• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Navigation and Port Research Conference
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• 2019.05a
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• pp.238-239
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• 2019

Cyber attacks can be caused by all equipment that perform communication functions, and the link between ship and land due to the development of communication technology means that the ship sector as well as the land sector can be easily exposed to cyber threat vulnerability. In this paper, we analyze cyber threat trend changes to identify cyber security vulnerabilities in the maritime sector and propose measures to enhance cyber security through other industry case studies.

• Journal of Navigation and Port Research
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• v.36 no.1
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• pp.9-14
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• 2012

Maritime security incidents by pirates and by terrorists increase, but maritime incidents investigation models are limited to figure out the maritime security incidents. This paper provides the analysis model for maritime security incidents. To develop this analysis model, this categorizes five threat factors, the ship, the cargo type, port system, human factor, information flow system, makes the risk assessment matrix to quantify the risk related to threat factors and classifies four priority categories of risk assessment matrix. Also, this model makes from the frameworks which include a variety of security initiatives implementing in stakeholder levels like international organizations, individual governments, shipping companies, and the ship. Therefore, this paper develops the Analysis for Maritime Security Management model based on various security initiatives responding to the stakeholder levels of maritime security management and top-bottom/bottom-up decision trees, and shows the validity through verifying the real maritime security incident of M/V Petro Ranger.

• Maritime Security
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• v.7 no.1
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• pp.1-29
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• 2023

For the last 70 years, the U.S.-led bilateral security system, or "Hub-and-Spokes" system, has been applied to Northeast Asia, and the system has been successfully settled in terms of stability and economic achievements of the region. Given the increasing complexity of the security environment of East Asia, it is plausible to consider the possibility of a security system shift from bilateral alliances to collective security. In order to analyze the driver of collective security system, this study developed three factors of formation and development of collective security system - main threat, intensity of the threat, and confidence among countries in the system - by reviewing international political theories related to security cooperation. Comparing the formation, development, and achievements of NATO and SEATO, the study figures out that the existence of the main threat, the high intensity of the threat, and the strong confidence among countries in the security system are the primary drivers for a successful collective security system. Based on the result, the study also analyzed the possibility of a security system shift in East Asia. Considering contemporary international conflicts such as U.S.-China strategic competition, Russia-Ukraine War, and growing threats posed by North Korean nuclear and missiles, the study anticipates that the necessity of a collective security system that will replace the current security system of the region would arise. Still, although some issues between countries should be overcome, the growing intensity of the threats will promote cooperation among countries by improving their confidence.

• Strategy21
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• s.44
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• pp.142-176
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• 2018

So far, the main threat to South Korea was North Korea. That is why South Korea established a strategy based on the threat of North Korea and most of the budget on defense was used to deter North Korea. Even though the neighboring countries(China, Japan, and Russia) are growing as a real threat with abilities and intentions based on their powerful naval forces, South Korea has not yet been able to establish a strategy that regards neighboring countries as a threat. But the decades-old structural mechanism of the Korean security environment is undergoing a radical change on April 27, 2018, through the South-North summit and the Panmunjom Declaration. Under the changing security environment, South Korea was placed in a complicated dilemma that had to deal with threats of two axes(China), three axes(China, Japan), and four axes(Japan, Russia). If the one axis threat(North Korea) is dominated by land threats, the second, third and fourth axis threats are threats from the sea. This paper analyzed the maritime strategy of Korea within the framework of maritime-geopolitics, in other words recognition and expansion of the sphere of maritime. I have designed that the maritime defense space that we can deny from threats is divided into three lines of defense: 1 line (radius 3,000km), 2 lines (2,000km), and 3 lines (1,000km). The three defense zones of the three lines were defined as an active defense(1 line), defensive offense(2 line), active offense(3 line). The three defense zones of the three lines were defined as the sphere of core maritime, As a power to deny the sphere of core maritime, it was analyzed as a maneuvering unit, a nuclear-powered submarine, the establishment of missile strategy, and the fortification of islands station. The marine strategy of South Korea with these concepts and means was defined as 'Offensive Maritime Denial Strategy'.

• Proceedings of KOSOMES biannual meeting
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• 2003.11a
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• pp.99-104
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• 2003

The maritime security risk has been recognized since the terrorists attacked the world trade center and the Pentagon In this paper, maritime security risk is analyzed on the basis if the data of crime in Korean sea We propose the countermeasures to prevent maritime security threats

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.220-250
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• 2013

