• International Area Studies Review
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• v.20 no.3
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• pp.23-44
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• 2016

This study attempts to scrutinize the effectiveness of the international economic sanction on North Korea by analyzing the determinants of the North Korea-China trade with Chinese Customs House data classified under general, border, processing, bonded warehouse. The result shows that after international economic sanctions, North Korea-China trade was increased across types of trade. In particular, sanction-sensitive items were increased after sanctions and China also weakened the effectiveness of sanctions. To put it concretely, North Korea's food and fuel imports from china increased in processing and border trade. In the case of luxury good, it was increased in general trade. Strategy goods (weaponry) increased only in bonded warehouse trade. For China's import from North Korea, food and fuel were increased in total, border and bonded warehouse trade. Considering the features of each type of trade, these increase are presumed to have been playing a decisive role in weakening the effect of international sanction on North Korea.

• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.69-92
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• 2018

North Korea conducted a total of six nuclear tests from the 1st test of 2006 to September, 2017. North Korea developed an armed forces security strategy at the level of regime protection and defense to respond to U.S. hostile policy. However, it is certain that strategic goals of North Korea's nuclear test were to overcome a crisis in North Korea's regime through US-North Korea negotiation and complete nuclear armed forces for socialist unification on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea's continuous nuclear test is a direct factor in threatening peace on the Korean Peninsula and an indirect factor in security dynamics of Northeast Asia. The U.N. Security Council has enforced sanctions against North Korea through six resolutions against North Korea's reckless nuclear test for the past 10 years. However, Kim Jong-Un's regime is in a position to stick to simultaneous pursuit of nuclear and economic development in spite of anti-North sanction of international society including U.N. and U.S.A. It is understood that North Korea was stimulated to conduct intense nuclear test as U.N. and U.S.A's anti-North sanction was not effective on North Korea. Full-scale and local wars are expected as military options, one of anti-North sanctions of the Trump administration. The Trump administration has attempted diplomatic pressure strategy as a secondary boycott unlike previous administrations. Nevertheless, North Korea has stood against U.N. and U.S.A's anti-North sanction with brinkmanship tactics, announcing full-scale military confrontation against U.S. It is judged that North Korea will pursue simultaneous nuclear weapons and economic development in terms of regime survival. North Korea will have less strategic choices in that its regime may collapse because of realistic national strategy between U.S.A. and China.

• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.113-136
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• 2018

The purpose of this study is to start from the recognition of the problem of why the sanctions of the international community could not indicate a great effect. In order to find answers to this question, this study focuses on China's aid to North Korea and analyzes the determinants of support for North Korea. Despite a tough international community's sanctions against North Korea, China has taken a dual stance on sanctions and support for North Korea. As for this dual attitude of China, this study approaches the internal and external situation of the support to the North with the rationale for the Two-level game theory. China's sanction against North Korea could be divided into two categories: external factors and domestic factors. These factors include strengthening supremacy in China, checking the US, playing a responsible role in China, securing resources in North Korea, sustaining stable growth in China, maintaining the legitimacy of China's socialist political system, and spreading the Beijing consensus. Based on the analysis of these factors, it could be expected that China's aid for North Korea will be official, informal, or continuous, and it will be difficult for the North to stop supporting North Korea or deteriorating North Korea- China relations.

• Strategy21
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• s.39
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• pp.5-46
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• 2016

