• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.35 no.4
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• pp.55-79
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• 2010

This study deals with a model for platform competition in a two-sided market. We suppose there are both direct and indirect network externalities between suppliers and users of each platform. Moreover, we suppose that both users and suppliers are distributed in their relative affinity for each platform type. That is, each user [supplier] has his/her own preferential position toward each platform, and users [suppliers] are horizontally differentiated over [0, 1]. And for analytical tractability, some parameters like direct and indirect network externalities are the same across the markets. Given the parameters and the pricing profile, users and suppliers conduct subscription game, where participants select the platform that gives them the highest payoffs. This game proceeds according to a replicator dynamics of the evolutionary game, which is simplified by properly defining gains from participant's strategy in the subscription game. We find that depending on the strength of these network effects, there might either be multiple stable equilibria, at which users and suppliers distribute across both platforms, or one unstable interior equilibrium corresponding to the market tipping in favor of either platform. In both cases, we also consider the pricing power of competing platform providers under the framework of the Stackelberg game. In particular, our study examines the possible effects of the type of competition between platform providers, which may constrain the equilibrium selection in the subscription game.

• Journal of KIISE:Information Networking
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• v.37 no.2
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• pp.94-98
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• 2010

In this paper, we formalize a new adaptive online price control scheme based on the Stackelberg game model. By using the hierarchical interaction strategy, control decisions in each mechanism act cooperatively and collaborate with each other to satisfy conflicting performance criteria. In addition, our dynamic online approach is practical for real network implementation. With a simulation study, the proposed scheme can adaptively adjust the network price to approximate an optimized solution under widely diverse network situations.

• ETRI Journal
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• v.42 no.4
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• pp.585-595
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• 2020

Integration of multiple communication technologies in a smart grid (SG) enables employing cognitive radio (CR) technology for improving reliability and security with low latency by adaptively and effectively allocating spectral resources. The versatile features of the CR enable the smart meter to select either the unlicensed or the licensed band for transmitting data to the utility company, thus reducing communication outage. Demand response management is regarded as the control unit of the SG that balances the load by regulating the real-time price that benefits both the utility company and consumers. In this study, joint allocation of the transmission power to the smart meter and consumer's demand is formulated as a two stage multi-armed bandit game in which the players select their optimal strategies noncooperatively without having any prior information about the media. Furthermore, based on historical rewards of the player, a real-time pricing adaptation method is proposed. The latter is validated through numerical results.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2002.07a
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• pp.428-431
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• 2002

본 논문에서는 경쟁적 전력시장에서 송전제약에 관한 비용을 적절히 할당하는 방법을 제시하고자 한다. 혼잡비용을 할당하는 방법으로는 모든 사용자들에게 똑같이 배분하는 방법과 혼잡의 원인을 제공한 사용자에게 정도에 따라 가중하여 혼잡비용을 할당하는 nodal pricing과 zonal pricing이 있다. 계산의 신속성과 복잡성으로 인해서 zonal pricing이 유용한 방법으로 사용되고 있다. 기존의 분할 기술은 계통운영자가 설정한 한계범위의 모선들을 zone으로 형성하는 통계적인 방법을 사용했다. 이 방법은 운영자의 임의성이 반영되는 모호한 알고리즘이라는 단점을 가지고 있다. 그래서 본 논문에서는 한계비용민감도를 이용한 계통분할 방법을 제안하였다.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2002.11b
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• pp.101-104
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• 2002

With the growing competitive pressure from market participants, utilities, consumer and government, analyses of existing competitive electricity market become more important. The presence of congestion in the transmission system can significantly increase the potential of exercising market power. Since the congestion in the network depends on the several factors. the market power cannot be simply analyzed through the existing indices. This paper presents a systematic analysis on local market power under uniform pricing scheme and provides some mitigation of the strategic market power.

