• The Journal of Internal Korean Medicine
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• v.39 no.5
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• pp.1032-1041
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• 2018

Despite a considerable improvement in antiemetic chemotherapy and the use of antiemetic prophylaxis for decades, there are still numerous cancer patients suffering from anorexia and nausea after chemotherapy, which forces them to postpone or refuse treatment. This case report is about a 66-year-old female patient diagnosed with malignant lymphoma of the small intestine who underwent right hemicolectomy. After the tumor and the colon adjacent to it were surgically removed, the patient continued to undergo chemotherapy. Chemotherapy-induced anorexia and nausea appeared but were well treated with administration of Dokhwaljihwang-tang-gamibang. During the treatment, no adverse effect related to this Korean medicine was reported. The outcome was evaluated by the functional assessment of anorexia/cachexia therapy (FAACT); the total score increased from 85 to 130 within 12 days, and the symptoms were alleviated. This improvement might suggest the feasibility of Dokhwaljihwang-tang-gamibang to help cancer patients suffering from chemotherapy-induced anorexia and nausea.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.22 no.3
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• pp.119-139
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• 2012

In the case of Banque Paribas V. Banco Santander in England for the reimbursement request of deferred payment credit by the nominated bank, the L/C-issuing bank refused to pay the proceeds at maturity because of a fraudulent transaction. The reason of refusal was that the nominated bank, Banco Santander, had no right of payment in deferred credit before its maturity if it made payment of proceeds without notice to the issuing bank, that is, payment not based upon a credit transaction but on its own account. However, in the case of ADIB V. Fortis Bank in America, the New York court made the decision that the deferred payment bank could not refuse to reimburse to the nominated bank, Fortis Bank, because of fraud. Its decision was based on the UCP600. We have analyzed and investigated the above two cases-one was an English court's decision and the other an American's. The English court's decision was made under UCP500, but the American court's was made under UCP600, which was revised in 2007. As a result, we can expect that from now on in deferred payment credit transactions, the power of the nominated bank will be greater than before, but the issuing bank will bear the risk of the beneficiary's fraud, so the issuing bank will be hesitant to issue deferred payment credit. Notwithstanding, we thought that the New York court decision would come into effect in the activation of deferred payment credit in practical trade transactions.

• The Korean Society of Law and Medicine
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• v.13 no.1
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• pp.359-395
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• 2012

In a broad term, health and medical data means all patient information that has been generated or circulated in government health and medical policies, such as medical research and public health, and all sorts of health and medical fields as well as patients' personal data, referred as medical data (filled out as medical record forms) by medical institutions. The kinds of health and medical data in medical records are prescribed by Articles on required medical data and the terms of recordkeeping in the Enforcement Decree of the Medical Service Act. As EMR, OCS, LIS, telemedicine and u-health emerges, sharing and protecting digital health and medical data is at issue in these days. At medical institutions, health and medical data, such as medical records, is classified as "sensitive information" and thus is protected strictly. However, due to the circulative property of information, health and medical data can be public as well as being private. The legal grounds of health and medical data as such are based on the right to informational self-determination, which is one of the fundamental rights derived from the Constitution. In there, patients' rights to refuse the collection of information, to control recordkeeping (to demand access, correction or deletion) and to control using and sharing of information are rooted. In any processing of health and medical data, such as generating, recording, storing, using or disposing, privacy can be violated in many ways, including the leakage, forgery, falsification or abuse of information. That is why laws, such as the Medical Service Act and the Personal Data Protection Law, and the Guideline for Protection of Personal Data at Medical Institutions (by the Ministry of Health and Welfare) provide for technical, physical, administrative and legal safeguards on those who handle personal data (health and medical information-processing personnel and medical institutions). The Personal Data Protection Law provides for the collection, use and sharing of personal data, and the regulation thereon, the disposal of information, the means of receiving consent, and the regulation of processing of personal data. On the contrary, health and medical data can be inspected or delivered of the copies, based on the principle of restriction on fundamental rights prescribed by the Constitution. For instance, Article 21(Access to Record) of the Medical Service Act, and the Personal Data Protection Law prescribe self-disclosure, the release of information by family members or by laws, the exchange of medical data due to patient transfer, the secondary use of medical data, such as medical research, and the release of information and the release of information required by the Personal Data Protection Law.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.14 no.4
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• pp.433-456
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• 2012

