• Strategy21
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• s.43
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• pp.57-88
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• 2018

Security situations are fundamentally and rapidly changing on the Korean Peninsula. Above all, as North Korea(NK) is heightening its nuclear and missile capabilities, Republic of Korea(ROK) is facing an existential threat. At the same time, as China's economic, diplomatic and military power is quickly rising, the balance of power is shifting and strategic competition between the Unite States(US) and China is accelerating in the Asia-Pacific region. Under the pressure of development of these situations, ROK seems to face allegedly the most serious crisis in its national security since the end of the Korean War. In the current grim geopolitical situation, maritime security may become the most difficult security challenge for ROK in the years to come. The purpose of this paper is to compare major changes in maritime security affairs of the ROK during last twenty years from 1998 until now(2018). 1998 was when this journal 『Strategy 21』 was published for the first time by the Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy. Then, this paper tries to identify challenges and risks with which this country has to deal for its survival and prosperity, and to propose some recommendations for the government, the Navy, and the Coast Guard as they are responsible for the maritime security of the country. The recommendations of this paper are as follows: strengthen ROK-US alliance and expand security cooperation with regional powers in support of the maintenance of the current security order in the region; building-up of maritime security capacity in preparation for crisis on the maritime domain with the navy targeting to acquire 'a non-nuclear, balance-of-terror capability, to improve interoperability with the Coast Guard based on 'a national fleet,' and to actively pursue innovation in naval science and technology. Finally, this paper proposes that naval capability the country needs in another twenty years depends on how effectively and rigorously the navy put its utmost efforts towards building 'a strongest navy' today.

• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.77-106
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• 2019

The purpose of this paper is to propose measures to respond to NK's nuclear threat by applying the concept of offset strategy in the US and the fourth industrial revolution technology innovation. Through this study, the concept, technology, and organization were examined to find measures to counter the NK's nuclear threat. The concept was to review the US offset strategy and consider the strategy of paralyzing the enemy's center as an operational concept. And the technologies that can support the 4th Industrial revolution and the 3rd US offset strategy. The organization analyzed the implications for the reform of the National Defense Reform 2.0 and the reorganization of the acquisition of the US DoD. Through the US offset strategy review, it is necessary to reconcile the strategic concepts of Korea and the US, and the interoperability of technologies and the cooperation fields of the ROK-US alliance. In addition, it is necessary to strengthen the capability of responding to NK's nuclear threat in connection with the 4th Industrial Revolution and the National Defense Reform 2.0 promotion. It is necessary to develop the concept of operational performance applying the new paradigm for the NK's nuclear issue and to apply advanced science and technology. And that it is necessary to organize effectively in conjunction with the National Defense Reform 2.0.

• Strategy21
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• s.44
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• pp.5-27
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• 2018

