• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• summer
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• pp.701-703
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• 2004

Although the electricity market structure worldwide may be different in kinds, there generally exists long-term forward market and short-term spot market. Particularly, the bilateral contract in long-term forward market fixes the price between a genco and a customer so that the customer can avoid risks due to price-spike in spot market. The genco also can make an efficient risk-hedge strategy through this bilateral contract. In this paper, we propose a new mechanism for evaluating the optimal bilateral contract price using game theory. This mechanism makes a customer reveal his/her own willingness to purchase electricity so that a fair bilateral contract price can be derived.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.53 no.8
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• pp.484-489
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• 2004

When the energy resource available to a particular plant (be it coal, oil, gas, water, or nuclear fuel) is a limiting factor in the operation of the plant, the entire economic dispatch calculation must be done differently. Each economic dispatch calculation must account for what happened before and what will happen in the future. This paper presents a formulation and a solution method for the optimization problem with a fuel constraint in a competitive electricity market. Take-or- Pay (TOP) contract for an energy resource is the typical constraint as a limiting factor. Two approaches are proposed in this paper for modeling the dispatch calculation in a market mechanism. The approaches differ in the subject who considers and inserts the fuel-constraint into its optimization problem. Market operator and each power producer having a TOP contract are assumed as such subjects. The two approaches are compared from the viewpoint of profits. surplus. and social welfare on the basis of Nash Equilibrium.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.14 no.3
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• pp.729-751
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• 2005

RPS(Renewable Portfolio Standards) is an institutional device to promote use of renewable energy through market mechanism by making renewable energy to constitute a pre-announced portion of the electricity production. We measure economic impacts of the introduction of RPS to domestic electricity market at the levels of electricity market, individual industrial sectors and the economy as a whole. First, we examine the TREC(Tradable Renewable Energy Credits) market, where the credits in excess of the obligation of the renewable energy production are sold to those who have to meet the obligation through purchased credits. We then measure end-users' additional cost originating from the introduction of RPS and TREC in electricity production, and their impacts on price and supply in the retail electricity market. Next, using input-output analysis, we measure economic impacts of the changes in retail price and supply on individual industrial sectors and the economy as a whole. Among many others, we find small price effect and large GDP effect - sectoral electricity price rises at around 5%, sectoral price level rises by 0.258%, and sectoral GDP declines by 1.940% on average by the year 2011.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2005.07a
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• pp.745-747
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• 2005

After restructuring electricity industry, national long term electricity plans moved to "Basic plan of electricity supply and demand" from "Long term power development plan". The main point is a change of path from plan of power development at national level to plan of electricity supply and demand at company level. A proposal by generation company is surveyed and reflected to the basic plan of electricity supply and demand. The second plan shows over 40% reserves in result of the proposals. It is the time to evaluating the proposal which covers market function in the basic plan of electricity supply and demand at the stage of market change. This research presents the need of evaluation of proposals and the methods of evaluation. Also it presents the alternative planning procedure to reflecting the evaluation methods.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• v.2 no.4
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• pp.494-499
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• 2007

In this paper, we have investigated how transmission network constraints can be modeled in an electricity market equilibrium model. Under Cournot competition assumption, a game model is set up considering transmission line capacity constraints. Based on locational marginal pricing principle, market clearing is formulated as a total consumers# benefit maximization problem, and then converted to a conventional optimal power flow (OPF) formulation with a linearized transmission model. Using market clearing formulation, best response analysis is formulated and, finally, Nash equilibrium is formulated. In order for illustration, a numerical study for a four node system with two generating firms and two loads are presented.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.58 no.8
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• pp.1496-1503
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• 2009

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is an international environmental treaty to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere. In order to fulfil the commitments of the countries in an economically efficient way, the UNFCCC adapted the emission trading scheme in the Kyoto Protocol. If the UNFCCC's scheme is enforced in the country, considerable changes in electric power industry are expected due to the imposed greenhouse gas emission reduction. This paper proposes a game theoretic model of the case when generation companies participate in both competitive electricity market and emission market simultaneously. The model is designed such that generation companies select strategically between power quantity and greenhouse gas reduction to maximize their profits in both markets. Demand function and Environmental Welfare of emission trading market is proposed in this model. From the simulation results using the proposed model the impact of the emission trading on generation companies seems very severe in case that the emission prices are significantly high.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.53 no.11
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• pp.630-635
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• 2004