South Korean national security strategy should be developed to effectively handle and counter increasing maritime threats and challenges. There are three major maritime threats South Korea faces today; maritime disputes on the EEZ boundary and Dokdo islet issues, North Korean threats, and international maritime security. Maritime disputes in the region are getting intensified and turned into a military confrontation after 2010. Now regional countries confront each other with military and police forces and use economic leverage to coerce the others. They are very eager to create advantageous de facto situations to legitimize their territorial claims. North Korean threat is also increasing in the sea as we witnessed in the Cheonan incident and Yeonpyoung shelling in 2010. North Korea resorts to local provocations and nuclear threats to coerce South Korea in which it may enjoy asymmetric advantages. The NLL area of the west sea would be a main hot spot that North Korea may continue to make a local provocation. Also, South Korean national economy is heavily dependent upon foreign trade and national strategic resources such as oil are all imported. Without an assurance on the safety of sea routes, these economic activities cannot be maintained and expanded. This paper argues that South Korea should make national maritime strategy and enhance the strength of naval forces. As a middle power, its national security strategy needs to consider all the threats and challenges not only from North Korea but also to maritime security. This is not a matter of choice but a mandate for national survival and prosperity. This paper discusses the importance of maritime security, changing characteristics of maritime threats and challenges, regional maritime disputes and its threat to South Korea's security, and South Korea's future security strategy and ways to enhance the role of naval forces. Our national maritime strategy needs to show middle and long term policy directions on how we will protect our maritime interests. Especially, it is important to build proper naval might to carry out all the roles and missions required to the military.

• Strategy21
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• s.36
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• pp.150-179
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• 2015

This thesis analyzes Somali piracy as a non-traditional threat to the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) and international countermeasures to the piracy. In an era of globally interdependent economies, the protection of sea lines and freedom of navigation are prerequisites for the development of states. Since the post-Cold War began in the early 1990s, ocean piracy has emerged as a significant threat to international trade. For instance, in the Malacca Strait which carries 30 percent of the world's trade volume, losses from failed shipping, insurance, plus other subsequent damages were enormous. Until the mid-2000s, navies and coast guards from Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, together with the International Maritime Organization (IMO), conducted anti-piracy operations in the Strait of Malacca. The combined efforts of these three maritime states, through information sharing and with reinforced assets including warships and patrol aircrafts, have successfully made a dent to lower incidents of piracy. Likewise, the United Nations' authorization of multinational forces to operate in Somali waters has pushed interdiction efforts including patrol and escort flotilla support. This along with self-reinforced security measures has successfully helped lower piracy from 75 incidents in 2012 to 15 in 2013. As illustrated, Somali piracy is a direct security threat to the international community and the SLOC which calls for global peacekeeping as a countermeasure. Reconstructing the economy and society to support public safety and stability should be the priority solution. Emphasis should be placed on restoring public peace and jurisdiction for control of piracy as a primary countermeasure.

• Proceedings of KOSOMES biannual meeting
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• 2006.05a
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• pp.7-13
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• 2006

On the analysis of maritime security awareness of people who engage in the fields of domestic passenger ships, the security code is proposed in order to prevent and to response threats of security in the domestic passenger ships.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.29 no.3
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• pp.657-673
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• 2019

As various IT and OT systems such as Electronic Chart Display and Information System and Automatic Identification System are used for ships, security elements that take into account even the ship's construction and navigation environment are required. However, cyber security research on the ship and shipbuilding ICT equipment industries is still lacking, and there is a lack of systematic methodologies through threat modeling. In this paper, the Data Flow Diagram was established in consideration of stakeholders approaching the ship system. Based on the Attack Library, which collects the security vulnerabilities and cases of ship systems, STRIDE methodologies and threat modeling using the Attack Tree are designed to identify possible threats from ships and to present ship cyber security measures.

• Maritime Security
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• v.4 no.1
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• pp.83-113
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• 2022

Although China's maritime militia has not been well known despite its long history, it is recently emerging as a serious threat to maritime security, causing neighboring countries' security concerns due to the growing number of maritime disputes with China. In this regard, it is now time to clearly define the true nature of the Chinese maritime militia. A close look at the organization and roles of the Chinese maritime militia reveals that it is an organization that is systematically managed and operated by the Chinese government and the People's Liberation Army of China. Its role is to serve the purpose of "contributing to the protection and expansion of China's marine interests." In addition, the threat factors of the Chinese maritime militia were analyzed by examining the cases of maritime disputes between the Chinese maritime militia and neighboring countries. First, the Chinese maritime militia has implemented the "Gray Zone Strategy." Second, it is a systematic organization supported by the Chinese government and the People's Liberation Army. Third, it is a maritime power that cannot be ignored as the world's largest militia organization. Fourth, it has a strategic flexibility that enables the execution of the dual mission of working for a living such as commercial fishing and serving in the maritime militia. The threats of the Chinese maritime militia are not limited to Southeast Asian countries located in the South China Sea. This is also the case in Korea as the country cannot avoid maritime disputes with China such as the Ieodo issue and the boundary delimitation of the West Sea. Accordingly, this study was focused on presenting a predictable scenario and countermeasures based on the analysis through a scenario technique with respect to the two cases that are most likely to occur in Korea-China relations. Finally, beyond identifying the nature of the Chinese maritime militia, this study takes a further step to share considerations as to how the organization may operate and develop in the future and how we can cope with its moves.