• Korean Journal of Cognitive Science
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• v.29 no.2
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• pp.137-160
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• 2018

The present article reviews recent arguments on the moral-conventional distinction in moral judgment and discusses the implications for moral psychology research. Traditional research on moral judgment has considered both the evaluation of transgressive actions of others and the categorization of the norms on the moral-conventional dimension. Kohlberg, Piaget, and Turiel (1983) regard moral principles to be clearly distinguished from social-conventional norms and suggested criteria for the moral-conventional distinction. They assume that the moral domain should be specifically related to the value of care and justice, and the judgment for the moral transgression should be universal and objective. The cognitive developmental approach or social domain theory, which has been generally accepted by moral psychology researchers, is recently being challenged. In this article, we introduce three different approaches that criticize the assumptions for the moral-conventional distinction, namely, moral sentimentalism, moral parochialism, and moral pluralism. Moral sentimentalism emphasizes the role of emotion in moral judgment and suggests that moral and conventional norms can be continuously distributed on an affective-nonaffective dimension. Moral parochialism, based on the evidence from anthropology and cross-cultural psychology, asserts that norm transgression can be the object of moral judgment only when the action is relevant to the survival and reproduction of a group and the individuals within the group; judgment for moral transgression can be as relative as that for conventional transgression. Moral pluralism suggests multiple moral intuitions that vary with culture and individual, and questions the assumption of the social domain theory that morality is confined to care and justice. These new perspectives imply that the moral-conventional distinction may not properly tap into the nature of moral judgment and that further research is needed.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.137
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• pp.57-79
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• 2016

The purpose of this paper is to explain MacIntyre's critique of moral pluralism of modern society and reveal the limits of his critique of liberalism. It is a distinctive feature of the social and cultural order that we inhabit that disagreements over central moral issues are peculiarly unsettleable. Debates concerned with the value of human life such as those over abortion and euthanasia, or about distributive justice and property rights, or about war and peace degenerate into confrontations of assertion and counter-assertion because the protagonists of rival positions invoke incommensurable forms of moral assertion against each other. We usually call this situation 'modern moral pluralism' and concede as the natural outcome of the activities of human reason under free institution. But in After Virtue, MacIntyre vigorously criticizes modern moral pluralism. The main cause he took which brought about this state of affairs was the failure of 'the Enlightenment project'. According to MacIntyre, the Enlightenment project which has dominated philosophy for the past three hundred years promised a conception of rationality independent of historical and social context, and independent of any specific understanding of man's nature or purpose. But not only has that promise in fact been unfulfilled, the project is itself fundamentally flawed and the promise could never be fulfilled. In consequence, modern moral and political thought are in a state of disarray from which they can be rescued only if we revert to an Aristotelian paradigm, with its essential commitment, and construct an account of practical reason premised on that commitment. But one of the deepest difficulties with the argument of After Virtue is that the very extent of its critique of the modern world seems to cast doubt on the possibility of any realistic revival under the conditions of modernity of the Aristotelianism which MacIntyre advocates. Especially when we consider we are not only the characters found in our narratives but also we ourselves are the author of our own narratives. Moral pluralism is not seen as disaster but rather as the natural outcome of the activities of human reason under enduring free institutions.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.120
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• pp.109-130
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• 2011

The main purpose of this paper is to examine Putnam's recent conception of ethics, and show that it gives rise to an ineluctable incoherence with his rationalism. This suggests that Putnam's philosophy has to be far more naturalized to make his new position cogent. Putnam recently has shown some explicit turn toward pragmatism a la James and Dewey under the name of "pragmatic pluralism." Putnam says that traditional ethics has presupposed some form of ontology in one way or another, which he sees is based on an unnecessary pursuit of a misleading conception of objectivity. Putnam tries to get rid of any notion of ontology in ethics, whereby we can talk about a third view which runs between traditional objectivism and nihilistic relativism. In this sense, he defines pragmatism as "fallibilism cum antiskepticism." Putnam's suggestion makes a good sense as far as it goes. However, his continuous transition toward pragmatism is critically impeded by his own adhesion to the normative conception of "reason." In this light, Putnam himself is wobbling between Kant and Dewey, just as he describes ethics is. Dewey's pragmatism does not have recourse to the very notion of reason to secure objectivity necessary to make sense of moral experience. Putnam needs to be far more naturalized to reach cogently where he espouses, and this can be done only by renouncing the normative conception of reason.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.123
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• pp.379-407
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• 2012

