• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.17 no.6
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• pp.11-18
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• 2007

Multiple linear cryptanalysis has been researched as a method building up the linear attack strength. We indicate that the lastest linear attack algorithm using multiple approximations, which was proposed by Biryukov et al. is hardly applicable to block ciphers with highly nonlinear key schedule, and propose a new multiple linear attack algorithm. Simulation of the new attack algorithm with a small block cipher shows that theory for the new multiple linear cryptanalysis works well in practice.

• Journal of the Korea Computer Industry Society
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• v.4 no.4
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• pp.523-532
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• 2003

In this paper, we designed a 128-bit block cipher, Lambda, which has 16-round extended Feistel structure and analyzed its secureness by the differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis. We could have full diffusion effect from the two rounds of the Lambda. Because of the strong diffusion effect of the algorithm, we could get a 8-round differential characteristic with probability $2^{-192}$ and a linear characteristic with probability $2^{-128}$. For the Lambda with 128-bit key, there is no shortcut attack, which is more efficient than the exhaustive key search, for more than 8 rounds of the algorithm.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.11 no.3
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• pp.45-52
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• 2001

In this paper, we examine the method for evaluating the security of SPN structures against differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis. We present an example of SPN structures in which there is a considerable difference between the differential probabilities and the characteristic probabilities. Then we 7pose an algorithm for estimating the maximum differential probabilities and the maximum linear hull probabilities of SPN structures and an useful method for accelerating the proposed algorithm. By using this method, we obain the maximum differential probabilities and the maximum linear probabilities of round function F of block cipher E2.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.12 no.6
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• pp.59-69
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• 2002

Many Linear attacks have introduced after M. Matsui suggested Linear Cryptanalysis in 1993. The one of them is the method suggested by B. Kaliski and M. Robshaw. It was a new method using multiple linear approximations to attack for block ciphers. It requires less known plaintexts than that of Linear Cryptanalysis(LC) by Matsui, but it has a problem. In this paper, we will introduce the new method using multiple linear approximation that can solve the problem. Using the new method, the requirements of the known plaintexts is 5(1.25) times as small as the requirements in LC on 8(16) round DES with a success rate of 95%(86%) respectively. We can also adopt A Chosen Plaintext Linear Attack suggested by L. R. Knudsen and J. E. Mathiassen and then our attack requires about $2^{40.6}$ chosen plaintexts to recover 15 key bits with 86% success rate. We believe that the results in this paper contain the fastest attack on the DES full round reported so far in the open literature.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information and Communication Engineering
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• v.7 no.7
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• pp.1462-1470
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• 2003

According to the necessity about information security as well as the advance of IT system and the spread of the Internet, a variety of cryptography algorithms are being developed and put to practical use. In addition the technique about cryptography attack also is advanced, and the algorithms which are strong against its attack are being studied. If the linear transformation matrix in the block cipher algorithm such as Substitution Permutation Networks(SPN) produces the Maximum Distance Separable(MDS) code, it has strong characteristics against the differential attack and linear attack. In this paper, we propose a new algorithm which cm estimate that the linear transformation matrix produces the MDS code. The elements of input code of linear transformation matrix over GF$({2_n})$ can be interpreted as variables. One of variables is transformed as an algebraic formula with the other variables, with applying the formula to the matrix the variables are eliminated one by one. If the number of variables is 1 and the all of coefficient of variable is non zero, then the linear transformation matrix produces the MDS code. The proposed algorithm reduces the calculation time greatly by diminishing the number of multiply and reciprocal operation compared with the conventional algorithm which is designed to know whether the every square submatrix is nonsingular.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.17 no.1
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• pp.121-125
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• 2007

Differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis are the most powerful approaches known for attacking many block ciphers and used to evaluating the security of many block ciphers. So designers have designed secure block ciphers against these cryptanalyses. In this paper, we present new three block cipher structures. And for given r, we prove that differential(linear) probabilities for r-round blockcipher structures are upper bounded by $p^2(q^2),\;2p^2(2q^2)$ if the maximum differential(linear) probability is p(q) and the round function is a bijective function.

• Proceedings of the Korea Institutes of Information Security and Cryptology Conference
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• 1994.11a
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• pp.121-131
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• 1994

Differential Cryptanalysis(DC) 및 선형암호분석 공격방법은 DES와 같은 비밀키 암호알고리듬을 실질적으로 공격할 수 있는 효과적인 방법들이다. 본 논문에서는 DC 및 선형암호분석을 통한 DES의 취약점을 분석하고 이를 보완할 수 있는 효과적인 80비트 블록 암호알고리듬을 설계하였다. 설계된 암호알고리즘은 DES보다 일반 특성과 DC 및 선형암호분석 공격에 대한 비도를 향상시킨 것으로 분석되었다.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.30 no.3
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• pp.325-336
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• 2020

Nonlinear Invariant Attack is an attack that should be considered when constructing lightweight block ciphers with relatively simple key schedule. A shortcut to prove a block cipher's resistance against nonlinear invariant attack is checking the smallest dimension of linear layer-invariant linear subspace which contains all known differences between round keys is equal to the block size. In this paper, we presents the following results. We identify the structure and number of optimal bit-permutations which require only one known difference between round keys for a designer to show that the corresponding block cipher is resistant against nonlinear invariant attack. Moreover, we show that PRESENT-like block ciphers need at least two known differences between round keys by checking all PRESENT-like bit-permutations. Additionally, we verify that the variants of PRESENT-like bit-permutations requiring the only two known differences between round keys do not conflict with the resistance against differential attack by comparing the best differential trails. Finally, through the distribution of the invariant factors of all bit-permutations that maintain BOGI logic with GIFT S-box, GIFT-variant block ciphers require at least 8 known differences between round keys for the resistance.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.57-66
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• 2005

SHACAL-2 is a 256-bit block cipher with various key sizes based on the hash function SHA-2. Recently, it was recommended as one of the NESSIE selections. This paper presents differential-linear type attacks on SHACAL-2 with 512-bit keys up to 32 out of its 64 rounds. Our 32-round attack on the 512-bit keys variants is the best efficient attack on this cipher in published literatures.

• Journal of the Korea Computer Industry Society
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• v.5 no.3
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• pp.405-414
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• 2004

In this paper, we designed a 128-bits block cipher, Circle-g, which has 18-rounds modified Feistel structure and analyzed its secureness by the differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis. We could have full diffusion effect from the two rounds of the Circle-g. Because of the strong diffusion effect of the F-function of the algorithm, we could get a 9-rounds DC characteristic with probability 2^{-144} and a 12-rounds LC characteristic with probability 2^{-144}. For the Circle-g with 128-bit key, there is no shortcut attack, which is more efficient than the exhaustive key search, for more than 12 rounds of the algorithm.