• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.24 no.3
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• pp.195-202
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• 2024

Future warfare is expected to be multi-domain operations including space, based on the development of advanced information and communication technologies. Advanced space-faring countries such as the United States, Russia, China, and Japan are creating space forces based on advanced space technology to prepare for future space warfare and strengthening cooperation with private companies and other countries. The South Korean military is preparing for space warfare for each type of weapon, but it is still relatively weak in terms of integrated strategy and technology. As not only advanced space countries but also North Korea is increasing its investment in space militarisation, the ROK military needs to develop a comprehensive plan and establish a specialized organisation to prepare for future space warfare. Therefore, this paper examines the current status of the ROK military's space warfare preparedness and proposes space warfare strategies such as establishing a dedicated space warfare and space cybersecurity organization, strengthening domestic and international cooperation, research and development and training of specialized personnel, and reestablishing a training system.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.4
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• pp.351-379
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• 2006

Former ministers of national defense and foreign affairs, intellectuals such as former and incumbent professors, and various NGO groups are demanding the South Korean government to stop promoting independence in operational control which is currently held by the United States Armed Forces in Korea commander. Although the Korea should exercise operational control independently in the future, orientation on the direction which should be taken under consideration in promoting this transfer should be assumed. First of all, South Korea must sufficiently examine the criticisms and dissenting opinions, and reflect them in promoting independence in operational control. From now on, the South Korean government should reflect the opinions of experts in operational control, and must promote the transfer with national consensus. Unilateral enforcement of the transfer may cause serious errors and aggravate conflicts Second, ROKA's exercise of independence in operational control should take place only after gaining restraint on North Korea's attack against the South, and the issues on nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction(WMD) has been resolved, and a peace regime has been reached. Furthermore, exercise of independence in wartime operational control should be promoted only if there is a guarantee that international trust and the military collaboration will be restored to a level beyond the present state. Third, the USFK and the Korean-US alliance is providing South Korea with national security, not to mention tremendous diplomatical, and economical benefits However, if the alliance between the two countries become weakened due to the exercise of the independence in operational control, we might suffer a great deal of loss. Even though reasonable justification and external independence may be gained through promoting independence in operational control, it should be promoted in a longitudinal manner because national security problems and conflicts may be intensified, and there is no actual profit in doing so. Fourth, if the Korean-US alliance becomes weakened and therefore the United States decides to discuss eastern-asia strategies, North Korea deterrence strategies, and Japanese rearmament issues with other neighboring countries, South Korea may become diplomatically isolated and a subordinate to surrounding countries, destroying the independence we have now instead of restoring it Therefore searching for means to reinforce international trust and collaboration between South Korea and the United States, and leaving ROKA’s independence in operational control as a long term objective would be a more realistic method.

• Maritime Security
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.73-114
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• 2021

This study examines the distribution of power in Northeast Asia based on the balance of power theory, a representative theory of realism, assuming military capabilities as the core power of states. The results of previous studies on the balance of power and military forces are reviewed and used to analyze changes in the strength of the US, China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea through 2020 to predict the security environment in 2030. In the balance of power theory, if the balance of power between a nation or a group of powers collapses, the possibility of war is high, and to survive in the international community with high uncertainty and distrust, the theory predicts that states must increase their powers in a self-help world and strengthen cooperation and alliance. Countries in Northeast Asia are also continuing to strengthen their military capabilities, and countries neighboring China are paying keen attention and remaining vigilant due to the rapid changes in the international security environment after the rapid rise of China. To mark the future 100th anniversary of the Chinese armed forces in the 2030s, China aims to realize 'defense and military modernization' and build a 'world-class military force' by the nation's 100th anniversary in the 2050s. The US is busy checking China's rise by strengthening international cooperation and alliances. The security environment and power dynamics in Northeast Asia are slowly changing as the US and China continue to compete for global hegemony. The changes and implications of the distribution of power in Northeast Asia after 2030 are examined based on the balance of power theory.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Military Science and Technology
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• v.23 no.2
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• pp.115-124
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• 2020

