• Korean Journal of Medical Ethics
• /
• v.21 no.4
• /
• pp.360-376
• /
• 2018

Nursing students experience ethical conflicts that lead to moral distress and moral sensitivity in clinical practice. Most nursing students have some difficulty in speaking up when faced with morally challenging situations. Hence, increasing moral courage of these students is important to improve the quality of practice, and carry out nursing responsibilities. However, research on the moral distress, moral sensitivity, and moral courage of nursing students has not been reported in South Korea. The purposes of this study were to (a) identify the levels of moral distress, moral sensitivity, and moral courage of nursing students and (b) examine the influence of moral distress and moral sensitivity on moral courage. Data were collected through a survey using self-reported questionnaires sent to senior nursing students at two nursing colleges in Seoul and Gyeonggido. A total of 138 senior nursing students participated in the survey. The data were analyzed using the IBM SPSS Statistics 23 program by Pearson's correlation coefficients and multiple regression analysis. The mean scores of the moral distress thermometer, moral distress, moral sensitivity, and moral courage were $3.53{\pm}2.18$, $57.33{\pm}43.35$, $134.98{\pm}13.98$, and $56.33{\pm}12.75$, respectively. The significant factors influencing moral courage were the moral distress thermometer and patient-centered nursing, which was a subcomponent of moral sensitivity. The explanatory power of the model was 5%. This study confirms that nursing students, like nurses, experience moral distress. It is therefore important to create organizational environments that support the moral courage of nursing students.

• Science of Emotion and Sensibility
• /
• v.19 no.3
• /
• pp.121-132
• /
• 2016

Emotion is considered to be involved in the moral decision-making process consisting of moral judgment, moral intention, and moral behavior. This research investigated the distinct role of two specific moral emotions, guilt and shame, when they are suppressed, on moral judgment, moral intention, and moral behavior through an online experiment. Moral emotion (guilt vs. shame) as well as suppression of these emotions (suppressing vs. control) was manipulated to infer the causality of moral emotions and the moral decision-making process when they are suppressed. The results suggest that suppressing guilt was involved in moral judgment and moral intention, but was not involved in moral behavior. In particular, participants who maintained guilt evaluated moral vignettes as more moral and perceived that they would follow the behavior described in the vignettes than those participants who suppressed their guilt. On the other hand, our data showed that suppressing shame was not involved in moral judgment and intention but was in behavior. Participants who maintained shame engaged in moral behavior more than participants who suppressed shame. We delineate the different mechanisms between guilt and shame on the moral decision-making process with the discrete emotion theory.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
• /
• no.32
• /
• pp.395-432
• /
• 2011

The purpose of this study is (i) to explore arguments of post-kohlbergian approach in moral psychology and; (ii) to analyze Blasi's and Lapsley's positions regarding the relationship between moral philosophy and psychology in terms of reflective reasoning and; (ⅲ) to suggest their's implication concerning the future development of moral identity theory. Moral identity theory has emerged as an alternative approach of the Kohlberg's moral development theory. Theorists of moral identity theory commonly criticize Kohlberg's theory as a philosophical psychology and insist the autonomy of moral psychology. However, one can find different positions within this trend, especially concerning he meaning and role of the reflection in moral functioning. Blasi emphasizes the importance of the reflective reasoning of moral agent, while Lapsley supports moral automacy contrary to Kohlberg's phenomenalism. Although Blasi had been negative about building moral psychology based on the moral philosophy, he has articulated the moral identity theory based on the concept of free will by Frankfurt. However, recently he criticizes intuitionist theory of Haidit and suggests the notion of the moral agent with the skill of reflective reasoning, or post-conventional thinking in Kohlberg's terms. Blasi's perspective of moral identity has two version. The one emphasizes the moral understanding which means strong evaluation, while the other refers to reasoning with weak evaluation. This leads to an inevitable inner contradiction within his theory of moral identity. Lapsley considers moral identity as a heuristic idea and suggests moral chronic as a new model of moral identity. This model is based on the social cognitive theory. His social cognitive model of moral personality provides the account for implicit, tacit, and automatic of moral functioning, while reflecting the core of moral identity. Lapsley suggests that moral function involves conscious and unconscious processes. The former occurs in normal situations of life, while the latter in rare and unusual situations. He does not highlight reasoning in moral functioning as Blasi do. In consequence, I will argue the notion of the moral agent with the skill of reflective reasoning, or post conventional thinking in Kohlberg's terms in the moral functioning like Gibbs and Turiel positions in the Journal of Moral Education' s 2008 special issue. Moral philosophy and psychology should be in complementary relations. It means we explore not only more interdisciplinary researches on the moral functioning, but also researches based on the moral philosophy.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
• /
• no.114
• /
• pp.305-335
• /
• 2016

In the eighteenth century, the scottish philosophers Francis Hutcheson, David Hume and Adam Smith share the idea that morality comes from moral sense, which is a feeling of approval or disapproval of agent's motive and action. However, they have the different views in explaining the mechanism that generates the moral sentiments. Hutcheson takes a moral sense to be a unique mental faculty that is innate to all humans, and regards it as being guaranteed by supernatural apparatus like divine Providence. Hume and Smith reject Hutcheson's concept of internal moral sense and take a stage further Hutcheson's projects of internalisation by naturalizing morality in terms of the principle of sympathy. It is widely held that Hume's moral sentimentalism is essentially similar to Adam Smith's. Though there are important points of contact between Smith's account of sympathy and Hume's, the differences are considerable. The chief of them lies in the fact that Hume grounds our approval of virtue on our recognition of its utility and convention, and Smith does not. Smith grounds our approval of virtue on the impartial spectator's judgment, i.e., conscience. Hence for Smith, the impartial spectator is the one that bridges the gap between particularity and universality and works the vehicle of practical reason. Given this, in this paper, first, I will clarify the difference between Hume's and Adam Smith's understandings of sympathy. Second, I will elucidate how they explain the process to produce the moral sentiments based on their understandings of sympathy. I shall finally explicate in what way Hume's and Smith's theories on sympathy work as moral normativity.

