• 한국경영과학회지
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• 제22권3호
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• pp.113-143
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• 1997

Most of the conflict problems between 2 persons can be represented as a bi-matrix game, because player's utilities, in general, are non-zero sum and change according to the progress of game. In the bi-matrix game the equilibrium point set which satisfies the Pareto optimality can be a good bargaining or coordination solution. Under the condition of incomplete information about the risk attitudes of the players, the bargaining or coordination solution depends on additional elements, namely, the players' methods of making inferences when they reach a node in the extensive form of the game that is off the equilibrium path. So the investigation about the players' inference type and its effects on the solution is essential. In addition to that, the effect of an individual's aversion to risk on various solutions in conflict problems, as expressed in his (her) utility function, must be considered. Those kinds of incomplete information make decision maker Bayesian, since it is often impossible to get correct information for building a decision making model. In Baysian point of view, this paper represents an analytic frame for guessing and learning opponent's attitude to risk for getting better reward. As an example for that analytic frame. 2 persons'bi-matrix game is considered. This example explains that a bi-matrix game can be transformed into a kind of matrix game through the players' implicitly cooperative attitude and the need of arbitration.

• 한국게임학회 논문지
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• 제1권1호
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• pp.61-67
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• 2001

This paper describes a program which learns good strategies for two-poison, deterministic, zero-sum board games of perfect information. The program learns by simply playing the game against either a human or computer opponent. The results of the program's teaming of a lot of games are reported. The program consists of search kernel and a move generator module. Only the move generator is modified to reflect the rules of the game to be played. The kernel uses a temporal difference procedure combined with a backpropagation neural network to team good evaluation functions for the game being played. Central to the performance of the program is the search procedure. This is a the capture tree search used in most successful janggi playing programs. It is based on the idea of using search to correct errors in evaluations of positions. This procedure is described, analyzed, tested, and implemented in the game-teaming program. Both the test results and the performance of the program confirm the results of the analysis which indicate that search improves game playing performance for sufficiently accurate evaluation functions.

• 한국국방경영분석학회지
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• 제31권1호
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• pp.1-13
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• 2005

Due to the rapid developments in information and computer technology, the warfare paradigm is being transformed into information-centric and knowledge-based warfare. This atmosphere may have significant impact on the ROK armed forces' Force Improvement Plans (FIP) which is documented in 'Defense White Paper 2004'. We focus here on the relationship of information-centric force and deterrence of invasion. Particularly, we are interested in understanding the level of information superiority that might be required to deter the invasion. In order to solve this problem, we employed two-sided, zero-sum strategic game to simulate the outcome with six hypothetical cases devised by varying the level of information superiority.

• Management Science and Financial Engineering
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• 제19권2호
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• pp.31-36
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• 2013

We propose a war-game model that is appropriate for a raid-type warfare in which, a priori, the maneuver of the attacker is relatively certain. The model is based on a multi-weapon extention of the Lanchester's law. Instead of a continuous time dynamic game with the differential equations from the Lanchester's law, however, we adopt a multi-period model relying on a time-discretization of the Lanchester's law. Despite the obvious limitation that two players make a move only on the discrete time epochs, the pragmatic model has a manifold justification. The existence of an equilibrium is readily established by its equivalence to a finite zero-sum game, the existence of whose equilibrium is, in turn, well-known to be no other than the LP-duality. It implies then that the war-game model dictates optimal strategies for both players under the assumption that any strategy choice of each player will be responded by a best strategy of her opponent. The model, therefore, provides a sound ground for finding an efficient reinforcement of a defense system that guarantees peaceful equilibria.

• 한국경영과학회지
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• 제7권2호
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• pp.53-58
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• 1982

‘섰다’ 게임은 흔히 애용되는 게임이다. 이 논문은 이 섰다 게임의 모형화를 시도한 것으로써 특히 2人섰다게임을 2인영합게임 (two-person zero-sum game)으로 모형화하여 최적해를 구해 보았다. 이 2人섰다 게임은 선과 또 한 사람사이의 섰다게임으로 판돈과 설 때 내는 돈의 액수에 따라 최적해가 달라지는 데 예로써 판돈보다 설 때 내는 돈이 3배일 때는 선은 7끗 이상일 때서는 것이 최적이고 상대방은 9끗 이상일 때서는 것이 최적이다. 이때 게임의 값은 -0.35이다.