The main purpose of this paper is to make a case for the availability of pragmatist ethics by showing the differences between utilitarianism and pragmatism. In this paper, drawing on Dewey's view, I show that Bentham and Mill were doomed to failure because they both regarded moral conduct not as a process but as a fixed act, the remarkable differences between their views notwithstanding. Besides, I also show that pragmatism distinguishes itself from utilitarianism by its focus on the aspect of the amendment of a conduct rather than its attainment. Pragmatist ethics works on the assumption that moral conduct arises only in conscious experience. What pragmatists mean by consciousness is not an ability just given to haman, but a function emerging from the human interaction with his environment. Therefore, morality is extended from and restricted by experience, because it is grounded in concrete experience, but not in the transcendental nor a priori realm. Since pragmatism suggests the possibility of "ethics without principles" in that it works through the way which successfully rejects the traditional absolutist ethics, while avoiding the downslide to a nihilistic form of skepticism. Thus, it may serve as a third view that overcomes a seriously divergent situation of the current ethical arguments. In other words, starting from the very nature of experience, pragmatist ethics offers a 'bottom-up' ethics, instead of a 'top-down' one. This reconstructive reading of pragmatism away from utilitarianism is expected to offer a more comprehensive account of our moral experience in the pluralistic world of diverged values.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.116
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• pp.437-464
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• 2010

The article, focusing on the theory of Zhong-He, sheds a new light on the philosophy of Daizhen. The theory of Zhong-He, according to the philosophical system of Zhuxi, serves as the theoretical foundation in erecting the apriori moral nature and guiding mental cultivation of subjects. Daizhen, on the contrary, criticizes the doctrine of Zhonghe in Zhuxi's philosophy as it produces negative side-effects of moral dogmatism. Zhuxi's doctrine, according to Daizhen, as it reduce the origin of morality to apriori condition of consciousness and delimit the range of cultivation to psychological realm of subjects, restricts moral subjects in the fortress of their own subjectivity. In this vein of his criticism, Daizhen attempts new interpretation on Zhonghe. The character Zhong (中), according to him, does not refer to apriori moral state or metaphysical moral substance as it does in the doctrine of Zhuxi. On the contrary, it denotes the state in which diverse existent beings are placed in their own position by their own dispositions. Similarly, the other character He (和) does not refer to the condition where an individual's consciousness is in equilibrium, but to the process of achieving the harmony of entire society in which diverse existent beings are communicating to each other. With his novel interpretation of the theory of Zhong-He, Daizhen could dissolve the tradition of Weifa (未發) and moral subjectivism in Zhuxi's philosophy and provide a way of establishing reciprocal communication and harmony between various individuals. It is in his ethics of rational mutual understanding where the significance of Daizhen's philosophy should be found.

• Journal of architectural history
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• v.10 no.4 s.28
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• pp.77-92
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• 2001

