North Korea's 4th nuclear test on Jan. 6 and following developments once again awakened the world into seriousness of the nuclear matters on the Korean peninsula. On March 2, UNSC adopted Resolution 2270 which is complemented by Seoul government's measures such as withdrawal from the Gaesung Industrial Complex (Feb. 9) and announcement of unilateral sanction (March 8). Seoul government also strongly urged the international community to strangle North Korea's 'financial resources.' The U.S., Japan, China, and other countries have issued unilateral sanctions to complement the UNSC measure. South Korea and the U.S. conducted their annual joint military drill (Resolve-Foal Eagle) in the largest-ever scale. North Korea, however, responded with demonstration of its nuclear capabilities and announcement of de facto 'nuclear-first' politics. North Korea test-fired a variety of delivery vehicles, threatened nuclear strikes against South Korea and the U.S., and declared itself as an 'invincible nuclear power armed with hydrogen bombs' at the 7th Workers 'Party Congress held in May, 2016. Considering the circumstantial evidences, the North's 4th nuclear test may have been a successful boosted fission bomb test. North Korea, and, if allowed to go on with its nuclear programs, will become a nuclear power armed with more than 50 nuclear weapons including hydrogen bombs. The North is already conducting nuclear blackmail strategy towards South Korea, and must be developing 'nuclear use' strategies. Accordingly, the most pressing challenge for the international community is to bring the North to 'real dialogue for denuclearization through powerful and consistent sanctions. Of course, China's cooperation is the key to success. In this situation, South Korea has urgent challenges on diplomacy and security fronts. A diplomatic challenge is how to lead China, which had shown dual attitudes between 'pressure and connivance' towards the North's nuclear matters pursuant to its military relations with the U.S, to participate in the sanctions consistently. A military one is how to offset the 'nuclear shadow effects' engendered by the North's nuclear blackmail and prevent its purposeful and non-purposeful use of nuclear weapons. Though South Korea's Ministry of Defense is currently spending a large portion of defense finance on preemption (kill-chain) and missile defense, they pose 'high cost and low efficiency' problems. For a 'low cost and high efficiency' of deterrence, South Korea needs to switch to a 'retaliation-centered' deterrence strategy. Though South Korea's response to the North's nuclear threat can theoretically be boiled down into dialogue, sanction and deterrence, now is the time to concentrate on strong sanction and determined deterrence since they are an inevitable mandatory course to destroy the North' nuclear-first delusion and bring it to a 'real denuclearization dialogue.'

This paper has attempted to examine the political and operational contexts within which North Korea's latest acts of nuclear blackmail, its test-firing of an SLBM on April 23rd 2016 and its fourth nuclear test on January 6^th 2016, should be understood. Analysis of the KN-11 SLBM and the Sinpo-class SSB is based on official South Korean, US and others sources, especially the ROK MND, as well as other resources from South Korea, US and others. Unfortunately, the results of this exploration are inconclusive: there is simply not enough evidence available at present to either confirm or refute the existence of a functional North Korean SLBM and SSB. Nevertheless, the North Korean determination to possess such assets should not be taken lightly. But even accepting North Korea's claims about its SLBMs at face value, which is undermined by news of apparently unsuccessful follow-up test-firings in November, and probably December 2015, there is little proof that North Korea has yet succeeded in miniaturizing its nuclear warhead, so the most extravagant fears are not yet justified. Taken together with North Korea's latest announcement of a supposed successful SLBM ejection-test, on March 23^th 2016, the KN-11 SLBM claims should probably be seen as primarily about proving North Korea's status as a nuclear power, both to exert external political pressure and to bolster internal political support for Kim Jong-un's rule. In conclusion, this paper recommends formulating a preemptive anti-access strategy for the ROKN, proposes acquiring an ASW CV and SSNs to implement submarine strategic deterrent patrols, and urges extending the existing limited AORs to facilitate the preemptive anti-access strategy. Other deterrence options may be suggested, but it is surely significant that the ROKN has recently publically referred to the deployment of an ASW CV and SSNs for the first time.

