• The Journal of Society for e-Business Studies
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• v.24 no.3
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• pp.111-128
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• 2019

In the current procurement system in Korean military, the army, navy and air force have their own distributors, military branches and warehouses. However, especially, it has been hard to have the economy of scale because most of suppliers have shipped their order from the suppliers to each of Korean military directly. Koran military considers the transportation cost as one of the management cost factors among various kinds of cost. Furthermore they have contracted with the suppliers in annual and collectively on the transportation. Hence they have been in trouble with getting efficiency of Defense budget execution because it is hard to make a decision of Defense budget with real transportation cost. Moreover Korean army, navy and air force have their own supply chain separately, so they can not cooperate flexible and quickly when they need. Therefore, in this research, we provide a benchmarking of DTCI (Defense Transportation Coordination Initiative) which has been proved that it has improved the procurement system in US implementing the integrated transportation system with 3PL and military. In addition we propose advanced integrated shipping model using Hub & Spoke system for Korean military. In order to prove its effect, we simulate our model based on the real data of the suppliers' delivery to compare with the current system when it comes to how much we can save the cost. Our research can provide evidence that the integrated procurement system in Korean military will improve Korean military procurement system.

• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.58-92
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• 2014

Even after S. Korea took 5.24 Measure(24 May 2014), N. Korea has not stopped raising provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, electronic and cyber attacks. To make matters worse, the communist country lunched long-range missiles(twice) and conducted 3rd nuclear test, escalating tensions which could possibly lead to an all-out war. Korean Government failed to respond properly. However, escalation into an all-out war was deterred by the CFC immediately carrying out its peacetime duty(CODA). The US made a rapid dispatch of its augmentation forces(Aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarine, strategic bomber, F-22) to the Korean Peninsula. In recognition of the importance of the Combined Forces Command, since May 2013 the Park Geun-Hye Administration has been pushing ahead with re-postponement of Wartime Operational Control Transfer(which initially meant the disassembling of the CFC as of 1 December 2015) More recently, there has been a series of unusual indicators from the North. Judging from its inventory of 20 nuclear weapons, 1,000 ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons, it is safe to say that N. Korea has gained at least war deterrence against S. Korea. Normally a nation with nuclear weapons shrink its size of conventional forces, but the North is pursuing the opposite, rather increasing them. In addition, there was a change of war plan by N. Korea in 2010, changing 'Conquering the Korean Peninsula' to 'Negotiation after the seizure of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA)' and establishing detailed plans for wartime projects. The change reflects the chain reaction in which requests from pro-north groups within the South will lead to the proclamation of war. Kim, Jeong-Un, leader of N. Korean regime, sent threatening messages using words such as 'exercising a nuclear preemptive strike right' and 'burning of Seoul'. Nam, Jae-June, Director of National Intelligence Service, stated that Kim, Jung-Un is throwing big talks, saying communization of the entire Korean Peninsula will come within the time frame of 3 years. Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, shared an alarming message that there is a high possibility that the North will raise local provocations or a full-fledged war whenever while putting much emphasis on defense posture. As for the response concept of the Korean Government, it has been decided that 'ROK·US Combined Local Provocation Counter-Measure' will be adopted to act against local provocations from the North. Major provocation types include ▲ violation of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) with mobilization of military ships ▲ artillery provocations on Northwestern Islands ▲ low altitude airborne intrusion ▲ rear infiltration of SOF ▲ local conflicts within the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) ▲ attacking friendly ships by submarines. Counter-measures currently established by the US involves the support from USFK and USFJ. In order to keep the sworn promise, the US is reinforcing both USFK and USFJ. An all-out war situation will be met by 'CFC OPLAN5027' and 'Tailored Expansion Deterrence Forces' with the CFC playing a central role. The US augmentation forces stands at 690,000 troops, some 160 ships, 2,000 aircraft and this comprise 50% of US total forces, which is estimated to be ninefold of Korean forces. The CFC needs to be in center in handling both local provocations and an all-out war situation. However, the combat power of S. Korean conventional forces is approximately around 80% of that of N. Korea, which has been confirmed from comments made by Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, during an interpellation session at the National Assembly. This means that S. Korean forces are not much growing. In particular, asymmetric capabilities of the North is posing a serious threat to the South including WMD, cyber warfare forces, SOF, forces targeting 5 Northwestern Islands, sub-surface and amphibious assault forces. The presence of such threats urgently requires immediate complementary efforts. For complementary efforts, the Korean Government should consider ① reinforcement of Korean forces; putting a stoppage to shrinking military, acquisition of adequate defense budget, building a missile defense and military leadership structure validity review, ② implementation of military tasks against the North; disciplinary measures on the sinking of ROKS Cheon-an/shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands, arrangement of inter-Korean military agreements, drawing lessons from studies on the correlation between aid for N. Korea, execution of inter-Korean Summit and provocations from the North, and ③ bolstering the ROK·US alliance; disregarding wartime operational control transfer plan(disassembling of CFC) and creation of a combined division.