• Journal of Korea Society of Industrial Information Systems
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• v.8 no.4
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• pp.17-25
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• 2003

In the current bandwidth mechanism, ISPs provide guaranteed internet bandwidth within itself domains. Also transmission of data through the network can cause congestion. An inevitable consequence is partly responsible for the difficulties to ISPs and customers. In economic views, multiple demands for a scarce resource are mediated through a bandwidth market. Using the auction-based admission algorithm In price congestion, I propose a different pricing scheme for statistically guaranteed QoS.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.34 no.3B
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• pp.288-303
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• 2009

In the near future it is foreseen that a genuine multimedia service over the WiMAX system is provided in a worldwide manner by exploiting the QoS technologies introduced in the wireless and wired broadband network. In this work we propose a pricing scheme for the multimedia service over the generic WiMAX system that supports a full QoS functionality. We assume real-time services such as the voice and video as well as the nonreal-time service such as the conventional high-speed data, and we propose a pricing and charging scheme for those services by investigating the inherent characteristics of those services and the multiple-class of QoS-service provided to them. After that we propose a method to compute expected revenue that is obtained from the WiMAX system by using an analytic method to estimate the usage of the bandwidth resources for the different class of services. Via numerical experiment, we verify the implication of the work.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.18 no.6
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• pp.975-988
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• 2016

Large access providers (ISPs) are seeking for new types of business agreements and pricing models to manage network costs and monetize better the provision of last-mile services. A typical paradigm of such new pricing norms is the proliferation of paid peering deals between ISPs and content providers (CPs), while on top of this, some ISPs are already experimenting with usage-based tariffs, usually through data-plans, instead of the typical fixed-based charging. In this work we define as common platform, the infrastructure in which a single ISP transacts with several CPs through peering agreements. In this context, we examine whether, and under which market conditions, the profitability of the involved stakeholders improves when the establishment of this platform is accompanied by a monetary compensation from the CPs to the ISP (paid peering), v.s. a scenario where their deal is a typical settlement-free one. In both cases, we assume that the ISP implements a usage-based access pricing scheme, implying that end-users will pay more for higher transaction rates with the CPs. Our framework captures some of the most important details of the current market, such as the various business models adopted by the CPs, the end-users' evaluation towards the ISP's and CPs' level of investments and the traffic rates per transaction for the offered services. By analysing the equilibrium derived by a leader-follower game, it turns out (among other practical takeaways) that whether or not the profitability of a CP improves, it highly depends on whether its business model is to sell content, or if it obtains its revenue from advertisements. Finally, we extract that consumer surplus is considerably higher under paid peering, which in turn implies improved levels of social welfare.

• Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
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• v.32 no.6
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• pp.675-685
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• 2014

This paper develops a differentiated pricing strategy over each segment of expressways based on the second-best pricing method for reducing congestion. To this end, a bi-level problem is proposed, in which the upper level of the model is formulated to determine toll level of each segment for minimizing traffic congestion, whereas the lower level of the model is formulated as a variable demand assignment problem. The sensitivity analysis based algorithm is took placed to find optimal solutions of upper level model. An application of the proposed model uses the modified Sioux-Falls network. The results show that the segment-based differentiated pricing strategy performs better than the existing uniform pricing strategy in reducing traffic congestion. This study can be applied as a demand management method to relieve disutility of excessively congested segments of expressways.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.5A no.3
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• pp.228-234
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• 2005

This paper presents the evaluation of reactive power pricing through the control of generator voltages under the assumption that the reactive power market has been transformed into the real power market. By applying the concept of economic dispatch, which minimizes the total cost of real power generation to reactive power generation, the algorithm for implementing reactive power pricing is proposed to determine the optimum voltage profiles of generators. It consists of reactive power voltage equation, the objective function that minimizes the total cost of reactive power generation, and linear analysis of inequality constraints in relation to the load voltages. From this algorithm, the total cost of the reactive power generation can be yielded to the minimum value within network constraints as the range of load voltages. This may provide the fair and reasonable price information for reactive power generation in the deregulated electricity market. The proposed algorithm has been tested on the IEEE 14-bus system using MATLAB.