• Journal of the Korean Home Economics Association
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• v.31 no.4
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• pp.157-168
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• 1993

The purpose of this study is to consider the『So-Hak』that is a teaching material book of child education, to apply for the education of children. Especilly this study analyzed the structure and contents of the 『So-Hak』and considered the modern significance of children's moral education in the parts of「Kyoung-sin」. The main findings of the study are as follows: 1. The structure of『So-Hak』is two parts of inside and outside, the inside parts are structure four volumes「Ib-Kyo」,「Myoung-Ryoon」,「Kyoung-Sin」,「Kye-Gyo」and the outside parts are structured two volumes「Ka-Eon」,「Sun-Haing」. The contents are including the explaynatory notes everyday life a saying for self-culture, a loyal subject, dutiful son. The inside parts proved of the introduction of Confucianism, quoting the Confucius Four scripture. The outside parts proved of the example the family words and good deeds. 2. The fundamental spirit of moral education including the part of「Kyoung-Sin」is the education of Humanism. It is the education of a moral Principle and human nature that morality welled up naturally is one's mind. It is significant for the mental education is modern society regarded as the times of moral crisis.

• Journal of Ethics
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• no.82
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• pp.73-125
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• 2011

This article aims to search for moral educational implication of J. D. Greene's recent neuro-scientific approaches to deontological ethics. Recently new technique in neuroscience such as fMRI is applied to moral and social psychological concepts or terms, and 'affective primacy' and 'automaticity' principles are highlighted as basic concepts of the new paradigm. When these principles are introduced to ethical theories, it makes rooms of new and different interpretations of them. J. D. Greene et al. claim that deontological moral judgments or theories are just a kind of post hoc rationalization for intuitions or emotions by ways of neuroscientific findings and evolutionary interpretation. For example, Kant's categorical imperative in which a maxim should be universalizable to be as a principle, might be a product of moral intuition. Firstly this article tries to search for intellectual backgrounds of the social intuitionalism where Greens' thought originates. Secondly, this article tries to collect and summarize his arguments about moral dilemma responses, personal-impersonal dilemma catergorizing hypothesis, fMRI data interpretations by ways of evolutionary theory, cultural and social psychological theories, application to deontological and consequential theories, and his suggestion that deontological ethics shoud be rejected as a normative ethical thought and consequentialism be a promising theory etc. Thirdly, this tries to analyse and critically exam those aspects and argumentation, especially from viewpoints of the ethicists whose various strategies seek to defeat Greene's claims. Fourthly, this article criticizes that his arguments make a few critical mistakes in methodology and data interpretation. Last, this article seeks to find its implications for moral education in korea, in which in spite of incomplete argumentation of his neuroscientific approach to morality, neuroethics needs to be introduced as a new approach and educational content, and critical materials as well.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.31
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• pp.289-319
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• 2011

Chutzu has established a theory of human mind and moral mind(人心道心說) by quoting the key of cultivation of mind comprised of sixteen letters(十六字心法) to a preface of Zhongyong(中庸章句序) and making comments on the key. Chutzu's theory of human mind and moral mind explains the supervision of mind that materializes chung-ho(中和), which is the core theme of Zhongyong(中庸). Supervision of mind is completed by consciousness. Chutzu defines consciousness as 'preparing the principle(理) and practicing the emotion(情)'. So, consciousness derives the reaction from the principle(理) in order to respond to the external stimulation. By being conscious, mind(心) reveals original nature(性) into emotion(情). An aspect that mind(心) keeps original nature prior to the external stimulation is un-awakened(未發). Once stimulation occurs, mind(心) becomes conscious of the principle which is proper to the situation. In sympathetic situation, sympathetic emotion is revealed by being conscious of benevolence(仁). In judgment situation, the emotion which judges right or wrong is revealed by being conscious of wisdom(智). An aspect of revealing the proper emotion relevant to the situation is wakened(已發). Mind(心) keeps all the original nature of benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom(仁義禮智). It supervises original nature and emotion, and reveals chung-ho(中和) by being conscious of the proper principle(理). Moral mind must supervise to accomplish chung-ho(中和), and gewuzhizhi(格物致知) must be done first to enhance the supervision of moral mind. By establishing a theory of human mind and moral mind(人心道心說), Chutzu completes a theory of mind that covers both theories of chung-ho(中和說) and gewuzhizhi(格物致知說).