North Korea's 4th nuclear test on Jan. 6 and following developments once again awakened the world into seriousness of the nuclear matters on the Korean peninsula. On March 2, UNSC adopted Resolution 2270 which is complemented by Seoul government's measures such as withdrawal from the Gaesung Industrial Complex (Feb. 9) and announcement of unilateral sanction (March 8). Seoul government also strongly urged the international community to strangle North Korea's 'financial resources.' The U.S., Japan, China, and other countries have issued unilateral sanctions to complement the UNSC measure. South Korea and the U.S. conducted their annual joint military drill (Resolve-Foal Eagle) in the largest-ever scale. North Korea, however, responded with demonstration of its nuclear capabilities and announcement of de facto 'nuclear-first' politics. North Korea test-fired a variety of delivery vehicles, threatened nuclear strikes against South Korea and the U.S., and declared itself as an 'invincible nuclear power armed with hydrogen bombs' at the 7th Workers 'Party Congress held in May, 2016. Considering the circumstantial evidences, the North's 4th nuclear test may have been a successful boosted fission bomb test. North Korea, and, if allowed to go on with its nuclear programs, will become a nuclear power armed with more than 50 nuclear weapons including hydrogen bombs. The North is already conducting nuclear blackmail strategy towards South Korea, and must be developing 'nuclear use' strategies. Accordingly, the most pressing challenge for the international community is to bring the North to 'real dialogue for denuclearization through powerful and consistent sanctions. Of course, China's cooperation is the key to success. In this situation, South Korea has urgent challenges on diplomacy and security fronts. A diplomatic challenge is how to lead China, which had shown dual attitudes between 'pressure and connivance' towards the North's nuclear matters pursuant to its military relations with the U.S, to participate in the sanctions consistently. A military one is how to offset the 'nuclear shadow effects' engendered by the North's nuclear blackmail and prevent its purposeful and non-purposeful use of nuclear weapons. Though South Korea's Ministry of Defense is currently spending a large portion of defense finance on preemption (kill-chain) and missile defense, they pose 'high cost and low efficiency' problems. For a 'low cost and high efficiency' of deterrence, South Korea needs to switch to a 'retaliation-centered' deterrence strategy. Though South Korea's response to the North's nuclear threat can theoretically be boiled down into dialogue, sanction and deterrence, now is the time to concentrate on strong sanction and determined deterrence since they are an inevitable mandatory course to destroy the North' nuclear-first delusion and bring it to a 'real denuclearization dialogue.'

• Journal of International Area Studies (JIAS)
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• v.22 no.1
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• pp.135-160
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• 2018

This study aims to predict the likely effect of economic sanctions on North Korea by examining case studies of Iran and Iraq. While UN sanctions against Iraq had immediate negative consequences for society, such as causing famine and reinforcing the authoritarian regime, sanctions against Iran had some productive consequences after they were reinforced by the U.S. and EU in significantly reduced oil exports and government expenditure, which in turn led to regime change and willingness to negotiate nuclear programs for economic recovery. Apart from these distinct differences, sanctions in both countries caused high inflation, shortage of necessary supplies, and increased unemployment. Case studies of Iran and Iraq also reveal that the sanctions disproportionately affected women and children, which implies that the recently reinforced economic sanctions of the U.S. and China against North Korea will cause more suffering of similarly socially marginalized groups in North Korea.

• Journal of Energy Engineering
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• v.24 no.4
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• pp.192-199
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• 2015

Under the economic banner of "self-reliance," North Korea has focused on hydro and thermal power as its main energy supply sources. However, in the face of extreme energy penury caused by machinery and material supply instability in the wake of the collapse of the former communist block as well as equipment aging and deterioration due to floods and other disasters, North Korea and international aid organizations are increasingly turning their attention toward energy source diversification. In particular, renewable energy is recognized as the best strategic energy source for North Korea and it is a decentralized energy option that is suitable in light of North Korea's power distribution networks and its pursuit of self-reliance. Biogas can contribute to improving the human rights situation of North Koreans in conjunction with an increase in food production. For this reason, renewable energy is the most promising option for an energy source that is likely to secure humanitarian aid from international organizations such as the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP). However, the implementation of such humanitarian aid has been hampered by rising concerns about the diversion of provided energy materials for military purposes and the disguised introduction of dual use items strategic materials as well as UN Security Council resolutions and sanctions of the international community against North Korea's military provocation, including nuclear tests and missile launches. This paper explores the possibility of solving this dilemma and proceeding with the humanitarian aid to North Korea by evaluating the potential for sanction and the risk of diversion of the possible products for biogas-related aid on the basis of the list of UN-sanctioned items.

• Strategy21
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• s.39
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• pp.82-113
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• 2016

