the center of his philosophical system, whereas Nietzsche declared 'God is dead'. Though Nietzsche expressed a concurrent opinion with Spinoza at first, it is well known that he turned his side against him soon after and criticized him sharply. There is a conflict at the core of this criticism concerning the existence or non-existence of God. Many think that Spinoza, however, cannot be free from the argument that his philosophy allows a possibility of atheism. Deleuze, who also called Spinoza an atheist, suggested a new viewpoint of the philosophy of Spinoza based on his attribution to the concept of 'power'. On the other hand, Deleuze reinterpreted Nietzsche, where he analyzed 'the will to power' in a totally inventive way. Likewise, the reciprocal communication of ideas connected by the concept of 'power' gives a foundation of identifying the two philosophers to Deleuze. In this paper, considering this reciprocal communication, I intent to reveal the foundation of identity of the two philosophers, Spinoza and Nietzsche, and as a result, investigate what the concept of identity means to Deleuze, the philosopher of difference. Furthermore, we will also take a look at how Deleuze presents a new perspective on the conflict on the existence of God of the two philosophers in the process of validating the identity.

• The Optical Journal
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• s.141
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• pp.18-20
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• 2012

"내일 지구가 멸망하더라도 나는 오늘 한 그루의 사과나무를 심겠다" 17세기 네델란드 태생의 철학자인 바뤼흐 스피노자가 이렇게 말했다고 한다. 그는 유럽의 대표적인 합리주의 철학자로 인정받으며 '에티카'를 통해 서양철학계에 커다란 화두를 던지기도 했다. 하지만 스피노자의 직업은 잘 알려져 있지 않았다. 그의 직업은 좀 색다르다. 그는 당시로는 파격적인 사상을 지닌 덕에 유대사회에서 추방됐고 카톨릭은 그의 모든 서적을 금서로 지정했다. 결국 스피노자는 렌즈를 가공하는 일로 생계를 유지하게 된다. 현대적 관점에서 보면 직가공에 의한 구면렌즈 가공이 이미 17세기 이전에 일반화된 것이다. 현대의 광학계 가공은 스피노자의 시대와는 비교할 수 없을 만큼의 다양한 기술적 발전에 힘입어 고정밀화, 비구면화, 양산화의 방향으로 진행되고 있다. 특히 성형 방식에 의한 비구면 렌즈 제조는 관련 분야의 핵심 기술이 되고 있으며 최근에는 적외선 렌즈에도 적용되고 있다.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.126
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• pp.295-320
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• 2013

This thesis amis to demonstrate basically that language has the potential enough to be able to determine human's belief, attitude and behavior for Spinoza. As long as the language could be conceived with the potential to do, then it is very important in human community. And it is through dynamic and changeable, not fixed state, that meaning of this language is revealed. For Spinoza, even sign and its meaning compose one language system, but both of which are different from the other community. Because language as sign used in a specific society is articulated expression of body image, each imagination as idea is necessarily followed by its sign. This fact makes us say that language express imaginal knowledge. But language should not be considered as an means to express adequate idea of it. By the reason that order of meaning is only determined by the connection of signs, and that of meanings, each meaning of sign is not fixed. In this respect, certain meaning is changeable on account of changing new order of ideas. Through re-arranging new order of meaning, language could express more adequate and better idea than before. but what the most important fact is that it is not sufficient to express adequate idea by the means of language. Power of language determining human's belief and attitude does not depend on whether meaning of sign is true or not, but on hegemony of order of meaning. with this regard, this world could be seen as battle area of conflicting for orders of meaning. The more members accept newly created rational thought through newly arranged words, the more new views of value gain power. Solidarity of man using common language can change the world. For this purpose, first step depends on freedom of thought, freedom of deliverance of thought in which spinoza insists through A Theological - Political Treatise.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.129
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• pp.315-339
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• 2014

