Asian Journal of Innovation and Policy

Asian Society for Innovation and Policy (아시아기술혁신학회)
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Dual Monopolies of New Durables and Their Ancillaries: Exclusive Supply Contracts

  • Flath, David (Faculty of Economics, Ritsumeikan University)
  • Received : 2017.08.14
  • Accepted : 2018.03.23
  • Published : 2018.04.30
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Abstract

A manufacturer of a durable good typically purchases supplies, including parts for assembly - that are also useful for repairs - from independent "original equipment suppliers" with which it contracts. The manufacturer is a branded monopolist of its final assembled product. To put into effect also a monopoly of the replacement parts, it must stipulate in its arrangements with independent suppliers of the parts that they not supply such patented parts to any other buyer. Durable good owners would then only be able to obtain their requirements of replacement parts from the same company that supplied the durable. This would amount to a tie-in of replacement parts to the direct purchase of new durables. And that describes the apparently widespread practice of automobile manufacturers in India, as exposed in a recent case before the Competition Commission of India (Samsher Kataria v Honda Siel Cars India Limited and others). Here, I will argue that such tie-in enabled automotive manufacturers to more fully appropriate consumer surplus, which induced them to lower the price of new cars, sell more cars and also sell more repair parts. The tie-in expanded the auto parts industry and promoted new entry. The main restraint on expansion of India's automotive manufacturing is not monopoly. It is government protection in the form of tariffs on automobiles and auto parts.

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