The South Korean society has experienced many changes since the sinking of ROKS Cheonan. The government reviewed its defense posture and adopted the 5·24 Measure in its relations with North Korea. As a result, the people of South Korea became more conscious of security situations on the Korean peninsula while North Korea's economy suffered badly. Meanwhile, the South Korean government has taken a flexible stance toward North Korea in terms of exchange and cooperation since September 2011. The flexible stance was to manage inter-Korea relations in a stable manner and relieve the hardships of the North Korean people while preserving the spirits and purposes of the 5·24 Measure. The UN Security Council adopted twenty-six resolutions and statements on North Korea since June 25, 1950. They include thirteen U.N. Security Council resolutions including those concerning nuclear weapons or missile programs, nine Presidential statements, and four press statements. Resolution 82, the first U.N. resolution on North Korea, came when the Korean War broke out. Resolution 825, the first one related to nuclear or missile programs, was adopted in response to North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT. Apart from these U.N. resolutions, the United States has imposed separate sanctions against North Korea. North Korea's nuclear weapons program can be considered in comparison with that of Iran in terms of the consequences they create for the regional security. The Security Council has adopted six resolutions on Iran so far. One should note that the resolutions on Iran have had much stronger sanctions compared to those imposed on North Korea. That is, while the North Korea case may be viewed as a more serious threat to international security from the perspective of nuclear weapons development or proliferation, tougher sanctions have been placed on Iran. There are two approaches that South Korea should take in addressing the related issues. First, we should aim to reduce the gap between sanctions imposed on Iran and North Korea. It is difficult to understand that a country with more serious problems is rewarded with lighter sanctions. We should take measures through the Security Council Sanctions Committee to make individuals and groups in North Korea that play a central role in developing nuclear weapons and missiles subject to additional sanctions. Second, we have to change. Other countries in the international community have become tired of North Korea's nuclear issue and now they look to South Korea for initiative. We should correctly understand this current situation and play a leading role within our capacity. Knowingly and unknowingly, the notion that the North Korean nuclear issue may be left to South Korea has been spread around the international community. Although the situation is grave, we should try to open a new horizon in ushering in the unification era by taking the initiative with confidence that there is a looming hope ahead of us. For these tasks, we should stop thinking in the old way that has been ossified for the last two decades. We should not be pushed around by neighboring great powers in dealing with North Korea related issues anymore; we should take the initiative with resolution that we will play our role at the center of four great powers and with confidence that we can do it. Based on the confidence that the Republic of Korea has become a country with enough capacity to take the initiative, we should establish a 'National Grand Strategy' representing South Korea's strategic vision that the unification is the ultimate solution to the problems related to North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

The United Nations Command (UNC) and the communist North failed to reach an agreement on where the maritime demarcation line should be drawn in the process of signing a truce after the Korean War because of the starkly different positions on the boundary of their territorial waters. As a result, the Armistice Treaty was signed on July 1953 without clarification about the maritime border. In the following month, Commander of the UNC unilaterally declared the Northern Limit Line (NLL) as a complementing measure to the Armistice. Referring to this, North Korea and its followers in South Korea wrongfully argue that the NLL is a "ghost line" that was established not based on the international law. However, one should note that the waters south of the NLL has always been under South Korea's jurisdiction since Korea's independence from Japan on August 15, 1945. There is no need to ask North Korea's approval for declaring the territorial waters that had already been under our sovereign jurisdiction. We do not need North Korea's approval just as we do not need Japan's approval with regard to our sovereign right over Dokdo. The legal status of the NLL may be explained with the following three characteristics. First, the NLL is a de facto maritime borderline that defines the territorial waters under the respective jurisdiction of the two divided countries. Second, the NLL in the West Sea also serves as a de facto military demarcation line at sea that can be likened to the border on the ground. Third, as a contacting line where the sea areas controlled by the two Koreas meet, the NLL is a maritime non-aggression line that was established on the legal basis of the 'acquiescence' element stipulated by the Inter-Korea Basic Agreement (article 11) and the Supplement on the Non-aggression principle (article 10). Particularly from the perspective of the