• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.28 no.2
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• pp.349-384
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• 2013

The Sputnik 1 launching in 1957 made the world recognize the necessity of international regulations on space development and activities in outer space. The United Nations established COPUOS the very next year, and adopted the mandate to examine legal issues concerning the peaceful uses of outer space. At the time, the military sector of the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union were in charge of the space development and they were not welcomed to discuss the prohibition of the military uses of outer space at the legal section in the COPUOS. Although both countries had common interests in securing the freedom of military uses in outer space. As the social and economic benefits derived from space activities have become more apparent, civil expenditures on space activities have continued to increase in several countries. Virtually all new spacefaring states explicitly place a priority on space-based applications to support social and economic development. Such space applications as satellite navigation and Earth imaging are core elements of almost every existing civil space program. Likewise, Moon exploration continues to be a priority for such established spacefaring states as China, Russia, India, and Japan. Recently, Companies that manufacture satellites and ground equipment have also seen significant growth. On 25 February 2012 China successfully launched the eleventh satellite for its indigenous global navigation and positioning satellite system, Beidou. Civil space activities began to grow in China when they were allocated to the China Great Wall Industry Corporation in 1986. China Aerospace Corporation was established in 1993, followed by the development of the China National Space Administration. In Japan civil space was initially coordinated by the National Space Activities Council formed in 1960. Most of the work was performed by the Institute of Space and Aeronautical Science of the University of Tokyo, the National Aerospace Laboratory, and, most importantly, the National Space Development Agency. In 2003 all this work was assumed by the Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency(JAXA). Japan eases restrictions on military space development. On 20 June 2012 Japan passed the Partial Revision of the Cabinet Establishment Act, which restructured the authority to regulate Japanese space policy and budget, including the governance of the JAXA. Under this legislation, the Space Activities Commission of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology, which was responsible for the development of Japanese space program, will be abolished. Regulation of space policy and budget will be handed over to the Space Strategy Headquarter formed under the Prime Minister's Cabinet. Space Strategy will be supported by a Consultative Policy Commission as an academics and independent observers. By revoking Article 4 (Objectives of the Agency) of a law that previously governed JAXA and mandated the development of space programs for "peaceful purposes only," the new legislation demonstrates consistency with Article 2 of the 2008 Basic Space Law. In conformity with the principles laid down in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty JAXA is now free to pursue the non-aggressive military use of space. New legislation is the culmination of a decade-long process that sought ways to "leverage Japan's space development programs and technologies for security purposes, to bolster the nation's defenses in the face of increased tensions in East Asia." In this connection it would also be very important and necessary to create an Asian Space Agency(ASA) for strengthening cooperation within the Asian space community towards joint undertakings.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.30 no.2
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• pp.469-497
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• 2015

