• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.35 no.4
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• pp.55-79
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• 2010

This study deals with a model for platform competition in a two-sided market. We suppose there are both direct and indirect network externalities between suppliers and users of each platform. Moreover, we suppose that both users and suppliers are distributed in their relative affinity for each platform type. That is, each user [supplier] has his/her own preferential position toward each platform, and users [suppliers] are horizontally differentiated over [0, 1]. And for analytical tractability, some parameters like direct and indirect network externalities are the same across the markets. Given the parameters and the pricing profile, users and suppliers conduct subscription game, where participants select the platform that gives them the highest payoffs. This game proceeds according to a replicator dynamics of the evolutionary game, which is simplified by properly defining gains from participant's strategy in the subscription game. We find that depending on the strength of these network effects, there might either be multiple stable equilibria, at which users and suppliers distribute across both platforms, or one unstable interior equilibrium corresponding to the market tipping in favor of either platform. In both cases, we also consider the pricing power of competing platform providers under the framework of the Stackelberg game. In particular, our study examines the possible effects of the type of competition between platform providers, which may constrain the equilibrium selection in the subscription game.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems Conference
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• 2002.12a
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• pp.395-398
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• 2002

본 논문에서는 ‘다목적 함수 최적화 문제(Multi-objective Optimization Problem MOP)’를 풀기 위하여 유전자 알고리즘을 진화적 게임 이론 적용시킨 ‘내쉬 유전자 알고리즘(Nash GA)’과 본 논문에서 새로이 제안하는 공진화 알고리즘의 구조를 설명하고 이 두 알고리즘의 결과를 시뮬레이션을 통하여 비교 검토함으로써 ‘진화적 게임 이론(Evolutionary Game Theory : EGT)’의 두 가지 아이디어 -‘내쉬의 균형(Equilibrium)’과 ‘진화적 안정전략(Evolutionary Stable Strategy . ESS)’-에 기반한 최적화 알고리즘들이 다목적 함수 문제의 최적해를 탐색할 수 있음을 확인한다.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.39B no.11
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• pp.790-802
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• 2014

In cognitive radio technology, secondary users can determine the absence of PU by periodic sensing operation and cooperative sensing between SUs yields a significant sensing performance improvement. However, there exists a trade off between the gains in terms of probability of detection of the primary users and the costs of false alarm probability. Therefore, the cooperation group must maintain the suitable size. And secondary users should sense not only the currently using channels and but also other candidates channel to switch in accordance with sudden appearance of the primary user. In this paper, we propose an effective group cooperative sensing algorithm in distributed network situations that is considering both of inband and outband sensing using evolutionary game theory. We derived that the strategy group of secondary users converges to an ESS(Evolutionary sable state). Using a learning algorithm, each secondary user can converge to the ESS without the exchange of information to each other.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.14 no.6
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• pp.614-618
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• 2012

Smart grid is widely considered to be a next generation power grid, which will be integrated with information feedback communications.However, smart grid communication technologies are subject to inefficient spectrum allocation problems. Cognitive radio networks can solve the problemof spectrumscarcity by opening the under-utilized licensed bands to secondary users. In this paper, adaptive cognitive radio spectrum sensing and sharing algorithms are developed for smart grid environments. Simulation results are presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme in comparison with other existing schemes.

• Proceedings of the IEEK Conference
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• 2000.07a
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• pp.97-100
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• 2000

In previous research of social dilemma, there is no extended game that the players can select one game out of some social dilemma games. We propose this kind of game as ＂Distributed Social Dilemma＂ In this game, each player tries to acquire the adaptive strategy throughout local interactions. We make use of GA as evolutionary operations. In this paper, our purpose is to examine how the game selection of players influences the evolution of cooperation in distributed social dilemma. In order to examine, we formulate distributed social dilemma by Game Theory and use agent-based simulation that each agent is regard as player

• Journal of Power Electronics
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.104-112
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• 2012

