• Strategy21
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• 통권46호
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• pp.205-238
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• 2020

The origin of mission command can be traced to the era of the Prussian military reforms led by General Gerhard von Scharnhorst after defeats in battle of Jena and Auerstadt in 1806 against Napoleon I. Mission Command is the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission-type orders. Commanders issue mission-type orders focused on the purpose of the operation rather than details of how to perform assigned tasks. The mission command has become the command philosophy of the German military and recently many countries in the west accept it as a command philosophy. This study compare and analyze the Battle of St. Vincent and the Battle of Jutland to make sure if the army-initiated mission commands were also useful for the navy. From the late 18th century, represented by the era of Nelson, Royal navy changed from the inherited rigid command culture to guaranteeing the disciplined initiative of its subordinate commanders. In the Battle of St. Vincent in 1797, Nelson acted contrary to the commander's orders at the crucial moment, which gave Britain a decisive victory. On the contrary more than 100 years later, the command culture of the Royal navy changed into a centralized command culture. In the Battle of Jutland in 1916, Royal Navy couldn't win because the rigid command culture did not guarantee initiative of subordinate commanders and subordinate commander's passive attitude of waiting for the commander's instructions even at critical moments. Therefore, a mission command that guarantees the initiative of subordinate commanders is a useful concept even in the navy because it makes subordinate commanders to take full advantage of a sudden change in battle. Today's advanced information and communication technologies have raised questions about mission command. But even advanced technology can't completely eliminate the fundamental nature of the war-the fog of war. War is chaotic and unpredictable. In the flood of lots of informations, senior commander's judgement is not always right because he(she) is also human, he(she) can make mistakes. In the age of informatization, mission command is still effective because it involves increasing interaction and synergy between senior and subordinate commanders by ensuring their independence. Therefore ROK navy also needs to activate mission command. ROK navy must dismantle the zero-defect mentality and apply from educations as Prussian did to establish a mission command culture.

• Strategy21
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• 통권41호
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• pp.52-84
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• 2017

After finishing Cold War, the U.S. Navy's ability to Sea control has been gradually eroded last 15-20 years. The global security environment demands that the surface Navy rededicate itself to sea control, as a new group of potential adversaries is working to deny U.S. navy command of the sea. China has been increasing their sea denial capability, such as extended anti-surface cruise missile and anti-surface ballistic missile. To cope with this situation, the U.S. Naval Surface Forces Command has announced Surface Forces Strategy: Return to Sea Control. It is a new operating and organizing concept for the U.S. surface fleet called 'distributed lethality'. Under distributed lethality, offensive weapons such as new ASCMs are to be distributed more widely across all types of Navy surface ships, and new operational concept for Navy surface fleet's capability for attacking enemy ships and make it less possible for an enemy to cripple the U.S. fleet by concentrating its attack on a few very high-value Navy surface ships. By increasing the lethality of the surface ships and distributing them across wide areas, the Navy forces potential adversaries to not only consider the threat from our carrier-based aircraft and submarines, but they now consider the threat form all of those surface ships. This idea of using the distributed lethality template to generate surface action groups and adaptive force package and to start thinking about to increase the lethal efficacy of these ships. The U.S. Navy believes distributed lethality increases the Navy's sea control capability and expands U.S. conventional deterrence. Funding new weapons and renovated operating concept to field a more lethal and distributed force will enable us to establish sea control, even in contested area. The U.S. Navy's Surface Forces Strategy provides some useful implications for The ROK Navy. First the ROK Navy need to reconsider sea control mission. securing sea control and exploiting sea control are in a close connection. However, recently the ROK Navy only focuses on exploiting sea control, for instance land attack mission. the ROK Navy is required to reinvigorate sea control mission, such as anti-surface warfare and anti-air warfare. Second, the ROK Navy must seek the way to improve its warfighting capability. It can be achieved by developing high-edge weapons and designing renewed operating concept and embraced new weapon's extended capabilities.

