The purpose of this study was to examine the professionalism of dental hygienists in dental institutions and the influential factors for their professionalism in an attempt to seek ways of enhancing the professionalism of dental hygienists. The subjects in this study were 172 dental hygienists who worked in dental institutions in Busan and Gimhae. A self-administered survey was conducted to gather data, and an experimental analysis was carried out to analyze the collected data. The major findings of the study were as follows: First, concerning professionalism, self-regulation belief(3.70) ranked highest(3.42), followed by service belief(3.65), autonomy belief(3.31), a sense of vocational calling(3.30) and utilization of the professional organization as a standard(3.12). Second, the professionalism of the dental hygienists was significantly better when their title was higher, when they were older, when they got a larger monthly pay and when they intended to work for a longer time. Third, as for the influential factors for their professionalism, age, marital status, the estimated term of working at the workplace and opinion on reemployment were also identified as the significant variables that were up to the standard level of significance(p=0.05). The findings of the study suggest that in order to boost the professionalism of dental hygienists, it's required to take institutional measures to give them more responsibility, autonomy and authority, and how to improve personnel administration by providing strong motivation for them to look at their workplaces more favorably and keep on working for a long time should discreetly be considered.
As a sub-concept of corporate or organization governance, business governance and IT governance have become major research topics in academia. However, despite the importance of process as a construct for mediating the domain between business and information technology, research on process governance is relatively inadequate. Process Governance focuses on activities that link business strategy with IT system implementation and explains the creation of corporate core values. The researcher studied the basic conceptual governance models of political science, sociology, public administration, and classified governance styles into six categories. The researcher focused on the series of metamodels. For examples, the traditional Strategy Alignment Model(SAM) by Henderson and Venkatraman which is replaced by the neo-SAM model, organizational governance network model, sequential organization governance model, organization governance meta model, process governance CUBE model, COSO and process governance CUBE comparison model, and finally Process Governance Framework and etc. The Major difference between SAM and neo-SAM model is Process Governance domain inserted between Business Governance and IT Governance. Among several metamodels, Process Governance framework, the core conceptual model consists of four activity dimensions: strategic aligning, human empowering, competency enhancing, and autonomous organizing. The researcher designed five variables for each activity dimensions, totally twenty variables. Besides four activity dimensions, there are six driving forces for Process Governance cycle: De-normalizing power, micro-power, vitalizing power, self-organizing power, normalizing power and sense-making. With four activity dimensions and six driving powers, an organization can maintain the flexibility of process governance cycle to cope with internal and external environmental changes. This study aims to propose the Process Governance competency model and Process Governance variables. The situation of the industry is changing from the function-oriented organization management to the process-oriented perspective. Process Governance framework proposed by the researcher will be the contextual reference models for the further diffusion of the research on Process Governance domain and the operational definition for the development of Process Governance measurement tools in detail.
Based on the global smart city promotion trend, in 2018, the "Fourth Industrial Revolution Committee" selected "sustainability" and "people-centered" as keywords in relation to the direction of domestic smart city policy. Accordingly, the Living Lab program, which is an active citizen-centered innovation methodology, is applied to each stage of the domestic smart city construction project. Through the Living Lab program, and in collaboration with the public and experts, the smart city discovers local issues as it focuses on citizens, devises solutions to sustainable urban problems, and formulates a regional development plan that reflects the needs of citizens. However, compared to citizen participation in urban regeneration projects that have been operated for a relatively long time, participation in smart city projects was found to significantly differ in level and sustainability. Therefore, this study conducted a comparative analysis of the characteristics of citizen participation at each stage of an urban regeneration project and, based on Arnstein's "Participation Ladder" model, examined the level of citizen participation activities in the Living Lab program carried out in a smart city commercial area from 2018 to 2019. The results indicated that citizen participation activities in the Living Lab conducted in the smart city project had a great influence on selecting smart city services, which fit the needs of local residents, and on determining the technological level of services appropriate to the region based on a relatively high level of authority, such as selection of smart city services or composition of solutions. However, most of the citizen participation activities were halted after the project's completion due to the one-off recruitment of citizen participation groups for the smart city construction project only. On the other hand, citizens' participation activities in the field of urban regeneration were focused on local communities, and continuous operation and management measures were being drawn from the project planning stage to the operation stage after the project was completed. This study presented a plan to revitalize citizen participation for the realization of a more sustainable smart city through a comparison of the characteristics and an examination of the level of citizen participation in such urban regeneration and smart city projects.