The confirming bank undertakes to make payment to the beneficiary, provided that a complying presentation is made and complies with its confirmation. In case L/C fraud is evident, though, the confirming bank as well as the issuing bank does not have the obligation to make payment. That is, the confirming bank does not take the risks involving documentary fraud. The confirming bank cannot exercise the right to recourse toward the beneficiary or the nominated bank when the issuing bank finds the discrepancies which the confirming bank has not noticed. This is because under UCP600, the issuing bank or the confirming bank cannot refuse to make payment with the cause of documentary discrepancy after 5 banking days following the presentation of documents. Even if the issuing bank accepts the discrepant documents following the confirming bank's request to do so, the confirming bank does not have the responsibility for the confirmation. When under Usance Negotiation Credit, the confirming bank acts as the nominated bank, the confirming bank should make payment in no time if the beneficiary presents complying documents. Therefore, unless the confirming bank intends to make immediate payment, they should consider using Deferred Payment or Acceptance L/C in Usance Credit. It is also safer for the beneficiary to have the reimbursing bank's undertaking to the reimbursement than just have confirmation of the credit because in the latter case they may not have full payment due to disputes regarding discrepancies of the documents even if they have confirmation of the credit.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.21 no.1
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• pp.135-167
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• 2006

Air service agreements between EU Member States and third countries concluded by Sweden, Finland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria, the Netherlands, Denmark and the United Kingdom after the Second World War infringe EU law. They authorize the third countries to withdraw, suspend or limit the traffic rights of air carriers designated by the signatory States. According to the Court of Justice of the European Communities (CJEC), these agreements infringe EU law in two respects. On the one hand, the presence of nationality clauses infringes the right of European airlines to non-discriminatory market access to routes between all Member States and third countries. On the other hand, only the EU has the authority to sign up to this type of commitment where agreements affect the exercise of EU competence, i.e. involve an area covered by EU legislation. The Court held that since the third countries have the right to refuse a carrier, these agreements therefore constitute an obstacle to the freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services, as the opening of European skies to third countries' companies is not reciprocal for all EU airlines. In the conclusion, in order to reconstruct these public international air law, The new negotiations between EU member states and third countries, especially the US, must be designed to ensure an adequate set of principles, so that Member States, in their bilateral relations with third countries in the area of air service, should consider following three models. The 1st, to develop a new model of public international air law such as a new Bermuda III. The 2nd, to reconstruct new freedoms of the air, for example, the 7th, 8th, and 9th freedoms. The 3rd, to explore new approaching models, such as complex system theory explored in the recent social sciences, to make access world-wide global problems instead of bilateral problems between EU member states and United States. The example will show any lessons to air talks between European Union and ROK.

• The Korean Society of Law and Medicine
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• v.20 no.3
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• pp.83-139
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• 2019

Recognition of liability for damages due to medical malpractice has been developed largely on the basis of two paths. First is the case where there is an error in a physician's medical practice and this infringes upon the legal interests of life and body, and the compensation for monetary and non-monetary damages incurred from such infringement on life and body becomes an issue. Second is the case where there is a breach of a physician's duty of explanation that results in a infringement on the patient's right of autonomous decision, and the compensation for non-monetary damages incurred from such infringement becomes an issue. However, even if there is a medical error, since it is difficult to prove the causation between the medical error of a physician and the infringement upon legal interests, the physician's responsibility for damage compensation is denied in some cases. Consider, for example, a case where a patient is already in the final stage of cancer and has a very low possibility of a complete recovery even if proper treatment is received from the physician. Here, it is not appropriate to refuse recognition of any damage compensation based on the reason that the possibility of the patient dying is very high even in the absence of a medical error. This is so because, at minimum, non-monetary damage such as psychological suffering is incurred due to the physician's medical error. In such a case, our courts recognize on an exceptional basis consolation money compensation for losing the chance to receive proper treatment. However, since the theoretical system has not been established in minutiae, what comes under the benefit and protection of the law is not clearly explicated. The recent discourse on compensating for damages incurred by patients, even when the causation between the physician's medical error and infringement upon the legal interests of life and body is denied, by establishing a new legal interest is based on the "legal principle of loss of opportunity for treatment." On what should be the substance of the new legal interest, treatment possibility argument, expectation infringement argument, considerable degree of survival possibility infringement argument and loss of opportunity for treatment argument are being put forth. It is reasonable to see the substance of this protected legal interest as "the benefit of receiving treatment appropriate to the medical standard" according to the loss of opportunity for treatment argument. The above benefit to the patient is a value inherent to human dignity that should not be infringed upon or obstructed by anyone, and at the same time, it is a basic desire regarding life and a benefit worthy of protection by law. In this regard, "the benefit of receiving treatment appropriate to the medical standard" can be made concrete as one of the general personal rights related to psychological legal interest.