• 정보화연구
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• 제9권2호
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• pp.167-176
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• 2012

한국군은 LISI 모델을 활용하여 소요제기 및 획득단계에서 체계의 상호운용성 수준측정 및 평가를 실시하고 있다. 그러나 LISI 모델은 체계 간 상호운용성 평가에 초점이 맞추어져 있기 때문에 다수 체계가 유기적으로 연결된 복합체계의 상호운용성 평가에는 제한적이다. 또한 LISI 모델은 정량적이기 보다는 정성적인 접근방법이기 때문에 상호운용성 의사결정에 가시적인 정보 제공에는 한계가 있다. 이에 대한 해결책으로 본 연구에서는 복합체계의 정량적인 상호운용성 평가 방법론을 제안한다. 제안 방법론에서는 아키텍처를 활용하여 임무 프로세스를 지원하는 복합체계가 식별되고, 체계의 다중도와 유사도 계수를 기반으로 상호운용성 평가가 이루어진다. 그리고 제안 방법론의 효용성을 보이기 위해 사례연구 결과를 제시한다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권46호
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• pp.89-122
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• 2020

The longing for submarine manufacture and the fear of her power had exited for a long time, but submarine that could submerge and attack was built from 20th century by science technology development. The question, 'Submarine can exercise her power in naval warfare?' had exited before World War I, but the effective value of submarine was shown in the procedure of a chain of naval warfare during World War I and World War II. Germany and the United States made the best use of submarines at that time. The submarines of these nations mounted fierce attack on the enemy's battleships and merchant ships and blocked the sea lanes for war material. These fierce attack on ships became impossible After World War II, and the major powers reduced and coordinated the defence budget, so they considered the role of submarine. However, submarine is still powerful weapon system because she can secretly navigate under the water, and one of the most important force in the navy. The aim of this thesis is analyzing submarine roles in each naval warfare and integrating maritime strategy and weapon system technology into her roles. First, the research about represent submarine roles like anti-surfaceship warfare, anti-submarine warfare, intelligence gathering, land attack, supporting special operation and mine landing warfare will be presented, then the major naval warfare where submarine participated(during ex-World War I, World War I, World War II, The Cold War Era and post Cold War) and the analyzing of submarine roles by time will be presented. Submarine was developed for anti-surfaceship warfare during ex-World War I but could not make remarkable military gain in naval warfare because her performance and weapon was inadequate. However, the effective value of submarine in the procedure of a chain of naval warfare was shown during World War I and World War II. The major powers put battleships into naval warfare undiscriminatingly to command the sea power and submarines did massive damage to enemy navy power, so put a restraint the maritime power of enemy, and blocked the sea lanes for war material. After World War II, the battlefield situation changed rapidly and the concept of preemption became difficult to apply in naval warfare. Therefore, the submarine was unable to concentrate on anti-surfaceship mission. Especially during the Cold War era, nuclear submarine came to appear and her weapon system developed rapidly. These development gave submarines special missions: anti-submarine warfare and intelligence gathering. At that time, United States and Soviet submarines tracked other nation's submarines loaded with nuclear weapons and departing from naval their base. The submarines also collected information on the volume of ships and a coastal missile launching site in company with this mission. After Cold War, the major powers despatched forces to major troubled regions to maintain world peace, their submarines approached the shores of these regions and attacked key enemy installations with cruise missiles. At that time, the United States eased the concept of preemption and made the concept of Bush doctrine because of possible 911 terrorism. The missiles fired from submarines and surface battleships accurately attacked key enemy installations. Many nations be strategically successful depending on what kind of mission a submarine is assigned. The patterns of future naval warfare that my country will provide against will be military power projection and coalition/joint operations. These suggest much more about what future missions we should assign to submarines.

• 한국통신학회논문지
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• 제39C권8호
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• pp.615-625
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• 2014

국방부는 미래전에 대비하기 위한 국방 개혁안을 토대로 2010년 "군사시설 종합 발전계획(Mater Plan)"을 수립하였다. 이것은 합동성 및 3군 균형발전을 고려한 군사력 구조조정 및 군 자산관리를 위해 전국에 산재한 군사시설을 통폐합하기 위한 계획이었다. 그러나 현용 국방 군사 시설기준을 적용하여 "군사시설 종합 발전계획"을 추진하기 위해서는 시설 기준의 부재 및 비합리적인 시설규모 산정 사례 발생으로 제 개정의 필요성이 대두 되었다. 미래 전장 환경은 플랫폼(Plat form)기반에서 네트워크 중심전(Network Centric Warfare) 기반으로 변화하면서 C4I(Command, Control, Communication, Computer & Intelligence) 체계를 이용한 지휘 통제 능력이 더욱 요구되고 있다. 그러므로 국방 정보기술(IT)과 시설이 잘 융합되어야 성공적인 임무수행을 보장할 수 있을 것이다. 따라서 국방부도 시설 통폐합에 따른 지휘통제 시설의 정보통신기반과 설비의 구축을 네트워크 중심전 수행에 맞는 정책, 설계 기준 및 운용 지침을 시급히 갖추어야 할 것이다. 본 논문에서는 이러한 문제점을 해결하기 위해 국방 I3A Framework를 제안한다.