When the marcher visited Korea in fall 1994, he was shocked to see high rise apartment buildings around the capitol region including Seoul and Suwon, resulting from rising demand of housing because of urban migration followed by second and third industrial development. After 6 years in March 2000, the researcher witnessed more apartment buildings and vinyl house complexes, one of the evidences of continued economic progress in Korea. Korea had to receive the rescue finance from International Monetary Fund (IMF) because of financial crisis in 1997. However, the sign of recovery was seen in a year, and the growth rate of Gross Domestic Products (GDP) in 1999 recorded as high as 10.7 percent. During this period, the Korean government has been working on restructuring of banks, enterprises, labour and public sectors. The major directions of government were; localization, reducing administrative manpower, limiting agricultural budgets, privatization of public enterprises, integration of agricultural organization, and easing of various regulations. Thus, the power of central government shifted to local government resulting in a power increase for city mayors and county chiefs. Agricultural extension services was one of targets of government restructuring, transferred to local governments from central government. At the same time, the number of extension offices was reduced by 64 percent, extension personnel reduced by 24 percent, and extension budgets reduced. During the process of restructuring, the basic direction of extension services was set by central Rural Development Administration Personnel management, technology development and supports were transferred to provincial Rural Development Administrations, and operational responsibilities transferred to city/county governments. Agricultural extension services at the local levels changed the name to Agricultural Technology Extension Center, established under jurisdiction of city mayor or county chief. The function of technology development works were added, at the same time reducing the number of educators for agriculture and rural life. As a result of observations of rural areas and agricultural extension services at various levels, functional responsibilities of extension were not well recognized throughout the central, provincial, and local levels. Central agricultural extension services should be more concerned about effective rural development by monitoring provincial and local level extension activities more throughly. At county level extension services, it may be desirable to add a research function to reflect local agricultural technological needs. Sometimes, adding administrative tasks for extension educators may be helpful far farmers. However, tasks such as inspection and investigation should be avoided, since it may hinder the effectiveness of extension educational activities. It appeared that major contents of the agricultural extension service in Korea were focused on saving agricultural materials, developing new agricultural technology, enhancing agricultural export, increasing production and establishing market oriented farming. However these kinds of efforts may lead to non-sustainable agriculture. It would be better to put more emphasis on sustainable agriculture in the future. Agricultural extension methods in Korea may be better classified into two approaches or functions; consultation function for advanced farmers and technology transfer or educational function for small farmers. Advanced farmers were more interested in technology and management information, while small farmers were more concerned about information for farm management directions and timely diffusion of agricultural technology information. Agricultural extension service should put more emphasis on small farmer groups and active participation of farmers in these groups. Providing information and moderate advice in selecting alternatives should be the major activities for consultation for advanced farmers, while problem solving processes may be the major educational function for small farmers. Systems such as internet and e-mail should be utilized for functions of information exchange. These activities may not be an easy task for decreased numbers of extension educators along with increased administrative tasks. It may be difficult to practice a one-to-one approach However group guidance may improve the task to a certain degree.
Land was originally communized by a community in the primitive society of Korea, and in the age of the ancient society SAM KUK-SILLA, KOKURYOE and PAEK JE-it was distributed under the principle of land-nationalization. But by the occupation of the lands which were permitted to transmit from generation to generation as Royal Grant Lands and newly cleared lands, the private occupation had already begun to be formed. Thus the private ownership of land originated by chiefs of the tribes had a trend to be gradually pervaded to the communal members. After the, SILLA Kingdom unified SAM KUK in 668 A.D., JEONG JEON System and KWAN RYO JEON System, which were the distribution systems of farmlands originated from the TANG Dynasty in China, were enforced to established the basis of an absolute monarchy. Even in this age the forest area was jointly controlled and commonly used by village communities because of the abundance of area and stocked volume, and the private ownership of the forest land was prohibited by law under the influence of the TANG Dynasty system. Toward the end of the SILLA Dynasty, however, as its centralism become weak, the tendency of the private occupancy of farmland by influential persons was expanded, and at the same time the occupancy of the forest land by the aristocrats and Buddhist temples began to come out. In the ensuing KORYO Dynasty (519 to 1391 A.D.) JEON SI KWA System under the principle of land-nationalization was strengthened and the privilege of tax collection was transferred to the bureaucrats and the aristocrats as a means of material compensation for them. Taking this opportunity the influential persons began to expand their lands for the tax collection on a large scale. Therefore, about in the middle of 11th century the farmlands and the forest lands were annexed