The purpose of this paper is to look at USN's efforts to rebuild its combat power in the face of a reemergence of great powers competition, and to propose some recommendations for the ROKN. In addition to the plan to augment its fleet towards a 355-ships capacity, the USN is pursuing to improve exponentially combat lethality(quality) of its existing fleet by means of innovative science and technology. In other words, the USN is putting its utmost efforts to improve readiness of current forces, to modernize maintenance facilities such as naval shipyards, and simultaneously to invest in innovative weapons system R&D for the future. After all, the USN seems to pursue innovations in advanced military Science & Technology as the best way to ensure continued supremacy in the coming strategic competition between great powers. However, it is to be seen whether the USN can smoothly continue these efforts to rebuild combat strength vis-a-vis its new competition peers, namely China and Russian navy, due to the stringent fiscal constraints, originating, among others, from the 2011 Budget Control Act effective yet. Then, it seems to be China's unilateral and assertive behaviors to expand its maritime jurisdiction in the South China Sea that drives the USN's rebuild-up efforts of the future. Now, some changes began to be perceived in the basic framework of the hitherto regional maritime security, in the name of declining sea control of the USN as well as withering maritime order based on international law and norms. However, the ROK-US alliance system is the most excellent security mechanism upon which the ROK, as a trading power, depends for its survival and prosperity. In addition, as denuclearization of North Korea seems to take significant time and efforts to accomplish in the years to come, nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence by the US is still noting but indispensible for the security of the ROK. In this connection, the naval cooperation between ROKN and USN should be seen and strengthened as the most important deterrents to North Korean nuclear and missile threats, as well as to potential maritime provocation by neighboring countries. Based on these observations, this paper argues that the ROK Navy should try to expand its own deterrent capability by pursuing selective technological innovation in order to prevent this country's destiny from being dictated by other powers. In doing so, however, it may be too risky for the ROK to pursue the emerging, disruptive innovative technologies such as rail gun, hypersonic weapon... etc., due to enormous budget, time, and very thin chance of success. This paper recommends, therefore, to carefully select and extensively invest on the most cost-effective technological innovations, suitable in the operational environments of the ROK. In particular, this paper stresses the following six areas as most potential naval innovations for the ROK Navy: long range precision strike; air and missile defense at sea; ASW with various unmanned maritime system (UMS) such as USV, UUV based on advanced hydraulic acoustic sensor (Sonar) technology; network; digitalization for the use of AI and big data; and nuclear-powered attack submarines as a strategic deterrent.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.41 no.3
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• pp.287-295
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• 2015

Due to the latest agreement between the military authorities of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States (US) of America, Korea's annual contribution to the budget of the United States Forces Korea (USFK) rose as high as close to 1 trillion won. This seemingly prohibitive amount has led to the questioning of military critics regarding determination criteria, wholesomeness of cost, alignment of incentives, and implementational transparency, etc. As these sources of mistrust can potentially undermine the congruence of alliance, we attempt to devise a scientific means to test the validity of Korea's budget contribution. Specifically, we use the real options approach (ROA) to estimating the interval of the fair prices of maintaining the USFK. We consider the USFK as an insurance against foreign incursions, and this enables us to assume their role as a put option. Upon a hypothetical war breakout, the daily cumulative size of the Korean economy is estimated by implementing the simulated loss ratios of assets and population. As a result, the strategic value (put premium) of the USFK is exponentially higher the sooner the US forces are augmented following an intrusion. Also, Korea's payments toward the USFK in 2011 and 2012 appear theoretically fairly valued.

• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.58-92
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• 2014

