• Strategy21
• /
• s.43
• /
• pp.225-247
• /
• 2018

The purpose of this study is to find out a significant influence of continental strategy theories on the development of maritime strategy theories. For this purpose, I examined similar and different parts of each theories and their implications when applied to different environment. In details, Chapter 2 deals with how continental strategy and maritime strategy theories are similar and different in general. In Chapter 3, I look into how Karl Clausewitz's theory that has been quoted the most by military strategy theorists had influenced over the theory of Julian Corbett, one of the representative English maritime strategy theorists. In Chapter 4, I study how the theory of Alfred Mahan that has also been quoted the most among the theories of maritime strategy had been influenced by Antoine-Henri Jomini's theory. And in Chapter 5, their contemporary implications and conclusions are drawn. According to my findings, unbelievably, the theories of maritime strategy had been influenced by existing continental strategy theories very much. Many similarities are found between them. However, at the same time, a large part of them is found significantly different from original ones especially when used to reflect the maritime distinctiveness. This means that the past maritime strategy theories and stored experience also wield influence, in many ways, yielding out much better ones in terms of applicability to changing environment. Therefore, devising new strategies with creative attitude using knowledges and experiences from both other fields and past ones is the virtue required for maritime strategists.

• Strategy21
• /
• s.41
• /
• pp.232-260
• /
• 2017

The purpose of this paper is to open a debate about what kind of deterrent strategy the ROK military should pursue in the era of NK's weapons of mass destruction and missile threats. I argue that the ROK military needs a comprehensive deterrent strategy that reflects the international security situations and trends and that builds on clear understanding of the basic concepts and how deterrence operates. The paper starts with surveying the basic knowledge of deterrence from the perspectives of both theory and practice. Then, it provides explanations on why deterrence against NK can be particularly difficult given the security environment in and around the Korean peninsula. For example, South Korea and North Korea hardly share 'common knowledge' that serves as a basic element for the operation of deterrence. Deterrence against North Korea involves complex situations in that both deterrence and compellence strategies may be relevant particularly to North Korea's WMD and missile threats. It also involves both immediate and general deterrence. Based on the discussion, I suggest several ideas that may serve as guidelines for establishing a deterrent strategy against NK. First, our threats for deterrence should be the ones that can be realized, particularly in terms of the international norms. In other words, they must be considered appropriate among other nations in the international community. Second, there should be separate plans for the different kinds of threats: one is conventional, local provocations and the other is WMD/missile related provocations. Third, we should pursue much closer cooperative relations with the U.S. military to enhance the effectiveness of immediate deterrence in the Korean peninsula. Fourth, the ROK military should aim to accomplish 'smart deterrence' maximizing the benefits of technological superiority. Fifth, the ROK military readiness and structure should be able to deny emerging North Korean military threats such as the submarine-launched ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Lastly, in executing threats, we should consider that the current action influences credibility and reputation of the ROK, which in turn affect the decisions for future provocations. North Korea's WMD/missile threats may soon become critical strategic-level threats to South Korea. In retrospect, the first debate on building a missile defense system in South Korea dates back to the 1980s. Mostly the debate has centered on whether or not South Korea's system should be integrated into the U.S. missile defense system. In the meantime, North Korea has become a small nuclear power that can threaten the United States with the ballistic missiles capability. If North Korea completes the SLBM program and loads the missiles on a submarine with improved underwater operation capability, then, South Korea may have to face the reality of power politics demonstrated by Thucydides through the Athenians: "The strong do what they have the power to do, the weak accept what they have to accept."

• Strategy21
• /
• s.40
• /
• pp.162-189
• /
• 2016

This research deals with the PLAN's capabilities and its implication for regional security, and suggests some measures for maritime security cooperation among regional states. China has began to focus its national strategy more on 'rising as a new maritime power' since the 18th Party Convention in November 2012. Chinese new strategy aims at building a strong navy, contributing economic prosperity and national security, and thus elevating its prestige in international society. Most of all, building a strong navy is the foremost task at this time, and that is why the PLAN has the priority for military modernization. Chinese new maritime strategy could cause naval arms race in East Asia and aggravate maritime territorial disputes among concerned parties. It is the time for regional states to discuss some measures to build confidence, such as arms control of naval weapons, establishment of multilateral maritime security mechanism, and foundation of regional security regime, thus enhancing regional maritime cooperation.

• Korean System Dynamics Review
• /
• v.13 no.1
• /
• pp.159-182
• /
• 2012

Strategic decision on the execution of national security improvement project is greatly important for the present and future national security. Though, the importance of strategic decision, decision making process has been executed under one-way thinking framework. This research provides a decision-making tool with make-or-buy approach for the national security improvement policy execution methods: foreign purchase and military R&D project, and, via simulation, confirms dynamic change of military capability index respect to change in ratio of foreign purchase and military R&D. A result shows that current ratio of foreign purchases and military R&D is insufficient for national security improvement policy goal. Applying the model from this research provides an appropriate ratio for short term and long term defense strategy and policy goal, and consequent result of increase in national security capability. Thus, this research model can be effectively utilized for national security improvement project.