• Strategy21
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• s.32
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• pp.97-122
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• 2013

The basic stance of the Republic of Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 'quiet diplomacy'. However, there had been demands for specific plans for practical protection of Dokdo. In 2011, Prime Minister Kim Hwang Sik mentioned that they are reviewing measures of stationing marines on Dokdo, while on August 10th, 2012, former president Lee Myung Bak visited Dokdo. The visit itself was meaningful as he was the first supreme commander to visit Dokdo. This paper studies on the necessity of naval power on Dokdo to maintain its effective control. The effective control must be done by a national organization in a peaceful and unimpaired method. If so, can stationing naval power, whether directly or indirectly, on Dokdo be considered a violation of 'peaceful' method? A 'peaceful' effective of control meas the right of sovereignty over a territory without other country's protest. In such terms, protecting a territory falls under practicing the right of sovereignty, and therefore does not violate 'peaceful'. In addition, looking at international cases such as Ligitan/Sipadan Case and Pedra Blanca Case, evidences such as 'navy activity', 'flyng ensign', and 'military communication facility installation' was used. In ter case of Yemen-Eritrea dispute over Hanish, methods on effective control over island and sea was also ruled by the installation of military posts and military surveillance activities. Thus, stationing naval power on Dokdo can be a way of maintaining effective control per international law. To station naval poer on Dokdo, Presidential Instruction 24 integrated Defense Guideline Enforcement Ordinance, which is domestic law, must be revised. Reason being, the Enforcement Ordinance states that the navy area of responsibility excluded Ullundo, where Dokdo is under jurisdiction of Ullungdim thus excluding navy control. In addition, considering the diplomatic situation, it is more fut to install navy radar site on Dokdo rather than 'stationing marines'. In other words, enforcing surveillance in the vicinity of Dokdo and installing radar site instead of stationing direct combatants is one way of practicing effective control without stimulating diplomatic disputes.

• Strategy21
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• s.44
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• pp.142-176
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• 2018

So far, the main threat to South Korea was North Korea. That is why South Korea established a strategy based on the threat of North Korea and most of the budget on defense was used to deter North Korea. Even though the neighboring countries(China, Japan, and Russia) are growing as a real threat with abilities and intentions based on their powerful naval forces, South Korea has not yet been able to establish a strategy that regards neighboring countries as a threat. But the decades-old structural mechanism of the Korean security environment is undergoing a radical change on April 27, 2018, through the South-North summit and the Panmunjom Declaration. Under the changing security environment, South Korea was placed in a complicated dilemma that had to deal with threats of two axes(China), three axes(China, Japan), and four axes(Japan, Russia). If the one axis threat(North Korea) is dominated by land threats, the second, third and fourth axis threats are threats from the sea. This paper analyzed the maritime strategy of Korea within the framework of maritime-geopolitics, in other words recognition and expansion of the sphere of maritime. I have designed that the maritime defense space that we can deny from threats is divided into three lines of defense: 1 line (radius 3,000km), 2 lines (2,000km), and 3 lines (1,000km). The three defense zones of the three lines were defined as an active defense(1 line), defensive offense(2 line), active offense(3 line). The three defense zones of the three lines were defined as the sphere of core maritime, As a power to deny the sphere of core maritime, it was analyzed as a maneuvering unit, a nuclear-powered submarine, the establishment of missile strategy, and the fortification of islands station. The marine strategy of South Korea with these concepts and means was defined as 'Offensive Maritime Denial Strategy'.

