• The Korean Publising Journal, Monthly
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• s.365
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• pp.78-78
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• 2006

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.129
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• pp.141-166
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• 2014

Xìng $sh{\grave{a}}n$(性善) theory of Mencius combined xìng(性) that means physical characteristic of human together $sh{\grave{a}}n$(善) that means moral value or moral behavior. Therefore in other to verify the meaning of xìng $sh{\grave{a}}n$(性善) we need to analysis human nature in Psychology and moral norm in Ethics simultaneously. And that necessity justified Moral Psychological approach to xìng $sh{\grave{a}}n$(性善). Mencius combined a priori morality and a priori moral norm and asserted xìng $sh{\grave{a}}n$(性善). And than he presented an example for a basis or a clue of mora norm and explained grounds of moral behavior. But various theory Moral Psychology considered morality as an attachment or derivation of human nature. So another new Moral Psychology is needed to investigate Mencius Xìng $sh{\grave{a}}n$(性善) theory in a viewpoint of Moral Psychology. And than that must managed morality and moral norm as essential problems firstly. That because Mencius considered human as a moral subjectivity and seek the clue or basis morality and moral norm in human nature. And secondly that must managed moral intelligence as a emotional intelligence, because of $li{\acute{a}}ng$ $n{\acute{e}}ng$(良能) $li{\acute{a}}ng$ zhī(良知) of Mencius meaned moral intelligence which was derived from blood tied and moral emotion.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.93
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• pp.121-148
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• 2011

The uncodifiability thesis in anti-theory argument is the typical claim for the impossibility of ethical theorizing. Based on this thesis reflecting particularism strongly, contemporary anti-theorists in ethics argue that individual decisions in particular situations cannot be codified into moral principles. The uncodifiability thesis needs to be examined by the following two issues: a theoretical issue of whether the object of codification is moral practices or not; and a practical one of whether moral principles present the decision procedure of moral reasoning or not. The characteristics of practical reasoning show that the object of codification in ethics, as moral theorists insist, is not moral practices but morality itself. Also moral theorists, contrary to the criticisms of anti-theorists, insist that moral reasoning is comprised of not only moral principles but also moral judgments with contextual knowledge and moral wisdom. In brief, moral theorists make a persuasive response to the uncodifiability thesis when they do neither intend to codify moral practices into moral principles nor to deduce the moral reasoning from moral principles. For them moral judgments should be examined by the moral principles which present universal and idealistic morality.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.147
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• pp.59-76
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• 2018

What are the conditions make a being x a moral agent? Can an artifact be moral agent? A moral agent is considered to be a rational being capable of distinguishing between right and wrong. This study critically analyzed Davidson's position on the condition of the rational being and argued that the network of beliefs with propositional attitude and the beliefs as their background cannot be a requisite for the rational being. Later, it proves that the conditions proposed by $Proke{\check{s}}ov{\acute{a}}$ are merely paratactically listed superficial elements. The moral agent in this study includes the rational agent and it is proven that the strong first person viewpoint is the necessary and sufficient condition for rational agent and moral agent. In conclusion, it suggested a the sketch of moderate skepticism which sets the tentative limit on the agent potential in an artifact by suggesting conditions for moral agent instead of intense skepticism that strongly denies the potential as the moral agent.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.43
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• pp.33-53
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• 2014

It's the situation that modern technological civilization shakes the life environment fundamentally without a serious reflection on the dangers. The sense of crisis' brought the rise of modern Ecology in awareness of survivability of the humanity. Because the serious reflection is not just a campaign for environmental protection, but is to establish the values which is possible to coexist and to make harmony between the nature and man, man and man, and to form a healthy relationship through philosophical thought and practice has intrinsic value for human and nature. Under these circumstances, if Yulgok lives now and he is questioned by the ecological theorists of the 21st century that "What do you think about the serious environmental problem of present times?", what really would be his explanation? In the presentation methods of the explanation, will question first what contents western ecologists who study Theory of the environment in technology, Deep Ecology, and Social Ecology propose, then will compare and introduce what similarities and differences from theirs. As a result, we'll be found that Yulgok's thought, moral consciousness, about the nature and humanity as a confucian scholar.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.32
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• pp.395-432
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• 2011

The purpose of this study is (i) to explore arguments of post-kohlbergian approach in moral psychology and; (ii) to analyze Blasi's and Lapsley's positions regarding the relationship between moral philosophy and psychology in terms of reflective reasoning and; (ⅲ) to suggest their's implication concerning the future development of moral identity theory. Moral identity theory has emerged as an alternative approach of the Kohlberg's moral development theory. Theorists of moral identity theory commonly criticize Kohlberg's theory as a philosophical psychology and insist the autonomy of moral psychology. However, one can find different positions within this trend, especially concerning he meaning and role of the reflection in moral functioning. Blasi emphasizes the importance of the reflective reasoning of moral agent, while Lapsley supports moral automacy contrary to Kohlberg's phenomenalism. Although Blasi had been negative about building moral psychology based on the moral philosophy, he has articulated the moral identity theory based on the concept of free will by Frankfurt. However, recently he criticizes intuitionist theory of Haidit and suggests the notion of the moral agent with the skill of reflective reasoning, or post-conventional thinking in Kohlberg's terms. Blasi's perspective of moral identity has two version. The one emphasizes the moral understanding which means strong evaluation, while the other refers to reasoning with weak evaluation. This leads to an inevitable inner contradiction within his theory of moral identity. Lapsley considers moral identity as a heuristic idea and suggests moral chronic as a new model of moral identity. This model is based on the social cognitive theory. His social cognitive model of moral personality provides the account for implicit, tacit, and automatic of moral functioning, while reflecting the core of moral identity. Lapsley suggests that moral function involves conscious and unconscious processes. The former occurs in normal situations of life, while the latter in rare and unusual situations. He does not highlight reasoning in moral functioning as Blasi do. In consequence, I will argue the notion of the moral agent with the skill of reflective reasoning, or post conventional thinking in Kohlberg's terms in the moral functioning like Gibbs and Turiel positions in the Journal of Moral Education' s 2008 special issue. Moral philosophy and psychology should be in complementary relations. It means we explore not only more interdisciplinary researches on the moral functioning, but also researches based on the moral philosophy.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.114
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• pp.305-335
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• 2016

