• Asia Marketing Journal
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• 제16권1호
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• pp.35-69
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• 2014

The impact of competition on pricing has been studied in the context of counterfactual merger analyses where expected optimal prices in a hypothetical monopoly are compared with observed prices in an oligopolistic market. Such analyses would typically assume static decision making by consumers and firms and thus have been applied mostly to data obtained from consumer packed goods such as cereal and soft drinks. However such static modeling approach is not suitable when decision makers are forward looking. When it comes to the markets for durable products with indirect network effects, consumer purchase decisions and firm pricing decisions are inherently dynamic as they take into account future states when making purchase and pricing decisions. Researchers need to take into account the dynamic aspects of decision making both in the consumer side and in the supplier side for such markets. Firms in a two-sided market typically subsidize one side of the market to exploit the indirect network effect. Such pricing behaviors would be more prevalent in competitive markets where firms would try to win over the battle for standard. While such qualitative expectation on the relationship between pricing behaviors and competitive structures could be easily formed, little empirical studies have measured the extent to which the distinct pricing structure in two-sided markets depends on the competitive structure of the market. This paper develops an empirical model to measure the impact of competition on optimal pricing of durable products under indirect network effects. In order to measure the impact of exogenously determined competition among firms on pricing, we compare the equilibrium prices in the observed oligopoly market to those in a hypothetical monopoly market. In computing the equilibrium prices, we account for the forward looking behaviors of consumers and supplier. We first estimate a demand function that accounts for consumers' forward-looking behaviors and indirect network effects. And then, for the supply side, the pricing equation is obtained as an outcome of the Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium in pricing. In doing so, we utilize numerical dynamic programming techniques. We apply our model to a data set obtained from the U.S. video game console market. The video game console market is considered a prototypical case of two-sided markets in which the platform typically subsidizes one side of market to expand the installed base anticipating larger revenues in the other side of market resulting from the expanded installed base. The data consist of monthly observations of price, hardware unit sales and the number of compatible software titles for Sony PlayStation and Nintendo 64 from September 1996 to August 2002. Sony PlayStation was released to the market a year before Nintendo 64 was launched. We compute the expected equilibrium price path for Nintendo 64 and Playstation for both oligopoly and for monopoly. Our analysis reveals that the price level differs significantly between two competition structures. The merged monopoly is expected to set prices higher by 14.8% for Sony PlayStation and 21.8% for Nintendo 64 on average than the independent firms in an oligopoly would do. And such removal of competition would result in a reduction in consumer value by 43.1%. Higher prices are expected for the hypothetical monopoly because the merged firm does not need to engage in the battle for industry standard. This result is attributed to the distinct property of a two-sided market that competing firms tend to set low prices particularly at the initial period to attract consumers at the introductory stage and to reinforce their own networks and eventually finally to dominate the market.

• 한국문헌정보학회지
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• 제35권2호
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• pp.151-170
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• 2001

전자저널의 보급은 날이 갈수록 늘고 있고 이를 공급하고 있는 출판사의 가격정책은 매우 다양하고 가변적이다. 전자저널의 가격모형으로는 인쇄저널 모형, 이용자수 모형, 공동출자 모형, 이용요금제 모형, 복합 모형 등이 있다. 연구 결과 국내에서 구독하고 있는 전자저널 가운데 가장 많이 채택되고 있는 가격모형은 인쇄저널 모형인 것으로 나타났다. 인쇄저널 모형은 과거에 구독했던 인쇄저널의 가격을 기준으로 구독료가 책정되므로 구독자인 도서관입장에서 보았을 때 융통성이 없고 지나치게 출판사 중심적이다. 향후 이 모형은 이용량을 간접적으로 반영해 차등적으로 가격을 책정하는 이용자수 모형으로 교체되어야 하며 궁극적으로는 이용량에 따라 차등적으로 요금을 부담하는 이용요금제 모형으로 전환되어야 할 것이다. 도서관은 출판사로 하여금 합리적인 가격정책을 수립하고 바람직한 가격모형을 채택하도록 촉구하는 노력을 기울여야 할 것이다.

• 전기학회논문지
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• 제63권7호
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• pp.889-895
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• 2014

Korea electric power industry had been under vertical monopoly but is typically getting restructured for free competition. An ideal pricing system under the competitive market system is 'unbundled pricing system' and 'marginal pricing system', but the current pricing system still adheres to the traditional bundled system and the average cost pricing system. Especially, progressive electricity rates for residential use reflect governmental policy-making which is focused on income redistribution & welfare, industrial supports and energy saving. This study proposes new and reasonable residential electricity pricing systems which are Time-Of-Use (TOU) and Real-Time Pricing (RTP) to reflect variations in the wholesale price of electricity. It also presents examples of various tariffs for residential electricity pricing systems.

• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 2003년도 하계학술대회 논문집 A
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• pp.646-648
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• 2003

Distribution pricing has been one of keystones of ongoing deregulation and privatization process in power industries. The electricity market has been established based on open access and nondiscriminatory use of the Distribution assets. As Distribution business remains as a monopoly, it is necessary to provide economic regulation. This paper focuses on the distribution pricing methods using by Incremental Marginal Cost and Yardstick Regulation.