This paper analyzes the contents and the effects of the UNSC 2270, and its implications to South Korea's defense strategy and navy. The UN Security Council passed strong sanctions against North Korea which punish North Korea's 4^th nuclear test. The sanctions compared to the previous ones require international society to take practical actions such as comprehensive trade bans as well as diplomatic isolation which will put significant pains on North Korea. Especially, these measures would greatly hamper economic development policy of Kim Joung-un regime. Because Kim Jung-un regime has inherent legitimacy problems which stems from the third family succession of the power, economic difficulties may play an important cause on the regime instability in the long term. In fact, the United States sees this possibility as an option to coerce North Korea in which North Korea choose denuclearization for its regime survival. Nevertheless, the prospects of the UN sanctions are not so optimistic. Considering North Korea's willingness for nuclear development and its level of nuclear technology, North Korea will try to play a gambit with the US and South Korea by exploiting its strategic advantages. North Korea's response will have three following strategies. First, it would actively pursue political and economic survival strategy by using China's support for the regime, strengthening its power grip in the name of countering US hostile policy, and enhancing peace propaganda. Second, North Korea will accelerate efforts to position its status as a nuclear de facto state. For this purpose, it could create nuclear crisis on the peninsula. Third, it would exploit local provocations as an exit strategy to get over the current situation. In order to counter North Korea's actions and punish North Korea's behavior strongly, South Korea needs following strategies and efforts. It should first make all the efforts to implement the UN sanctions. Strong and practical nuclear deterrence strategy and capability with the U.S. should be developed. Effective strategy and capabilities for the prevention and deterrence of North Korea's provocation should be prepared. For this purpose, North Korea's provocation strategy should be thoroughly reviewed. Active international cooperation is needed to punish and coerce North Korea's behavior. Finally, South Korea should prepare for the possible occurrence of North Korea's contingency and make use of the situation as an opportunity to achieve unification. All these strategies and efforts demand the more active roles and missions of South Korea's navy and thus, nullify North Korea's intention militarily.

Korea and China are neighboring countries with close contacts in many areas from long time ago, and have shared interests in maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and in deepening economic relationship which has been mutually complementary in their nature. Therefore their bilateral relations has been developed at a remarkable pace to the extent that it can't be better than now. However, the differences in their responses to North Korean nuclear test and ensuing long-range ballistic missile test-fire and the Chinese strong concern on the possible deployment of THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Air Defence) anti-missile system in Korea show that there are some weaknesses in their relations. For example, Korea is not still confident that China would fully implement the sanction measures contained in the UNSC resolution and I argue that Chinese proposal of parallel negotiation of the denuclearization and the replacement of Korean armistice with the Peace Agreement is not much persuasive. In THAAD issue, if Korea comes to conclusion in the future that THAAD is the most effective way to counter North Korean threats, Korea should make every efforts to assure China that Korea-US alliance is not targeting China, and the THAAD is a defensive system, not damaging Chinese security. In the longer-term, deepening strategic distrust and competition between the US and China in this part of East Asia, changing nature of economic cooperation between Korea and China, and the revival of 'great country mentality' by Chinese people together with the rising nationalism in both Korea and China would cast shadow on Korea-China relation in the years ahead, unless properly handled. In this regard, I suggest that the security communications between the two countries be further strengthened, and the tri-lateral dialogue channel be established among the three countries of Korea, the US and China, particularly on North Korean issues. I also suggest the new pattern of economic cooperation be sought, considering the changing economic environment in China, while strengthening the efforts to understand each other through more interactions between the two peoples.

