• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.6 no.12
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• pp.3133-3151
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• 2012

The optimal price strategy selection of two bounded rational cognitive mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) in a duopoly spectrum sharing market is investigated. The bounded rational operators dynamically compete to sell the leased spectrum to secondary users in order to maximize their profits. Meanwhile, the secondary users' heterogeneous preferences to rate and price are taken into consideration. The evolutionary game theory (EGT) is employed to model the dynamic price strategy selection of the MVNOs taking into account the response of the secondary users. The behavior dynamics and the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of the operators are derived via replicated dynamics. Furthermore, a reward and punishment mechanism is developed to optimize the performance of the operators. Numerical results show that the proposed evolutionary algorithm is convergent to the ESS, and the incentive mechanism increases the profits of the operators. It may provide some insight about the optimal price strategy selection for MVNOs in the next generation cognitive wireless networks.

• Journal of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems
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• v.14 no.3
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• pp.253-261
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• 2004

Game theory is mathematical analysis developed to study involved in making decisions. In 1928, Von Neumann proved that every two-person, zero-sum game with finitely many pure strategies for each player is deterministic. As well, in the early 50's, Nash presented another concept as the basis for a generalization of Von Neumann's theorem. Another central achievement of game theory is the introduction of evolutionary game theory, by which agents can play optimal strategies in the absence of rationality. Not the rationality but through the process of Darwinian selection, a population of agents can evolve to an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) introduced by Maynard Smith. Keeping pace with these game theoretical studies, the first computer simulation of co-evolution was tried out by Hillis in 1991. Moreover, Kauffman proposed NK model to analyze co-evolutionary dynamics between different species. He showed how co-evolutionary phenomenon reaches static states and that these states are Nash equilibrium or ESS introduced in game theory. Since the studies about co-evolutionary phenomenon were started, however many other researchers have developed co-evolutionary algorithms, in this paper we propose Game theory based Co-Evolutionary Algorithm (GCEA) and confirm that this algorithm can be a solution of evolutionary problems by searching the ESS.To evaluate newly designed GCEA approach, we solve several test Multi-objective Optimization Problems (MOPs). From the results of these evaluations, we confirm that evolutionary game can be embodied by co-evolutionary algorithm and analyze optimization performance of GCEA by comparing experimental results using GCEA with the results using other evolutionary optimization algorithms.

• Journal of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems
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• v.12 no.6
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• pp.491-496
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• 2002

Multi-objective Optimization Problems(MOPs) are occur more frequently than generally thought when we try to solve engineering problems. In the real world, the majority cases of optimization problems are the problems composed of several competitive objective functions. In this paper, we introduce the definition of MOPs and several approaches to solve these problems. In the introduction, established optimization algorithms based on the concept of Pareto optimal solution are introduced. And contrary these algorithms, we introduce theoretical backgrounds of Nash Genetic Algorithm(Nash GA) and Evolutionary Stable Strategy(ESS), which is the basis of Co-evolutionary algorithm proposed in this paper. In the next chapter, we introduce the definitions of MOPs and Pareto optimal solution. And the architecture of Nash GA and Co-evolutionary algorithm for solving MOPs are following. Finally from the experimental results we confirm that two algorithms based on Evolutionary Game Theory(EGT) which are Nash GA and Co-evolutionary algorithm can search optimal solutions of MOPs.

• International Journal of Control, Automation, and Systems
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• v.2 no.4
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• pp.463-474
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• 2004

Game theory is a method of mathematical analysis developed to study the decision making process. In 1928, Von Neumann mathematically proved that every two-person, zero-sum game with many pure finite strategies for each player is deterministic. In the early 50's, Nash presented another concept as the basis for a generalization of Von Neumann's theorem. Another central achievement of game theory is the introduction of evolutionary game theory, by which agents can play optimal strategies in the absence of rationality. Through the process of Darwinian selection, a population of agents can evolve to an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) as introduced by Maynard Smith in 1982. Keeping pace with these game theoretical studies, the first computer simulation of coevolution was tried out by Hillis. Moreover, Kauffman proposed the NK model to analyze coevolutionary dynamics between different species. He showed how coevolutionary phenomenon reaches static states and that these states are either Nash equilibrium or ESS in game theory. Since studies concerning coevolutionary phenomenon were initiated, there have been numerous other researchers who have developed coevolutionary algorithms. In this paper we propose a new coevolutionary algorithm named Game theory based Coevolutionary Algorithm (GCEA) and we confirm that this algorithm can be a solution of evolutionary problems by searching the ESS. To evaluate this newly designed approach, we solve several test Multiobjective Optimization Problems (MOPs). From the results of these evaluations, we confirm that evolutionary game can be embodied by the coevolutionary algorithm and analyze the optimization performance of our algorithm by comparing the performance of our algorithm with that of other evolutionary optimization algorithms.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.14 no.1
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• pp.44-57
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• 2015

