• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information and Communication Engineering
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• v.16 no.5
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• pp.1102-1112
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• 2012

The policy of the United States is a Korean Peninsula free of all nuclear weapons. The United States government was considering the possibility of military action to eliminate the North Korean nuclear threat. Talk of military action peaked from mid-1993 through mid-1994. Such an attack might have led directly to a Korean war. At that time the nuclear crisis solutioned by North Korea-United States negotiation and ROK-United States alliance. PSI's purpose is to prevent or at least inhibit the spread of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors whose possession would be a serious threat to global or regional security. The most controversial activity of PSI is interdiction. North Korea has expressed grave concern over the initiative, stating that it has a sovereign right to develop, deploy, and export weapons, and that it would view any interdiction of its ships as a declaration of war. If South Korea is to execute interdiction North Korean ships expect tensions to increase dramatically on the peninsula with North Korea doing something quite provacative in response. South Korea cannot help approaching PSI with great caution, since it has to consider the ROK-United States alliance, and inter-Korean relations.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.14 no.1
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• pp.11-21
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• 2014

South Korea should not be in subordinate position in international relationships like the past. As the status of middle power. South Korea achieves peaceful unification through overcoming North Korea's nuclear and conventional threats, and builds military power in Northeast Asia as a 'balancer'. This can firstly be achieved by constructing "attack systems triad". 'attack systems triad' can be established through integrating the C41SR as a common strategy for the purposes of preemptive deterrence and retaliatory deterrence against the dangers of the present and the future. Second, denial deterrence can be achieved by establishing "defense system triad" by combining common military power and defensive weapon system. Finally, development of independent advanced technological strategies can be achieved by building defense industry and combination of research and development through constructing "Infra triad". As for constructing and reinforcing the future of the ROK military, a unilateral principle and policy efforts to achieve the aforementioned force construction models are needed. This can only be achieved through the government's national vision to take on the role of mediator and a basis founded upon the consensus of the public.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.14 no.6_1
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• pp.129-138
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• 2014

South Korea should correspond to the primary threat to North Korea's nuclear weapons. It is necessary to have countermeasures to solve the realistic problems of North Korea's nuclear weapons. We can intensify military pact between the United States and Korea and at the same time strengthening the current military power. Currently, we take note the threat North Korea's missile. We can not control the development of a nuclear weapon and there are possibilities that North Korea have successfully miniaturized nuclear enough to carry by the missile. We should overview and check the Korea's missile defenses system. While the direction of the overall missile defense system deployment with a focus on lower and upper air defense network. And discuss defense research should be to build a system that can be protected with a key strategic facilities and cities. While North Korea have nuclear weapon, the main issues related to North Korea's nuclear threat. The six party talks countries try to solve the problem by the international and diplomatic approach. At the same time we should make somewhat to defend measures such as military defenses of Kill chain system to protect our country. Kill Chain is on of the effective defense system. We know that North Korea do not abandon to develop nuclear weapons by diplomatic efforts. We should performed in fact by a variety of military suppression method.

• Journal of the Korean Geographical Society
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• v.50 no.4
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• pp.407-430
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• 2015

The purpose of this study is to prove double faced heterotopiatic placeness of North Korea which can be highlighted to one aspect through priming test. Korean-Americans are found to have a perception of North Korea as a closed society where political leader cult is practiced, Pyongyang as a display city. They have Christian nostalgia toward it as a place where Christianity was first introduced to. North Korea's heterotopiatic placeness is sharing the 5,000 years of history of the Korea peninsula on the one hand and being a closed dictatorship place on the other. North Korea is kept isolated and closed but has had a liminal space through the intentional open system like special economic zone. Pyongyang is the city for specific class where it shows the heterotopiatic character. Priming is found effective in Yeongbyun, a place of extreme mixtures placeness as being the hometown of the beloved Korean poet Kim So-Wol and the site of nuclear weapon experiment but Korean-Americans have not found any priming effect regarding the Geumgang mountain tour. As to the Arirang performance, a man-made landscape expressing North Korea's sense of value and ideology, priming resulted in preference. This study raises the needs for understanding North Korea as a multifaced placeness and it can purposely be emphasized and changed to contribute the two Korea's unification.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.18 no.1
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• pp.129-141
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• 2018

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effectiveness of preventive attacks through cases of military attacks against nuclear facilities in Iraq and Syria that Israel has conducted. It also suggests a desirable approach to preventive attacks against North Korea. The Operation Opera in Iraq in 1981 and the Operation Orchard in Syria in 2007 are examined with an aim to support the opinion "the preventive attack can not be successful in the long run though it may be effective in the short term". It is also possible to denuclearize if the effective preventive attacks on the Korean peninsula are conducted together with removing both nuclear weapons development means and will. In order to guarantee the successful prevent attacks, it is necessary to secure the legitimacy of preventive attacks as well as international pressure. Also, the reliable military attack should be done on facilities, manpower and monitored continuously to prevent developing the nuclear afterwards.