The construction of Jeju Naval Base was finally completed and donated to the Republic of Korea Navy on February 26th this year. There is no doubt that the new base will contribute to the substantial augmentation of Korea's naval power and maritime security. However, we should note that the new naval base took a long and hard twenty-three years to be completed. In the 21st century, Korea should adopt a new strategy that can fulfill the security requirements of Korea for the new age of international relations. The 21st century is characterized by globalization, and in the world of globalization, a national boarder has become meaningless. In the late 20th century, after the Cold War, trade between countries have greatly increased and so did the importance of the seas. Having transformed from an agricultural country into a commercial country, Korea went from a continental state to a maritime state. Korea has become the 9th largest trading state, and obviously, the importance of the sea has become significant. Korea's national strategic focus needs to be on the sea for national survival. Thus, since the 1990s, the Korean Navy has planned to build the Jeju Naval Base. Jeju, due to its geopolitical characteristics, is extremely important to the 21st century Korea's economy and national security. Jeju is the starting point of the sea route that reaches out to the world, and at the same time, the ending point of the sea route that heads towards Korea. Jeju is located in the center of Northeast Asia and thus, Jeju Naval Base is extremely important for the area's security and order. Jeju Naval Base will be very useful not only for the maritime security of Korea, but also for keeping peace and order in Northeast Asia. Jeju Naval Base was the minimal effort against the six sea route security threats towards Korea. The six sea route threats are: 1) Threat from North Korea; 2) China's Threat towards Korea's sovereignty; 3) China's treat towards Korea's fishery; 4) Threat from Japan; 5) Threat towards Korea's sea routes; 6) Threat from recent phenomena of isolationism of the United States. Jeju Naval Base is built for both warships and civilian ships--such as cruise ships--to use. Just like the United States' Pearl Harbor, Jeju Naval Base will become not only the largest military base, but a beautiful tourist site.

The completion of Jeju Naval Base on February 2016 made the Republic of Korea Navy(ROKN) review the size and role of the Maritime Task Flotilla(MTF). The new strategic environment for the 12st century and the new challenges require the Navy to counter North Korea's provocations and prevent potential enemy's threat. The Navy is also required to take part in the variety of international roles and missions commensurated with Korea's global status to maximize the national interest. Despite these changes, Korea's military construction concept is still unable to break away from the old paradigm of the North Korean threat largely centered. In order to develop the current MTF into the Task Group with the construction of Jeju Naval Base, the Navy must newly not only establish new force development plan and fleet management concepts but also go to persuade and convince policy decision makers. To this end, the following efforts should be promoted. First, the ROK Navy steps up efforts in order to share with the Task Group's vision and strategy. The Navy should also provide the size and structure as well as the missions and roles of the Task Group to react to new maritime security environment. Second, the Navy analyse the MTF's ability and what is required and necessary to perform its duty. After that, it must set out the direction of the Task Group's force development. Third, the current missions and roles of the MTF should be re-established to respond various threats. Finally, accommodating of new technology to the MTF should intensify its strengths. The ROK Navy has a mixed force structure consisting of three fixed- base fleets and a MTF. The fixed base fleet has a passive force to defend and protect its own sea areas, but the MTF should actively not only counter North Korea's threats, including ballistic missiles, but also fight potential threats and takes international missions as a primary task force. However, the MTF has a limited capability to accomplish given missions and long-range operations, and thus, the ROK Navy is strongly required to construct the Task Group.

Aircraft carriers: are they national platforms to maximize national interest or just simply paper tigers to be little useful for states' development? To some states such as U.S., U.K, and France, aircraft carriers functioned as national assets which is indispensable to their interest. By contrast, Thailand's aircraft carrier was a dead platform which is useless to its national interest and India's ones were little used on the mission field. What is the mechanism leading to this difference? The key is whether states make aircraft carriers connected to overall national evolution when it comes to establishing military strategy and planning a long-term force structure. Put it another way, conditions to acquire them need to be analyzed regarding two variables-national status(prestige and economic power) and threat(mission)-for the future as well as in the present. The former acquired carriers under the condition of making them becoming national platforms which is balanced with their overall development. However, the latter simply bought them without carefully taking account of economic obstacles, e.g., the poverty rate, when it comes to force planning. At the same time, we should not neglect to identify that states of the former cases might have a hard time in maximizing their key interests if they did not have carriers. Accordingly, conditions on carriers' acquisition need to be carefully examined and a typological theory suggested here could shed light on this process. This theory shows that South Korea's status is eligible to have a necessary and sufficient condition to acquire carriers.