• Strategy21
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• s.36
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• pp.33-58
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• 2015

In 1996, China, Japan and the ROK all became the party to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Since then, the UNCLOS has been a fundamental basis for the resolution and management of maritime disputes amongst them. However, there still remain acrimonious disputes in the region. Resources nationalism and the revival of geopolitics aggravates the disputes particularly on sovereignty over disputed islands, maritime delimitation and the legal nature of military activities in other States' Exclusive Economic Zones. Under the circumstances, why have the demands for the conclusion of a regional agreement been raised in this region? A desirable regional agreement regarding ocean affairs should be compatible with the rights and obligations under the UNCLOS, a universal norm regarding ocean affairs. This paper will propose a desirable regional agreement by adopting an incremental approach.

• Strategy21
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• s.36
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• pp.241-265
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• 2015

최근 몇 년 동안 나타난 러시아 해군의 부활(resurgence)은 우크라이나 사태로 본 러시아 군사력 증강을 대표하는 상징이다. 전통적으로 러시아 해양전략(Sea power)은 러시아 경제 및 안보 목표를 달성하는데 있어 핵심이었다. 러시아 해군은 주로 전략적 억제, 연안방어, 해상교통로 보호, 해외전개 그리고 군사력 투사 등의 임무를 수행한다. 특히 최근 들어 러시아 해군력이 양적 질적으로 증강되는 양상을 보이고 있으며, 이는 최근 잠수함, 수상함 그리고 해군항공 전력이 크게 증강되고 있는 현상에서 증명되고 있다. 이는 불과 몇 년 전까지 러시아 해군력에 대한 정비 및 작전 운용에 있어 많은 문제점을 보이던 부정적 사례와 현격히 다른 모습이다. 특히 푸틴 정부에 들어서 러시아 해군은 양적이며 질적인 증강뿐만이 아닌, 세계 해양에서의 원해 해군작전을 비록 지금은 간헐적이기는 하지만 활발히 실시하고 있으며, 러시아 주변국 해군과의 다양한 해군협력도 추진하고 있다. 궁극적으로 러시아 해군은 단기적으로 연안방어를 기본 임무로 수행할 것이나, 장기적으로는 과거 구소련 해군력 위상과 영향력을 부활시키기 위해 세계 무대에서의 군사적 영향력을 증진시키는 대양해군(Blue Water Navy)을 지향할 것이다.

• Strategy21
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• s.43
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• pp.249-271
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• 2018

최근 카자흐스탄이 러시아나 서구제국들이 아닌 중국과의 에너지 외교에 큰 진전을 보이고 있듯이, 중국은 미국이나 러시아를 자극하지 않은 채로 중앙아시아제국들과의 경제협력을 확대하고 이를 통한 성공적인 에너지안보체제를 구축하고자 한다. 그러나 역사적으로 일정지역에 중국인들의 진출이 늘어나거나 중국인들의 경제적 영향력이 제고되면, 중국정부의 대상지역에 대한 영향력도 제고되었다는 사실로 미루어, 중국의 해외투자 또는 해외이주와 연관된 중국정부의 연계전략에 대한 주의가 요구된다. 중국정부는 해외투자 또는 해외이주지원이라는 명목으로 제주도의 해군기지 주변 강정마을에 대한 부동산 구매를 시도하고 있으며, 그 밖의 한국 내 미군기지 주변에도 중국인타운을 형성하는데 보이지 않는 정부차원의 지원을 확대하고 있다. 이와 같은 현상은 일본 내 미군기지, 특히 오키나와 미군기지 주변과 사스마섬의 일본 자위대 기지 주변에서도 동일하게 전개되고 있다. 이런 중국정부의 의도는 한국과 일본에 주둔하고 있는 미군기지에 대한 견제장치인 동시에 해당지역 주민들에 대한 중국의 영향력 제고를 목적적 결과물로 노정하고 있는 것이다. 중국자본과 중국인들의 한국과 일본 현지진출은 경제적 이해를 넘어서는 외교적, 군사적 문제까지도 야기할 수 있고 이로 인한 국가간 갈등요인이 제고될 수 있는 만큼, 중국의 해외투자 연계전략에 대한 보다 철저한 관리 감독이 필요하다.

• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.178-206
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• 2014

The battlefield environment in the maritime has been changed by advanced IT technology, variation of naval warfare condition, and developed military science and technology. In addition, state-of-the-art surface combatants has become to multi-purpose battleship that is heavily armed in order to meet actively in composed future sea battlefield condition and perform multi-purpose missions as well as having capability of strategic strike. To maximize the combat strength and survivability of ship, it is not only possible for Zumwalt(DDG-1000) class combatant to conduct multi-purpose mission with advanced weapon system installation, innovative hull form and upper structure such as deckhouse, shipboard high-powered sensor, total ship computing environment, and integrated power control but it was designed so that can be installed with energy based weapon systems in immediate future. Zumwalt class combatant has been set a high value with enormous threatening surface battleship in the present, it seems to be expected that this ship will be restraint means during operation in the littoral. The advent of Zumwalt class battleship in the US Navy can be constructed as a powerful intention of naval strength building for preparing future warfare. It is required surface ship that can be perform multi-purpose mission when the trend of constructed surface combatants was analyzed. In addition, shipboard system has been continuously modernized to keep the optimized ship and maximize the survivability with high-powered detection and surveillance sensor as well as modularity of combat system to efficient operation.

• Strategy21
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• s.42
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• pp.293-317
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• 2017

A series of immoral conducts are repeatedly occurring by some commanders and high-ranking officers in the ROK navy. They are seriously compromising not only harmony and solidarity of the organization, but also pride and morale of members of the service. They seem to be results of the fragile ethical background of the service as well as of failures in military education and training on ethics. This paper sees backgrounds of weak ethical foundations of the navy as follows: the enduring legacies of cultural factors, such as the toxic military culture of the Japanese colonization, dark side of mariners' traditions, the sea-aversive Confucian culture, and unique characteristics in any small organization or society, etc... This paper also suggests the current ethnic systems of the navy are primarily based on responsive measures against misdeeds, rather than fundamental prescriptions for immoral behaviors, in the absence of ethical instrument for warriors. The paper also emphasizes the importance of developing character-based leadership, founded on, above all, respects for human integrity and strong sense of honor. Moreover, the importance of accountability in charging the command, as advocated by the US navy, is also stressed in order to establish a more robust ethic ground within the navy. Based on these analyses, the author proposes that in order to become a stronger and healthier fighting force, the navy needs to make continuous command efforts and organizational innovations to improve ethic principle and moral standard of the service, to strengthen ethics of naval leaders by a robust system of ethical education and training programs, and ultimately to solidify a navy culture in which moral passions and energies are spreading over.

• Strategy21
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• s.44
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• pp.254-290
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• 2018

Why did Kim Jong Un turn his foreign policy upside down in a sudden? US naval blockade became one of candidates for the reason since it had been threatened by Trump administration for the first time in December 2017. Has the blockades worked well like that in the international politic history? This paper reveals the effectiveness of naval blockade on sanctioning in the peacetime. This research analyzes three hypothetical arguments about the naval blockade based on the result of empirical tests with TIES Dataset. First, sanctions by blockading are more effective in gaining political benefits than the other economic sanctions. It was ranked the 4th effective way of sanction out of 9. And 56.3% of pacific naval blockades without packaged economic sanctions were succeeded, whereas the possibility of success increase up to 61.2% when blockade has been imposed in accordance with the other type of economic sanctions. Second, blockades deter military collisions, even war. When it comes to military provocation issue, blockading sanctions gain political interest far more than the other type of economic sanctions. The possibility of the success reaches up to 74%. Also, there wasn't any historical cases of war incurred by blockading sanctions within 5 years after the blockade end. Third, policy makers just need 1.2 years on average to see the end of sanctions when they choose the naval blockade as the method of imposing sanction on the adversary. It is impressively short span of time in achieving political goal compared to the other types of sanctions which are need 9 years on average. North East Asia sea could be the next stage for a naval blockade sooner or later. Because China and Japan not only possess capabilities of blockade but also have will to impose blockades to the others if conditions are set. And even the North Korea with lots of submerging forces could be a blockading threat in the specific area. So, the Republic of Korea has to pay more attention and be prepared for naval blockading sanction.