• Asia pacific journal of information systems
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• 제23권1호
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• pp.1-19
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• 2013

The market for commercial open source software (OSS) has been rapidly growing with the proliferation of OSS. One way to commercialize OSS is the support model, which has been adopted by leading OSS firms such as Red Hat and JBoss. Despite the growing interest in OSS commercialization, little research has provided OSS support providers with a pricing guideline. In this paper, we examine the optimal pricing strategies for OSS support providers. Our benchmark is a monopoly case in which we investigate a startup software vendor's incentive to choose the OSS support regime over the proprietary one. Then we extend the model to a duopoly case in which OSS under the support regime competes against proprietary software. We characterize the conditions under which the OSS support model is viable under competition. We believe that our results offer insights to the OSS vendors who consider commercializing their OSS with a support model.

• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 2002년도 하계학술대회 논문집 A
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• pp.401-403
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• 2002

Transmission and Distribution(T&D) pricing has been one of keystones of ongoing deregulation and privatization process in power industries. The electricity markel has been established based on open access and nondiscriminatory use of the T&D assets. As T&D business remains as a monopoly, it is necessary to provide economic regulation. This paper focuses on the distribution pricing methods and the analysis of pricing structure of distribution-retail sale company under power system deregulation.

• Asian Journal of Innovation and Policy
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• 제7권1호
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• pp.207-234
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• 2018

A manufacturer of a durable good typically purchases supplies, including parts for assembly - that are also useful for repairs - from independent "original equipment suppliers" with which it contracts. The manufacturer is a branded monopolist of its final assembled product. To put into effect also a monopoly of the replacement parts, it must stipulate in its arrangements with independent suppliers of the parts that they not supply such patented parts to any other buyer. Durable good owners would then only be able to obtain their requirements of replacement parts from the same company that supplied the durable. This would amount to a tie-in of replacement parts to the direct purchase of new durables. And that describes the apparently widespread practice of automobile manufacturers in India, as exposed in a recent case before the Competition Commission of India (Samsher Kataria v Honda Siel Cars India Limited and others). Here, I will argue that such tie-in enabled automotive manufacturers to more fully appropriate consumer surplus, which induced them to lower the price of new cars, sell more cars and also sell more repair parts. The tie-in expanded the auto parts industry and promoted new entry. The main restraint on expansion of India's automotive manufacturing is not monopoly. It is government protection in the form of tariffs on automobiles and auto parts.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• 제25권1호
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• pp.55-98
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• 2003

본 연구는 국내 은행산업의 대형화 및 시장집중도 상승에 따른 은행서비스 시장의 경쟁저하 및 독과점화 우려에 대해 실증적인 분석을 시도한 것이다. 실증분석은 1996년 1월부터 2002년 12월까지 84개월 동안의 은행산업 관련자료를 이용한 Bresnahan-Lau 방법, 즉 은행서비스에 대한 수요함수와 공급함수를 추정하는 방법으로 진행되었다. 추정결과는 전체 표본기간 동안에는 국내 은행산업이 완전경쟁 수준의 가격설정행태(pricing behavior)를 보였으며, 시장집중도 상승을 고려하여 표본기간을 구분할 경우 구분시점에 따라 다소 차이는 있으나, 일반적인 우려와는 달리 시장집중도가 상승한 이후에 적어도 현재까지는 경쟁이 저하되지는 않았다는 것을 시사하고 있다.

• 전자공학회논문지
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• 제50권2호
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• pp.11-19
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• 2013

인터넷 서비스 제공자들은 차등화 서비스를 제공하기 위한 정책적인 수단으로, 혹은 일부 악의적인 사용자들로 인한 회선의 독점적 사용을 막기 위한 수단으로 각 사용자의 최대 데이터 전송 속도를 일정 수준 이하로 제한하고 있다. 이 논문에서는 이러한 최대 접속 속도의 제한이 서비스 제공자의 수입과 서비스 가격 결정에 미치는 영향을 분석하고자 한다. 우리는 먼저 최대 접속 속도의 제한을 고려한 현실적인 인터넷의 서비스 품질 모델을 제안하고, 각 사용자에 대한 최대 접속 속도의 제한이 사용자들의 서비스 가입 결정에 어떻게 영향을 미치는 지 분석한다. 또한 그에 따라 변화하는 서비스 제공자의 수입이 안정성을 보장 받기 위한 조건을 유도하여, 수입을 최대화하기 위한 가격 결정 방법을 최적화 문제로 나타낸다.

• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 2001년도 하계학술대회 논문집 A
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• pp.553-555
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• 2001

It is required to develop a rational transmission tariff structure to ensure the fair participation of the player in the market where transmission sector remains as a monopoly after the electricity industry restructuring. The objective of this study is to suggest an improved transmission rate system which classifies the line capacity into line usage and reliability capacity based on their purpose of use and reasonably allocates the costs incurred by each of them to users.