• International conference on construction engineering and project management
• /
• 2007.03a
• /
• pp.106-118
• /
• 2007

Little attention has been focussed on a precise definition and evaluation mechanism for project management risk specifically related to contractors. When bidding, contractors traditionally price risks using unsystematic approaches. The high business failure rate our industry records may indicate that the current unsystematic mechanisms contractors use for building up contingencies may be inadequate. The reluctance of some contractors to include a price for risk in their tenders when bidding for work competitively may also not be a useful approach. Here, instead, we first define the meaning of contractor contingency, and then we develop a facile quantitative technique that contractors can use to estimate a price for project risk. This model will help contractors analyse their exposure to project risks; and also help them express the risk in monetary terms for management action. When bidding for work, they can decide how to allocate contingencies strategically in a way that balances risk and reward.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
• /
• v.3A no.1
• /
• pp.47-52
• /
• 2003

This paper presents a schematic process based on the method of eliminating dominated strategies to obtain the optimal bidding strategy Pursuing the Nash equilibrium Point. The Proposed approach is demonstrated for a bidding game in a generation competitive market with 2-dimensional bidding strategy vectors constituting a price-quantity strategy curve.

• International conference on construction engineering and project management
• /
• 2009.05a
• /
• pp.1433-1439
• /
• 2009

Best value is the ultimate goal of the owner and can thus have diverse meanings according to the project characteristic, owner's purpose, user groups' payment capability, etc.. Recently, resettlement problems of the marginalized members in the urban regeneration area have been issued in Korea because they have no capability to purchase (or lease) redeveloped housing (or apartment). It means that a minimized production cost for reducing supply price of housing is a key factor in establishing the best value of the marginalized members. The lowest-price bidding system serves the purpose of ensuring a minimized production cost, but due to the low-cost investments, it creates various problems, such as sloppy construction, lowered quality, an increased LCC, and worsening profitability for builders. Thus, to help them resettle, it is necessary to supply affordable housing geared towards a certain appropriate quality and minimum construction costs. Towards this end, this study aimed to propose a cost reduction bidding system based on a technical proposal. The proposed technical-proposal-based cost reduction bidding system consists of the following components: work-unit-based, project-unit-based, and construction-period-reducing technical proposals. These components are evaluated to select the best bidder for a given project. The technical proposal based cost reduction bidding system proposed herein is expected to provide facilities with appropriate supply prices and appropriate quality levels, to bolster the technological competitiveness of builders.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
• /
• v.57 no.7
• /
• pp.1157-1166
• /
• 2008

This paper presents a new approach for the evaluation of location marginal prices (LMPs) considering demand-side bidding (DSB) in a competitive electricity market. The stabilization of the electric power supply and demand balance is one of the major important activities in electric power industry. In this paper, we present an analytical method for calculation of LMPs considering DSB, which has opportunity to compete with generating units, as England & Wales Pool's DSB scheme[1]. Also, we propose a new approach that LMP considering DSB is divided into three components. The proposed approach can be used for the evaluation of demand-side bidding into the electricity market and the assessment of the influence of DSB on total production costs and LMPs as well as three components.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
• /
• v.33 no.3
• /
• pp.322-328
• /
• 2007

Highly standardized products are suitable for automated purchasing using electronic commerce technology, where the price becomes the most important factor. Suppliers can change the prices dynamically based on the inventory level and market situation in order to maximize the sales and profit. In the virtual marketplace where multiple customers purchase multiple standardized products from multiple suppliers repetitively, customers can purchase the required amount of each item as a dynamic bidding by allocating purchase orders to the suppliers based on the current price. Customers need a method to quickly determine the optimal allocation of orders to the suppliers using the dynamically changing data to minimize the total cost. We present a LP model which minimizes the sum of the total price plus transportation cost for this problem. Simulation results using random data show meaningful reduction of the total cost.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
• /
• 1995.07b
• /
• pp.535-539
• /
• 1995

In recent years, electric industries in many countries confront with a structural change in business and socio-economic environments. Since 1984, PUC and utilities in U.S.A. have adopted or developing competitive bidding systems, and this new procurement programs prevailing and restructuring the power markets. In Korea, government and the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) invited the private sector to build and operate two 500 MW coal plants and two 400 MW LNG plants during 2001 - 2004. The plan also specifies basic concepts and conditions for the IPP projects such that new IPPs are selected through competitive bidding system with the purchased power price based on the avoided cost. In this study, the direction, guideline and scoring methods to Korean IPP bidding system are presented. Also, as a benchmark price and rates for purchased power, the avoided cost calculation models are developed, this study may contribute for the development of private power in Korea, and improve overall economic efficiencies of whole electric power sector.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
• /
• v.8 no.4
• /
• pp.201-212
• /
• 2009

This study analyzed the structure of pricing in the automobile auction market by using real trade data. We focused on the bidding behavior of bidders and the contract price of exhibits. First, we proposed a relational framework among exhibits, number of bidders, and the contract price. Next, we utilized a neural network model to estimate the number of bidders and the contract price. Subsequently, we investigated the relationship between the number of bidders and the contact price, and evaluated our method through an analysis that employed verifying data. Lastly, we listed our suggestions for bidding in auction markets.

• Journal of Energy Engineering
• /
• v.11 no.1
• /
• pp.59-66
• /
• 2002

The vertically integrated power industry was divided into six generation companies and one market operator, where electricity trading was launched at power exchange. In this environment, the profits of each generation companies are guaranteed according to utilizing strategies of their own generation equipments. This paper presents on generator maintenance scheduling and efficient bidding strategies for generation equipments through the calculation of the contract and the application of each generator cost function based on the past demand forecasting error and market operating data.

• Korean Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
• /
• v.11 no.2
• /
• pp.35-44
• /
• 2010

Currently, the unit price of public construction projects are not being evaluated appropriately for several reasons. First, the evaluation of the unit price differ per nature of the bidding process and its estimation process. In fact, pricing is determined to meet the total price in turnkey projects and to pass the low bid price deliberation process in unit price projects, and thus, such prices cannot be said to be reasonable prices per public project. After the contract is awarded, however, the prices determined without taking into consideration the characteristic of each bidding process and price estimate process are used for the valuation of progress payment, design changes, and escalation. Furthermore, this is also being applied to other low bid deliberation process as actual public project unit price, thereby affecting other processes as well. In effect, this system increases the risks for both the owner and the bidder who have determined the unit price. This research examines the risk factor and its extent in order to properly manage it in preparation for the future.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
• /
• v.52 no.6
• /
• pp.340-346
• /
• 2003

This paper presents a game theory application for an analysis of uniform price auction in a simplified competitive electricity market and analyzes the properties of Nash equilibrium for various conditions. We have assumed that each generation firm submits his bid to a market in the form of a sealed bid and the market is operated as a uniform price auction. Two firms are supposed to be the players of the market, and we consider the maximum generation quantity constraint of one firm only. The system demand is assumed to have a linear relationship with market clearing prices and the bidding curve of each firm, representing the price at which he has a willingness to sell his generation quantity, is also assumed to have a linear function. In this paper, we analyze the effects of maximum generation quantity constraints on the Nash equilibrium of the uniform price auction. A simple numerical example with two generation firms is demonstrated to show the basic idea of the proposed methodology.