The international community's sanctions against North Korea, triggered by North Korea's nuclear tests and by missile development in the country, are considered the strongest sanctions in history, banning exports of North Korea's major items and limiting imports of machinery and oil products. Accordingly, North Korea's trade volume decreased to the level of collapse after the sanctions, meaning that the sanctions against North Korea were considered to be effective. However, according to this paper, which analyzed the price fluctuations of refined petroleum products in North Korea through the methodology of an event study, the market prices of oil products were only temporarily affected by the sanctions and remained stable over the long run despite the restrictions on the volumes of refined petroleum products introduced. This can be explained by evidence that North Korea has introduced refined oil supplies that are not much different from those before the sanctions through its use of illegal transshipments even after the sanctions. With regard to strategic materials such as refined oil, the North Korean authorities are believed to be desperately avoiding sanctions by, for instance, finding loopholes in the sanctions to meet the minimum level of demand.
This study presents the results of an empirical analysis on whether the experience of contact with North Korea and North Korean settlers affects the perceptions of unification. Specifically, the purpose of this study was to examine whether the contact experience enhances intimacy with the North Korean settlers or raises a friendly perception of North Korea.The results of this study are as follows. First, the experience of contact with North Korea and North Korean defectors had a positive effect on intimacy with North Korean settlers, friendly perception of North Korea, and perceptions of unification. Second, intimacy toward North Korean settlers and perception of North Korea played a mediating role between contact experience and unification consciousness.
The Scope of Application of North Korea's Foreign Economic Arbitration Act and Foreign Investment Act This article examines whether the Foreign Economic Arbitration Act and the Foreign Investment Act of North Korea apply to South Korean parties or companies. This article analyzes laws and agreements related to economic cooperation between South Korea and North Korea. Furthermore, this article compares and evaluates laws related to foreign investment and enacted in North Korea. Now, North Korea's door is closed due to economic sanctions against it, but it will be opened soon. Thus, this article prepares for the future opening of North Korea's markets. Is there a rule of laws in North Korea or just a ruler? Are there laws in North Korea? North Korea has enacted a number of legislation to attract foreign investors, referring to those Chinese laws. For example, North Korea enacted the Foreigner Investment Act, the Foreigner Company Act, the Foreign Investment Bank Act, the Foreign Economic Arbitration Act, the Foreign Economic Contract Act, the International Trade Act, and the Free Economy and Trade Zone Act, among others. Article 2 (2) of the Foreign Investment Law of North Korea states, "Foreign investors are corporations and individuals from other countries investing in our country." It is interpreted that South Korea is not included in the "other countries" of this definition. According to many mutual agreements signed by South Korea and North Korea, the relationship between the two Koreas is a special relation inside the Korean ethnic group. An arbitration between a South Korean party and a North Korean party has the characteristics of both domestic arbitrations and international arbitrations. If the South Korea and North Korea Commercial Arbitration Commission or the Kaesong Industrial Complex Arbitration Commission is not established, the possibility of arbitration by the Chosun International Trade Arbitration Commission, established under North Korea's Foreign Economic Arbitration Act, should be examined. There have been no cases where the Foreign Economic Arbitration Act is applied to disputes between parties of South Korea and North Korea. It might be possible to apply the Foreign Economic Arbitration Act by recognizing the "foreign factor" of a dispute between the South Korean party and North Korean party. It is necessary to raise legislative clarifications by revising the North Korea's Foreign Economic Arbitration Act as to whether Korean parties or companies are included in the scope of this Act's application. Even if it is interpreted that South Korean parties or companies are not included in the scope of North Korea's Foreign Economic Arbitration Act, disputes between South Korean companies and North Korean companies can be resolved by foreign arbitration institutes such as CIETAC in China, HKIAC in Hong Kong, or SIAC in Singapore. Such arbitration awards could be enforced in North Korea pursuant to Article 64 of North Korea's Foreign Economic Arbitration Act. This is because the arbitration awards of foreign arbitration institutes are included in the scope of North Korea's Foreign Economic Arbitration Act. The matter is how to enforce the North Korean laws when a North Korean party or North Korean government does not abide by the laws or their contracts. It is essential for North Korea to join the New York Convention (Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards) and the ICSID Convention (Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States).
