• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.227-233
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• 2023

Along with the 4th Industrial Revolution, the impact of "unmanned" is affecting all fields around the world, and in particular, in the military sector, "unmanned" is so important that it occupies a part of the main combat system. Recently, the South Korean military is facing a crisis due to the North Korea's UAV incident that invaded our airspace and descended to Seoul. In response, the South Korea military declared its willingness and countermeasures to capture and destroy North Korea's UAV. However, as the technological development of UAV continues and the utilization plan is expanding, the countermeasures for UAV at the current level can be useless. Also, the threat from North Korea is not just UAV. North Korea has practically a nuclear power and is set to conduct its seventh nuclear test, and its missile technology is also being advanced, with 38 arounds of 67 missile tests conducted in 2022 alone. It is also developing five key strategic weapons that can pose a fatal threat to Korea, and North Korea's strong conventional forces are located around the NLL(Northern Limit Line), and the port of Long Range Artillery is facing the Seoul metropolitan area. It is important to respond to North Korea's UAV threats, which are now receiving much attention, but it will be necessary to comprehensively analyze and clearly prioritize North Korea's threats and use a limited budget to respond to them.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.46 no.4
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• pp.272-280
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• 2023

For the past 70 years, an intense rivalry has persisted on the Korean Peninsula, and North Korea's nuclear and missile threats are becoming increasingly imminent. Facing a shortage of military resources, South Korea has pursued a national defense reform, significantly reducing the number of units and troops while focusing on ground forces. However, North Korea's strategic objective of unifying South Korea through surprise attacks, prompt responses, and combined nuclear and missile assaults remains unchanged. The central issue in this context revolves around determining the appropriate size of the Korean military's standing forces. This study employs the concept of net assessment as a novel method to ascertain the optimal size of the Korean military. Threats, strategic objectives, doctrine, and unit rotations are simultaneously considered from the enemy's perspective. In anticipation of security risks on the Korean Peninsula, an acceptable troop size will be proposed using the net assessment approach to calculate the appropriate standing force size.

• Strategy21
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• s.39
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• pp.5-46
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• 2016

North Korea's 4th nuclear test on Jan. 6 and following developments once again awakened the world into seriousness of the nuclear matters on the Korean peninsula. On March 2, UNSC adopted Resolution 2270 which is complemented by Seoul government's measures such as withdrawal from the Gaesung Industrial Complex (Feb. 9) and announcement of unilateral sanction (March 8). Seoul government also strongly urged the international community to strangle North Korea's 'financial resources.' The U.S., Japan, China, and other countries have issued unilateral sanctions to complement the UNSC measure. South Korea and the U.S. conducted their annual joint military drill (Resolve-Foal Eagle) in the largest-ever scale. North Korea, however, responded with demonstration of its nuclear capabilities and announcement of de facto 'nuclear-first' politics. North Korea test-fired a variety of delivery vehicles, threatened nuclear strikes against South Korea and the U.S., and declared itself as an 'invincible nuclear power armed with hydrogen bombs' at the 7th Workers 'Party Congress held in May, 2016. Considering the circumstantial evidences, the North's 4th nuclear test may have been a successful boosted fission bomb test. North Korea, and, if allowed to go on with its nuclear programs, will become a nuclear power armed with more than 50 nuclear weapons including hydrogen bombs. The North is already conducting nuclear blackmail strategy towards South Korea, and must be developing 'nuclear use' strategies. Accordingly, the most pressing challenge for the international community is to bring the North to 'real dialogue for denuclearization through powerful and consistent sanctions. Of course, China's cooperation is the key to success. In this situation, South Korea has urgent challenges on diplomacy and security fronts. A diplomatic challenge is how to lead China, which had shown dual attitudes between 'pressure and connivance' towards the North's nuclear matters pursuant to its military relations with the U.S, to participate in the sanctions consistently. A military one is how to offset the 'nuclear shadow effects' engendered by the North's nuclear blackmail and prevent its purposeful and non-purposeful use of nuclear weapons. Though South Korea's Ministry of Defense is currently spending a large portion of defense finance on preemption (kill-chain) and missile defense, they pose 'high cost and low efficiency' problems. For a 'low cost and high efficiency' of deterrence, South Korea needs to switch to a 'retaliation-centered' deterrence strategy. Though South Korea's response to the North's nuclear threat can theoretically be boiled down into dialogue, sanction and deterrence, now is the time to concentrate on strong sanction and determined deterrence since they are an inevitable mandatory course to destroy the North' nuclear-first delusion and bring it to a 'real denuclearization dialogue.'