• (The)Study of the Eastern Classic
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• no.54
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• pp.349-386
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• 2014

Noju Oh Hui-sang(1763-1833) is one of the neo-Confucian scholars representing with Hong Chik-pil the Kiho-Nak School from the late 18th to the early 19th century. He did sincerely not only succeed theories of Kiho School originated from Yulgok, but also strengthened the main view of the Nak faction by clarifying the theoretical stance of it derived from Kim Chang-hyop. Not only he does suggest critical points of view against Ho faction in terms of Horak Controversy, but also criticizes heterodox account, which raised by an inner circle of Nak faction. In this vein, Oh established the neo-Confucian ways of realization of morality and ideal society by setting up his own points of view on mind and bright virtues that are followed by various issues of Horak Controversy. My paper will examine the values of Oh's account of Nature-Principle in the light of intellectual historical context by paying a special attention to his critical views of Ho faction. Oh's main idea is how to systematize practical foundation of realizing morality. Thus, he wants to theoretically explain both the practice of morality and the reality of pure moral mind in order to establish concrete practices of them in the real world. In doing so, he pays attention to mutual inclusive relationship between Principle and Matter(ki:氣). The mutual inclusive relationship between them can be exactly applied into the relationship between mind and Nature. So, the realityof moral principle explicitly implies the pure goodness of moral agency. Furthermore, his elucidation of logical relationship between mind and Nature and its values via the ontological understanding of them is to set up a system of cultivation, i.e., realizing practical foundation of pure moral mind. In conclusion, we can evaluate that Oh's account of Nature-Principle, at least, aims not only at establishment of moral agency and its reality in a theoretical dimension, but also at a guarantee of their realization in the world.

• (The)Study of the Eastern Classic
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• no.34
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• pp.311-338
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• 2009

The moral corruption or the reality of absence of humanity derived from the development of science and society is very serious. Especially the moral education which should provide new breakthroughs facing such issue will be the initial concern in the educational world and the key point that judges our future. This study, as a part of efforts made for such demands of the times, is an attempt to approach the field of the present elementary education specifically by deducing the abundant meaning that the Confucianism's Chungseojidoh(忠恕之道: the principle of "Faithfulness" and "Benevolence") stands for. To build an ethical social community also means to draw voluntary moral practices into this society and this is possible with our (the moral subject) struggling the problems within but not remaining in the limitations of physical norms. Chungseojidoh as universal ethics contains a virtue ethical meaning as Jenlogy, a meaning of identity recognition and self-esteem inspiration, a meaning of social community ethics as ethics of good offices, etc. Such meanings, in particular, can be discussed more profoundly in terms of educational prevention from violence or cliquish issues in school that are largely related to education of humanity if 'applying schemes for elementary education' is seen as the center of the issue. And furthermore, they will be able to open a discussion over problems of the situation which the Korean society is in - especially the insistence, egoism or conflicts between social communities - can be answered in actuality.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.114
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• pp.305-335
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• 2016

In the eighteenth century, the scottish philosophers Francis Hutcheson, David Hume and Adam Smith share the idea that morality comes from moral sense, which is a feeling of approval or disapproval of agent's motive and action. However, they have the different views in explaining the mechanism that generates the moral sentiments. Hutcheson takes a moral sense to be a unique mental faculty that is innate to all humans, and regards it as being guaranteed by supernatural apparatus like divine Providence. Hume and Smith reject Hutcheson's concept of internal moral sense and take a stage further Hutcheson's projects of internalisation by naturalizing morality in terms of the principle of sympathy. It is widely held that Hume's moral sentimentalism is essentially similar to Adam Smith's. Though there are important points of contact between Smith's account of sympathy and Hume's, the differences are considerable. The chief of them lies in the fact that Hume grounds our approval of virtue on our recognition of its utility and convention, and Smith does not. Smith grounds our approval of virtue on the impartial spectator's judgment, i.e., conscience. Hence for Smith, the impartial spectator is the one that bridges the gap between particularity and universality and works the vehicle of practical reason. Given this, in this paper, first, I will clarify the difference between Hume's and Adam Smith's understandings of sympathy. Second, I will elucidate how they explain the process to produce the moral sentiments based on their understandings of sympathy. I shall finally explicate in what way Hume's and Smith's theories on sympathy work as moral normativity.