현대의 건축시기는 다원성의 시기 또는 복합성의 시기라고 불리운다. 모더니즘과 포스트모더니즘의 시기를 거치며 다양한 형태적 실험의 과정을 겪었고 수많은 이데올로기와 이론들로 무장된 논쟁의 역사도 갖게 되었다. 이러한 현대건축의 다양성은 건축디자인이라는 전문직의 사회에 기여하는 역할을 반추(反芻)함과 동시에 다변하는 인간사고의 역동성을 반영하고 있다. 건축관련 책자나 저널 등에서 흔히 발견할 수 있는 Neo-Classicism, Deconstructivism, Minimalism, High-Tech, New Moderns 등등의 건축양식들은 스타일을 지칭하는 언어라기보다는 건축적 사고를 지칭하는 언어라고 할 수 있다. 결국 건축디자인이라는 작업은 인간을 둘러 싼 건조환경의 생성에서 출발하는 것이므로 건축적 사고방식은 그 시기의 사회현상과 밀접한 관계를 맺게 된다. 20세기 말부터 불어닥친 디지털 문화의 사회변혁은 전 세계를 하나의 채널로 엮게 되었고, 이러한 영향들은 지역과 민족, 그리고 종교적인 요소들까지도 혼합하여 국경을 초월한 미래의 새로운 이상들을 꿈꾸게 되었다. 19세기 산업혁명과 함께 급속히 벨라진 인류문명의 진보는 필수적으로 세계화를 동반하는 것이고, 세계화와 지역성사이의 괴리를 통해 나타나는 문화적 비판과 충돌은 아직도 진행상태인 것이다. 세계화라는 통염은 문명의 보편성을 기반으로 하며 전통문화의 파괴가 뒤따를 수밖에 없는데, 현재와 같이 IT혁명을 통해 급속도로 빨라진 세계문화의 교류는 한 국가가 뿌리를 내리고 있는 문화적 유산이라는 토양을 포기하여야 할 단계에 와 있다고 논평할 정도이다. 여기서 건축은 문화적 상징으로 작용하게 되는데, 그것이 심미적이든 관습적이든 또는, 경제적이든 건축가는 해답의 제시라는 임무에 직면하게 된다. 20세기에 진행된 모더니즘의 건축은 구조와 공간에 대한 고전건축의 숙원을 고덕건축이 이룬 것처럼 15세기 르네상스 시대로부터 진행된 형태와 공간, 기능, 그리고 아름다움과 기술(technology) 또는 경제성 등에 대한 건축적 의문과 탐구를 일단락지었다고 할 수 있다. 이러한 모더니즘의 한복판에 Mies van der Rohe라는 거장이 깊은 발자국을 남기며 한 시대를 이루었고 그가 남긴 시대정신의 이념과 가치를 Miesianism이라고 부른다. 실용성과 도덕성을 근본으로 하는 Miesianism은 대중에 호소하는 미적 표현주의를 부정하고 지역정서를 중시하는 문맥적 접근방식을 경시함으로써 보편화라는 현상을 불러일으킨 국제주의 양식의 한 부류로 비판을 받아왔다. 즉, Miesianism의 단순하고 강렬한 외형적 요소는 그것이 내포하는 기술적 합리성이나 공간적 완결성을 무시한 채 전 세계에 영향을 미쳤고 동시에 지역적 저항을 받게 되었다. 시카고 및 전 세계의 Miesian들, 즉 Mies van der Rohe의 제자들이나 그로부터 영향을 받은 수많은 건축가들은 이러한 저항과 비판에 직면하게 되며 새로운 사고의 시대적 요구 앞에 고뇌하게 된다. 한국에서는 1978년 Mies van der Rohe의 제자인 김종성이 미국에서 서울로 돌아와 '서울건축컨설탄트'를 설립하며 본격적으로 Miesianism의 규범적 건축론을 설파하기 시작하였다. 이른바 시카고 국제주의학파의 건축전수라고 할 수 있는데 '서울건축컨설탄트'를 통하여 배출된 김종성의 제자들은 명쾌하고도 간결한 건축해법의 경험을 토대름대로의 정체성을 갖고자 노력하였으나 결국 다원적 가치를 요구하는 시대적 흐름 속에 혼란을 겪고 있는 것 또한 사실이다. 본 연구는 Miesianism의 기원을 밝히고 그것의 실수와 오류를 밝힘과 동시에 현대의 여러 가지 건축유형들과 비교하여 봄으로써 Post-Miesianism의 실체와 그 미래에 대하여 고찰하여 보고자 한다. 미스의 유산이라고 할 수 있는 Miesianism의 요체는 첫째, Schinkel로부터 이어받은 시대정신의 사명감, 둘째, Berlage가 전해준 전문가로서의 도덕성을 바탕으로 하여 이루어진 기술적 합리성의 실현, 그리고 마지막으로 그 당시의 추상예술에 대한 이해로써 받아들인 nee-Suprematism의 아방 가르데적인 자세라고 할 수 있다. 그러나 이것들을 전파하고 수용하는 과정에서 미스적인 단순하고 명쾌한 외관이 더욱 강한 인상을 남기게 되었고 또한 미스가 현대성의 본질이라고 믿는 기술의 전수는 모든 외관을 동일하게 만드는 International Style로서의 보편적 획일성을 초래하였다. Mies van der Rohe의 강력하고 규범적인 dogma는 그의 제자들에게는 강렬한 카리스마로 각인되었고, Mies가 원한 것이 아닐지라도 그들을 하나의 틀 속에 가두는 영향력을 행사하였다. 2세대이든 3세대이든 기술적 합리성과 추상적 단순미라는 믿음을 맹목적으로 추종할 때 그들은 Miesian으로 남아있게 되며, 거기서 벗어났을 때 non-Miesian, 또는 배신자로 취급하기까지 하였다. 이것은 미스의 제자들에게 강한 족쇄가 되어 형태적 또는 개념적 변화의 시도를 어렵게 하였고 시대적 요구에 부응하지 못한다는 평가에 이르게 되었다. 문화의 다양성과 역동성을 인정함과 동시에 Miesianism에 대한 새롭고 시대에 적합한 해석을 기대하게 되는데, 이러한 기대 속에서 우리는 Post-Miesianism이라는 새로운 유형을 엿볼 수 있게 된다. Post-Miesianism의 징후를 현대의 다양한 건축유형에서 발견할 수 있는데, High-Tech의 구축적이고 정밀한 건축 기술적 해법과 Minimalism의 반복성을 통한 추상미의 표현 등에서 뿐만이 아니라 Post-Modernism의 인간성의 추구나 문맥적 고려, 또는 해체주의의 형이상학적이고 아방가르데적인 실험주의 정신까지조차 Post-Miesianism이 공유할 수 있는 부분이 있다고 보여진다. 또한, 미스의 영향이 2세대, 3세대의 건축가들에게 미치면서 여러 방향으로 변질되어 가는 것을 우리는 발견할 수 있으며 그러한 시대성에 적응하는 시도들이야말로 새로운 미래를 향한 Post-Miesianism의 실체인 것이다. Mies가 말하였듯이 한 시대의 끝은 그 시대가 완전히 이해되었을 때이며, 모더니즘의 숙제는 아직 해결되지 않았으므로 Miesianism의 탐구는 Post-Miesianism이라는 새로운 주제로 계속될 것이다. 이를 통하여 21세기 디지털 문명의 시대 속에서 현대건축이 안을 수밖에 없는 보편성과 지역성의 충돌이라는 문제의 해결에 한 발걸음 다가갈 수 있기를 기대하여 본다.

