• Journal of KIISE:Software and Applications
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• v.27 no.3
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• pp.257-265
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• 2000

There is much selective confliction in nature where selfish and rational individuals exists. Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) game deals with this problem, and has been used to study on the evolution of cooperation in social, economic and biological systems. So far, there has been much work about the relationship of the number of players and cooperation, strategy learning as a machine learning and the effect of payoff functions to cooperation. In this paper, We attempt to investigate the cooperative coalition size according to payoff functions, and observe the relationship of localization and the evolution of cooperation in NIPD (N-player IPD) game. Experimental results indicate that cooperative coalition size increases as the gradient of the payoff function for cooperation becomes steeper than that of defector's payoff function, or as the minimum coalition size gets smaller, Moreover, the smaller the neighborhood of interaction is, the higher the cooperative coalition emerges through the evolution of population.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.12 no.2
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• pp.712-717
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• 2011

Option issuers generally utilize Dynamic Delta Hedging(DDH) technique to avoid the risk resulting from continuously changing option value. DDH duplicates payoff of option position by adjusting hedge position according to the delta value from Black-Scholes(BS) model in order to maintain risk neutral state. DDH, however, is not able to guarantee optimal hedging performance because of the weaknesses caused by impractical assumptions inherent in BS model. Therefore, this study presents a methodology for dynamic option hedge using artificial neural network(ANN) to enhance hedging performance and show the superiority of the proposed method using various computational experiments.

• Journal of the military operations research society of Korea
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• v.7 no.2
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• pp.19-29
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• 1981

• Journal of Information Technology Applications and Management
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• v.14 no.1
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• pp.21-36
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• 2007

We face with numerous situation of decision making. In this situation, we would make decision through individual's own information, or others' decision making with ignoring private information, Also we would make decision through compromise of private information and others' information. like this, we call situation to imitate information of previous decision maker, with disregarding private own information,'information cascades' Also, anchoring effects are results of insufficient adjustment from an arbitrary value. In this paper, we examined how information cascades effects and anchoring effects would be generated in the people who use IT technique as instant poll of website. And this paper presents alternatives to decrease information cascades effects and anchoring effects. This exercise provides facts anchoring effects occur when voters can see poll result. And this paper shows that more degree of output difference is deepened, and more anchoring effects occur. Also this paper shows that when website gives positive payoff, more anchoring effects occur.

• Journal of Technology Innovation
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.175-201
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• 2007

Licensing contracts between partners in International Joint Ventures(IJV) have not only aspects of relation contract, which is interdependent and long-term cooperative relationships in interpartner but also aspects of discrete contract which is exposed to opportunistic risk caused by IJV partners who maximize individual profit instead of joint payoff maximization. In this circumstance, appropriate compensation structures such as lump-sum and royalty can reduce conflicts and spur interpartner cooperation. In addition, compensation structures that stipulate each party's rights, duties, and responsibilities under various sets of environmental conditions have strong implications for transaction cost minimization and joint payoff maximization. On the other hands, compensation structures such as lump-sum and royalty in IJV licensing contract have benefits and costs depending on IJV partners uncertainty, partner dependency, and environment uncertainty. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to empirically show how partner uncertainty, partner dependence and environment uncertainty influence compensation structure chosen by licensor in IJV.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.6
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• pp.347-353
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• 2003

In models of imperfect competition of deregulated electricity markets, the key task is to find the Nash equilibrium(NE). The approaches for finding the NE have had two major bottlenecks: computation of mixed strategy equilibrium and treatment of multi-player games. This paper proposes a payoff matrix approach that resolves these bottlenecks. The proposed method can efficiently find a mixed strategy equilibrium in a multi-player game. The formulation of the m condition for a three-player game is introduced and a basic computation scheme of solving nonlinear equalities and checking inequalities is proposed. In order to relieve the inevitable burden of searching the subspace of payoffs, several techniques are adopted in this paper. Two example application problems arising from electricity markets and involving a Cournot and a Bertrand model, respectively, are investigated for verifying the proposed method.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.27 no.2
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• pp.214-225
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• 2001

This research deals with an off-line learning method targeted for systematically constructing negotiation strategies in automated electronic commerce. Single-issue negotiation is assumed. Variants of competitive learning and hierarchical clustering method are devised and applied to extracting negotiation strategies, given historical negotiation data set and tactics. Our research is motivated by the following fact: evidence from both theoretical analysis and observations of human interaction shows that if decision makers have prior knowledge on the behaviors of opponents from negotiation, the overall payoff would increase. Simulation-based experiments convinced us that the proposed method is more effective than human negotiation in terms of the ratio of negotiation settlement and resulting payoff.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.10 no.2
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• pp.320-329
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• 2010

As software producers have tried to keep their profit against illegal piracy, contents producers also want to protect their contents from unlawful sharing among users. Some researchers uncovered that the regulation on the unlicensed contents is not the best policy to maximize their profit mainly due to network effect but this issue has been still controversial. In this paper, we develop a model to investigate the effect of regulation against unlicensed contents sharing on the profit of contents producers and present the optimal condition to maximize profit of contents producers under the regulation and non-regulation of unlicensed contents. As a result, we analyzed that the firm's payoff under the regulation on unlicensed contents is not always greater than the payoff under the non-regulation because of network externality. If the additional utility from off-line purchase of type P consumers (who enjoy the additional benefit of off-line purchase) is large enough, then the firm's payoff is maximized without regulation.

• Communications of the Korean Mathematical Society
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• v.32 no.2
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• pp.467-477
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• 2017

This paper is about the derivations of local volatilities for European quanto call option prices according to various types of payoffs. We derive the explicit formulas of local volatilities with constant foreign and domestic interest rates by adapting the method of Derman-Kani.

• Asian Journal of Business Environment
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• v.10 no.2
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• pp.5-15
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• 2020

Purpose: This study examines the impact of individual reciprocal preferences on coalition formation. The reciprocal model considers a player's own payoff, the player's perception of others' payoffs, and others' perceptions of the player's payoff. Research design, data and methodology: A reciprocal model is built to illustrate how reciprocity influences individual decisions in a coalition game and its formation. The prediction is examined with experimental evidences from a dictator game and a membership game. Results: The theoretical result suggests that the coalition formation could be unstable due to negative reciprocal kindness. The experimental findings support that negative reciprocal kindness could lead players participating in a coalition, no matter their dominant strategies are. When subjects were essential to make contributions to a coalition, they were more likely to cooperate if they were treated badly. In contrast, when subjects were unnecessary, the reciprocal kindness could enhance cooperative tendencies. Conclusions: This study reveals that the reciprocal behavior could influence individual decisions and reshape the coalition formation. In terms of policy implications, this study has shown that coalition formation could be reshaped by reciprocal prefe rences. Due to the strategic and complicated decision process in an interactive environment, a comprehensive investigation of factors would be required in a climate coalition in practice.