Diese Abhandlung untersucht Jacobis ${\ddot{U}}ber$ die Lehre Spinoza und den von diesem veranlassten Spinoza-Streit. Damit sie $enth{\ddot{u}}llt$ zuerst Jacobischen Zusammenhang zwischen transzent und immanent und folgt auf seine Wirkungsgeschichte in der Moderne. Ich rekonstruiere den Streit zwischen Jacobi und Lessing und danach interpretiere dessen Rezeption durch Hegel und Schleiermacher. Lessing stellt anstatt der traditionellen Begriffe der Gottheit ἑν ${\kappa}{\alpha}{\iota}$ ${\pi}{\alpha}{\nu}$ auf. $Demgegen{\ddot{u}}ber$ behauptet Jacobi Salto mortale um ihn ${\ddot{u}}berschreiten$ zu $k{\ddot{o}}nnen$, indem er Lessing als Pantheist und Atheist bestimmt. Salto mortale bei Jacobi ist der Sprung zu dem ${\ddot{U}}bernat{\ddot{u}}rlichen$ und dem Glaube. Der Streit zwischen Jacobi und Lessing ist der zwischen dem Naturalismus und ${\ddot{U}}bernaturalismus$ und $dar{\ddot{u}}berhinaus$ der zwischen dem Athismus und Theismus. $W{\ddot{a}}hrend$ die Natur der Inbegriff der Bedingten ist, ist Gott der absolute Anfang der Natur $au{\ss}erhalb$ des Naturzusammenhangs. $W{\ddot{a}}hrend$ Spinoza Gott im $nat{\ddot{u}}rlichen$ Zusammenhang begreift, $fa{\ss}t$ Jacobi den im ${\ddot{u}}bernat{\ddot{u}}rlichen$ auf. Deus sive natura bei Spinoza $ver{\ddot{a}}ndert$ sich Gott im Menschen bei Jacobi. Gott im Menschen ist nichts anders als das Prinzip des Lebens und das aller Vernuft. In diesem Zusammenhang $fa{\ss}t$ Hegel Gott als Geist denn Subjekt des Lebens auf und $h{\ddot{a}}lt$ das Wesen des Geistes $f{\ddot{u}}r$ die sich selbst vermittelnde Bewegung. Dies zeigt sich als die Spinoza ${\ddot{u}}berbietende$ Immanenzphilosophie. $Demgegen{\ddot{u}}ber$ behauptet Schleiermacher die Einheit des Endlichen und Unendlichen in der $religi{\ddot{o}}sen$ Anschuung. Die Verbindung von Mensch und Gott ist die im Endlichen immanent bleibende Anschauung der $g{\ddot{o}}ttlichen$ Eigenschaft. Dies zeigt das transzendente im immanenten.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.38
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• pp.303-328
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• 2013

The purpose of the present article is to understand moral instruction through Ethics written by Spinoza and enable the implications drawn from its understanding to give shape to lesson plans. In his representative book titled Ethics, Spinoza speculates ultimate substance from the metaphysical perspective and converges it into ethics. The ultimate substance, which is a cause of itself, refers to immanent cause of all things that have numerous attributes as essence. All things in nature develop the substance and exchange influence among individuals at the same time. A human in the influential relationship perceives things based on one's beneficialness and assigns moral words of good and evil. However, a human, who is a mode of substance, should escape from morals that are superficial, relative, and objective, in order to realize nature. Becoming a more complete human requires going through moral imagination in reality but going beyond the imagination ultimately. Moral instruction premises the moral imagination of a student who exists as a mode; meanwhile, it is a study to escape from the influence of moral imagination. Good and evil arise from the limitation that an existing human has, but if a life is to preserve the necessity of ultimate substance, moral instruction can be defined as the processes of alleviating the influence that hinders a human's nature from being realized. Giving shape to this processes with the basis on the Spinoza's epistemic argument, moral instructional texts can be composed of stages to form more adequate moral ideas about moral subjects gradually and cumulatively. The moral instruction like this expects moral awareness which is relatively perfect than the present moral imagination. Furthermore, with the teaching and learning like this sustained, it is expected that ultimately the limitation arising from sensible perception can be overcome to approach the realization of a human's nature.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.105
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• pp.401-421
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• 2008

The purpose of this paper is to examine the achieved role of Kant philosophy in restructuring Deleuze philosophy from either a positive or effective perspectives. On top of this foundation, I will demonstrate the major part largely unknown in a composing structural elements of Deleuze philosophy as follows: 1. I will draw a bird's-eye view of the triad of Bergson, Nietsche, and Spinoza regarding Deleuze philosophy. Especially I will spare time in analyzing Deleuze's late works like and then demonstrate the structure of Deleuze movie philosophy. 2. The line of Kant's position in that circumstance will be clarified as well. 3. Through that, the meaning of Kantian attempt and its effect will be examined. Finally the connecting Kant with various levels of Deleuze's Copernicusian revolutions based on will certainly bring about a meaningful fruitification.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.114
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• pp.305-335
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• 2016