not only around the vicinity of the capital but also in the border area by influential persons. Toward the end of the KORYO Dynasty the royal families, the bureaucrats and the local lords all possessed manors and occupied the forest lands on a large scale as a part of their farmlands. In the KORYO Dynasty, where national economic foundation was based upon the lands, the disorder of the land system threatened the fall of the Dynasty and so the land reform carried out by General YI SEONG-GYE had led to the creation of ensuing YI Dynasty. All systems of the YI Dynasty were substantially adopted from those of the KORYO Dynasty and thereby KWA JEON System was enforced under the principle of land-nationalization, while the occupancy or the forest land was strictly prohibited, except the national or royal uses, by the forbidden item in KYEONG JE YUK JEON SOK JEON, one of codes provided by the successive kings in the YI Dynasty. Thus the basis of the forest land system through the YI Dynasty had been established, while the private forest area possessed by influential persons since the previous KORYO Dynasty was preserved continuously under the influence of their authorities. Therefore, this principle of the prohibition was nothing but a legal fiction for the security of sovereign powers. Consequently the private occupancy of the forest area was gradually enlarged and finally toward the end of YI Dynasty the privately possessed forest lands were to be officially authorized. The forest administration systems in the YI Dynasty are summarized as follows: a) KEUM SAN and BONG SAN. Under the principle of land-nationalization by a powerful centralism KWA JEON System was established at the beginning of the YI Dynasty and its government expropriated all the forests and prohibited strictly the private occupation. In order to maintain the dignity of the royal capital, the forests surounding capital areas were instituted as KEUM SAN (the reserved forests) and the well-stocked natural forest lands were chosen throughout the nation by the government as BONG SAN(national forests for timber production), where the government nominated SAN JIK(forest rangers) and gave them duties to protect and afforest the forests. This forest reservation system exacted statute labors from the people of mountainious districts and yet their commons of the forest were restricted rigidly. This consequently aroused their strong aversion against such forest reservation, therefore those forest lands were radically spoiled by them. To settle this difficult problem successive kings emphasized the preservation of the forests repeatedly, and in KYEONG KUK DAI JOEN, the written constitution of the YI Dynasty, a regulation for the forest preservation was provided but the desired results could not be obtained. Subsequently the split of bureaucrats with incessant feuds among politicians and scholars weakened the centralism and moreover, the foreign invasions since 1592 made the national land devasted and the rural communities impoverished. It happned that many wandering peasants from rural areas moved into the deep forest lands, where they cultivated burnt fields recklessly in the reserved forest resulting in the severe damage of the national forests. And it was inevitable for the government to increase the number of BONG SAN in order to solve the problem of the timber shortage. The increase of its number accelerated illegal and reckless cutting inevitably by the people living mountainuos districts and so the government issued excessive laws and ordinances to reserve the forests. In the middle of the 18th century the severe feuds among the politicians being brought under control, the excessive laws and ordinances were put in good order and the political situation became temporarily stabilized. But in spite of those endeavors evil habitudes of forest devastation, which had been inveterate since the KORYO Dynasty, continued to become greater in degree. After the conclusion of "the Treaty of KANG WHA with Japan" in 1876 western administration system began to be adopted, and thereafter through the promulgation of the Forest Law in 1908 the Imperial Forests were separated from the National Forests and the modern forest ownership system was fixed. b) KANG MU JANG. After the reorganization of the military system, attaching importance to the Royal Guard Corps, the founder of the YI Dynasty, TAI JO (1392 to 1398 A.D.) instituted the royal preserves-KANG MU JANG-to attain the purposes for military training and royal hunting, prohibiting strictly private hunting, felling and clearing by the rural inhabitants. Moreover, the tyrant, YEON SAN (1495 to 1506 A.D.), expanded widely the preserves at random and strengthened its prohibition, so KANG MU JANG had become the focus of the public antipathy. Since the invasion of Japanese in 1592, however, the innovation of military training methods had to be made because of the changes of arms and tactics, and the royal preserves were laid aside consequently and finally they had become the private forests of influential persons since 17th century. c) Forests for official use. All the forests for official use occupied by government officies since the KORYO Dynasty were expropriated by the YI Dynasty in 1392, and afterwards the forests were allotted on a fixed standard area to the government officies in need of firewoods, and as the forest resources became exhausted due to the depredated forest yield, each office gradually enlarged the allotted area. In the 17th century the national land had been almost devastated by the Japanese invasion and therefore each office was in the difficulty with severe deficit in revenue, thereafter waste lands and forest lands were allotted to government offices inorder to promote the land clearing and the increase in the collections of taxes. And an abuse of wide occupation of the forests by them was derived and there appeared a cause of disorder in the forest land system. So a provision prohibiting to allot the forests newly official use was enacted in 1672, nevertheless the government offices were trying to enlarge their occupied area by encroaching the boundary and this abuse continued up to the end of the YI Dynasty. d) Private forests. The