In 2009 Iridium 33, a satellite owned by the American Iridium Communications Inc. and Kosmos-2251, a satellite owned by the Russian Space Forces, collided at a speed of 42,120 km/h and an altitude of 789 kilometers above the Taymyr Peninsula in Siberia. NASA estimated that the satellite collision had created approximately 1,000 pieces of debris larger than 10 centimeters, in addition to many smaller ones. By July 2011, the U.S. Space Surveillance Network(SSN) had catalogued over 2,000 large debris fragments. On January 11, 2007 China conducted a test on its anti-satellite missile. A Chinese weather satellite, the FY-1C polar orbit satellite, was destroyed by the missile that was launched using a multistage solid-fuel. The test was unprecedented for having created a record amount of debris. At least 2,317 pieces of trackable size (i.e. of golf ball size or larger) and an estimated 150,000 particles were generated as a result. As far as the Space Treaties such as 1967 Outer Space Treaty, 1968 Rescue Agreement, 1972 Liability Convention, 1975 Registration Convention and 1979 Moon Agreement are concerned, few provisions addressing the space environment and debris in space can be found. In the early years of space exploration dating back to the late 1950s, the focus of international law was on the establishment of a basic set of rules on the activities undertaken by various states in outer space.. Consequently environmental issues, including those of space debris, did not receive the priority they deserve when international space law was originally drafted. As shown in the case of the 1978 "Cosmos 954 Incident" between Canada and USSR, the two parties settled it by the memorandum between two nations not by the Space Treaties to which they are parties. In 1994 the 66th conference of International Law Association(ILA) adopted "International Instrument on the Protection of the Environment from Damage Caused by Space Debris". The Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee(IADC) issued some guidelines for the space debris which were the basis of "the UN Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines" which had been approved by the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space(COPUOS) in its 527th meeting. On December 21 2007 this guideline was approved by UNGA Resolution 62/217. The EU has proposed an "International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities" as a transparency and confidence-building measure. It was only in 2010 that the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee began considering as an agenda item the long-term sustainability of outer space. A Working Group on the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities was established, the objectives of which include identifying areas of concern for the long-term sustainability of outer space activities, proposing measures that could enhance sustainability, and producing voluntary guidelines to reduce risks to long-term sustainability. By this effort "Guidelines on the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities" are being under consideration. In the case of "Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exp1oration and Use of Outer Space" adopted by UNGA Resolution 1962(XVIII), December 13 1963, the 9 principles proclaimed in that Declaration, although all of them incorporated in the Space Treaties, could be regarded as customary international law binding all states considering the time and opinio juris by the responses of the world. Although the soft law such as resolutions, guidelines are not binding law, there are some provisions which have a fundamentally norm-creating character and customary international law. In November 12 1974 UN General Assembly recalled through a Resolution 3232(XXIX) "Review of the role of International Court of Justice" that the development of international law may be reflected, inter alia, by the declarations and resolutions of the General Assembly which may to that extend be taken into consideration by the judgements of the International Court of Justice. We are expecting COPUOS which gave birth 5 Space Treaties that it could give us binding space debris mitigation measures to be implemented based on space debris mitigation soft law in the near future.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.31 no.1
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• pp.145-167
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• 2016

UN Security Council is entitled to power for determining the existence of the threat to the peace. Specifying the provisions adopted in accordance with the chapter 7 of the UN Charter, its resolution is deemed as document confirming its decision about the threat to the peace. In general, resolutions adopted by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, are considered binding, in accordance with Article 25 of the Charter. Regarding to the terms of the Resolutions to be interpreted, the word "decide" is used as to the suspension of the ballistic missile program, the word "demand" is used as to the stopping of the the launch of ballistic missile, and the word "demand" is used as to return to the missile test moratorium. These provisions may be deemed to determining specific obligations to be imposed upon the States in accordance with the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. On the other hand, the Resolutions may be limited to the decision, not leading to a sort of international legislation, the main purpose of which is to provide a legal basis for international sanctions against Northe Korea. North Korea missile test case has reminded us of continuing discussion about whether the decision of the Security Council lacks the legislative authority due to its decision process. Furthermore, having regard to the outer space and space activities, the outer space law regime would be not compatible with the Security Council decision process in that the former presupposes the agreement among all States parties, while the latter based upon the agreement between Council member States. Therefore, it is premature to consider the Security Council decision as becoming the lex specialis of the space law regime.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.25 no.1
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• pp.159-203
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• 2010

Together with the development of space science outer space law has become one of the most rapidly developing branches of international law. This reflects a general realization that these new activities must be subject to reasonable legal regulation if they are to serve the peaceful purposes of mankind without undue confusion and disorder. The exploration and use of outer space introduces many novel opportunities and dilemmas, and inspired insights are needed in the development of this new resource. In particular, the settlement of space law disputes is a relatively new discussion in international law. However, the significance of the settlement of space law disputes was acknowledged in various colloquia organized by legal academicians and practitioners around the world. Analysis of the dispute settlement provisions in space agreements plainly reveals the degree to which States persist to be mistrustful of any impingement to their sovereignty. They are reluctant to submit disputes to adjudication and binding arbitration, particularly when these provisions are negotiated between States which have dissimilar political, economic and social interests and demography. However, there is a slow but clear shift in this attitude as States realize the contemporary political, economic and technical pressures necessitating the lifting of the veil of State sovereignty. The development of an effective mechanism for the settlement of disputes arising in relation to the development of the exploration and exploitation of outer space has been the subject of global study by highly qualified publicists and international institutions. The 1972 Liability Convention is the space treaty with the most elaborate provisions for dispute settlement. However, it fails to ensure binding decisions. In this point, the 1998 Taipei Final Draft Convention may be a useful instrument for further consideration on whether an independent sectorialized dispute settlement mechanism should be established. Considering these circumstances it seemed essential to take legislative action to implement a system as comprehensive as the relevant legal framework are in the Law of the Sea and International Criminal Law mechanisms for dispute settlement and conflict avoidance from outer space activities.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.24 no.2
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• pp.211-234
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• 2009