domestic law, the NLL should be understood as a boundary defining areas controlled by temporarily divided states (not two different states) because the problem exists between a legitimate central government (South Korea) and an anti-government group (North Korea). In this sense, the NLL problem should be viewed not in terms of territorial preservation or expansion. Rather, it should be understood as a matter of national identity related to territorial sovereignty and national pride. North Korea's continuous efforts to problematize the NLL may be part of its strategy to nullify the Armistice Treaty. In other words, North Korea tries to take away the basis of the NLL by abrogating the Armistice Treaty and creating a condition in which the United Nations Command can be dissolved. By doing so, North Korea may be able to start the process for the peace treaty with the United States and reestablish a maritime line of its interest. So, North Korea's rationale behind making the NLL a disputed line is to deny the effectiveness of the NLL and ask for the establishment of a new legal boundary. Such an effort should be understood as part of a strategy to make the NLL question a political and military dispute (the similar motivation can be found in Japan's effort to make Dokdo a disputed Island). Therefore, the South Korean government should not accommodate such hidden intentions and strategy of North Korea. The NLL has been the de facto maritime border (that defines our territorial waters) and military demarcation line at sea that we have defended with a lot of sacrifice for the last sixty years. This is the line that our government and the military must defend in the future as we have done so far. Our commitment to the defense of the NLL is not only a matter of national policy protecting territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction; it is also our responsibility for those who were fallen while defending the North-Western Islands and the NLL.

North Korea's continuous threats and provocative behaviors have aggravated tension on the Korean peninsula particularly with the recent nuclear weapons test. South Korea's best way to cope with this situation is to maintain the balance among three policy directions: dialogue, sanctions, and deterrence. Among the three, I argue that deterrence should be prioritized. There are different sources of deterrence such as military power, economic power, and diplomatic clouts. States can build deterrence capability independently. Alternatively, they may do so through relations with other states including alliances, bilateral relations, or multilateral relations in the international community. What South Korea needs most urgently is to maintain deterrence against North Korea's local provocations through the enhancement of independent military capability particularly by addressing the asymmetric vulnerability between militaries of the South and the North. Most of all, the South Korean government should recognize the seriousness of the negative consequences that North Korea's 'Nuclear shadow strategy' would bring about for the inter-Korea relations and security situations in Northeast Asia. Based on this understanding, it should develop an 'assertive deterrence strategy' that emphasizes 'multi-purpose, multi-stage, and tailored deterrence whose main idea lies in punitive retaliation.' This deterrence strategy requires a flexible targeting policy and a variety of retaliatory measures capable of taking out all targets in North Korea. At the same time, the force structures of the army, the air force, and the navy should be improved in a way that maximizes their deterrence capability. For example, the army should work on expanding the guided missile command and the special forces command and reforming the reserve forces. The navy and the air force should increase striking capabilities including air-to-ground, ship-to-ground, and submarine-to-ground strikes to a great extent. The marine corps can enhance its deterrence capability by changing the force structure from the stationary defense-oriented one that would have to suffer some degree of troop attrition at the early stage of hostilities to the one that focuses on 'counteroffensive landing operations.' The government should continue efforts for defense reform in order to obtain these capabilities while building the 'Korean-style triad system' that consists of advanced air, ground, and surface/ subsurface weapon systems. Besides these measures, South Korea should start to acquire a minimum level of nuclear potential within the legal boundary that the international law defines. For this, South Korea should withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Moreover, it should obtain the right to process and enrich uranium through changing the U.S.-South Korea nuclear cooperation treaty. Whether or not we should be armed with nuclear weapons should not be understood in terms of "all or nothing." We should consider an 'in-between' option as the Japanese case proves. With regard to the wartime OPCON transition, we need to re-consider the timing of the transition as an effort to demonstrate the costliness of North Korea's provocative behaviors. If impossible, South Korea should take measures to make the Strategic Alliance 2015 serve as a persisting deterrence system against North Korea. As the last point, all the following governments of South Korea should keep in mind that continuing reconciliatory efforts should always be pursued along with other security policies toward North Korea.