• Journal of Preventive Medicine and Public Health
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• v.35 no.2
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• pp.141-146
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• 2002

Objectives : This study was peformed in order to assess the incidence of hypertension based on two-years follow-up of a rural hypertension-free cohort in Korea. Methods : The study cohen comprised 2,580 subjects aged above 20 (1,107 men and 1,473 women) of Chung-Song County in Kyungpook Province judged to be hypertensive-free at the baseline examination in 1996. For each of two examinations in the two-year follow-up, those subjects free of hypertension were followed for the development of hypertension to the next examination one year (1997) and two years later (1998). The drop-out rate was 24.7% in men and 19.6% in women. Hypertension was defined as follows 1) above mild hypertension as a SBP above 140 mmHg or a DBP above 90 mmMg,2) above moderate hypertension as a SBP above 160 mmHg or a DBP above 100 mmHg or when the participant reported having used antihypertensive medication after beginning this survey. Results : The age-standardized incidence of above mild hypertension was 6 per 100 person years (PYS) in men and that of above moderate hypertension was 1.2. In women, the age-standardized rate for above mild hypertension was 5.7 and 1.5 for above mild and moderate hypertension, respectively. However, the rates of incidence as calculated by the risk method were 4.8% and 1.0% in men and 4.6%, 1.2% in women, respectively. In both genders, incidence was significantly associated with advancing age(p<0.01), In men, the incidences of above moderate hypertension by age group were 0.5 per 100 PYS aged 20-39, 0.7 aged 40-49, 1.7 aged 50-59, 3.6 aged 60-69, and 5.8 aged above 70(p<0.01). In women, those the incidence measured 0.6 per 100 PYS aged 20-39, 1.8 aged 40-49, 1.3 aged 50-59, 3.3 aged 60-69, and 5.6 aged above 70(p<0.01). After age 60, the incidence of hypertension increased rapidly. Conclusions : The incidence data of hypertension reported in this study may serve as a reference data for evaluating the impact of future public efforts in the primary prevention of hypertension in Korea.