The number of North Korean refugees residing in the Republic of Korea (South) has reached 17,000, and this number is expected to exceed 20,000 (North Korean Supporter's Association, 2009). Refugees have developed improper dietary habits while hiding and escaping North Korea. They have also developed preferences for exotic food. This thesis attempts determine the changes in Korean food. This study also describes the view on South Korean food by North Korean refugees. According to our survey, women refugees had better dietary habits than men. Moreover, women and those in their 40's showed a tendency to choose food based on quality over quantity. Both men and women refugees responded that they cook food based on North Korean recipes. Those who view their current financial status as average or higher stated that South Korean food is tastier than North Korean food. Those whose financial status among North Koreans was average or higher when they lived in North Korea appreciated the splendor and beauty of South Korean food more. The results of this study are expected to assist in determining the differences in dietary habits between those from the North compared to Koreans living in the Republic of Korea. Therefore, studies between South and North Korean food should continue.
Research on the news coverage of North Korea has been paying less attention to social media platforms than to legacy media. An increasing number of social media users post, retweet, share, interpret, and set agendas on North Korea. The accessibility of international users and North Korea's publicity purposes make social media a venue for expression, news diversity, and framing about the nation. This study examined the sentiment of Twitter posts on North Korea from a framing perspective and the relationship between network strengths and sentiment from a social network perspective. Data were collected using two tools: Jupyter Notebook with Python 3.6 for preliminary analysis and NodeXL for main analysis. A total of 11,957 tweets, 10,000 of which were collected using Python and 1,957 tweets using NodeXL, about North Korea between June 20-21, 2020 were collected. Results demonstrated that there was more negative sentiment than positive sentiment about North Korea in the sampled Twitter posts. Some users belonging to small network sizes reached out to others on Twitter to build networks and spread positive information about North Korea. Influential users tended to be impartial to sentiment about North Korea, while some Twitter users with a small network exhibited high percentages of positive words about North Korea. Overall, marginalized populations with network bonding were more likely to express positive sentiment about North Korea than were influencers at the center of networks.
The objective of this paper is to analyze why China's policy toward North Korea after the second North Korean nuclear crisis have plunged into the dilemma between pressure and inducement. This paper stress that dilemma between China's two aims toward North, that is, stability in Korean peninsula and North East Asia, and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula that can explain China's inconsistent policies on North Korea. As North Korea publicly revealed the intention of nuclear development and China has played the mediator role for protecting its security, China's two aims toward North have faced the situation of a dilemma. Because China's two aims are directly related with stability in the neighbor that pursuit to perform 'economic development' since 1978, China's two aims toward North would not be changed easily. Therefore, as long as North Korea would not make an effort on denuclearization and China continually would maintain two aims on North, it will be continued a dilemma between China's policies toward North.
In south Korea, the so-called 'conservative-liberal' rivalry over the assessment of the government's North Korean policies is seen to be impeding the road to right policy choices. For example, the liberals accused former President Lee Myung-bak's hardline policy of provoking Pyongyang and leading to a deterioration of inter-Korean relations, while the conservatives appreciated it for helping nurture mutually beneficial inter-Korean relations in the longer term by compelling North Korea to observe international norms. However, such debate over the vices and virtues of Seoul's North Korea policies is hardly meaningful as the measuring sticks used by the liberals and the conservatives are entirely different matters. The two major goals South Korea must pursue with its North Korean policies should be 'peaceful management of division' and 'change in North Korea'. The former is related to maintaining stability within South Korea and promoting co-prosperity with North Korea. For this, the nation needs to engage, encompass and assist the Pyongyang regime. The second goal is also necessary since South Korea, as a divided nation, must seek a unified Korea under the system of democracy and market economies by bringing change in North Korea. For this, South Korea needs powerful leverages with which it can persuade and coerce the North. This means that the nation is destined to simultaneously chase the above-mentioned two goals, while also both recognizing and negating the legitimacy of the North Korean regime. This situation necessitates Seoul to apply flexibility in reconciling with Pyongyang while applying firm principles to sever the vicious circle involving the North's military provocations. The May 25 Measures, which banned trade and economic cooperation with the North except those related to humanitarian assistance, were taken as sanctions against Pyongyang for sinking the South Korean corvette Chonan in March 2010. The Measures were taken by the Seoul government immediately after a multinational investigation team discovered evidence confirming that the South Korean naval ship had been torpedoed by a midget North Korean submarine. Naturally, the May 24 Measures have since then become a major stumbling block in inter-Korean exchange, prompting opposition politicians and concerned entrepreneurs to demand Seoul to unilaterally lift the Measures. Given the significant damages the Measures have inflicted on inter-Korean economic relations, removing them remains as homework for both Koreas. However, the Measures pertains to the 'principles on national security' the Seoul government must adhere to under all circumstances. This is why North Korea's apology and promises not to repeat similar provocations must come first. For now, South Korea has no alternative but to let North Korea solve the problems it has created. South Korea's role is to help the North do so.