This paper asks whether the Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy should continue to focus on building ocean-going naval ships when it faces the threats of North Korean provocations in littoral areas. My position is that the ROK Navy should keep pursuing ocean-going capabilities. I provide explanations why it should do so from the perspectives of three important dimensions: capability, doctrine, and organizational identity. First, I argue that the distinction between a littoral navy and an ocean-going navy is an unnecessary dichotomy. It may lead to inefficiency in national security. The military posture should be designed in a way that it can address all external threats to national security regardless of whether they are from North Korea or not. Such capability is the one that the ROK Navy has tried to acquire with the 'Blue Water Navy' initiative since the 1990s. Second, also from the perspective of lately developed military doctrines that emphasize jointness and precision strike capability, ocean-going capabilities such as the mobile task fleet program have become a must, not an option, given today's security situations on and around the Korean peninsula. Lastly, I draw attention to the fact that the 'Blue Water Navy (BWN)' initiative meant more than just capability to the ROK navy. The BWN represents the ROK navy's organizational identity that the navy has defined since the 1980s as it emphasized promoting national interest and international standing as part of its organizational essence. Furthermore, the phrase 'blue water navy' took on symbolic meanings to the people that are associated with South Korean-ness including sovereignty, national pride, standing in the world and hopes for the future. Since 1990s, many scholars and experts have made the case for the necessity of improving South Korea's naval capability based on different rationales. They emphasized the protection of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs), the economic value of the sea, the potential danger associated with territorial disputes over islands, and increasing naval power of neighboring countries since the end of the Cold War. This paper adds to this debate by trying to explain the matter with different factors including naval doctrines and organizational identity. Particularly, this paper constitutes a unique endeavor in that it incorporating constructivist elements (that is, identity politics) in explaining a national security matter.

Korea, China, and Japan forms triangle structure which mixed complicatedly on the history and maritime territorial disputes. Nationalism lies on the basis of triangle structure, and it is a main factor which increase tension and conflicts among three countries. Considering dynamics of changing nationalism circumstance, Ieodo issue needs to prepare active countermeasures which considers cope with nationalism confrontations. The aim of this article is suggests preparations of active countermeasures cope with nationalism provocative actions. First, I will specify nationalism as a factor of territorial dispute, and review characters of Ieodo issue. Second, I will analyse China's nationalism to Ieodo through analysis of China's media contents and coverage trend of Ieodo issue (2006~2008). I will suggest necessity of active defense measures coup with China's nationalism, basis of these analysis. As a result, China's nationalism might be a criterion which measures of China's desire for Ieodo. Stimulating Ieodo coverage of China's state media can be a criterion which predicts China governments's for Jurisdiction of Ieodo. We need active measures coup with China's nationalism Which evolves into a much more bold and assertive.