Even after S. Korea took 5.24 Measure(24 May 2014), N. Korea has not stopped raising provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, electronic and cyber attacks. To make matters worse, the communist country lunched long-range missiles(twice) and conducted 3rd nuclear test, escalating tensions which could possibly lead to an all-out war. Korean Government failed to respond properly. However, escalation into an all-out war was deterred by the CFC immediately carrying out its peacetime duty(CODA). The US made a rapid dispatch of its augmentation forces(Aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarine, strategic bomber, F-22) to the Korean Peninsula. In recognition of the importance of the Combined Forces Command, since May 2013 the Park Geun-Hye Administration has been pushing ahead with re-postponement of Wartime Operational Control Transfer(which initially meant the disassembling of the CFC as of 1 December 2015) More recently, there has been a series of unusual indicators from the North. Judging from its inventory of 20 nuclear weapons, 1,000 ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons, it is safe to say that N. Korea has gained at least war deterrence against S. Korea. Normally a nation with nuclear weapons shrink its size of conventional forces, but the North is pursuing the opposite, rather increasing them. In addition, there was a change of war plan by N. Korea in 2010, changing 'Conquering the Korean Peninsula' to 'Negotiation after the seizure of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA)' and establishing detailed plans for wartime projects. The change reflects the chain reaction in which requests from pro-north groups within the South will lead to the proclamation of war. Kim, Jeong-Un, leader of N. Korean regime, sent threatening messages using words such as 'exercising a nuclear preemptive strike right' and 'burning of Seoul'. Nam, Jae-June, Director of National Intelligence Service, stated that Kim, Jung-Un is throwing big talks, saying communization of the entire Korean Peninsula will come within the time frame of 3 years. Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, shared an alarming message that there is a high possibility that the North will raise local provocations or a full-fledged war whenever while putting much emphasis on defense posture. As for the response concept of the Korean Government, it has been decided that 'ROK·US Combined Local Provocation Counter-Measure' will be adopted to act against local provocations from the North. Major provocation types include ▲ violation of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) with mobilization of military ships ▲ artillery provocations on Northwestern Islands ▲ low altitude airborne intrusion ▲ rear infiltration of SOF ▲ local conflicts within the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) ▲ attacking friendly ships by submarines. Counter-measures currently established by the US involves the support from USFK and USFJ. In order to keep the sworn promise, the US is reinforcing both USFK and USFJ. An all-out war situation will be met by 'CFC OPLAN5027' and 'Tailored Expansion Deterrence Forces' with the CFC playing a central role. The US augmentation forces stands at 690,000 troops, some 160 ships, 2,000 aircraft and this comprise 50% of US total forces, which is estimated to be ninefold of Korean forces. The CFC needs to be in center in handling both local provocations and an all-out war situation. However, the combat power of S. Korean conventional forces is approximately around 80% of that of N. Korea, which has been confirmed from comments made by Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, during an interpellation session at the National Assembly. This means that S. Korean forces are not much growing. In particular, asymmetric capabilities of the North is posing a serious threat to the South including WMD, cyber warfare forces, SOF, forces targeting 5 Northwestern Islands, sub-surface and amphibious assault forces. The presence of such threats urgently requires immediate complementary efforts. For complementary efforts, the Korean Government should consider ① reinforcement of Korean forces; putting a stoppage to shrinking military, acquisition of adequate defense budget, building a missile defense and military leadership structure validity review, ② implementation of military tasks against the North; disciplinary measures on the sinking of ROKS Cheon-an/shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands, arrangement of inter-Korean military agreements, drawing lessons from studies on the correlation between aid for N. Korea, execution of inter-Korean Summit and provocations from the North, and ③ bolstering the ROK·US alliance; disregarding wartime operational control transfer plan(disassembling of CFC) and creation of a combined division.

• Korean Journal of Legislative Studies
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.53-75
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• 2016

This article presents a descriptive analysis on national security policy platforms promoted by the ruling parties of South Korea during general and presidential elections. National security platforms made during the elections campaigns are a window that allows us to see how the ruling party perceives the threat environment, opportunity-structures, policy preferences and material capabilities faced by the state. South Korea presents a unique case since it faces constant military threats from North Korea and interacts with China and the United States. Therefore, the national security policy platforms, which are explicitly campaigned during the general and presidential elections, showcases the worldview of the ruling party. The study essentially focuses on three areas of the platforms - its threat perception on North Korea, the ROK-US alliance and the future vision for the Korean peninsula by covering two presidential elections and three general elections for the last 20 years.

• Strategy21
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• s.33
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• pp.65-112
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• 2014

