• Health Policy and Management
• /
• v.31 no.4
• /
• pp.479-490
• /
• 2021

Background: Conflict in the medical world in 2020 led to the rejection of the national examination for doctors. This study explained the process until the end of the national test refusal situation triggered in 2020 through the signaling game theory. The government has succeeded in requiring medical students to take the national exam. Methods: To explain the rejection of the national examination, we first compose and show an example of two small non-signaling games where medical students know which type the government is of, then combine them to play a signaling game. Results: The behavior of the government and medical students was examined through the signaling game model. In the context of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, the government makes an ultimatum, whatever the type. And the medical students accept it. They judged that the government could not be expected to abolish the policy. If COVID-19 had not occurred, medical students would have been able to continue the confrontation. Conclusion: The government instilled in the other party the perception that the government would not bend its policies because it was the surly type and would not be afraid of a strong confrontation. Through the image created in this way, the government was forced to accept the ultimatum by medical students. Academically, this study is to deal with the policy-making process through the signaling game theory. In the area of health care policy, this study suggests that various situations such as the type of government or the spread of COVID-19 can become important in addition to the rationality of the policy itself.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
• /
• v.33 no.3
• /
• pp.129-146
• /
• 2023

We construct a signaling game model between the arbitrator and claimants, in which the arbitrator's marketing amount is adopted as the signaling device. Assuming that the parties to the dispute select an arbitrator, and if there is a difference in the arbitrator's fee depending on the arbitrator's reputation, the arbitrator will pay to further enhance his reputation. We would like to analyze the cost differences between arbitrators who already have a high reputation and arbitrators who strive to further enhance their reputation using the signal model. From the Analysis of our study, We derive perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the signaling game and refine the equilibrium into a unique equilibrium by invoking the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987). Further, we characterize the refined equilibrium.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
• /
• v.17 no.1
• /
• pp.75-83
• /
• 2015

In mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs), nodes are mobile in nature. Collaboration between mobile nodes is more significant in MANETs, which have as their greatest challenges vulnerabilities to various security attacks and an inability to operate securely while preserving its resources and performing secure routing among nodes. Therefore, it is essential to develop an effective secure routing protocol to protect the nodes from anonymous behaviors. Currently, game theory is a tool that analyzes, formulates and solves selfishness issues. It is seldom applied to detect malicious behavior in networks. It deals, instead, with the strategic and rational behavior of each node. In our study,we used the dynamic Bayesian signaling game to analyze the strategy profile for regular and malicious nodes. This game also revealed the best actions of individual strategies for each node. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) provides a prominent solution for signaling games to solve incomplete information by combining strategies and payoff of players that constitute equilibrium. Using PBE strategies of nodes are private information of regular and malicious nodes. Regular nodes should be cooperative during routing and update their payoff, while malicious nodes take sophisticated risks by evaluating their risk of being identified to decide when to decline. This approach minimizes the utility of malicious nodes and it motivates better cooperation between nodes by using the reputation system. Regular nodes monitor continuously to evaluate their neighbors using belief updating systems of the Bayes rule.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business
• /
• v.14 no.1
• /
• pp.231-246
• /
• 2023

Purpose - This study attempts to provide a new theoretical perspective on the quality signaling and its impact on a market under information asymmetry, focusing on how the accuracy and the cost of quality signaling affect sellers' and buyers' profit, suggesting appropriate designs of quality signaling methods which mitigates information asymmetry. Design/methodology/approach - In order to examine the effect of quality signaling on strategic interactions within the market, we establish an analytic model where market outcomes are determined by seller's quality claim and price, and buyers are risk-neutral. By investigating this analytic model through relevant game trees, we find the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the market and predict related market outcomes based on sellers' quality signaling strategy. Findings - Our analytic model shows counterintuitive results that seller profit will be the lowest with inaccurate quality signaling and the highest with no quality signaling, mostly due to the certification cost. Consequently, sellers should proceed with caution if the quality signaling is less than accurate, as it may backfire. We believe that this is due to the fact that the inaccuracy of quality signaling causes some confusion and uncertainty in both sellers and buyers' decision to maximize profit, making it hard for sellers to predict buyers' behavior. Research implications or Originality - Although the sources and types of quality signaling errors have been investigated in the literature, there has not been satisfactory understanding regarding how inaccuracy of quality certification affects specific market outcomes. We expect that our theoretical model would provide important implications on how to utilize quality signaling to solve adverse selection issues in markets under information asymmetry.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
• /
• v.35 no.7B
• /
• pp.991-1000
• /
• 2010

The Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 (HMIPv6) has been proposed to accommodate frequent mobility of the Mobile Node. HMIPv6 can effectively reduce the signaling overhead and latency. However, it has a problem that the registration of a mobile node concentrates on the furthest MAP(Mobility Anchor Point) when the mobile node enters into a new domain. This paper proposes a new load distribution mechanism by using the concept of Nash Bargaining Solution. The main advantage of the proposed scheme can prevent load concentration from being registered to the specified MAP based on the weight value according to the available resource-ratio of a MAP. With a simulation study, the proposed scheme can improve network performance under widely diverse traffic load intensities.