Ieodo is a submerged rock within a Korea's Exclusive Economic Zone(EEZ) in the East China Sea with its most shallow part about 4.6m below the sea level which has no specific rights for the EEZ delimitation. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) stipulates that any coastal state has the rights to claim an EEZ that stretches up to 200 nautical miles from its shore, except where there is an overlap with a neighboring country's claims. Korea claims that Ieodo is within its EEZ as it sits on the Korean side of the equidistant line and the reef is located on the Korea section of the continental shelf. China does not recognize Korea's application of the equidistance principle and insists that Ieodo lies on its continental shelf. According to UNCLOS, Ieodo is located in international waters, rather than one country's EEZ as the two countries have failed to reach a final agreement over the delimitation of the maritime border. This study seeks to understand the evolution of the People's Liberation Army Navy(PLAN) strategy as main obstacles for the EEZ delimitation between Korea and China. PLAN's Strategy evolves from "coastal defense" to "offshore defence", since the late 1980s from a "coastal defence" strategy to an "offshore defence" strategy which would extend the perimeter of defence to between 200 nm and 400 nm from the coast. China's economic power has increased It's dependence on open trade routes for energy supplies and for its own imports and exports. China want secure Sea Lane. PLAN's "offshore defence" strategy combines the concept of active defence with the deployment of its military forces beyond its borders. China's navy try to forward base its units and to achieve an ocean going capability. China's navy expects to have a 'Blue Water' capability by 2050. China insists that coastal states do have a right under UNCLOS to regulate the activities of foreign military forces in their EEZs. China protests several times against US military forces operating within It's EEZ. The U.S. position is that EEZs should be consistent with customary international law of the sea, as reflected in UNCLOS. U.S. has a national interest in the preservation of freedom of navigation as recognized in customary international law of the sea and reflected in UNCLOS. U.S. insists that coastal states under UNCLOS do not have the right to regulate foreign military activities in their EEZs. To be consistent with its demand that the U.S. cease performing military operations in china's EEZ, China would not be able to undertake any military operations in the waters of South Korea's EEZ. As such, to preserve its own security interests, China prefers a status quo policy and used strategic ambiguity on the Ieodo issue. PLAN's strategy of coastal defence has been transformed into offensive defence, Korea's EEZ can be a serious limitation to PLAN's operational plan of activities. Considering China'a view of EEZs, China do not want make EEZ delimitation agreement between Korea and China. China argues that the overlapping areas between EEZs should be handled through negotiations and neither side can take unilateral actions before an agreement is reached. China would prefer Ieodo sea zone as a international waters, rather than one country's EEZ.

Last December, the Abe government came back, and it is critical core of Northeast Asia. They visited to Yasukuni Shrine, denied to Korea's invasion and they are denying all of their invasion history. I'm afraid they want to take Dokdo. Dokdo is Korean territory, but Japan politics assert it belongs to them. To make matters worse, they are waiting an opportunity to invade. Ministry of Foreign Affair blue paper and Ministry of Defense white paper have claimed Dokdo as Japanese territory, and many right wing politicians are taking part in the Cabinet. Liberal Democratic Party of Japan is becoming more right wing politicians than before by Japan Restoration Party, and the others also have more right wing ideologies. It can't control Japan right wing political parties. They finally aim to take Dokdo. In this situation, we have to defend Dokdo. Japan must be very important partner for our nation's development. But it is necessary to trust between two countries. Dokdo is effective controlled by Korea. It is the best way how to keep Dokdo. During Dokdo is effective controlled by Korea, the Japanese Government has limited Dokdo's ownership. Now we don't have any way to keep Dokdo except more effective control. We have strategies about Japanese claim of Dokdo's ownership as follows. First, we can overpower Japan right wing politics as Japan conscientious force's ideology. Second, Japan politics say to Dokdo's ownership is based on The San Francisco Treaty. But it is not right. Third, we have to exchange a lot of local government and civic society in Japan. Finally, we must prepare thoroughly to bring the matter to the International Court of Justice.