Recently, there has been an increasing interchange between South Korea and North Korea. Accordingly, there has been active research to understand the society and culture of North Korea, it has been attempted to have comparative study about nursing education to increase understanding between South and North Korea. In the current educational system, 12 years of education is required for entering a nursing college or university in South Korea, but there are only 10 years for entering nursing college in North Korea. After finishing undergraduate studies one can enter graduate school for a masters degree and or a doctoral degree, but there is a longitudinal relation to medical education in North Korea. Regarding the number of nursing educational institutions, there are 50 BSN programs & 61 Diploma programs in South Korea and 11 Diploma programs in North Korea. In regards to curriculum, South Korea has diverse subjects for general education for freshmen, then is subjects to basic specialities sophomore year, and speciality subject and clinical practices from junior year corresponding to the student's intentions. North Korea has minor subjects for general education and basic specialities in freshmen, speciality subjects sophomore year, speciality subjects and clinical practice in the junior year that may not correspond with the student's intentions. The most outstanding difference in the curriculum is North Korea has various subjects for oriental medicine with clinical application. North Korea also does not teach computer science and English is at a very low level. In clinical practice, South Korea has various settings for clinical practice including community health institutions under the nursing professor or clinical instructor. However, North Korea has limited settings for clinical practice (general hospitals) under a doctor's instruction. Also both South and North Korea have a similar licensing system. Therefore, there must be many more studies regarding North Korea, especially in nursing and nursing education in order to decrease differences and confusion between the Koreas and to prepare for a future unification.
This study extends theoretically the expected utility model of trade-conflict developed by Polacheck if a third country is involved, and analyses empirically how trade between North Korea and China affects to the political conflict between South and North Korea. The results of empirical analysis show that North Korea's exports to South Korea and China do not affect the conflict or cooperative relations between South and North Korea. But North Korea's imports from South Korea and China affect to the conflict between South and North Korea: increasing of North Korea's imports to South Korea reduce conflict between South and North Korea, but increasing of North Korea's imports to China increase conflict between South and North Korea.
Economic Development Zone(EDZ) in the province is one of the foreign policy for economic development of North Korea. North Korea has promulgated 27 Economic Development Zones(5 EDZs as central level and 22 EDZs as provincial level) to promote economic growth through the expansion of external opening policy. EDZs of the provinces play an important role in North Korea's national and regional economic growth. The purpose of this study is to select analytical criteria that can be quantified when considering the location conditions of North Korean economic development zones when domestic companies advance into North Korea according to the progress of inter-Korean economic cooperation, and derive the relative importance between the criteria. After that, based on this, we intend to quantify the evaluation of the location priority of the economic development zone. In this study, through AHP analysis results, when domestic companies enter North Korea, we derive the importance and preference of location selection factors when considering the location conditions of North Korean economic development zones. Taking into account the reality of North Korea when the Korean company entered the North economic development zone following location for evaluation. That is, logistics and transportation, industrial infrastructure, competitiveness, and management incentives. And 14 sub-factors were selected and AHP analysis was performed.
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