• Korean Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
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• v.6 no.5 s.27
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• pp.102-109
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• 2005

The contract price of successful bidders in domestic public work projects has dropped significantly under lowest bidding process. Furthermore, compared to the U.S. and Japan, the bids are substantially lower. The increasing trend for domestic construction companies to bid projects without considering markup or expected profit, with the purpose of gaining experience for future similar work, has contributed to the overall dumping in bid prices. The government has implemented controls in hopes of reducing the price dropping trend but these have yet to work in the market. This study determines the level of significance of the contract price of the successful bidder in domestic public works projects and identifies factors that cause bid-dropping by comparing to those of the US and Japan. By mirroring advance countries' rules and regulations to prevent an abnormally low bidder, recommendation are provided to keep unrealistically low bidders from winning the work.

• Korean Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
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• v.16 no.5
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• pp.86-96
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• 2015

According to previous research, the reason why Design-Build(hereinafter "DB") outperforms Design-Bid-Build(hereinafter "DBB") in terms of cost is due to less change orders(hereinafter "COs"). However, if biddropping was low for DBB resulting into increasing COs, then it would be wrong to conclude that DB is superior due to less COs. Therefore, in order to confirm such misjudgment, the attempt to comprehensively analyze biddropping, COs and delivery method was made as previous methods had analyzed either the relationship between delivery method and COs, or biddropping and COs. This research uses path analysis, which simultaneously compares effect sizes on COs according to delivery method and biddropping based on the project type, and validated the mediator effect. The research proved that DB outperforms DBB due to less COs cannot be validated as biddropping caused a mediator effect by intervening between the delivery method and COs for specific project types. Therefore, the mechanism of delivery method acts on COs through biddropping was established. Also, the identity of biddropping was investigated in a different perspective from previous research. Based on this result, this research is expected to help determine a delivery method by considering the mediator effect of specific projects and evaluate performance.

• Journal of the military operations research society of Korea
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• v.37 no.1
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• pp.49-70
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• 2011

This paper re-evaluated the research on the accounting information's effectiveness in military construction contracts, questioning the former research results on the central army's construction contract that was under the Qualification Assessment System, especially concerning the relations between the accounting information and the bidding ratios as well as the relations between the bidding rates and the defect rates, which targeted between 1 to 10 billions civil engineering, construction, electricity, telecommunication, and environment work types. Unlike the previous results, the relationship between the accounting information and the bidding rates was shown to be considerably limited that the bidding ratio could not be identified through the accounting information, while it could discern the relations with the defect rates. Furthermore, the proven results did not support the hypothesis that the differences in bidding rates could affect the defect ratio. However, through the prediction model of bidding and defect ratios, we could identity the accounting variables that influenced the ratios. Additionally through the results regarding the non-financial indexes in the Pre-Qualification items, the weight on these indexes could be adjusted. In conclusion, the research results has given us new understanding of the problems in the Qualification Assessment System which accounts for the majority of the current military construction contracts and provide validity on the government's expanded implementation of the Lowest Price Award System.

• Communications for Statistical Applications and Methods
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• v.18 no.1
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• pp.23-34
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• 2011

Property auctions have become a new method for real estate investment because the property auction market grows in tandem with the growth of the real estate market. This study focused on the statistical model for predicting bid price rates which is the main index for participants in the real estate auction market. For estimating the monthly bid price rate, we proposed a new method to make up for the mean of regions and terms as well as to reduce the prediction error using a decision tree analysis. We also proposed a linear regression model to predict a bid price rate for individual auction property. We applied the proposed model to apartment auction property and tried to predict the bid price rate as well as categorize individual auction property into an auction grade.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.32 no.2
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• pp.144-170
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• 2010

This paper considers the effect of various types of procurement auction system on competition focusing on the rate of successful bidding. We analyze the number of bidders and the rate of successful bids using online procurement data of the Public Procurement Service. The average number of bidders is 301 and the average rate of successful bids is 87.42% while the weighted average rate is 75.13%. These numbers show that there is quite strong competition among bidders and the rate is lower as the expected price is higher. When we analyze the data of price procurement auction, the rate is also shown to be lower as the expected price is higher. Furthermore, the rate decreases as the number of bidders increases which naturally makes the competition stronger. Meanwhile, the analysis finds that the inclusion of the onsite bidding, the PQ(Pre-Qualification) result, or major-10 winning companies cannot explain the rate much in our data. In case of turnkey-alternative, the average rate of successful bidding for 484 cases record 90.20%. The average is 84.89% with 120 alternatives and 91.97% with 364 cases of turnkey. The reason why the rate of turnkey-alternative is lower than that of price procurement auction is the lack of competition as well as the systematic difference. By setting up a model, we are able to explain the difference in rate caused by the respective reason. When we suppose there are 3 bidders in case of price procurement auction for a project that exceeds 100 billion won, the rate is expected to be around 64%. This implies that difference of 26% is caused by the systemic difference and 3% by the lack of competition. Therefore, we conclude that the difference in rate between turnkey-alternative and price procurement auction is caused mainly by the systemic difference. In case of PPP(Public Private Partnership) projects, among 154 projects in total, only 40% has more than 2 bidders that compete. The average number of bidders is 1.88 which is less than 2, and the average rate of successful bids is 90%. In sum, under the price procurement auction, there is strong competition which is reflected by the rate of successful bids. However, there is room to decrease the rate by strengthening the competition under the turnkey-alternative. Also with PPP projects, we expect the rate can be steadily reduced with revived competition among bidders.