Generation companies(Genco) submit the supply functions as a bidding function to a bid market in a competitive electricity market. The profits of Gencos vary in accordance with the bid functions, so the selection of a bidding function plays a key role in increasing their profits. In order to get a profitable bidding function which is usually linear, it is required to modify adequately the intersection and the slope of a linear supply function. This paper presents an analysis of the selection of the supply function from the viewpoint of Nash equilibrium(NE). Four types of bidding function parameters are used for analizing the electricity market. The competition of selecting bidding parameters is modeled as two level games in this research. One is a subgame where a certain type of parameters is given and the players compete to select values of the underlying parameters. The other is an overall game where the players compete to select a profitable type among the four types of parameters. The NEs in both games are computed by an using analytic method and a payoff matrix method. It is verified in case studies for the NE of overall game to satisfy the equilibrium condition.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.54 no.8
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• pp.418-428
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• 2005

In this paper, a new probabilistic generation modeling method which can address the characteristics of changed electricity industry is proposed. The major contribution of this paper can be captured in the development of a probabilistic generation modeling considering generator maintenance outage and in the classification of market demand into multiple demand clusters for the applications to electricity markets. Conventional forced outage rates of generators are conceptually combined with maintenance outage of generators and, consequently, effective outage rates of generators are newly defined in order to properly address the probabilistic characteristic of generation in electricity markets. Then, original market demands are classified into several distinct demand clusters, which are defined by the effective outage rates of generators and by the inherent characteristic of the original demand. We have found that generators have different effective outage rates values at each classified demand cluster, depending on the market situation. From this, therefore, it can be seen that electricity markets can also be classified into several groups which show similar patterns and that the fundamental characteristics of power systems can be more efficiently analyzed in electricity markets perspectives, for this classification can be widely applicable to other technical problems in power systems such as generation scheduling, power flow analysis, price forecasts, and so on.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.39 no.6
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• pp.562-576
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• 2013

Power TAC (Power Trading Agent Competition) is an agent-based simulation for competitions between electricity brokering agents on the smart grid. To win the competition, agents obtain electricity from the electricity wholesale market among the power plants. In this operation, a key to success is balancing the demand of the customer and the supply from the plants because any imbalance results in a significant penalty to the brokering agent. Given the bidding on the wholesale market requires the price and the quantity on the electricity, this paper proposes four different price estimation strategies: exponentially moving average, linear regression, fuzzy logic, and support vector regression. Our evaluations with the competition simulation show which strategy is better than which, and which strategy wins in the free-for-all situations. This result is a crucial component in designing an electricity brokering agent in both Power TAC and the real world.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.219-243
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• 2004

Generally, electricity market has monopoly market structure because of need of enormous investment for infrastructure. However, the introduction of competition in network industry as electricity is a tendency of the world with decreasing the effects of economy of scale due to the advancement of technology. Now, electricity industry restructuring is in progress but the competition in electricity retail market is not in force yet in Korea. Whether a effective competition exist or not is very important to policy decision maker who drive restructuring, but there are small numbers of quantitative researches on that. In this study, we estimated the effectiveness of competition in the electricity retail market through switching costs. If switching costs are high, consumers actually can be locked in incumbent firm in spite of introduction of competition. Therefore switching is a critical factor to determine effectiveness of competition and to estimate the size of switching costs quantitatively can proffer the information about whether the competition in the electricity retail market is effective or not in the future. We estimated switching costs using consumer' stated-preference data by conjoint analysis. In according to estimation results, the cost of switching process is not so high, but the relative brand loyalty of an incumbent company is significantly high. And the price is considered as the most important factor choosing an electric service commodity. Based on the empirical results, it is possible to analyze the relationship between suppliers' competitiveness resulted from management efficiency and customers' switching possibilities. The paper therefore provides guidance for suppliers in deciding to enter into retail competition and for policy makers in introducing retail competition. And it has a significance of estimating the switching costs directly.