• Journal of the military operations research society of Korea
• /
• v.24 no.1
• /
• pp.98-109
• /
• 1998

This study develops a maintenance strategy for a reparable 2-unit standby system. The maintenance strategy implies the waiting time to call the repair facility when the unit-1 fails. Almeida and Souza set up the multi-attribute utility function consisting of system availability and repair cost for several maintenance strategies and decide the optimal maintenance strategy that maximize the expected value of the utility function. We decide the optimal maintenance strategy satisfying the following two criteria about the utility function : maximum variance using Almeida and Souza's utility function. It both criteria are not satisfied at the same time for every strategies, the strategy maximizing the lower confidence limit for expected utility function is regarded as an optimal one.

• Journal of Radiation Industry
• /
• v.17 no.4
• /
• pp.411-416
• /
• 2023

From Cold War, Nuclear weapons have emerged military power into a very dangerous and important way of each national security. Throughout the era, the U.S. had stationed nuclear weapons in South Korea. But President George Bush initially started the withdrawal of nuclear tactical weapons deployed abroad in 1991. After that, under the protection of the nuclear umbrella, South Korea guarantees that the United States would operate its nuclear weapons to protect South Korea if it would be needed and the economy of South Korea has rapidly developed as more strong countries in the world. However, South Korea has seen and been realized the present state from the recent war between Russia and Ukraine. The protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella from nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles of North Korea is unlikely to be permanently guaranteed. At the same time, South Korea should consider the security environment changes of surrounding nations such as China as military power acceleration and Russia as re-formation ambition. Because of these reasons, South Korea independently wants to protect itself and have the own nuclear weapons as a way to counter security threats. A majority of South Koreans also definitely believe that North Korea will not denuclearize or give up because North Korea has been having nuclear weapons as the final survival strategy of Kim Jong Un's regime. However, South Korea considers and makes new nuclear strategy through the role and effect of nuclear deterrence strategy in dispute between India and Pakistan and how to overcome the paradox of nuclear deterrence strategy. Therefore, this research is to suggest the effective nuclear deterrence strategy of South Korea from new security threats of surrounding nations through dispute between India and Pakistan. The focus of this research is that what is the role and paradox of nuclear deterrence strategy in dispute between India and Pakistan and how to find the effective nuclear deterrence strategy of South Korea.

• Journal of the military operations research society of Korea
• /
• v.29 no.1
• /
• pp.1-7
• /
• 2003

In a game called red and black, you can stake any amount s in your possession. Suppose you. goal is 1 and you. current fortune is i with 0 < f < 1. You win back your stake and as much more with probability p and lose your stake with probability, q = 1 - p. Ahn(2000) considered optimum strategy for this game with the value of p greater than \frac{1}{2} where the player has the advantage over the house. The optimum strategy at any when p>\frac{1}{2} is to play timidly, which is to bet a small amount each time. In this paper we perform the simulation study to show that the Timin strategy is optimum.

• Journal of the military operations research society of Korea
• /
• v.14 no.1
• /
• pp.63-83
• /
• 1988

This study is concerned with the equilibrium bidding strategy and the optimal auction design of sequential auction with a reserve price and an entry fee. It is assumed that each bidder has a fixed reservation value and draws the reservation values of other bidders independently in the same distribution and may obtain at most one object to be sold. Under such assumptions, the sequential auction will be analyzed by the game theoretic approach. The purpose of this paper is, in the sequential auction, to find the equilibrium bidding strategy and to design the optimal auction under the equilibrium bidding strategy. The equilibrium bidding strategy and the optimal auction design are further analyzed with respect to change of the reserve price, the entry fee, and the number of bidders and objects. Specially, the auctioneer's expected revenue for each auction is obtained and analyzed.

• Journal of the military operations research society of Korea
• /
• v.13 no.2
• /
• pp.63-83
• /
• 1987

This study is concerned with the equilibrium bidding strategy and the optimal auction design of sequential auction with a reserve price and an entry fee. It is assumed that each bidder has a fixed reservation value and draws the reservation values of other bidders independently in the same distribution and may obtain at most one object to be sold. Under such assumptions, the sequential auction will be analyzed by the game theoretic approach. The purpose of this paper is, in the sequential auction, to find the equilibrium bidding strategy and to design the optimal auction under the equilibrium bidding strategy. The equilibrium bidding strategy and the optimal auction design are further analyzed with respect to change of the reserve price, the entry fee, and the number of bidders and objects. Specially, the auctioneer's expected revenue for each auction is obtained and analyzed.

• Journal of the military operations research society of Korea
• /
• v.7 no.1
• /
• pp.25-41
• /
• 1981