• 경영과학
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• 제26권1호
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• pp.1-5
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• 2009

I study a solution concept which preserves the nice Nash equilibrium properties of two-person zero-sum games, and define a locally competitive equilibrium which is characterized by a saddle point with respect to the coordinates of strategies. I show that a locally competitive equilibrium shares the properties of uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs, interchangeablity of equilibrium strategies and convexity of the equilibrium set.

• 한국국방경영분석학회지
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• 제23권1호
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• pp.25-46
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• 1997

In this paper, we consider a tow-person zero-sum game in which an attack helicopter with a missile wishes to destroy a tank. The tank has much small-caliber ammunition for protection itself from the attack helicopter. And the attack helicopter possesses a missile for attacking the tank. We develop models for the behavior of the attack helicopter, in terms of missile launch time, and of the tank, in terms of ammunition firing rate, in several situations. In particular, we examine the Weiss-Gillman model.

• International Journal of Control, Automation, and Systems
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• 제2권4호
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• pp.463-474
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• 2004

Game theory is a method of mathematical analysis developed to study the decision making process. In 1928, Von Neumann mathematically proved that every two-person, zero-sum game with many pure finite strategies for each player is deterministic. In the early 50's, Nash presented another concept as the basis for a generalization of Von Neumann's theorem. Another central achievement of game theory is the introduction of evolutionary game theory, by which agents can play optimal strategies in the absence of rationality. Through the process of Darwinian selection, a population of agents can evolve to an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) as introduced by Maynard Smith in 1982. Keeping pace with these game theoretical studies, the first computer simulation of coevolution was tried out by Hillis. Moreover, Kauffman proposed the NK model to analyze coevolutionary dynamics between different species. He showed how coevolutionary phenomenon reaches static states and that these states are either Nash equilibrium or ESS in game theory. Since studies concerning coevolutionary phenomenon were initiated, there have been numerous other researchers who have developed coevolutionary algorithms. In this paper we propose a new coevolutionary algorithm named Game theory based Coevolutionary Algorithm (GCEA) and we confirm that this algorithm can be a solution of evolutionary problems by searching the ESS. To evaluate this newly designed approach, we solve several test Multiobjective Optimization Problems (MOPs). From the results of these evaluations, we confirm that evolutionary game can be embodied by the coevolutionary algorithm and analyze the optimization performance of our algorithm by comparing the performance of our algorithm with that of other evolutionary optimization algorithms.

• 대한기계학회논문집A
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• 제37권11호
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• pp.1429-1436
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• 2013

본 논문에서는 미분게임 이론과 다수준 계획법을 이용하여 차량 전복 방지 제어기를 설계하는 방법을 제안한다. 차량 전복 방지 문제는 비협조적 제로섬 2 인 미분게임으로 정식화된다. 미분게임의 균형해로 얻어지는 제어기는 모든 가능한 조향 입력에 대해 최악의 성능을 보장한다. 적은 계산량으로 미분 게임의 균형해를 찾기 위해 완화 과정을 가지는 다수준 계획법을 이용한다. 차량의 롤 운동을 억제하기 위해 능동 현가장치를 사용하면 차량의 횡방향 안정성이 상실되므로 이를 방지하기 위해 자세제어장치(ESP)를 이용한다. 시뮬레이션을 통해 제안된 방법이 미분게임의 균형해를 찾는데 효과적임을 보이고 설계된 제어기가 차량의 전복을 방지함을 보인다.

• 한국유통학회지:유통연구
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• 제11권4호
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• pp.31-48
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• 2006

본 연구에서는 최근 이동통신단말기보조금을 둘러싸고 이동통신서비스사업자와 이동통신 단말기제조업자 사이에서 발생한 갈등상황을 중심으로 2인비영합게임을 정의하고 그에 대한 최적전략게임해를 도출하였다. 연구결과 이동통신서비스사업자와 이동통신단말기제조업자 중 자기가 속한 시장에 대한 시장지배력이 높은 사업자는 자신에게 유리한 전략으로 힘을 행사할 수 있으며, 양 사업자들이 각자의 시장에 대한 시장지배력이 비슷하게 높다면 양자간에 잠재적 갈등과 협력의 기회가 공존하고 있다는 점 등이 밝혀졌다. 또한, 본 연구의 결과는 이동통신단말기보조금에 대한 경로갈등과 유사한 다양한 제품과 서비스를 대상으로 발생될 수 있는 경로갈등의 해결을 위한 효과적인 준거기준을 제공할 수 있을 것으로 기대 된다.