In this paper a new method for the design of a simple PI controller is presented and it has been applied in the control of a Boost based PFC rectifier. The Strength Pareto evolutionary algorithm, which is based on the Pareto Optimality concept, used in Game theory literature is implemented as a multi-objective optimization approach to gain a good transient response and a high quality input current. In the proposed method, the input current harmonics and the dynamic response have been assumed as objective functions, while the PI controller's gains of the PFC rectifier (Kpi, Tpi) are design variables. The proposed algorithm generates a set of optimal gains called a Pareto Set corresponding to a Pareto Front, which is a set of optimal results for the objective functions. All of the Pareto Front points are optimum, but according to the design priority objective function, each one can be selected. Simulation and experimental results are presented to prove the superiority of the proposed design methodology over other methods.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.14 no.8
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• pp.293-303
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• 2016

Analysis of bargaining games utilizing evolutionary computation in recent years has dealt with important issues in the field of game theory. In this paper, we investigated interaction and coevolution process among heterogeneous artificial agents using evolutionary computation in the bargaining game. We present three kinds of evolving-strategic agents participating in the bargaining games; genetic algorithms (GA), particle swarm optimization (PSO) and differential evolution (DE). The co-evolutionary processes among three kinds of artificial agents which are GA-agent, PSO-agent, and DE-agent are tested to observe which EC-agent shows the best performance in the bargaining game. The simulation results show that a PSO-agent is better than a GA-agent and a DE-agent, and that a GA-agent is better than a DE-agent with respect to co-evolution in bargaining game. In order to understand why a PSO-agent is the best among three kinds of artificial agents in the bargaining game, we observed the strategies of artificial agents after completion of game. The results indicated that the PSO-agent evolves in direction of the strategy to gain as much as possible at the risk of gaining no property upon failure of the transaction, while the GA-agent and the DE-agent evolve in direction of the strategy to accomplish the transaction regardless of the quantity.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.14 no.11
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• pp.549-557
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• 2014

Recently, analysis of bargaining game using evolutionary computation is essential issues in field of game theory. In this paper, we observe a bargaining game using co-evolution between two heterogenous artificial agents. In oder to model two artificial agents, we use a particle swarm optimization and a differential evolution. We investigate algorithm parameters for the best performance and observe that which strategy is better in the bargaining game under the co-evolution between two heterogenous artificial agents. Experimental simulation results show that particle swarm optimization outperforms differential evolution in the bargaining game.

• ETRI Journal
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• v.37 no.1
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• pp.77-87
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• 2015

In wireless networks, cooperation is necessary for many protocols, such as routing, clock synchronization, and security. It is known that cooperator nodes suffer greatly from problems such as increasing energy consumption. Therefore, rational nodes have no incentive to cooperatively forward traffic for others. A rational node is different from a malicious node. It is a node that makes the best decision in each state (cooperate or non-cooperate). In this paper, game theory is used to analyze the cooperation between nodes. An evolutionary game has been investigated using two nodes, and their strategies have been compared to find the best one. Subsequently, two approaches, one based on a genetic algorithm (GA) and the other on learning automata (LA), are presented to incite nodes for cooperating in a noisy environment. As you will see later, the GA strategy is able to disable the effect of noise by using a big enough chromosome; however, it cannot persuade nodes to cooperate in a noisefree environment. Unlike the GA strategy, the LA strategy shows good results in a noise-free environment because it has good agreement in cooperation-based strategies in both types of environment (noise-free and noisy).

• Journal of Korea Society of Industrial Information Systems
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• v.22 no.1
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• pp.89-104
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• 2017

This Study is to Explain the Reason of Stagnation of Technological Innovation for Digitalized Products in Competitive Market by Using the Concept of Consumer's Technical Appreciation Ability and by Employing Evolutionary Game Theory. In this Study, Consumer's Behaviors are Divided into Two Areas (Areas I and II). In Area I, Both Firms and Consumers Instinctively Welcome the Technological Innovation of Digitalized Products so that their Technological Skills are Likely to Advance Rapidly in a Short Time. On the Other Hand, in Area II, Consumers Feel Uncomfortable in the Usage of Advanced Digitalized Products so that they are Likely to Choose Digitalized Products Under Optimized Technology Condition. In other Words, Consumers want to the Old Models with Already Optimized Technology Rather than a Bland New Model. This Situation Allows Managers to make a Bland New Model Similar to a Earlier Model in many ways. Therefore, the Innovation of Digitalized Products may be Stagnated.