In the eighteenth century, the scottish philosophers Francis Hutcheson, David Hume and Adam Smith share the idea that morality comes from moral sense, which is a feeling of approval or disapproval of agent's motive and action. However, they have the different views in explaining the mechanism that generates the moral sentiments. Hutcheson takes a moral sense to be a unique mental faculty that is innate to all humans, and regards it as being guaranteed by supernatural apparatus like divine Providence. Hume and Smith reject Hutcheson's concept of internal moral sense and take a stage further Hutcheson's projects of internalisation by naturalizing morality in terms of the principle of sympathy. It is widely held that Hume's moral sentimentalism is essentially similar to Adam Smith's. Though there are important points of contact between Smith's account of sympathy and Hume's, the differences are considerable. The chief of them lies in the fact that Hume grounds our approval of virtue on our recognition of its utility and convention, and Smith does not. Smith grounds our approval of virtue on the impartial spectator's judgment, i.e., conscience. Hence for Smith, the impartial spectator is the one that bridges the gap between particularity and universality and works the vehicle of practical reason. Given this, in this paper, first, I will clarify the difference between Hume's and Adam Smith's understandings of sympathy. Second, I will elucidate how they explain the process to produce the moral sentiments based on their understandings of sympathy. I shall finally explicate in what way Hume's and Smith's theories on sympathy work as moral normativity.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.38
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• pp.303-328
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• 2013

The purpose of the present article is to understand moral instruction through Ethics written by Spinoza and enable the implications drawn from its understanding to give shape to lesson plans. In his representative book titled Ethics, Spinoza speculates ultimate substance from the metaphysical perspective and converges it into ethics. The ultimate substance, which is a cause of itself, refers to immanent cause of all things that have numerous attributes as essence. All things in nature develop the substance and exchange influence among individuals at the same time. A human in the influential relationship perceives things based on one's beneficialness and assigns moral words of good and evil. However, a human, who is a mode of substance, should escape from morals that are superficial, relative, and objective, in order to realize nature. Becoming a more complete human requires going through moral imagination in reality but going beyond the imagination ultimately. Moral instruction premises the moral imagination of a student who exists as a mode; meanwhile, it is a study to escape from the influence of moral imagination. Good and evil arise from the limitation that an existing human has, but if a life is to preserve the necessity of ultimate substance, moral instruction can be defined as the processes of alleviating the influence that hinders a human's nature from being realized. Giving shape to this processes with the basis on the Spinoza's epistemic argument, moral instructional texts can be composed of stages to form more adequate moral ideas about moral subjects gradually and cumulatively. The moral instruction like this expects moral awareness which is relatively perfect than the present moral imagination. Furthermore, with the teaching and learning like this sustained, it is expected that ultimately the limitation arising from sensible perception can be overcome to approach the realization of a human's nature.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.116
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• pp.1-28
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• 2017

Axel Honneth's recognition-theoretical conception of morality is most often characterized as a teleological or ethical foundation of morality and understood in simple consequentialist sense. Besides teleological or consequentialist components, however, there are obviously Kantian deontological ones too in his moral conception of Recognition. This study is intended to provide a consistent and coherent interpreta-tion of it, which is largely adopting main features of the moral philosophy of Kant. This interpretation makes a deontological restructuring of Honneth's moral conception of recognition necessary. It is in this way that the moral aspect of recognition will be able to satisfy the intention and whole project of Honneth's theory of recognition.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.139
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• pp.133-167
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• 2016

Happiness is no more than a pleasant mental state that we can feel everyday. How to seek happiness is the key subject of positive psychology, for which we also need a clear neural system so that our emotional life can be accomplished. This is an issue in people with neural problems (such as psychopathy or hypochondria) as they can not achieve such emotional clarity. In this sense neuroscience is thought of as a new approach that can replace the traditional rational insight which has been aimed at completing a virtual life. But there is also a limit: we can not reach a virtual life with only a confirmation of our transitive state. A practice of virtue which our moral ethos aims at, has been a problem of rational insight. Here is a gap between our emotional life and our rational insight in which an anguish of psychology results. So a task we should combine organically is band between neuroscientific fact and ethical practice; a new addition to psychology. But unfortunately psychology can not solve this problem by itself, for it is a meta-question arising beyond psychology. Thus an explication of this meta-question is, I believe, a new theory of moral philosophy; one that can only be explored using an interdisciplinary approach.