North Korea conducted the launcher test, which, as North Korea claimed, belonged to the sovereign rights for the purpose of peaceful utilization and exploration of the outer space. The launching was allegedly done for the sole purpose of putting the satellite into earth orbit, while international community stressed the fact that the orbiting of satellite was not confirmed and that the technology used was not distinct from the purpose of building intercontinental ballistic missile. UN Security Council adopted the resolutions which took the effect that the launching was deemed as the missile launching, not the mere launcher test. North Korea declared the moratorium of suspending its test activity. Controversial issues have been raised regarding whether the launcher itself has the legal status of enjoying the freedom of space flight based upon the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. The resolutions, however, has put forward a binding instrument forbidding the launching. UN Security Council resolutions, however, should be read not as defining the missile test illegal, in that the language of resolutions, such as 'demand', should be considered as not formulating a sort of obligatory act or inact. On the other hand, the resolutions should be read as having binding force with respect to any activity relating to the weapons of mass destruction. The resolution 1718 is written in more specific language such as 'decides that the DPRK shall suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launching'. Therefore, the lauching activity of the North Korea is banned by the UN Security Council resolution. It should be noted that the resolution does not include any specific provisions defining the space of activity of the North Korea as illegal. But, the legal effect of the moratorium is not denied as to its launching itself, which is corresponding to the missile test clearisibanned in accordance with the resolutions.

• Journal of the Korean Society for Aeronautical & Space Sciences
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• v.46 no.12
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• pp.1056-1069
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• 2018

In order to promote the commercial space activities of the private sector, the Trump Administration announced the commercial space regulatory reforms by issuing the Space Policy Directive-2 (SPD-2) on May 24, 2018, followed by the SPD-3 dealing with a separate issue of the space traffic management on June 18. Both executive orders, based on the recommendations prepared by the National Space Council (NSC) reconstituted in June 2017 and signed by the President, involve regulatory reform policy related to launch services, commercial remote sensing, establishment of one-stop shop office in Commerce Department, radio frequency spectrum, export control, and space traffic management, providing a strong guidance to the Federal Government. The commercial space regulatory reform policy can be seen in broader terms of the National Security Strategy earlier announced on Dec. 18, 2017, and as such, it pursues the economic growth of the U.S. and the national security as well. The U.S. law and policy prioritizing its national interests by promoting commercial space activities may lead to concerns and debate on the potential breach of the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty. Hence, it is worth noting the legal implications as derived from the U.S. space policy and domestic legislation, thereby accelerating international discussion to build on international norms as appropriate to the pr ogress of space technology and space commercialization.

• Current Industrial and Technological Trends in Aerospace
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• v.6 no.1
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• pp.3-13
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• 2008

The year 2007 marked two important anniversaries for space. The Soviet Union launched Sputnik 50 years ago on October 4. 1957. The 40th anniversary of the United Nations treaty on outer space was also marked in 2007. 2008 and 2007 were full of dramatic events of space activity as well : Success of Japan's first large lunar explorer 'KAGUYA'(SELENE) and China's 'Chang'e 1', launch of ISS laboratory module, 'Colombus' and 'Kibo', test of China's ASAT, and success of Korea's first astronaut program and so on. International government space budgets reached $78.3 billion in 2007, a strong growth rate of 36% over 2006, and the recently released Global Exploration Strategy, The Framework for Coordination is a set of guidelines for international cooperation among 14 of the world's space agencies. Worldwide space industry revenue grew by 20% over 2005, $106.1 billion in 2006 and $173.9 billion expected in 2007. This paper discusses the issues related to the Earth observation R&D trend and market in detail. Korea's 2008 government space spending is \316.4 billion, 2007 space industry revenue was $106 million. Several research projects are now underway and STSAT 2 will be launched by KSLV-1 at the Naro Space Center within this year.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.22 no.1
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• pp.105-123
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• 2007