Since Korea and Japan established diplomatic relationship, Relationship between Korea and Japan has not been easygoing. There are two most explosive, and noticeable ones among topics which have affected the relationship ; Dokdo and Historical Distortion. Without these issues, relationship between two countries will take a turn for the better. However, unfortunately, it seems that it is almost never going to happen. There is the Japanese conservative right-wing who has an influence on those two issues. The right-wing takes regard getting negative view or finding out dark past as an action from Self-torture view of history, and tries to dilute the Japanese sense of guilt on past invasions to neighbor countries. Moreover, to become a "normal country", they are trying to revise Constitution of the Japan so that Japan can possess the military and re-arm, dispatch troops abroad, and get the right to break the war. In other words, they expect Japan to become a powerful nation with great influence on Asia and world, as the period in which Japan conquered Korean peninsula, China, and South-Eastern nations. Japan still harbours secret romanticism for bygone days of imperialist glory. That is why neighbors want to never make the painful history happen again. In order to deal with this effort, most of all, it is required to assert better argument with a careful, thorough analysis on Japanese opinion about Dokdo. There might be a hidden card which can be accepted in the international society considering Japanese persistent effort to make Dokdo disputed area, and that is why we have to know that it is. In addition, it is needed to secure a high-quality professional manpower because the issues of Dokdo and Historical Distortion are primarily the matter of logic and references. The professional manpower should have open-minded to break down walls of their own majors. We have to introduce our achievements and stances to the international society vigorously. As a definite way to solve these problems, we have to develop national power. We have to possess naval forces and coast guard to protect our territory and Koreans overseas. There are not many options Korea can do to Japan, except protesting denunciation, and pressing a joint efforts. Most of the suggestions stated before are what have to be conducted domestically. It is a miserable condition, because two problems are Japanese domestic issues, but they become international issues and we have to seek a solution for ourselves.

South Korean national security strategy should be developed to effectively handle and counter increasing maritime threats and challenges. There are three major maritime threats South Korea faces today; maritime disputes on the EEZ boundary and Dokdo islet issues, North Korean threats, and international maritime security. Maritime disputes in the region are getting intensified and turned into a military confrontation after 2010. Now regional countries confront each other with military and police forces and use economic leverage to coerce the others. They are very eager to create advantageous de facto situations to legitimize their territorial claims. North Korean threat is also increasing in the sea as we witnessed in the Cheonan incident and Yeonpyoung shelling in 2010. North Korea resorts to local provocations and nuclear threats to coerce South Korea in which it may