Due to the increasing threats of submarines from North Korea and other countries, ROK Navy should improve the detection capability of submarines. There are two ways to detect submarines : acoustic detection and non-acoustic detection. Since the acoustic-detection way has limitations in spite of its usefulness, it should have the complementary way. The non-acoustic detection is the way to detect submarines which are operating mast sets such as periscopes and snorkels by non-acoustic sensors. So, this paper proposes a new submarine non-acoustic detection model using an ensemble of Convolutional Neural Network models in order to automate the non-acoustic detection. The proposed model is trained to classify targets as 4 classes which are submarines, flag buoys, lighted buoys, small boats. Based on the numerical study with 10,287 images, we confirm the proposed model can achieve 91.5 % test accuracy for the non-acoustic detection of submarines.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Military Science and Technology
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• v.20 no.2
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• pp.279-288
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• 2017

The Material Transportation Capability Analysis Method in North Korea includes adversary's activities such as destruction of bridge which is one kind of choke points in the road network and surprise attack against resupply march unit. Also, the amount of damage on choke points in the road network and repair time depending on repair unit commitment must be reflected. In this study, a scenario encompassing plausible resupply transportation circumstances while counterattacking into NK will be established. Then, based on such scenario, a simulation model will be established and the result of simulation will be compared to the results of numeric example which has been used in the ROK Army. We demonstrate, through a certain Corps operation area, that the Scenario-based Simulation Model results predict the performance of resupply operation very well. Therefore, it makes sustainment planners and commanders do activities which is suitable for battlefield and should be used in the real situation. It is also a stochastic model.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Military Science and Technology
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• v.22 no.1
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• pp.124-134
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• 2019

As the types of North Korea's provocation are diverse and unexpectable in the costal area, ROK navy needs to develop countermeasures, such as costal defence guided rockets. Recently ROK navy developed the PKX-B which is equipped with the new 130 mm guided rocket. The most popular rockets are LOGIR for short range targets, 130 mm guided rocket for middle range targets and Spike-NLOS for long range targets. As various guided rockets are developed, it is required to develop a guided rocket analysis model and it's analysis methodology. In addition, these guided rockets can be installed on any platforms; ground vehicle, aircraft and warship. The paper proposes systematic methodology to estimate the operational effectiveness of costal defence guided rockets. A case study exploiting the ARENA simulation model is explained to demonstrate the implementation of the proposed methodology.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.32 no.1
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• pp.287-325
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• 2017

Considering the development of aerospace, military science and technology since the 20th century, the sky is very important for the nation's existence and prosperity. The proverb "Whosoever commands the space commands the world itself!" emphasizes the need for the command of the air. This essay is the first study on the status of airspace after reunification. First, the territorial airspace is over the territory and territorial sea, and its horizontal extent is determined by the territorial boundary lines. Acceptance of the present order is most reasonable, rather than attempting to reconfigure through historical truths about border issues, and it could be supported by neighboring countries in the reunification period. For peace in Northeast Asia, the reunified Korea needs to respect the existing border agreement between North Korea and China or Russia. However, the North Korean straight baselines established in the East Sea and the Yellow Sea should be discarded because they are not available under United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. It is desirable for the reunified Korea to redefine the straight baselines that comply with international law and determine the territorial waters up to and including the 12-nautical mile outside it. Second, the Flight Information Region (hereinafter "FIR") is a region defined by the International Civil Aviation Organization (hereinafter "ICAO") in order to provide information necessary for the safe and efficient flight of aircraft and the search and rescue of aircraft. At present, Korea is divided into Incheon FIR which is under the jurisdiction of South Korea and Pyongyang FIR which is under the jurisdiction of North Korea. If North Korea can not temporarily exercise control of Pyongyang FIR due to a sudden change of circumstances, it is desirable for South Korea to exercise control of Pyongyang FIR, and if it is unavoidable, ICAO should temporarily exercise it. In reunified Korea, it is desirable to abolish Pyongyang FIR and integrate it into Incheon FIR with the approval of ICAO, considering systematic management and control of FIR, establishment of route, and efficiency of management. Third, the Air Defense Identification Zone (hereinafter "ADIZ") is a zone that requires easy identification, positioning, and control of aircraft for national security purposes, and is set up unilaterally by the country concerned. The US unilaterally established the Korea Air Defense Identification Area (KADIZ) by the Declaration of Commitment on March 22, 1951. The Ministry of Defense proclaimed a new KADIZ which extended to the area including IEODO on December 13, 2013. At present, North Korea's military warning zone is set only at maritime boundaries such as the East Sea and the Yellow Sea. But in view of its lack of function as ADIZ in relations with China and Russia, the reunified Korea has no obligation to succeed it. Since the depth of the Korean peninsula is short, it is necessary to set ADIZ boundary on the outskirts of the territorial airspace to achieve the original purpose of ADIZ. Therefore, KADIZ of the reunified Korea should be newly established by the boundary line that coincides with the Incheon FIR of the reunified Korea. However, if there is no buffer zone overlapping with or adjacent to the ADIZs of neighboring countries, military tensions may rise. Therefore, through bilateral negotiations for peace in Northeast Asia, a buffer zone is established between adjacent ADIZs.

