• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.21 no.2
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• pp.231-268
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• 2018

Wittgenstein asserts in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 5.542 that "A believes that p" is of the form "'p' says p" and "here we have no co-ordination of a fact and an object, but a co-ordination of facts by means of a co-ordination of their objects." What does, then, it mean exactly that 'p' says p? What are "facts" and "a co-ordination" in the expression "a co-ordination of facts"? Are propositional attitude statements significant propositions or not? Furthermore, what is the point of Wittgenstein's criticism of Russell's theory of judgement? In this paper, I will answer these questions on the basis of Wittgenstein's explication of the concept of thought and Ramsey's relevant remark on propositional attitude. Meanwhile propositional attitude statements are bound up with solipsism of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and some of them have senses. Hence both of assertions that all the propositional attitude statements are significant and all of them are nonsense in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus are not correct.

• Korean Journal of Cognitive Science
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• v.6 no.1
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• pp.31-46
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• 1995

According to the Fregean theory of meaning based on the distinction between sense and reference,the cognitive significance of coreferential names may be distinct or The so-called direct reference theorists. however,claim that unamhbiguous,coreferential names.which have the same denotation from context to context, must have the same cognitive significance.Thereby,Fregean senses,counted as intermediate entities that determine the denotation of a term,are altogether rejected.Once Fregean senses are rejected.however,it is hard to explain why the substitytivity of coreferential names fails in the contexts of propositional attitudes.Thus,the puzzles of propositional attitudes have been the stumbling block for direct reference theorists. Recently, Zalta claimed that by small amendation it is possible to reconcile the conflicting views of Fregeans and the direct reference theorists without losing their important insights.Indeed, he claimed that his suggestion admirably solves the propositional puzzles.In this article,we shall critically examine his eclectic solution only to highlight some of the more basic issues.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.147
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• pp.59-76
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• 2018

What are the conditions make a being x a moral agent? Can an artifact be moral agent? A moral agent is considered to be a rational being capable of distinguishing between right and wrong. This study critically analyzed Davidson's position on the condition of the rational being and argued that the network of beliefs with propositional attitude and the beliefs as their background cannot be a requisite for the rational being. Later, it proves that the conditions proposed by $Proke{\check{s}}ov{\acute{a}}$ are merely paratactically listed superficial elements. The moral agent in this study includes the rational agent and it is proven that the strong first person viewpoint is the necessary and sufficient condition for rational agent and moral agent. In conclusion, it suggested a the sketch of moderate skepticism which sets the tentative limit on the agent potential in an artifact by suggesting conditions for moral agent instead of intense skepticism that strongly denies the potential as the moral agent.

• Language and Information
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• v.4 no.2
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• pp.93-105
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• 2000

I argue in this paper that the sequence of tense (SOT) phenomenon can be accounted for without positing a SOT rule, focusing on the contrast between the past under-past sentences which lead to ambiguity and those sentences which do not. The different interpreta- tion of past under past sentences depends on whether the stative or then non-stative predicates occur in the complement clauses in the propositional attitude verbs. Based on this, I also argue that the embedded past tense does not contribute to the seman- tics past tense in the complement clause. Instead, it is due to the occurrence of the stative or non-stative predicates in the complement clauses. The stative predicates are associated with the temporal precedence or the overlap relation, whereas the non-stative predicates the precedence relation only. This fact triggers the contrast in past- under- past sentences.(Korea University)

• Asia Pacific Journal of Corpus Research
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• v.2 no.2
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• pp.1-15
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• 2021

The study aims to explore the use of metadiscourse in the Bank Negara Malaysia Governor's speeches based on Hyland's Interpersonal Model of Metadiscourse. The corpus data consist of 343 speech texts, which were extracted from the Malaysian Corpus of Financial English (MacFE), amounting to 688,778 tokens. Adopting both quantitative and qualitative approaches to data analysis the study investigates (1) the overall use of metadiscourse in the Bank Negara Governor's speech texts and (2) the functions of the most prominent metadiscourse resources used and their functions in the speech texts. The findings reveal that the Governor's speech texts to be interactional rather than interactive, revealing a rich distribution of interactional metadiscourse resources, namely engagement markers, self-mention, hedges, boosters and attitude markers throughout the texts. The interactional metadiscourse resources function to establish speaker-audience engagement and alignment of views, as well as to express degree of uncertainty and certainty and attitudes. The study concludes that the speech texts are not merely informational or propositional, but rather interpersonal.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.116
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• pp.133-154
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• 2010

Eliminativist about mentality want to throw out propositional attitude. In this respect, according to R. G. Swinburne, Lynne R. Baker, this theory seems to be self refuting. But it is not so clear enough in what sense eliminativism is self refuting. There are several construals of self-refutation argument against eliminativism. Among them, Patricia Churchland's simple version is defended here. For doing this, we need to analyze William Ramsey's reconstruction of self- refutation argument and J. L. Mackie's famous concept of self-refutation. As a result of this analysis, we can understand most self-refutation arguments against eliminativism don't succeed to defeat eliminativism with this argument.