• Korean Journal of Heritage: History & Science
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• v.55 no.1
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• pp.111-132
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• 2022

The comprehensive examination on tendering system has been introduced to the Cultural Heritage repair and restoration field since 2016 to remedy the repair issues of South Gate in 2014. The Cultural Heritage Administration tried to attain the high performance of the cultural heritage repair and restoration works securing the proper payment for the repair and restoration works. It is high time to review the operating performance of the comprehensive examination on tendering system (hereinafter referred to as the "CEOTS"), as the system has been run for over 5 years to correspond with its original goal, i.e., "The Proper Payment in return for the High Performance of Repair and Restoration works." This study intends to analyze 114 tenders of CEOTS from 2016 to 2020. As a result of the analysis of 114 tenders, firstly, more than half of bid winners were in the top 20% of repair & restoration capacity disclosure amount list, which mostly fulfilled the goal of 'attaining high performance.' Secondly, as the winning bid rate is decreasing from 86.847% in 2017 to 85.488% in 2020, the goal of 'guarantee of a proper payment' is not achieved yet. Thirdly, the influence of Economic Evaluation section in CEOTS has been grown since the change of scoring system in CEOTS in 2019. This study identifies two reasons why the winning bid rate of CEOTS has decreased. Firstly, it is caused by the fact that 'the group that got more than 1st place' and 'the first place group' that are more than half of the total bidders have the decreasing bidding rate trend as the years go by. Secondly, the exclusion rate of 'the group that got more than 1st place' is higher than the exclusion rate of 'the group that got less than 1st place', which means the expected winning rate would be lowered. It is proposed that the revision of CEOTS code is needed, i.e. easing the strict rule concerning the exclusion rate as well as setting up the lower bidding limit to prevent the excessive decreasing winning bid rate.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute Of Construction Engineering and Management
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• 2007.11a
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• pp.704-709
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• 2007

The purpose of this study is to present both problems and improvement plans on the bidding system of the Korea National Housing Corporation, which orders apartment houses professionally. For data gathering, this study used data from electronic procurement system from 2001 to 2005. The research method of this study is to analyze the data categorized into four types: changes of ordering and contract price ration, the lowest-pricing bidding system, and permanent projects by grades. As a result of the analysis, the amount of ordering is biased in favor of particular level. Finally, this study present following improvement plans: 1) screening system and the lowest-pricing bidding system need to be supplemented, 2) the contract price ratio and the amount of ordering should be controlled, and 3) the improvement of PQ and the introduction of the list of Qualified companies by types need to be presented.

• 월간 기계설비
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• s.233
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• pp.47-54
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• 2009

공정거래위원회(위원장 정호열)는 지난 11월 6일 표준하도급계약서를 개정하고 이날부터 시행에 들어갔다. 개정된 표준하도급계약서는 발주자의 요청에 따라 설계변경이 이루어진 경우 증가된 물량 또는 신규비목의 단가는 설계변경 당시를 기준으로 산정한 단가와 이 단가에 낙찰률을 곱한 금액을 합한 금액의 100분의 50 이내에서 당사자간 협의해 정하도록 했다. 다만, 발주자의 요청 이외의 사유로 설계변경이 이뤄진 경우에는 종전과 같이 $\Delta$증감된 공사의 단가는 수급사업자가 작성한 산출내역서 상 단가를 적용하고 $\Delta$신규비목의 단가는 설계변경 당시 기준으로 작성한 단가에 낙찰률을 곱한 금액을 적용토록 했다.

• Journal of the Society of Disaster Information
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.164-177
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• 2013

From 2010 years to 2013, the selection method of successful bidder has been changed design suitable lowest method, comprehensive evaluation method(bid price adjustment, design score adjustments, weight standards), fixed amount best design method. Therefore this study was presented by analyzing the impact on the domestic construction industry according the way to determine the successful bidder, the evaluation order method and the operational issues through the analysis of order status, order number, results of acceptance an order, success rate range, results of acceptance an order according to weight success rate, results of acceptance an order by work type and order institution of a turnkey alternative tendering construction performed in domestic civil part.

• 월간 기계설비
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• s.130
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• pp.12-13
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• 2001

건설공제조합은 지난 5월 25일 운영위원회를 개최하고 1천억원 이상 PQ공사에 대한 이행보증거부 낙찰률을 예가대비 73$\%$로 상향조정하는 등 보증인수조건을 대폭 강화하고 이를 6월부터 시행하기로 했다.