• The Journal of Industrial Distribution & Business
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.29-37
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• 2011

It remains that South and North Korea are the most conflict ridden region of the world and at high risk of military collision despite the appropriateness and necessity of unification between South and North Korea. Meanwhile, our government has pushed ahead with exchange between the two countries in many different fields to defuse this conflict and tension. But, these efforts have made it less meaningful as South-North relations are strained again. This can be because temporary recovery of political relation didn't proceed to system improvement and economic cooperation. This study on exchange cooperation of circulation · distribution between South and North Korea begins with expectation that this study will be based on realizing free circulation · distribution for the unification and making an economic bloc through exchange cooperation of circulation · distribution. To expand economy exchange and cooperation between the two nations, the field of circulation · distribution should be developed. On the basis of this discussion, this study suggests that cooperation relation and the mood of reconciliation created by political declaration are institutionalized in the national consensus and exchange should be expanded in the economic field as well as political field.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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• v.10 no.2
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• pp.167-172
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• 2024

In major wars of the 21st century, drones are expanding beyond surveillance and reconnaissance to include land and air as well as sea and underwater for purposes such as precision strikes, suicide attacks, and cognitive warfare. These drones will perform multi-domain operations, and to this end, they will continue to develop by improving the level of autonomy and strengthening scalability based on the High-Low Mix concept. Recently, drones have been used as a major means in major wars around the world, and there seems to be a good chance that they will evolve into game changers in the future. North Korea has also been making significant efforts to operate reconnaissance and attack drones for a long time. North Korea has recently continued to engage in provocations using drones, and its capabilities are gradually becoming more sophisticated. In addition, with the recent emergence of new strategic Drones, wartime and peacetime threats such as North Korea's use of these to secure surveillance, reconnaissance and early warning capabilities against South Korea and new types of provocations are expected to be strengthened. Through this study, we hope to provide implications by analyzing the capabilities of North Korea's strategic Drones, predicting their operation patterns, and conducting active follow-up research on the establishment of a comprehensive strategy, such as our military's drone deployment and counter-drone system solutions.

• Strategy21
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• s.39
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• pp.163-197
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• 2016

The completion of Jeju Naval Base on February 2016 made the Republic of Korea Navy(ROKN) review the size and role of the Maritime Task Flotilla(MTF). The new strategic environment for the 12st century and the new challenges require the Navy to counter North Korea's provocations and prevent potential enemy's threat. The Navy is also required to take part in the variety of international roles and missions commensurated with Korea's global status to maximize the national interest. Despite these changes, Korea's military construction concept is still unable to break away from the old paradigm of the North Korean threat largely centered. In order to develop the current MTF into the Task Group with the construction of Jeju Naval Base, the Navy must newly not only establish new force development plan and fleet management concepts but also go to persuade and convince policy decision makers. To this end, the following efforts should be promoted. First, the ROK Navy steps up efforts in order to share with the Task Group's vision and strategy. The Navy should also provide the size and structure as well as the missions and roles of the Task Group to react to new maritime security environment. Second, the Navy analyse the MTF's ability and what is required and necessary to perform its duty. After that, it must set out the direction of the Task Group's force development. Third, the current missions and roles of the MTF should be re-established to respond various threats. Finally, accommodating of new technology to the MTF should intensify its strengths. The ROK Navy has a mixed force structure consisting of three fixed- base fleets and a MTF. The fixed base fleet has a passive force to defend and protect its own sea areas, but the MTF should actively not only counter North Korea's threats, including ballistic missiles, but also fight potential threats and takes international missions as a primary task force. However, the MTF has a limited capability to accomplish given missions and long-range operations, and thus, the ROK Navy is strongly required to construct the Task Group.