• Journal of Physiology & Pathology in Korean Medicine
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• v.16 no.4
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• pp.626-629
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• 2002

In Oriental medicine, Five Mental is a concept for understanding of man's mental structure. Spirit and body is inseparable relation in Oriental Medicine. Function of spirit and body is regarded as one in Oriental Medical physiology. Spirit is the essence of a function which an organism reveal, and it is regarded in the same with life. For this reason, identification spirit with life is special feature of Oriental Medicine. In Confucianism, Li(理) refers to nature's discipline, which everything under the sun shares. It is similar to the concept of Shin(神) in a broad sense and Sung(性) is similar to that of Shin(神) in a narrow sense. Confucianism's principle is similar to Oriental medicine's, in that they classify Sung(性) into Gi-Jil-Ji-Sung(氣質之性) and Bon-Yeon-Ji-Sung(本然之性), that Sung(性) acts upon man differently according to his disposition, and that materials have an effect on Shin(神)'s action. According to mind's action, there are Human mind(人心) and Moral mind(道心). Human mind(人心) is defined as a mental action of higher degree and Moral mind(道心) is conceived as a mental action related to body. It is similar to Oriental medicine's principle in which Shin(神) is classified into Hun(魂) and Beak(魄) according to its action. Yi(意) is self-control and application, and Zhi(志) is a conscious state in which basic acts towards the object are fixed regularly. Those are similar to the concepts of Oriental medicine.

• (The)Study of the Eastern Classic
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• no.34
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• pp.7-38
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• 2009

This paper attempts to explore the theory of moral leadership in the Great Learning. There are two fundamental contents in the elements of moral leadership's human nature in the Great learning. These are meaning of general principle(綱領指趣) - studying, self cultivation and social authority from rectifying name, and category of concrete learning(學問綱目) - the scheme of manifesting original nature (明德之方) and the scheme of loving the people(親民之方). In this, there are two principles. One is the principle of stage. In the theory of moral leadership of the Great learning, there are stages from self-cultivation to making the world tranquil. The other is the principle of stop at the highest good in manifesting nature and loving the people. In the meaning of general principle, moral leader must have good nature that he or she preforms his or her original nature and accomplishes self-cultivation. For this he or she must learn and study, and endeavors self-polishing. In the category of concrete learning, at first, in the scheme of manifesting original nature, there are investigation things-extending knowledge and making the will sincere-rectifying the mind as the pre conditions of the self-cultivation, and moral leader must carry out harmonization peoples and accomplishing public morals as the result of self-cultivation. The harmonization people means that everyone has equal position and lives with each other in harmony In the scheme of loving the people, there are the connected ethics of self cultivation-regulating the family(修身齊家) and the connected ethics of regulating the family-ordering the state(齊家治國) by effect of self-cultivation.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.141
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• pp.313-342
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• 2017

This paper illuminates the philosophical meaning of appropriateness(中節) in Yi Yik(李瀷) and Shin Hudam(愼後聃)'s theories of moral emotion. According to this paper, there was a difficult problem in Toegye Yi Hwang (退溪 李滉)'s philosophy. That is, How we could regulate the relation between Four Beginnings(四端) and appropriate Seven Feelings(七情). Yi Yik tried to solve this problem by elucidating philosophical significances of appropriate Seven Feelings as it were, one hand, he approved the morality of appropriate Seven Feelings, and on the other hand, differentiated appropriate Seven Feelings from Four Beginnings. Thereby He achieved to explain this problem. His solution was dependent on the concept of 'impartial sympathic spectator' that he suggested. It is valuable that Yi Yik reexamined the ethical meaning of appropriateness. His pupil Shin Hudam, however, criticised Yi Yik's opinion and identified Four Beginnings with appropriate Seven Feelings. Shin Hudam deconstructed the conceptual scheme of moral emotion suggested by Yi Yik and regarded appropriate Seven Feelings as Four Beginnings. According to Shin Hudam, the concept of appropriate Seven Feelings designed by Yi Yik was very ambiguous, actually there was no any dividing line between Four Beginnings and appropriate Seven Feelings. Both are equally moral principle manifestation(理發)and moral public(公). Now old concept category of moral emotion(Sadan and Chiljeong) was disappeared and new concept category of moral emotion was appeared, that is public and private.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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• v.9 no.5
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• pp.57-63
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• 2023

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the aspects of hybrid warfare and show the limits of jus in bello, a principle that evaluates the moral responsibility of the agents. As a theory of the morality of war presented in traditional warfare, the just war theory has been widely accepted. In particular, jus in bello offers the criteria of moral legitimacy regarding the actions of individuals participating in or involved in war. However, hybrid warfare, in which various aspects of warfare operate in a complex way, has obvious differences compared to traditional warfare, and this difference causes difficulties in determining the moral evaluation and attribution of responsibility for actions in war. In order to appropriately resolve the moral problems arising from hybrid warfare, it is necessary to clarify what the limitations of existing moral justification theories are. To this end, in this paper, we will first present a conceptual understanding of hybrid warfare, specify the differences from traditional warfare, and then show the limits of its application in hybrid warfare in light of the three principles that compose jus in bello.