본 논문은 왜 인도해군이 인도양을 벗어나 태평양 해역으로 진출하려는지에 대한 이유를 설명한다. 인도는 거대한 섬 국가이자, 해양국가이다. 이에 인도해군(Indian Navy: IN)은 인도양에서의 해양안보(maritime security) 활동을 주도하고 있으며, 이는 이 해양에서 발생되고 있는 다양한 비군사적 위협에 대한 기여로 나타나고 있다. 예를 들면 아덴만 해적퇴치작전 등이다. 인도는 지리적으로 중국 등의 대륙국가와 국경을 접하고 있으나, 태평양 연안국가들과 긴밀한 양자간 관계를 유지하고 있으며, 아울러 다양한 다자간 협력체에 적극적으로 참가하고 있다. 후자의 경우 EAS, ARF, ASEAN 등의 협력체이다. 또한 인도는 경제, 사회문화적으로 태평양 연안국가들과 동질성을 갖고 있다. 그 동안 인도해군은 태평양에 대한 많은 기여와 관심을 갖고 있었으며, 이는 서태평양해군심포지움(WPNS) 업저버 국가 등의 다양한 활동 확대에서 발견되고 있다. 인도는 동방정책(India's Look East Policy)를 외교정책으로 채택하고 있으며, 이는 태평양에서의 해양안보에 대한 기여와 참여를 의미한다. 이는 최근까지 왜 인도해군이 중국, 아세안, 한국, 일본 및 호주 등과 긴밀한 해양협력 관계를 유지하고 있는지에 대한 주된 이유를 설명한다. 이러한 인도해군의 기여는 태평양 해양에서의 해양 평화와 번영에 기여할 것으로 전망된다.

한국과 인도 간 관계(이후 한국-인도 관계)는 오랜 역사를 통해 정치, 사회, 경제 및 전략적 측면에서 지속적으로 발전되었다. 특히 인도의 "동방정책(Look East Policy)" 채택과 한국의 "중견국 외교(Middle-power diplomacy)" 선언 간 동질성을 모색하는 차원에서 최근에 더욱 긴밀히 발전되고 있다. 즉 최근에 이르러 갑자기 발전된 관계가 아니라는 논지이다. 이에 본 논문에서는 한국과 인도 간 관계를 역사적 시각, 탈냉전 이후 시각, 경제적 시각 및 교육 및 문화적 그리고 지정학적 시각에서 평가하고자 한다. 특히 역내 중견국(middle power) 대표적 국가를 활용한 긴밀한 전략적 협력을 강조하고자 한다. 이를 위해 2004년 노무현 대통령의 인도 공식 방문 이후 2015년 1월 박근혜 대통령의 방문까지의 양국 간 전략적 협력 관계를 조명해 본다. 이에 따라 양국 관계는 이미 공개된 바와 같이 이는 사이버, 방산, 군사협력 및 정보교환 등의 분야로 구체화되고 있다. 일부는 이를 중국을 견제하는 양국 간의 협력이라고 평가하나, 본 논문은 특정 국가를 지목하기보다, 역내 중견국으로서의 전략적 관계 증진을 통한 역내 이익 보호에 있다고 평가한다. 특히 양국 간을 지리적으로 연결하는 해양을 통한 해양협력에 대한 논의를 추가한다. 예를 들면 역내 자연재난 구조작전(DR operation) 및 인도주의 지원작전(HA operation) 해양협력과 현재 진행되고 있는 아덴만 해적퇴치작전(Anti-piracy naval operation)이다.