government, at the bigninning of the YI Dynasty, expropriated the forests all over the country under the principle of prohibition of private occupancy of forest lands except for the national uses, while it could not expropriate completely all of the forest lands privately occupied and inherited successively by bureaucrats, and even local governors could not control them because of their strong influences. Accordingly the King, TAI JONG (1401 to 1418 A.D.), legislated the prohibition of private forest occupancy in his code, KYEONG JE YUK JEON (1413), and furthermore he repeatedly emphasized to observe the law. But The private occupancy of forest lands was not yet ceased up at the age of the King, SE JO (1455 to 1468 A.D.), so he prescribed the provision in KYEONG KUK DAI JEON (1474), an immutable law as a written constitution in the YI Dynasty: "Anyone who privately occupy the forest land shall be inflicted 80 floggings" and he prohibited the private possession of forest area even by princes and princesses. But, it seemed to be almost impossible for only one provsion in a code to obstruct the historical growing tendecy of private forest occupancy, for example, the King, SEONG JONG (1470 to 1494 A.D.), himself granted the forests to his royal families in defiance of the prohibition and thereafter such precedents were successively expanded, and besides, taking advantage of these facts, the influential persons openly acquired their private forest lands. After tyrannical rule of the King, YEON SAN (1945 to 1506 A.D.), the political disorder due to the splits to bureaucrats with successional feuds and the usurpations of thrones accelerated the private forest occupancy in all parts of the country, thus the forbidden clause on the private forest occupancy in the law had become merely a legal fiction since the establishment of the Dynasty. As above mentioned, after the invasion of Japanese in 1592, the courts of princes (KUNG BANGG) fell into the financial difficulties, and successive kings transferred the right of tax collection from fisherys and saltfarms to each KUNG BANG and at the same time they allotted the forest areas in attempt to promote the clearing. Availing themselves of this opportunity, royal families and bureaucrats intended to occupy the forests on large scale. Besides a privilege of free selection of grave yard, which had been conventionalized from the era of the KORYO Dynasty, created an abuse of occuping too wide area for grave yards in any forest at their random, so the King, TAI JONG, restricted the area of grave yard and homestead of each family. Under the policy of suppresion of Buddhism in the YI Dynasty a privilege of taxexemption for Buddhist temples was deprived and temple forests had to follow the same course as private forests did. In the middle of 18th century the King, YEONG JO (1725 to 1776 A.D.), took an impartial policy for political parties and promoted the spirit of observing laws by putting royal orders and regulations in good order excessively issued before, thus the confused political situation was saved, meanwhile the government officially permittd the private forest ownership which substantially had already been permitted tacitly and at the same time the private afforestation areas around the grave yards was authorized as private forests at least within YONG HO (a boundary of grave yard). Consequently by the enforcement of above mentioned policies the forbidden clause of private forest ownership which had been a basic principle of forest system in the YI Dynasty entireely remained as only a historical document. Under the rule of the King, SUN JO (1801 to 1834 A.D.), the political situation again got into confusion and as the result of the exploitation from farmers by bureaucrats, the extremely impoverished rural communities created successively wandering peasants who cleared burnt fields and deforested recklessly. In this way the devastation of forests come to the peak regardless of being private forests or national forests, moreover, the influential persons extorted private forests or reserved forests and their expansion of grave yards became also excessive. In 1894 a regulation was issued that the extorted private forests shall be returned to the initial propriators and besides taking wide area of the grave yards was prohibited. And after a reform of the administrative structure following western style, a modern forest possession system was prepared in 1908 by the forest law including a regulation of the return system of forest land ownership. At this point a forbidden clause of private occupancy of forest land got abolished which had been kept even in fictitious state since the foundation of the YI Dynasty. e) Common forests. As above mentioned, the forest system in the YI Dynasty was on the ground of public ownership principle but there was a high restriction to the forest profits of farmers according to the progressive private possession of forest area. And the farmers realized the necessity of possessing common forest. They organized village associations, SONGE or KEUM SONGE, to take the ownerless forests remained around the village as the common forest in opposition to influential persons and on the other hand, they prepared the self-punishment system for the common management of their forests. They made a contribution to the forest protection by preserving the common forests in the late YI Dynasty. It is generally known that the absolute monarchy expr opriates the widespread common forests all over the country in the process of chainging from thefeudal society to the capitalistic one. At this turning point in Korea, Japanese colonialists made public that the ratio of national and private forest lands was 8 to 2 in the late YI Dynasty, but this was merely a distorted statistics with the intention of rationalizing of their dispossession of forests from Korean owners, and they took advantage of dead forbidden clause on the private occupancy of forests for their colonization. They were pretending as if all forests had been in ownerless state, but, in truth, almost all the forest lands in the late YI Dynasty except national forests were in the state of private ownership or private occupancy regardless of their lawfulness.