In recent years, for the purpose of solving the problem regarding environment protection and resource saving, certain measures and policies have been promoted to establish a reverse supply chains (RSCs) with material flows from collection of used products to reuse the recycled parts in production of products. It is necessary to analyze behaviors of RSC members to determine the optimal operation. This paper discusses a RSC with a retailer and a manufacturer and verifies the behavior strategies of RSC members which may change over time in response to changes parameters related to the recycling promotion activity in RSC. A retailer takes two behaviors: cooperation/non-cooperation in recycling promotion activity. A manufacturer takes two behaviors: monitoring/non-monitoring of behaviors of the retailer. Evolutionary game theory combining the evolutionary theory of Darwin with game theory is adopted to clarify analytically evolutionary outcomes driven by a change in each behavior of RSC members over time. The evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) for RSC members' behaviors are derived by using the replicator dynamics. The analysis numerically demonstrates how parameters of the recycling promotion activity: (i) sale promotion cost, (ii) monitoring cost, (iii) compensation and (iv) penalty cost affect the judgment of ESSs of behaviors of RSC members.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems Conference
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• 2002.12a
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• pp.395-398
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• 2002

본 논문에서는 ‘다목적 함수 최적화 문제(Multi-objective Optimization Problem MOP)’를 풀기 위하여 유전자 알고리즘을 진화적 게임 이론 적용시킨 ‘내쉬 유전자 알고리즘(Nash GA)’과 본 논문에서 새로이 제안하는 공진화 알고리즘의 구조를 설명하고 이 두 알고리즘의 결과를 시뮬레이션을 통하여 비교 검토함으로써 ‘진화적 게임 이론(Evolutionary Game Theory : EGT)’의 두 가지 아이디어 -‘내쉬의 균형(Equilibrium)’과 ‘진화적 안정전략(Evolutionary Stable Strategy . ESS)’-에 기반한 최적화 알고리즘들이 다목적 함수 문제의 최적해를 탐색할 수 있음을 확인한다.

• International Journal of Control, Automation, and Systems
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• v.2 no.2
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• pp.247-255
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• 2004

The majority of real-world problems encountered by engineers involve simultaneous optimization of competing objectives. In this case instead of single optima, there is a set of alternative trade-offs, generally known as Pareto-optimal solutions. The use of evolutionary algorithms Pareto GA, which was first introduced by Goldberg in 1989, has now become a sort of standard in solving Multiobjective Optimization Problems (MOPs). Though this approach was further developed leading to numerous applications, these applications are based on Pareto ranking and employ the use of the fitness sharing function to maintain diversity. Another scheme for solving MOPs has been presented by J. Nash to solve MOPs originated from Game Theory and Economics. Sefrioui introduced the Nash Genetic Algorithm in 1998. This approach combines genetic algorithms with Nash's idea. Another central achievement of Game Theory is the introduction of an Evolutionary Stable Strategy, introduced by Maynard Smith in 1982. In this paper, we will try to find ESS as a solution of MOPs using our game model based co-evolutionary algorithm. First, we will investigate the validity of our co-evolutionary approach to solve MOPs. That is, we will demonstrate how the evolutionary game can be embodied using co-evolutionary algorithms and also confirm whether it can reach the optimal equilibrium point of a MOP. Second, we will evaluate the effectiveness of our approach, comparing it with other methods through rigorous experiments on several MOPs.

• Structural Engineering and Mechanics
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• v.62 no.5
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• pp.537-550
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• 2017

Structural sizing is a rewarding task due to its non-convex constrained nature in the design space. In order to provide both global exploration and proper search refinement, a hybrid method is developed here based on outstanding features of Evolutionary Computing and Teaching-Learning-Based Optimization. The new method introduces an observer phase for memory exploitation in addition to vector-sum movements in the original teacher and learner phases. Proper integer coding is suited and applied for structural size optimization together with a fly-to-boundary technique and an elitism strategy. Performance of the proposed method is further evaluated treating a number of truss examples compared with teaching-learning-based optimization. The results show enhanced capability of the method in efficient and stable convergence toward the optimum and effective capturing of high quality solutions in discrete structural sizing problems.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.35 no.4
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• pp.55-79
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• 2010

This study deals with a model for platform competition in a two-sided market. We suppose there are both direct and indirect network externalities between suppliers and users of each platform. Moreover, we suppose that both users and suppliers are distributed in their relative affinity for each platform type. That is, each user [supplier] has his/her own preferential position toward each platform, and users [suppliers] are horizontally differentiated over [0, 1]. And for analytical tractability, some parameters like direct and indirect network externalities are the same across the markets. Given the parameters and the pricing profile, users and suppliers conduct subscription game, where participants select the platform that gives them the highest payoffs. This game proceeds according to a replicator dynamics of the evolutionary game, which is simplified by properly defining gains from participant's strategy in the subscription game. We find that depending on the strength of these network effects, there might either be multiple stable equilibria, at which users and suppliers distribute across both platforms, or one unstable interior equilibrium corresponding to the market tipping in favor of either platform. In both cases, we also consider the pricing power of competing platform providers under the framework of the Stackelberg game. In particular, our study examines the possible effects of the type of competition between platform providers, which may constrain the equilibrium selection in the subscription game.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.39B no.11
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• pp.790-802
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• 2014

In cognitive radio technology, secondary users can determine the absence of PU by periodic sensing operation and cooperative sensing between SUs yields a significant sensing performance improvement. However, there exists a trade off between the gains in terms of probability of detection of the primary users and the costs of false alarm probability. Therefore, the cooperation group must maintain the suitable size. And secondary users should sense not only the currently using channels and but also other candidates channel to switch in accordance with sudden appearance of the primary user. In this paper, we propose an effective group cooperative sensing algorithm in distributed network situations that is considering both of inband and outband sensing using evolutionary game theory. We derived that the strategy group of secondary users converges to an ESS(Evolutionary sable state). Using a learning algorithm, each secondary user can converge to the ESS without the exchange of information to each other.