• Journal of Convergence for Information Technology
• /
• v.9 no.9
• /
• pp.78-86
• /
• 2019

In the study, the moral sensitivity, moral distress, and biomedical ethics awareness levels of hospital nurses are examined, and the mediating effect of biomedical ethics awareness in the relationship between moral sensitivity and moral distress is verified. As the study subjects, 153 hospital nurses were selected from both university hospitals and general hospitals in S city and J city. Using the SPSS WIN 21.0 system, data analysis was conducted via t-tests, the Sheffe test, correlation analysis, multiple regression analyses, Sobel test. The average level of moral sensitivity experienced by the hospital nurses was 4.70(out of 7), moral distress was 62.80(out of 336), and biomedical ethics awareness was 2.21(out of 4). Moral distress had a static correlation with moral sensitivity and biochemical ethics awareness, and moral sensitivity had a static correlation with biomedical ethics awareness. Finally, biomedical ethics awareness showed a partial mediating effect in the relationship between moral sensitivity and moral distress. It is important to develop a biomedical ethics education program that can help hospital nurses to resolve moral issues, thereby improving moral sensitivity and diminishing their moral distress.

• Science of Emotion and Sensibility
• /
• v.14 no.4
• /
• pp.555-570
• /
• 2011

In order to do morally right behavior that we cognitively know, prosocial moral motivation is necessary. Previous studies revealed emotion is important for prosocial moral motivation. This was supported by cognitive neuroscience studies using functional magnetic resonance imaging(fMRI) in which the activity of ventral striatum(VS) was observed when people made moral decision. VS was originally known as the core area of reward process but recently VS was found to respond also to social reward and even feeling of prosocial emotion itself. However it is not clear why VS was activated when people experience prosocial moral sentiments. The aims of this review article were to find situations in which people are prosocially and morally motivated and to understand more about the role of emotion as a moral motivator by examining evidence regarding the neural network, including VS, of prosocial moral motivation and moral decision-making.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
• /
• v.19 no.11
• /
• pp.415-423
• /
• 2019

This study focused on establishing the basic direction for the development of officials ethics education contents using value clarification. The value clarification is well known as an effective teaching and learning method to develop moral judgment among others as follows: moral sensitivity, moral motivation, moral practice. This study outlines the teaching-learning method and the evaluation method for the actual officials ethics education. This waits for the further empirical works.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
• /
• no.38
• /
• pp.303-328
• /
• 2013

The purpose of the present article is to understand moral instruction through Ethics written by Spinoza and enable the implications drawn from its understanding to give shape to lesson plans. In his representative book titled Ethics, Spinoza speculates ultimate substance from the metaphysical perspective and converges it into ethics. The ultimate substance, which is a cause of itself, refers to immanent cause of all things that have numerous attributes as essence. All things in nature develop the substance and exchange influence among individuals at the same time. A human in the influential relationship perceives things based on one's beneficialness and assigns moral words of good and evil. However, a human, who is a mode of substance, should escape from morals that are superficial, relative, and objective, in order to realize nature. Becoming a more complete human requires going through moral imagination in reality but going beyond the imagination ultimately. Moral instruction premises the moral imagination of a student who exists as a mode; meanwhile, it is a study to escape from the influence of moral imagination. Good and evil arise from the limitation that an existing human has, but if a life is to preserve the necessity of ultimate substance, moral instruction can be defined as the processes of alleviating the influence that hinders a human's nature from being realized. Giving shape to this processes with the basis on the Spinoza's epistemic argument, moral instructional texts can be composed of stages to form more adequate moral ideas about moral subjects gradually and cumulatively. The moral instruction like this expects moral awareness which is relatively perfect than the present moral imagination. Furthermore, with the teaching and learning like this sustained, it is expected that ultimately the limitation arising from sensible perception can be overcome to approach the realization of a human's nature.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
• /
• v.14 no.3
• /
• pp.361-372
• /
• 2016

The purpose of this study was to examine the mediating effect of moral elevation and self control on the relationship between moral identity, character strengths, family strengths, and altruistic behavior in the times of convergence. The collected data were analyzed by SEM. The results of this study were as follows: First, moral self has indirect effect on altruistic behavior through moral elevation and self control in turn, and character strengths, have indirect effect on altruistic behavior through moral elevation and self control and moral elevation, self control in turn, and family strengths have indirect effect on altruistic behavior through self control. Second, it was found that there was a significant gender difference in the structural weights of character strengths and moral elevation.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
• /
• v.146
• /
• pp.271-307
• /
• 2018

The purpose of this study is to elucidate on moral education's direction in the age of transhumanism. For transhumanism's moral education, I suggest a genetically modified plan, moral artificial intelligence method, and pharmacological method for moral bio-enhancement. I also suggest a plan for anti-transhumanism's moral education. Anti-transhumanism as a position in the ethical debate on human enhancement makes two main claims. One is a moral claim that human enhancement may disregard or violate something intrinsically valuable about human nature. The other is a political claim that human enhancement should be banned or severely restricted. In this article, I try to make a critical evaluation of transhumanism and anti-transhumanism. For this aim, I critically analyze the logic of both. Finally I argue that transhumanism's moral education has technological strengths and ethical weaknesses. But transhumanism's moral education can overcome the ethical weakness through human enhancement debate and real possibility. Anti-transhumanism's moral education needs to make significant influence through traditional education.