• Journal of the military operations research society of Korea
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• v.4 no.1
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• pp.46-54
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• 1978

• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.58-92
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• 2014

Even after S. Korea took 5.24 Measure(24 May 2014), N. Korea has not stopped raising provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, electronic and cyber attacks. To make matters worse, the communist country lunched long-range missiles(twice) and conducted 3rd nuclear test, escalating tensions which could possibly lead to an all-out war. Korean Government failed to respond properly. However, escalation into an all-out war was deterred by the CFC immediately carrying out its peacetime duty(CODA). The US made a rapid dispatch of its augmentation forces(Aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarine, strategic bomber, F-22) to the Korean Peninsula. In recognition of the importance of the Combined Forces Command, since May 2013 the Park Geun-Hye Administration has been pushing ahead with re-postponement of Wartime Operational Control Transfer(which initially meant the disassembling of the CFC as of 1 December 2015) More recently, there has been a series of unusual indicators from the North. Judging from its inventory of 20 nuclear weapons, 1,000 ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons, it is safe to say that N. Korea has gained at least war deterrence against S. Korea. Normally a nation with nuclear weapons shrink its size of conventional forces, but the North is pursuing the opposite, rather increasing them. In addition, there was a change of war plan by N. Korea in 2010, changing 'Conquering the Korean Peninsula' to 'Negotiation after the seizure of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA)' and establishing detailed plans for wartime projects. The change reflects the chain reaction in which requests from pro-north groups within the South will lead to the proclamation of war. Kim, Jeong-Un, leader of N. Korean regime, sent threatening messages using words such as 'exercising a nuclear preemptive strike right' and 'burning of Seoul'. Nam, Jae-June, Director of National Intelligence Service, stated that Kim, Jung-Un is throwing big talks, saying communization of the entire Korean Peninsula will come within the time frame of 3 years. Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, shared an alarming message that there is a high possibility that the North will raise local provocations or a full-fledged war whenever while putting much emphasis on defense posture. As for the response concept of the Korean Government, it has been decided that 'ROK·US Combined Local Provocation Counter-Measure' will be adopted to act against local provocations from the North. Major provocation types include ▲ violation of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) with mobilization of military ships ▲ artillery provocations on Northwestern Islands ▲ low altitude airborne intrusion ▲ rear infiltration of SOF ▲ local conflicts within the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) ▲ attacking friendly ships by submarines. Counter-measures currently established by the US involves the support from USFK and USFJ. In order to keep the sworn promise, the US is reinforcing both USFK and USFJ. An all-out war situation will be met by 'CFC OPLAN5027' and 'Tailored Expansion Deterrence Forces' with the CFC playing a central role. The US augmentation forces stands at 690,000 troops, some 160 ships, 2,000 aircraft and this comprise 50% of US total forces, which is estimated to be ninefold of Korean forces. The CFC needs to be in center in handling both local provocations and an all-out war situation. However, the combat power of S. Korean conventional forces is approximately around 80% of that of N. Korea, which has been confirmed from comments made by Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, during an interpellation session at the National Assembly. This means that S. Korean forces are not much growing. In particular, asymmetric capabilities of the North is posing a serious threat to the South including WMD, cyber warfare forces, SOF, forces targeting 5 Northwestern Islands, sub-surface and amphibious assault forces. The presence of such threats urgently requires immediate complementary efforts. For complementary efforts, the Korean Government should consider ① reinforcement of Korean forces; putting a stoppage to shrinking military, acquisition of adequate defense budget, building a missile defense and military leadership structure validity review, ② implementation of military tasks against the North; disciplinary measures on the sinking of ROKS Cheon-an/shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands, arrangement of inter-Korean military agreements, drawing lessons from studies on the correlation between aid for N. Korea, execution of inter-Korean Summit and provocations from the North, and ③ bolstering the ROK·US alliance; disregarding wartime operational control transfer plan(disassembling of CFC) and creation of a combined division.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.14 no.6_1
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• pp.129-138
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• 2014

South Korea should correspond to the primary threat to North Korea's nuclear weapons. It is necessary to have countermeasures to solve the realistic problems of North Korea's nuclear weapons. We can intensify military pact between the United States and Korea and at the same time strengthening the current military power. Currently, we take note the threat North Korea's missile. We can not control the development of a nuclear weapon and there are possibilities that North Korea have successfully miniaturized nuclear enough to carry by the missile. We should overview and check the Korea's missile defenses system. While the direction of the overall missile defense system deployment with a focus on lower and upper air defense network. And discuss defense research should be to build a system that can be protected with a key strategic facilities and cities. While North Korea have nuclear weapon, the main issues related to North Korea's nuclear threat. The six party talks countries try to solve the problem by the international and diplomatic approach. At the same time we should make somewhat to defend measures such as military defenses of Kill chain system to protect our country. Kill Chain is on of the effective defense system. We know that North Korea do not abandon to develop nuclear weapons by diplomatic efforts. We should performed in fact by a variety of military suppression method.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.20 no.2
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• pp.101-110
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• 2020

