• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.42 no.2
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• pp.138-150
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• 2016

This study aims to analyze the structure and characteristics of the domestic online game industry using network analysis. In particular, two-mode network analysis is employed to measure the network structure, centrality, and cluster for two types of online game platforms, online games and mobile games, from 1996 to 2014. We also conduct a dynamic analysis to capture the structural changes in the ecosystem by internal and external environmental changes before and after turning point for each online game platform. It is revealed that the online game econsystem has the higher number of clusters and higher concentration ratio than those of mobile game ecosystem. In dynamic analysis, both platforms exhibit similar trends over time with the increasing number of clusters, enlargement of largest cluster's size, and decreasing concentration ratio. This study is expected to provide fruitful implications for strategic decision making of online game companies and policy making for the online game industry.

• 한국ITS학회:학술대회논문집
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• 2004.11a
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• pp.1-6
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• 2004

• Journal of Distribution Research
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• v.11 no.4
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• pp.31-48
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• 2006

This study was motivated by a recent channel conflict on subsidies for mobile handset between a service provider and a handset manufacturer in the mobile communication market. In this study, we have developed a two-person non-zero sum game for the channel conflict on subsidies for mobile handset, and derived its optimal strategic game solution. As a result, we have found that, between the service operator and the handset manufacturer, one who has high level of market leadership in his own market has a power to affect the optimal strategic game solution. We have also found that, when the service operator and the handset manufacturer have relatively high level of market leadership in their own market, there exist both of potential channel conflict and cooperation. The result of this study may provide an effective reference for a solution of similar channel conflicts.

• Journal of Korea Game Society
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.59-68
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• 2009

This study empirically analyzes game engine supplier's licensing strategy connected with supplier's technological regime and technological innovation. The results show that game engine supplier's technological regime is heterogeneously differentiated and it's user friendliness increases. "User Friendliness" of supplier's technological regime enables supplier's efficient technological transfer and increases supporting capability. Technological knowledge factors such as modularity of game engine structure, generic capability, codifiability of tacit game engine knowledge and degree of innovation turn incomplete technological market into efficient technological market by increasing supporting capability and by reducing transaction cost.

• Journal of Korea Game Society
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• v.10 no.6
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• pp.67-78
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• 2010

Game is the cultural product, which gives users high authority in usage process with its high interactivity. This study is about the user innovation based on customer empowerment, and the possibilities to change the game itself applying high activity of the game. Especially, game modification, which users transform the original game, is an example that the interactivity and changeability of game are maximized. However, these elements were not considered when constructing frameworks to investigate the competition and strategy in game industry. Therefore, this study is based on the customer empowerments of the game modification. Moreover, this study proposes the newly reorganized strategic group map in game industry, which is based on game user innovation and user evaluation.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.56 no.7
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• pp.1199-1204
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• 2007

In a cost based pool market, the generation capacity can be used as strategic bids by generation companies (Gencos) with the cost functions open to the market. Competition using strategic capacities is modeled by Cournot and Perfect Competiton (PC) model, and transformed into two by two payoff matrix game with Gencos' decision variables of Cournot and PC model. The payoff matrices vary when capacity payments are given to Gencos in accordance with their capacity bids. Nash Equilibrium (NE) in the matrices also moves with capacity price changes. In order to maximize social welfare of the market, NE should locate in a certain position of the payoff matrices, which corresponds to a PC NE. A concept of a critical capacity price is proposed and calculated in this paper that is defined as a minimum capacity price leading to PC NE. The critical capacity price is verified to work as a tool for suppressing a strategic capacity withholding in simulations of a test system.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.55 no.9
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• pp.392-398
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• 2006

Maintenance scheduling of generating units (MSU) has strategic dimension in an oligopolistic market. Strategic MSU of gencos can affect a market power through capacity withdrawal which is related to bidding strategy in an generation wholesale market. This paper presents a combined framework that models the interrelation between competitive bidding and strategic MSU. The combined game model is represented as some sub-optimization problems of a market operator (MO) and gencos, that should be solved through bi-level optimization scheme. The gradient method with dual variables is also adopted to calculate a Nash Equilibrium (NE) by an iterative update technique in this paper. Illustrative numerical example shows that NE of a supply function equilibrium is obtained properly by using proposed solution technique. The MSU made by MO is compared with that by each genco and that under perfect competition market.

• Cartoon and Animation Studies
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• s.39
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• pp.365-391
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• 2015

The purpose of this study is to comprehend the characteristics of collaborative examples in mobile games by analyzing the types of cultural fusion and their utilization in mobile game industry. The major examples of collaborations include the collaborative works utilizing artists, characters, and products by examining the practical collaborations within international mobile games between the years 2010 to 2014. The most typical kind of collaboration among them is the utilization of characters, composed of using characters between games, applying animation characters, borrowing cartoon or web-cartoon characters, hiring famous celebrities, or even including great men in their games. Therefore, the characteristics of mobile game's collaborative types are confirmed as below by studying the above examples. (1) There are many examples of collaborating between different types of businesses defined as 'conversion type fusion.' (2) The character utilization is the most sought after type of collaboration. (3) The applied content's target audience seems to share the same age groups of the game's audience. (4) The game industry always adopts the components that could be recognized instantly. (5) The status and influence of mobile game have risen greatly. Consequently, this research has important role in establishing the strategic collaborative plans for mobile game business by expanding the prospects of game related researches and industrial and academic theories.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.11 no.2
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• pp.7-12
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• 1986

The problem of strategic R & D investment is formulate as a differential game model and solved explicity for a special case. It is shown that, at equilibrium, an increase in the intensity of market competition or a decrease in the role of technology transfer results in an increase in the initial rate of investment by competing tfirms. The increased initial investment rate may enhance the rate of technology development. This dynamic model can be used to propose non cooperative R & D investment policies in technologically competitive situation.

• Asia Marketing Journal
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• v.21 no.4
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• pp.77-89
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• 2020

Population-level learning has traditionally been used to provide an explanation for the underlying mechanism of industry change. But it has yet to examine the impact on strategic decisions such as market entry. This conceptual paper aims to provide an insight into how population-level learning affects entry likelihood by acting as a tool for interpreting population-level changes. We study this in the context of the fast-paced mobile gaming industry where population-level information is salient and develop a set of propositions with regard to the likelihood of entry.