The launching of the Taepo-dong 1 on 31 August 1998 by the North Korea was the first case where the diplomatic protests was made against the flight, the purpose of which, the launching State claimed, consisted in space exploration and use. It is the principle regarding the freedom of space exploration and use, as included in the international treaty, that is relevant in applying the various rules and in defining the legal status of the flight. Its legal status, however, was not actually taken into account, as political negotiations leading to the test moratorium has been successful until present day in freezing the political crisis. This implies that the rules of the law lack the validity and logic sufficient in dictating the conduct of the States. This case shows that, in effect, it is not the rule but the politics that is to govern the status of the flight.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• no.spc
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• pp.87-104
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• 2007

The launching of the Taepo-dong 1 on 31 August 1998 by the North Korea was the first case where the diplomatic protests was made against the flight, the purpose of which, the launching State claimed, consisted in space exploration and use. It is the principle regarding the freedom of space exploration and use, as included in the international treaty, that is relevant in applying the various rules and in defining the legal status of the flight. Its legal status, however, was not actually taken into account, as political negotiations leading to the test moratorium has been successful until present day in freezing the political crisis. This implies that the rules of the law lack the validity and logic sufficient in dictating the conduct of the States. This case shows that, in effect, it is not the rule but the politics that is to govern the status of the flight.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.21 no.1
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• pp.169-189
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• 2006

In 2007, KSLV(Korea Small Launching Vehicle) that we made at Goheung National Space Center is going to launch and promotes of our space exploration systematically and 'Space Exploration Promotion Act' was enter into force. 'Space Exploration Promotion Act' article 3, section 1, as is prescribing "Korean government keeps the space treaties contracted with other countries and international organizations and pursues after peaceful uses of outer space." The representative international treaties are Outer Space Treaty (1967) and Liability Convention (1972) etc. In Liability convention article 2, "A launching State shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space object on the surface of the earth or to aircraft in flight. The important content of the art. 2 is the responsible entity is the 'State' not the 'Company'. According by Korean Space Exploration Act art. 14, person who launches space objects according to art. 8 and art. 11 must bear the liability for damages owing to space accidents of the space objects. Could Korean government apply the Products Liability Act which is enter into force from July 1, 2002 to space launching person? And what is the contact type between Korea Aerospace Research Institute(KARl) and Russia manufacturer. Is that a Co-Development contract or Licence Product contract? And there is no exemption clause to waive the Russia manufacturer's liability which we could find it from other similar contract condition. If there is no exemption clause to the Russia manufacturer, could we apply the Korean Products Liability Act to Russia one? The most important legal point is whether we could apply the Korean Products Liability Act to the main component company. According by the art. 17 of the contract between KARl and the company, KARl already apply the Products Liability Act to the main component company. For reference, we need to examine the Appalachian Insurance co. v. McDonnell Douglas case, this case is that long distance electricity communication satellite of Western Union Telegraph company possessions fails on track entry. In Western Union's insurance company supplied to Western Union with insurance of $ 105 millions, which has the satellite regard as entirely damage. Five insurance companies -Appalachian insurance company, Commonwealth insurance company, Industrial Indemnity, Mutual Marine Office, Northbrook Excess & Surplus insurance company- went to court against McDonnell Douglases, Morton Thiokol and Hitco company to inquire for fault and strict liability of product. By the Appalachian Insurance co. v. McDonnell Douglas case, KARl should waiver the main component's product liability burden. And we could study the possibility of the adapt 'Government Contractor Defense' theory to the main component company.