• Journal of Radiation Protection and Research
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• v.39 no.3
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• pp.127-133
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• 2014

North Korea's uranium enrichment facility is a matter of international concern. It is of particular alarming to South Korea with regard to the security and safety of the country. This situation requires continuous monitoring of the DPRK and emergency preparedness on the part of the ROK. To assess the detectability of an undeclared uranium enrichment plant in North Korea, uranium concentrations in the air at both a short and a long distance from the enrichment facility were estimated. $UF_6$ source terms were determined by using existing information on North Korean facility and data from the operation experience of enrichment plants from other countries. Using the calculated source terms, two atmospheric dispersion models (Gaussian Plume Model and HYSPLIT models) and meteorological data were used to estimate the uranium particle concentrations from the Yongbyon enrichment facility. A maximum uranium concentration and its location are dependent upon the meteorological conditions and the height of the UF6 release point. This study showed that the maximum uranium concentration around the enrichment facility was about $1.0{\times}10^{-7}g{\cdot}m^{-3}$. The location of the maximum concentration was within about 0.4 km of the facility. It has been assumed that the uranium sample of about a few micrograms (${\mu}g$) could be obtained; and that few micrograms of uranium can be easily measured with current measurement instruments. On the contrary, a uranium concentration at a distance of more than 100 kilometers from the enrichment facility was estimated to be about $1.0{\times}10^{-13}{\sim}1.0{\times}10^{-15}g{\cdot}m^{-3}$, which is less than back-ground level. Therefore, based on the results of our paper, an air sample taken within the vicinity of the Yongbyon enrichment facility could be used to determine as to whether or not North Korea is carrying out an undeclared nuclear program. However, the air samples taken at a longer distance of a few hundred kilometers would prove difficult in detecting a clandestine nuclear activities.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference
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• 2012.05a
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• pp.869-871
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• 2012

In this paper, we make silicon photodiodes for the detection of pulsed radiation that affects electronics devices and study the output characteristics of photodiodes using circuit design. We conducted the simulation for pulse sensing circuit and experimented the photodiode output characteristics using a high luminance light emitting diode. The results can be used for the design of the input sensor that is trigger of additional module for protecting a electoronics circuit from high energy pulse radiation.

• Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT)
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• v.7 no.3
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• pp.143-151
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• 2009

Due to a more favorable climate in the recent relationship between U.S. and North Korea, North Korea nuclear issue is expected to enter the new phase of nuclear verification. From now on, our government should make preparation for taking the appropriate steps against the situation developed after the declaration by North Korea. Therefore, this paper is to identify the problems that may be occurred in the process of verifying and dismantling North Korea's nuclear program and to suggest the policy considerations that should be incorporated in establishing the action plan for verifying and dismantling her nuclear program, based on the analysis of experiences to verify and dismantle the WMDs in the former Soviet Union and in Iraq, respectively.

• Korean journal of communication and information
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• v.25
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• pp.7-40
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• 2004

Today, nuclear energy conflict is caused from the dangerous radioactive material. The main party of this conflict are politic and economic systems which deride nuclear energy, and the persons concerned which it oppose and the anti-nuclear environment group. If the nuclear waste is transported from one nation to another nation, multi national anti-nuclear group appears as conflict party. We call this domestic and transnational risk communication new social movement. From the viewpoint of system theory, the new social movement can mean the offensive development of self-reference which withstand the "technicalization of communication" through the "symbolically generalized communication media" like money and power. By comparing Northeast Asia and Europe, the nuclear energy conflict did not show a big difference in the selection of nuclear waste storing site. In the Northeast Asia, when Taiwan exports the nuclear waste to North Korea, the international conflict broke out. In Europe, Germany has a hard experience with the construction-plan for the re-treating plant that produces the plutonium from the dangerous nuclear waste, and with the transnational transport of the nuclear waste. The new social movement aims the global paradigm which is able to guarantee the subtainability of ecological environment. The nuclear conflict in the "world risk society" is solved through the "discourse-alliance" which accomplishes sub-politics by crossing the border of class, nation and system.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Radiology
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.37-43
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• 2021

Republic of Korea has many nuclear facilities in the country, and Democratic People's Republic of Korea(North Korea) locates in the surrounding country. Therefore, it is necessary to construct the target facility's nuclear forensic data in a preemptive response to the changing international situation. For this reason, this study suggests "signature" materials used to understand the origins and sources of nuclear and other radioactive materials, taking into account domestic nuclear facilities and the nuclear fuel cycle. In domestic, pressurized light water reactors and pressurized heavy water reactors are in operation, and enriched and natural uranium are used as fuels. In the front-end fuel cycle, the signature materials can be nature uranium and UF6 in the uranium enrichment process. The domestic back-end fuel cycle adopts a non-circulating cycle excluding the reprocessing process, and the primary signature material is spent nuclear fuel. According to IAEA recommendation, the importance of these materials as the signature and characteristic contents are suggested in this study. To prove the integrity of nuclear material and build a national nuclear forensics library, it is necessary to grasp the signature material and acquire the characteristic data considering the domestic nuclear facilities and the nuclear fuel cycle.