enjoy asymmetric advantages. The NLL area of the west sea would be a main hot spot that North Korea may continue to make a local provocation. Also, South Korean national economy is heavily dependent upon foreign trade and national strategic resources such as oil are all imported. Without an assurance on the safety of sea routes, these economic activities cannot be maintained and expanded. This paper argues that South Korea should make national maritime strategy and enhance the strength of naval forces. As a middle power, its national security strategy needs to consider all the threats and challenges not only from North Korea but also to maritime security. This is not a matter of choice but a mandate for national survival and prosperity. This paper discusses the importance of maritime security, changing characteristics of maritime threats and challenges, regional maritime disputes and its threat to South Korea's security, and South Korea's future security strategy and ways to enhance the role of naval forces. Our national maritime strategy needs to show middle and long term policy directions on how we will protect our maritime interests. Especially, it is important to build proper naval might to carry out all the roles and missions required to the military.

해적은 공해상 해상안전을 위협 한다는 점에서 '인류공동의 적'으로 규정되어 모든 국가가 이를 규제할 수 있는 보편적 관할권이 행사되는 범죄이다. 한국을 포함한 아시아 지역 국가들은 말라카해협 통항에 관해 깊은 이해관계를 갖고 있어 해적 소탕에 대한 의지가 강한 편이다. 이러한 의지는 2006년 '아시아해적퇴치정보공유센터(ReCAAP ISO)'의 창설에 밑거름이 되었으며, 아시아 지역에서 해적이 출현하면 동 센터를 통해 17개국 회원국으로 즉시 통보되고, 주변국의 해경과 해군이 유기적인 작전을 통해 해적을 효율적으로 퇴치하고 있는 모범사례다. 그러나 2009년 소말리아 내란에 따른 무정부 상태가 지속되면서 소말리아 및 아덴만에서의 해적활동이 극성을 부리기 시작했으며, 선박납치 행위가 급증하자 세계 각국에서 함정과 항공기를 파견하여 해적퇴치 활동을 전개하고 있으나 근절되지 않을 뿐만 아니라 해적의 활동해역이 확대되고 있다. 이러한 배경 하에 시작된 본 연구는 연구결과를 중심으로 다음과 같은 대응 방안을 제시한다. 첫째, 소말리아 해적의 근본원인은 국가의 붕괴에서 비롯된 치안부재와 열악한 경제사정 등 내부적인 요인이 크기 때문에 다국적 해군 활동으로 인한 근본적인 해적퇴치에는 한계가 있다. 따라서 국제적인 차원에서 '지역협력협정'체결은 물론, 소말리아 국가재건을 위한 노력이 함께 이루어지는 종합적인 대책이 필요하다. 그러나 보다 더 근본적인 해결책은 유엔차원에서 빠른 시간 내에 소말리아가 정치적 안정을 유지할 수 있도록 정치적 차원에서의 지원이 필요하며, 해적과 테러리스트가 연계됨으로써 국제문제로 확대되지 않도록 하는 노력도 병행되어야 한다. 둘째, 해적문제는 특정국가에만 해당되는 것이 아니라 초국가적인 문제임을 감안하여 유엔안전보장이사회 결의 제1851호에서 '지역 센터' 설립을 권고하고 있는 것처럼 2006년 아시아 국가들이 설치한 ReCAAP ISO와 같은 형태의 지역국가 간 협력기구 또는 유엔 차원의 해적 전담기구를 설치하여 국제사회 공조 하에 해적에 대처하는 방안을 추진하는 것이 필요하다. 셋째, 최근 발생하고 있는 해적행위는 주로 항구 등 내수, 영해 등 연안국의 관할권이 행사되는 지역에서 발생하고 있어 유엔해양법상의 규정은 이러한 '해적' 퇴치에 더 이상 효율적이지 못하다. 국제사회는 이러한 문제점을 인식하여 국제해사기구 (IMO) 등 국제기구를 통해 영해내의 해적 처벌을 위해 최선의 노력을 기울이고 있다. 향후 궁극적으로는 유엔해양법협약의 개정을 통해 법적인 문제점이 개선되어야 한다. 넷째, 전술적인 측면에서도 지상에 기지를 두고 있는 해적들의 지도부가 그 동안 쌓아 놓은 네트워크를 이용하여 다국적 해군에 대한 정보를 수집하고 대응방안을 강구함으로써 나름대로의 생존전략을 구사할 것으로 예상된다. 특히, 선박을 납치한 후 소말리아 연안으로 이동하면서 해군함정과 대치하는 과정에서 해적들이 살상을 당하는 사례가 증가함에 따라 지금까지는 피랍된 선박의 선원을 단순히 해적활동에 참여시키거나, 항해지원을 위한 목적 등으로만 활용했는데, 앞으로는 해적들의 인명피해를 최소화하기 위해서라도 선원들을 방패막이로 활용할 가능성이 더욱 높아질 것으로 예상된다. 따라서 참가하는 해군함정 또는 부대간 해적들의 활동 관련 정보를 공유하는 등 사전에 정보를 획득하기 위한 협력을 강화해야 한다. 다섯째, 한국군함이 삼호주얼리호를 납치했던 소말리아 해적을 한국까지 대리고 와서 처벌하는 것은 불합리하고, 많은 문제점을 야기할 수 있기 때문에 향후 해적처벌을 위한 국제사법기구의 설치가 요구된다. 회원국 분담금으로 운영되는 유엔에 산하기관을 설치하여 소말리아 인접국에서 해결하도록 적극적인 노력을 경주할 필요가 있다. 마지막으로, 선박회사에서도 자국 선박이 위험구역으로 지정된 해역을 항해할 경우를 대비해서 선박자동식별 시스템 구축을 확대하고, 해적이 선박에 승선했을 경우를 대비해서 안전구역(citadel)을 설치하여 선원의 안전을 확보하는 등의 대책이 필요하다. 본 연구를 통해 해양안보는 어느 특정국가에게만 주어진 것이 아니며, 해적행위도 특정 국가의 선박을 대상으로 하는 것이 아니므로 각국 정부간 공동의 협력과 국제사회의 공조가 반드시 실현될 때 해적의 위협으로부터 선박의 안전과 국제사회의 평화가 실현될 수 있다는 것을 강조하고자 한다.