• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.32
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• pp.395-432
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• 2011

The purpose of this study is (i) to explore arguments of post-kohlbergian approach in moral psychology and; (ii) to analyze Blasi's and Lapsley's positions regarding the relationship between moral philosophy and psychology in terms of reflective reasoning and; (ⅲ) to suggest their's implication concerning the future development of moral identity theory. Moral identity theory has emerged as an alternative approach of the Kohlberg's moral development theory. Theorists of moral identity theory commonly criticize Kohlberg's theory as a philosophical psychology and insist the autonomy of moral psychology. However, one can find different positions within this trend, especially concerning he meaning and role of the reflection in moral functioning. Blasi emphasizes the importance of the reflective reasoning of moral agent, while Lapsley supports moral automacy contrary to Kohlberg's phenomenalism. Although Blasi had been negative about building moral psychology based on the moral philosophy, he has articulated the moral identity theory based on the concept of free will by Frankfurt. However, recently he criticizes intuitionist theory of Haidit and suggests the notion of the moral agent with the skill of reflective reasoning, or post-conventional thinking in Kohlberg's terms. Blasi's perspective of moral identity has two version. The one emphasizes the moral understanding which means strong evaluation, while the other refers to reasoning with weak evaluation. This leads to an inevitable inner contradiction within his theory of moral identity. Lapsley considers moral identity as a heuristic idea and suggests moral chronic as a new model of moral identity. This model is based on the social cognitive theory. His social cognitive model of moral personality provides the account for implicit, tacit, and automatic of moral functioning, while reflecting the core of moral identity. Lapsley suggests that moral function involves conscious and unconscious processes. The former occurs in normal situations of life, while the latter in rare and unusual situations. He does not highlight reasoning in moral functioning as Blasi do. In consequence, I will argue the notion of the moral agent with the skill of reflective reasoning, or post conventional thinking in Kohlberg's terms in the moral functioning like Gibbs and Turiel positions in the Journal of Moral Education' s 2008 special issue. Moral philosophy and psychology should be in complementary relations. It means we explore not only more interdisciplinary researches on the moral functioning, but also researches based on the moral philosophy.

• Proceedings of KHEA Conference
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• 2006.10a
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• pp.95-95
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• 2006

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.93
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• pp.121-148
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• 2011

The uncodifiability thesis in anti-theory argument is the typical claim for the impossibility of ethical theorizing. Based on this thesis reflecting particularism strongly, contemporary anti-theorists in ethics argue that individual decisions in particular situations cannot be codified into moral principles. The uncodifiability thesis needs to be examined by the following two issues: a theoretical issue of whether the object of codification is moral practices or not; and a practical one of whether moral principles present the decision procedure of moral reasoning or not. The characteristics of practical reasoning show that the object of codification in ethics, as moral theorists insist, is not moral practices but morality itself. Also moral theorists, contrary to the criticisms of anti-theorists, insist that moral reasoning is comprised of not only moral principles but also moral judgments with contextual knowledge and moral wisdom. In brief, moral theorists make a persuasive response to the uncodifiability thesis when they do neither intend to codify moral practices into moral principles nor to deduce the moral reasoning from moral principles. For them moral judgments should be examined by the moral principles which present universal and idealistic morality.

• Journal of the Korean Home Economics Association
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• v.45 no.3
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• pp.71-86
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• 2007

The purpose of this study was to investigate North Korean child defectors and South Korean children's pro-social moral reasoning, pro-social decision-making, moral reasoning and moral judgement on violence. The participants were 82 North Korean child defectors and 186 South Korean children in Seoul and Kyunggi Province. All respondents answered self-report questionnaires including 6 stories of pro-social moral conflicts and 4 stories of moral conflicts on violence. Data were analyzed by independent sample t-test, $Scheff{\acute{e}}$ test, repeated measure ANOVA and one-way ANOVA. The major findings were as follows. First, North Korean child defectors showed a bigger difference between the level of pro-social moral reasoning in close relationship situations and that in distant relationship situations than South Korean children did. In the 11-13 year old group, North Korean child defectors showed lower level of pro-social moral reasoning than that of South Korean children. Second, children showed more helping responses in close relationship situations than in distant relationship situations. The 11-13 year old group Children also showed more helping responses than the 14-16 year old group did. Third, 11-13 year old South Korean children showed a higher level of moral reasoning on violence than the North Korean child defectors did. Finally, North Korean child defectors judged violence with a justifiable intention as being more wrong than South Korean children did.