Recent trends show that the PRC has stepped aside its "army-centered approach" and placed greater emphasis on its Navy and Air Force for a wider range of operations, thereby reducing its ground force and harnessing its economic power and military technology into naval development. A quantitative growth of the PLA Navy itself is no surprise as this is not a recent phenomenon. Now is the time to pay closer attention to the level of PRC naval force's performance and the extent of its warfighting capacity in the maritime domain. It is also worth asking what China can do with its widening naval power foundation. In short, it is time to delve into several possible scenarios I which the PRC poses a real threat. With this in mind, in Section Two the paper seeks to observe the construction progress of PRC's naval power and its future prospects up to the year 2020, and categorize time frame according to its major force improvement trends. By analyzing qualitative improvements made over time, such as the scale of investment and the number of ships compared to increase in displacement (tonnage), this paper attempts to identify salient features in the construction of naval power. Chapter Three sets out performance evaluation on each type of PRC naval ships as well as capabilities of the Navy, Air Force, the Second Artillery (i.e., strategic missile forces) and satellites that could support maritime warfare. Finall, the concluding chapter estimates the PRC's maritime warfighting capability as anticipated in respective conflict scenarios, and considers its impact on the Korean Peninsula and proposes the directions ROK should steer in response. First of all, since the 1980s the PRC navy has undergone transitions as the focus of its military strategic outlook shifted from ground warfare to maritime warfare, and within 30 years of its effort to construct naval power while greatly reducing the size of its ground forces, the PRC has succeeded in building its naval power next to the U.S.'s in the world in terms of number, with acquisition of an aircraft carrier, Chinese-version of the Aegis, submarines and so on. The PRC also enjoys great potentials to qualitatively develop its forces such as indigenous aircraft carriers, next-generation strategic submarines, next-generation destroyers and so forth, which is possible because the PRC has accumulated its independent production capabilities in the process of its 30-year-long efforts. Secondly, one could argue that ROK still has its chances of coping with the PRC in naval power since, despite its continuous efforts, many estimate that the PRC naval force is roughly ten or more years behind that of superpowers such as the U.S., on areas including radar detection capability, EW capability, C4I and data-link systems, doctrines on force employment as well as tactics, and such gap cannot be easily overcome. The most probable scenarios involving the PRC in sea areas surrounding the Korean Peninsula are: first, upon the outbreak of war in the peninsula, the PRC may pursue military intervention through sea, thereby undermining efforts of the ROK-U.S. combined operations; second, ROK-PRC or PRC-Japan conflicts over maritime jurisdiction or ownership over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands could inflict damage to ROK territorial sovereignty or economic gains. The PRC would likely attempt to resolve the conflict employing blitzkrieg tactics before U.S. forces arrive on the scene, while at the same time delaying and denying access of the incoming U.S. forces. If this proves unattainable, the PRC could take a course of action adopting "long-term attrition warfare," thus weakening its enemy's sustainability. All in all, thiss paper makes three proposals on how the ROK should respond. First, modern warfare as well as the emergent future warfare demonstrates that the center stage of battle is no longer the domestic territory, but rather further away into the sea and space. In this respect, the ROKN should take advantage of the distinct feature of battle space on the peninsula, which is surrounded by the seas, and obtain capabilities to intercept more than 50 percent of the enemy's ballistic missiles, including those of North Korea. In tandem with this capacity, employment of a large scale of UAV/F Carrier for Kill Chain operations should enhance effectiveness. This is because conditions are more favorable to defend from sea, on matters concerning accuracy rates against enemy targets, minimized threat of friendly damage, and cost effectiveness. Second, to maintain readiness for a North Korean crisis where timely deployment of US forces is not possible, the ROKN ought to obtain capabilities to hold the enemy attack at bay while deterring PRC naval intervention. It is also argued that ROKN should strengthen its power so as to protect national interests in the seas surrounding the peninsula without support from the USN, should ROK-PRC or ROK-Japan conflict arise concerning maritime jurisprudence. Third, the ROK should fortify infrastructures for independent construction of naval power and expand its R&D efforts, and for this purpose, the ROK should make the most of the advantages stemming from the ROK-U.S. alliance inducing active support from the United States. The rationale behind this argument is that while it is strategically effective to rely on alliance or jump on the bandwagon, the ultimate goal is always to acquire an independent response capability as much as possible.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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• v.10 no.1
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• pp.183-192
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• 2024