This paper analyzes the contents and the effects of the UNSC 2270, and its implications to South Korea's defense strategy and navy. The UN Security Council passed strong sanctions against North Korea which punish North Korea's 4^th nuclear test. The sanctions compared to the previous ones require international society to take practical actions such as comprehensive trade bans as well as diplomatic isolation which will put significant pains on North Korea. Especially, these measures would greatly hamper economic development policy of Kim Joung-un regime. Because Kim Jung-un regime has inherent legitimacy problems which stems from the third family succession of the power, economic difficulties may play an important cause on the regime instability in the long term. In fact, the United States sees this possibility as an option to coerce North Korea in which North Korea choose denuclearization for its regime survival. Nevertheless, the prospects of the UN sanctions are not so optimistic. Considering North Korea's willingness for nuclear development and its level of nuclear technology, North Korea will try to play a gambit with the US and South Korea by exploiting its strategic advantages. North Korea's response will have three following strategies. First, it would actively pursue political and economic survival strategy by using China's support for the regime, strengthening its power grip in the name of countering US hostile policy, and enhancing peace propaganda. Second, North Korea will accelerate efforts to position its status as a nuclear de facto state. For this purpose, it could create nuclear crisis on the peninsula. Third, it would exploit local provocations as an exit strategy to get over the current situation. In order to counter North Korea's actions and punish North Korea's behavior strongly, South Korea needs following strategies and efforts. It should first make all the efforts to implement the UN sanctions. Strong and practical nuclear deterrence strategy and capability with the U.S. should be developed. Effective strategy and capabilities for the prevention and deterrence of North Korea's provocation should be prepared. For this purpose, North Korea's provocation strategy should be thoroughly reviewed. Active international cooperation is needed to punish and coerce North Korea's behavior. Finally, South Korea should prepare for the possible occurrence of North Korea's contingency and make use of the situation as an opportunity to achieve unification. All these strategies and efforts demand the more active roles and missions of South Korea's navy and thus, nullify North Korea's intention militarily.

• Journal of the Economic Geographical Society of Korea
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• v.22 no.4
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• pp.438-457
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• 2019

The main purpose of this paper is to identify the entry types and locational determinants of North Korean workers in cross-border regions between North Korea and China. More specifically, the paper has attempted to divide the entry type of them in the regions into two; 1) entry via transactions between Chinese traders with North Korea and North Korea trade companies, and 2) entry via transactions between Korean-Chinese middlemen and North Korean trade companies. Also, it has analyzed main factors of their locational determinants in the spatial contexts of the regions. There have been changes in two perspectives in terms of the entry paths and types of them in accordance with the transformation of characteristics of United Nations sanction against North Korea from 'call-upon' to 'decide' after UN Security Council Resolution 2094 in 2013. Firstly, main agents who have dealing with North Korean trade companies which have right to dispatch North Korean workers have been changed from Chinese traders into Korean-Chinese brokers who are specialized in the introduction of North Korean workers with one-stop service from visa administrative to labor managements. Secondly, there has been a transfer of North Korean workers in the regions from formal to informal workers who has been admitted into China with a short stay or a tourist visa, and then remained illegally to be employed in China. Therefore, as demands on service which is able to guarantee the security of North Korean informal workers and their managements have increased, Korean-Chinese brokers have been stimulated in the regions after the operation of real international sanctions against overseas North Korean workers. In addition, the main factors of their locational determinants in cross-border regions between North Korea and China are could be analyzed in three perspectives; 1) an increase in real wages in accordance with the reform of the Chinese social insurance system after 2011, 2) the structural vulnerability of labor markets in the regions, 3) the utilization of stable and manageable workers.

• Strategy21
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• s.46
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• pp.29-56
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• 2020

Despite the deep concerns against the DPRK and the harsh sanctions imposed on it, the country renders the sanctions futile by facilitating various illegal trades such as the ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum or coal. Recently, the international community went into paying attention to solve this matter. Among the measures the community can take, "reinforcing the search and inspection of the DPRK related vessels transiting in the high and territorial seas" is the best policy approach to reduce the sanction evasion and provide the international community with considerable bargaining advantages. This measure requires the forceful action by legal enforcement agencies, also known as VBSS. (Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure) It would make the deals prohibited by the UNSCRs (United Nation Security Council Resolutions) less profitable by reducing the expected return on the deals and increasing the cost for them. So, it would make the illegal deals under the table less attractive. The DPRK has been able to render the sanctions futile by exploiting the limitations of the current maritime sanctions. The resolutions are short of being specific about law enforcement, and the PSI (Proliferation Security Initiative) is legally nonbinding. However, if the UNSCRs and the PSI are combined, they can generate a new source of power and exploit the weakness of the DPRK. Noting that the recent UNSCRs stipulated all the legal discussions in the resolutions are confined and applied only to the DPRK, the PSI can target the commercial trade as well as the WMD-related materials in the case of the DPRK's illegal maritime practices. Therefore, the PSI endorsing partners should go beyond mere commitments. They should discuss action plans to implement the maritime interdictions to the extent that they discourage the DPRK and its business partners continuing the illegal activities.