In the eighteenth century, the scottish philosophers Francis Hutcheson, David Hume and Adam Smith share the idea that morality comes from moral sense, which is a feeling of approval or disapproval of agent's motive and action. However, they have the different views in explaining the mechanism that generates the moral sentiments. Hutcheson takes a moral sense to be a unique mental faculty that is innate to all humans, and regards it as being guaranteed by supernatural apparatus like divine Providence. Hume and Smith reject Hutcheson's concept of internal moral sense and take a stage further Hutcheson's projects of internalisation by naturalizing morality in terms of the principle of sympathy. It is widely held that Hume's moral sentimentalism is essentially similar to Adam Smith's. Though there are important points of contact between Smith's account of sympathy and Hume's, the differences are considerable. The chief of them lies in the fact that Hume grounds our approval of virtue on our recognition of its utility and convention, and Smith does not. Smith grounds our approval of virtue on the impartial spectator's judgment, i.e., conscience. Hence for Smith, the impartial spectator is the one that bridges the gap between particularity and universality and works the vehicle of practical reason. Given this, in this paper, first, I will clarify the difference between Hume's and Adam Smith's understandings of sympathy. Second, I will elucidate how they explain the process to produce the moral sentiments based on their understandings of sympathy. I shall finally explicate in what way Hume's and Smith's theories on sympathy work as moral normativity.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.114
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• pp.177-212
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• 2016

Kants Begriff der Freiheit des Willens ist sehr kompliziert und verwirrend. Denn sowie es Ziel der ${\gg}$Kritik der praktischen Vernunft${\ll}$ ist, die reine praktische Vernunft zu beweisen, liegt der Fokus von Kants Begriff der Freiheit auf der Freiheit von Zwang, wobei Kant eine unbestimmte Haltung zur Freiheit von Notwendigkeit einnimmt und sie dann $schie{\ss}lich$ leugnet. Leibnizens Begriff der Freiheit dagegen hebt die Freiheit von Notwendigkeit hervor, denn er sagt, dass der menschliche Wille nicht nur vom Zwang der Leidenschaft, sondern auch von Notwendigkeit frei sei. Die Struktur von Leibnizens Freiheitslehre unterscheidet sich zwar sehr von der Kants, aber die Charakterlehren beider Denker, in denen die $M{\ddot{o}}glichkeit$ der Vereinbarkeit von Freiheit und Notwendigkeit behandelt werden, weisen viele Parallelen auf. Zudem ist Leibnizens Begriff der Freiheit sehr eindeutig. Daher ist ein Vergleich von Leibnizens und Kants Begriff der Freiheit nicht nur sinnvoll und $f{\ddot{u}}hrt$ zu einem besserem $Verst{\ddot{a}}ndnis$ von Kants Freiheitsbegriff, durch die vergleichende Analyse stellt sich zudem auch heraus, dass auch bei Kant nicht nur Freiheit von Zwang, sondern auch Freiheit von Notwendigkeit $m{\ddot{o}}glich$ ist. Leibniz geht $f{\ddot{u}}r$ seine Freiheitslehre von dem Begriff der Freiheit vom Zwang der Leidenschaft, welcher von allen Rationalisten anerkannt wird, sowie von dem Begriff der Freiheit von der Notwendigkeit, welcher von Spinoza negiert wird, aus. Kant dagegen definiert Freiheit als $Unabh{\ddot{a}}ngigkeit$ von den Naturgesetzen, was diesen Begriff von Anfang an unklar macht. Kant war sich anfangs der Zweideutigkeit dieses Konzepts nicht $bewu{\ss}t$ und hat es undeutlich gebraucht, doch in der Neuauflage von ${\gg}$Die Religion innerhalb der $blo{\ss}en$ Vernunft${\ll}$ erkennt er den Unterschied in den zwei Begriffen der Willensfreiheit, weshalb er bei der Rechtslehre in der ${\gg}$Metaphysik der Sitten${\ll}$ dazu kommt, die Wahlfreiheit zu negieren. Aber in den Abschnitten, wo Kant in der ${\gg}$Kritik der reinen Vernunft${\ll}$ und der ${\gg}$Kritik der praktischen Vernunft${\ll}$ die Vereinbarkeit von Freiheit und Notwendigkeit behandelt, $f{\ddot{u}}hrt$ Kant aus, so wie auch Leibniz, dass der intelligible Charakter des Menschen sich durch wiederholte freie Wahl formt, womit sich $best{\ddot{a}}tigt$, dass auch Kant die Freiheit der Wahl anerkannt hat. Kant leugnet die Wahlfreiheit, weil er der Ansicht ist, dass der Begriff der Freiheit als ein einheitlicher Begriff definiert werden muss. Doch Freiheit muss nicht zwingend einheitlich definiert werden. Da Freiheit von Zwang und Freiheit von Notwendigkeit nicht $widerspr{\ddot{u}}chliche$ Begriffe sind, $k{\ddot{o}}nnen$ sie dem selben Willen gleichzeitig zugeteilt werden. Auch wird erst hierdurch Autonomie $m{\ddot{o}}glich$ gemacht.