Since the third inter-Korean summit, the inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang and the U.S.-North Korea summit in Singapore and Hanoi, denuclearization negotiations are under way that will determine the fate of the Korean Peninsula. However, the negotiations are stalled and some skepticism is expected due to the conflicting U.S.-North Korea stance over the terms of denuclearization. The reason why it is difficult to realize the complete denuclearization of North Korea is that there are a variety of variables such as the traditional security dilemma in Northeast Asia, the hegemonic competition between the U.S. and China, and the formation of a new cold-war system. At a turning point when three inter-Korean summits and three U.S.-North Korea summits were held in the wake of the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics, North Korea's complete denuclearization has become a must-do historical task for Northeast Asia and world peace beyond the Korean Peninsula. In this sense, the inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang is seen as a historic occasion for presenting a new milestone for the denuclearization of North Korea and the development of inter-Korean relations through the 9.19 Pyongyang Joint Declaration and the Military Agreement. Meanwhile, Constructivism, which has become the main paradigm of international political theory, presents the view that ideological variables such as ideology, history and culture define material factors, identity and interests of state actors, and that the structure of international relations can be changed through interaction. In this study, the historical meaning of the 9.19 Pyongyang Declaration, which is now past its first anniversary, was considered from a constructivist perspective. To this end, the development process of constructivism theory and analysis model and the development process of inter-Korean relations were briefly reviewed, and the military implications of the 9.19 Military Agreement were presented.

• Journal of Environmental Policy
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• v.3 no.2
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• pp.1-29
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• 2004

As a result of very limited access due to the military confrontation between South and North Koreas for the last five decades, ecosystems in the transboundary coastal area in the western part of Korean Peninsula have been protected from intensive developments in both Koreas. In the core of the recent two military collisions lies the fishery resources represented as blue crabs as well as the politico-military aspect. Increasing development pressures from both sides as reflected in the South Korea supporting the construction of an industrial complex in Kaesung, North Korea, is the main factor which threatens the sustainable resource base in this region. This research is aimed to develop a cooperative management system for the well-preserved transboundary coastal area between South Korea and North Korea. The Pressure-State-Response (PSR) framework of OECD was used to assess environmental conditions, socioeconomic pressures on the environment of the region, and policy responses of both Koreas to those pressures. Protection of ecosystems, peace settlement, and prosperity of the region and the entire peninsula were proposed as the management goals of the cooperative management system. The designation of the area as a Co-managed Marine Protected Area System (COMPAS) through close cooperation among South Korea, North Korea, and international entities was suggested as a way to achieve those goals. Revision of legal and institutional mechanisms, strengthening knowledge base for optimal COMPAS management, integration of the marine protected area and DMZ (demilitarized zone) ecosystem, enhancing stakeholder participation, building international partnership, and securing financial resources were presented as six management strategies.

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.220-250
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• 2013

South Korean national security strategy should be developed to effectively handle and counter increasing maritime threats and challenges. There are three major maritime threats South Korea faces today; maritime disputes on the EEZ boundary and Dokdo islet issues, North Korean threats, and international maritime security. Maritime disputes in the region are getting intensified and turned into a military confrontation after 2010. Now regional countries confront each other with military and police forces and use economic leverage to coerce the others. They are very eager to create advantageous de facto situations to legitimize their territorial claims. North Korean threat is also increasing in the sea as we witnessed in the Cheonan incident and Yeonpyoung shelling in 2010. North Korea resorts to local provocations and nuclear threats to coerce South Korea in which it may enjoy asymmetric advantages. The NLL area of the west sea would be a main hot spot that North Korea may continue to make a local provocation. Also, South Korean national economy is heavily dependent upon foreign trade and national strategic resources such as oil are all imported. Without an assurance on the safety of sea routes, these economic activities cannot be maintained and expanded. This paper argues that South Korea should make national maritime strategy and enhance the strength of naval forces. As a middle power, its national security strategy needs to consider all the threats and challenges not only from North Korea but also to maritime security. This is not a matter of choice but a mandate for national survival and prosperity. This paper discusses the importance of maritime security, changing characteristics of maritime threats and challenges, regional maritime disputes and its threat to South Korea's security, and South Korea's future security strategy and ways to enhance the role of naval forces. Our national maritime strategy needs to show middle and long term policy directions on how we will protect our maritime interests. Especially, it is important to build proper naval might to carry out all the roles and missions required to the military.

• Journal of the military operations research society of Korea
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• v.18 no.1
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• pp.15-31
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• 1992

Developments toward a 'the end of the Cold War' are the main factor determining the situation in the Korean Peninsula. While all the combat resources of North Korea are systematically controlled and kept available for instant mobilization even in peacetime. South Korea is inferior to North Korea in terms of mobilization system and efficiency, exercise intensity and equipments. In sum, the South faces far greater restraints in wartime conversion capability than does the North. Mobilization refers to a nation's compulsory control, management and operation of its human and material resources for the purpose of national security. The total capability for safeguarding national security must be pursued by the continuous examination and complementation of our mobilization system and capability. This paper proposes an efficient management of national mobilization system that can be instantly operated on the whole in time of national emergency. Therefore, the actual operation of National Security Council is suggested to prepare operations against the emergencies and establish the foundation for national security.