• Journal of Environmental Policy
• /
• v.8 no.4
• /
• pp.75-94
• /
• 2009

The process of obtaining third-party financing contacts was analyzed via a two-stage game model: a "signaling game" for the first stage,and a "principal-agent model" for the second stage. The two-stage game was solved by a process of backward induction. In the second stage game, the optimal effort level of the energy saving company (ESCO), the optimal compensation scheme of the energy user, and the optimal payoffs for both parties were derived for each subgame. The optimal solutions forthe different subgames were then compared with each other. Our main finding was that if there is some restriction on ESCO's revenue (e.g. a progressive sales tax) that causes ESCO's revenue toincrease at a decreasing rate, then the optimal sharing ratio is uniquely determined at a level of strictly less than one under a linear compensation scheme, i.e. a unique balance exists. Subgames have a unique equilibrium arrived at separately for each situation,. Within this equilibrium, energy users accept energy audit proposals from H-type ESCOs with high levels of technology, but reject proposals from L-type ESCOs with low levels of technology. While L-type ESCOs cannot attain profits in the third-party financing market, H-type ESCOS can pocket the price differential between L-type and H-type audit fees. Accordingly, revenues in an H-type ESCO equilibrium increase not only in line with the technology of the ESCO inquestion, but also faster than in an L-type equilibrium due to more advanced technology. At the same time, energy users receive some positive payoff by allowing ESCOs to perform third-party financing tasks within their existing energy system without incurring any extra costs.

• Korean Management Science Review
• /
• v.33 no.4
• /
• pp.65-75
• /
• 2016

We study limit pricing in a price-based duopoly market under asymmetric information on the demand state. An incumbent, who is a monopolist in the initial period, has complete information on the size of a market, while a potential entrant only knows it partially. After observing the sales price of the incumbent in the first period, the entrant decides whether to enter a duopoly market and the sales price if she chooses to. We present a separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium, which indicates that limit pricing can deter the entry of a potential entrant under price competition when there is information asymmetry about the demand state.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference
• /
• 2006.05a
• /
• pp.522-525
• /
• 2006

Recently, mobile devices support multi-functions such as 3D game, wireless internet, moving pictures, DMB, GPS, and PMP. Bigger size of display device is indispensable to support these functions and higher speed of the interface is needed. However, conventional parallel interfaces between processor and display nodule are not competent enough for that high speed transfers. High-speed serial interface is beginning to appear as an alternative for parallel interface. The advantages of the serial interface are high bandwidth, small number of interconnections, low-power consumption, and good quality of electro-magnetic interference. In this paper, we implement serial interface and use it for a display module. LVDS is used for PHY layer and a defined packet is used for link layer. The feature of the implemented serial interface is the reduced number of interconnections with enough bandwidth.

• Journal of Intelligence and Information Systems
• /
• v.22 no.1
• /
• pp.119-138
• /
• 2016

Since the Industrial Revolution, which made the mass production and mass distribution of standardized goods possible, machine-made (manufactured) products have accounted for the majority of the market. However, in recent years, the phenomenon of purchasing even more expensive handmade products has become a noticeable trend as consumers have started to acknowledge the value of handmade products, such as the craftsman's commitment, belief in their quality and scarcity, and the sense of self-esteem from having them,. Consumer interest in these handmade products has shown explosive growth and has been coupled with the recent development of three-dimensional (3D) printing technologies. Etsy.com is the world's largest online handmade platform. It is no different from any other online platform; it provides an online market where buyers and sellers virtually meet to share information and transact business. However, Etsy.com is different in that shops within this platform only deal with handmade products in a variety of categories, ranging from jewelry to toys. Since its establishment in 2005, despite being limited to handmade products, Etsy.com has enjoyed rapid growth in membership, transaction volume, and revenue. Most recently in April 2015, it raised funds through an initial public offering (IPO) of more than 1.8 billion USD, which demonstrates the huge potential of online handmade platforms. After the success of Etsy.com, various types of online handmade platforms such as Handmade at Amazon, ArtFire, DaWanda, and Craft is ART have emerged and are now competing with each other, at the same time, which has increased the size of the market. According to Deloitte's 2015 holiday survey on which types of gifts the respondents plan to buy during the holiday season, about 16% of U.S. consumers chose "homemade or craft items (e.g., Etsy purchase)," which was the same rate as those for the computer game and shoes categories. This indicates that consumer interests in online handmade platforms will continue to rise in the future. However, this high interest in the market for handmade products and their platforms has not yet led to academic research. Most extant studies have only focused on machine-made products and intelligent services for them. This indicates a lack of studies on handmade products and their intelligent services on virtual platforms. Therefore, this study used signaling theory and prior research on the effects of sellers' characteristics on their performance (e.g., total sales and price premiums) in the buyer-seller relationship to identify the key influencing e-Image factors (e.g., reputation, size, information sharing, and length of relationship). Then, their impacts on the performance of shops within the online handmade platform were empirically examined; the dataset was collected from Etsy.com through the application of web harvesting technology. The results from the structural equation modeling revealed that the reputation, size, and information sharing have significant effects on the total sales, while the reputation and length of relationship influence price premiums. This study extended the online platform research into online handmade platform research by identifying key influencing e-Image factors on within-platform shop's total sales and price premiums based on signaling theory and then performed a statistical investigation. These findings are expected to be a stepping stone for future studies on intelligent online handmade services as well as handmade products themselves. Furthermore, the findings of the study provide online handmade platform operators with practical guidelines on how to implement intelligent online handmade services. They should also help shop managers build their marketing strategies in a more specific and effective manner by suggesting key influencing e-Image factors. The results of this study should contribute to the vitalization of intelligent online handmade services by providing clues on how to maximize within-platform shops' total sales and price premiums.