The purpose of this study is to empirically analyze the determining factors (economy, security, domestic politics, administration, and international politics) that affect the ROK-US defense cost sharing decision. Through this, we will gain a deeper understanding of the defense cost sharing decision process and improve the efficiency of defense cost sharing calculation and execution. The scope of the study is ROK-US defense cost sharing from 1991 to 2021. The data used in the empirical analysis were various secondary data such as Ministry of National Defense, government statistical data, SIPRI, and media reports. As an empirical analysis method, multiple regression analysis using time series was used and the data was analyzed using an autoregressive model. As a result of empirical research through multiple regression analysis, we derived the following results. It was analyzed that the size of Korea's economy, that is, GDP, the previous year's defense cost share, and the number of U.S. troops stationed in Korea had a positive influence on the decision on defense cost sharing. This indicates that Korea's economic growth is a major factor influencing the increase in defense cost sharing, and that the gradual increase in the budget and the negotiation method of the Special Agreement (SMA) for cost sharing of stationing US troops in Korea play an important role. On the other hand, the political tendencies of the ruling party, North Korea's military threats, and China's defense budget were found to have no statistically significant influence on the decision to share defense costs.

• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.1 no.2
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• pp.171-208
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• 2017

This paper is to analyze the type characteristics and prospects of the North Korean nuclear strategy. To this end, the paper is composed of 5 chapters titled introduction; the concept and type of nuclear strategy; the nuclear capabilities of North Korea and the declarative nuclear strategy; the operational characteristics and prospects of the North Korean nuclear strategy; and conclusion. Recently, the deployment of nuclear weapons and the enhancement of nuclear capabilities in North Korea have raised serious problems in our security and military preparedness. Nuclear strategy means military strategy related to the organization, deployment and operation of nuclear weapons. The study of North Korea's nuclear strategy begins with a very realistic assumption that the nuclear arsenal of North Korea has been substantiated. It is a measure based on North Korea's nuclear arsenal that our defense authorities present the concepts of preemptive attack, missile defense, and mass retaliation as countermeasures against the North Korean nuclear issue and are in the process of introducing and deploying them. The declared nuclear declaration strategy of the DPRK is summarized as: (1)Nuclear deterrence and retaliation strategy under the (North Korea's) Nuclear Weapons Act, (2)Nuclear preemptive aggression, (3)The principle of 'no first use' of nuclear weapons in the 7th Congress. And the intentions and operational characteristics of the North Korean nuclear strategy are as follows: (1)Avoiding blame through imitation of existing nuclear state practices, (2)Favoring of nuclear strategy through declarative nuclear strategy, (3)Non-settlement of nuclear strategy due to gap between nuclear capability and nuclear posture. North Korea has declared itself a nuclear-weapon state through the revised Constitution(2012.7), the Line of 'Construction of the Nuclear Armed Forces and the Economy'(2013.3), and the Nuclear Weapons Act(2013.4). However, the status of "nuclear nations" can only be granted by the NPT, which is already a closed system. Realistically, a robust ROK-US alliance and close US-ROK cooperation are crucial to curbing and overcoming the North Korean nuclear threat we face. On this basis, it is essential not only to deter North Korea's nuclear attacks, but also to establish and implement our own short-term, middle-term and long-term political and military countermeasures for North Korea's denuclearization and disarmament.

• Korean Journal of Legislative Studies
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• v.24 no.2
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• pp.5-38
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• 2018

A seismic change is under way in diplomatic topography surrounding the Korean Peninsula. A new dynamic is being generated that could lead to a breakthrough in the nuclear stalemate and to an end of hostility between the two Koreas. Moon Administration's bold and creative foreign policy, which is alleged to place South Korea in the "driver's seat", is probably responsible for what is happening on the Korean Peninsula. However, on the other hand, Moon Administration's foreign policy shows a lot of continuity with foreign policy of previous conservative governments. In particular, the Moon government's emphasis on the vitality of the ROK-US alliance and its commitment to close coordination with the US in dealing with nuclear issues of North Korea is the hallmark of the continuity in South Korea's foreign policy. Emphasizing and sharing the notion of the continuities in foreign policy could contribute to social integration by garnering bi-partisan support. It could also spawn sense of stability, predictability, and confidence to diplomatic counterparts in other countries. And it could help avoid the negative effects of expectation-reality gap in the event that the outcome of all the diplomatic endeavor falls short of expectation held by citizens.