• Korean Journal of Child Studies
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• v.26 no.2
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• pp.1-14
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• 2005

This study investigated moral judgment and moral reasoning about aggressive behavior by intention, presentation of results of aggressive behavior, and age of child. Forty-four 3-year old and forty-six 5-year-old day-care children in Seoul and Kyonggi Province were interviewed individually with 20 pictorial tasks. Data analysis was by frequencies, percentiles, means, standard deviations, paired t-test, and ANOVA(repeated measures). Both age groups judged instrumental and resentment-based types of aggression to be worse than prosocial or rule observance-based aggression. Both age groups judged aggressive behavior to be worse when results of aggression were presented. Five-year-olds judged aggression to be worse on instrumental than on retributive types of intent. Level of reasoning on aggressive behavior was lowest in cases of satisfying resentment Level of reasoning about aggression increased with age.

• Korean Journal of Child Studies
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• v.24 no.2
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• pp.15-33
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• 2003

The 120 participants of this study were 5- and 9-year-old children and their mothers. Children responded to 24 prosocial moral reasoning dilemmas and 8 prosocial decision-making tasks. Mothers' prosocial moral reasoning was assessed with questionnaires. Level of moral reasoning was higher in distant than in close relationships. 5-year-olds in preoperational stage used the complex situational cues in their reasoning, and prosocial moral reasoning of 9-year-olds was positively related to mothers' prosocial moral reasoning in the situation with conditions of distant relationship, low costs, and internal responsibility. Children made more helping decisions in close than in distant relationship situations, low rather than high cost situations, and external rather than internal responsibility situations. 5-year-olds whose mothers were high in level of prosocial moral reasoning were more helpful.

• Journal of Korea Game Society
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• v.21 no.1
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• pp.149-160
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• 2021

Recently in the gaming market, immoral game behaviors such as flaming, trolling, and illegal program use have drawn attention as serious problems. With 209 gamers of , this study analyzed the effects of perception toward in-game rules, social identity, moral identity, and moral positioning with control of gender and gaming time. Results showed that moral identity and formal moral perception toward in-game rules had positive effects while moral positioning and social identity had negative effects on immoral behavior. Notably, moral identity had interaction effect with moral positioning.

• Journal of Christian Education in Korea
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• v.64
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• pp.145-171
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• 2020

Christian communities have long sought to find what type of moral judgment is appropriate and what the Christian behavior is, by taking the church's ethical norms and behavior patterns as objects of reflection. In the same context, Christian education also tried to base the psychological rationalism of J. Piaget and L. Kohlberg, but the reason-centered structural development theory was not the answer. In fact, the structural development theory, which emphasized autonomy while excluding emotions from the moral judgment process, over-emphasizing cognition or reason, eventually led to moral relativism, unlike what was intended. In addition, it was criticized for not being able to adequately elucidate the gap between human moral reasoning and behavior, and for attempting to interpret morality excessively within the context of social culture. Recently, these limitations of structural developmental theory have been reinterpreted by neuroethics, especially moral psychology theories, which claim that moral judgment ability is physically wired in the brain and relies heavily on networks between cortical and limbic system. The purpose of this paper is to review some of the newly emerged research themes of neuroethics, and then to discuss two main theories that explain morality in the perspective of neuroethics and the implications that Christian education should pay attention to.

• Journal of Ethics
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• no.82
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• pp.73-125
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• 2011

This article aims to search for moral educational implication of J. D. Greene's recent neuro-scientific approaches to deontological ethics. Recently new technique in neuroscience such as fMRI is applied to moral and social psychological concepts or terms, and 'affective primacy' and 'automaticity' principles are highlighted as basic concepts of the new paradigm. When these principles are introduced to ethical theories, it makes rooms of new and different interpretations of them. J. D. Greene et al. claim that deontological moral judgments or theories are just a kind of post hoc rationalization for intuitions or emotions by ways of neuroscientific findings and evolutionary interpretation. For example, Kant's categorical imperative in which a maxim should be universalizable to be as a principle, might be a product of moral intuition. Firstly this article tries to search for intellectual backgrounds of the social intuitionalism where Greens' thought originates. Secondly, this article tries to collect and summarize his arguments about moral dilemma responses, personal-impersonal dilemma catergorizing hypothesis, fMRI data interpretations by ways of evolutionary theory, cultural and social psychological theories, application to deontological and consequential theories, and his suggestion that deontological ethics shoud be rejected as a normative ethical thought and consequentialism be a promising theory etc. Thirdly, this tries to analyse and critically exam those aspects and argumentation, especially from viewpoints of the ethicists whose various strategies seek to defeat Greene's claims. Fourthly, this article criticizes that his arguments make a few critical mistakes in methodology and data interpretation. Last, this article seeks to find its implications for moral education in korea, in which in spite of incomplete argumentation of his neuroscientific approach to morality, neuroethics needs to be introduced as a new approach and educational content, and critical materials as well.

• Proceedings of KHEA Conference
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• 2003.04a
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• pp.168-168
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• 2003