• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.18 no.4
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• pp.658-669
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• 2016

The tremendous increase in mobile data traffic coupled with fierce competition in wireless industry brings about spectrum scarcity and bandwidth fragmentation. This inevitably results in asymmetric-valued long term evolution (LTE) spectrum allocation that stems from different timing for twice improvement in capacity between competing operators, given spectrum allocations today. This motivates us to study the economic effects of asymmetric-valued LTE spectrum allocation. In this paper, we formulate the interactions between operators and users as a hierarchical dynamic game framework, where two spiteful operators simultaneously make spectrum acquisition decisions in the upper-level first-price sealed-bid auction game, and dynamic pricing decisions in the lower-level differential game, taking into account user subscription dynamics. Using backward induction, we derive the equilibrium of the entire game under mild conditions. Through analytical and numerical results, we verify our studies by comparing the latest result of LTE spectrum auction in South Korea, which serves as the benchmark of asymmetric-valued LTE spectrum auction designs.

• Journal of the military operations research society of Korea
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• v.5 no.1
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• pp.137-153
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• 1979

The duel is an extreme case of game situations. The duel is of zero-sum type, but a infinite game. This duel situation appears not only in extreme competitive situations such as war, but also in economic situations such as bidding. The study on duel situations started from late 1940's, but considerable contributions have been made in 1960's by Ancker, Restrepo, Yanovskaya, Kimeldorf among others. Specially Kimeldorf recently has made big contribution in developing the theory of the game-theoretic duel. The purpose of this paper is to summarize and systemize the theory of the game-theoretic duel. In the first part, noisy duel situations shall be dealt with, and in the second part, silent duel shall follow. Finally these two situations shall be generalized in the form of continuous firing model.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2001.11b
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• pp.57-59
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• 2001

The restructuring of power industry is still going on all over the world for last several decades. Many kinds of restructuring model has been studied, proposed, and applied. Among those models, power pool is more popular than others. This paper assumes the power pool market structure having competitive generation sector and a new method is presented to build bidding strategy in that market. The utilities participating in the market have the perfect information on their cost and price functions, but they don't know the strategy to be chosen by others. To define one's strategy as a vector, we make utility's cost/price function into discrete step function. An utility knows only his own strategy, so he estimates the other's strategy using stochastic methods. For considering these conditions, we introduce the Bayesian rules and noncooperative game theory concepts. Also additional assumptions are included for simplification of solving process. Each utility builds the strategy to maximize his own expected profit function using noncooperative Bayesian game. A numerical example is given in case study to show essential features of this approach.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2000.11a
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• pp.3-5
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• 2000

It has been the paradigm of game theory that more than two utilities compete and determine the price and amount of dispatch. In order for this theory to be available on real power system, it is necessary to consider the transmission costs as well as the generation costs. In addition Independent System Operator(ISO) should be able to mitigate the congestion, recover the transmission costs and provide information for long-term capacity investment by devising reasonable pricing schemes for the transmission services. Generators also have to take the transmission costs into account when building the bidding strategies. This paper proposes an approach to analyzing the profit maximizing game considering the transmission cost in a competitive electricity market.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.51 no.7
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• pp.311-316
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• 2002

It has been a basic model for the present electric power industry that more than two generators compete, and thereby the market clearing price and the generation schedules are determined through the bid process. In order for this paradigm to be applicable to real electric power systems and markets, it is necessary to reflect many physical and economic constraints related to frequency and transmission in the dispatching schedule. The paper presents an approach to deriving a Nash bargaining solution in a competitive electricity market where multiple generators are playing with the system operator who mitigates the transmission congestion to minimize the total transaction cost. In this study, we take the effect of the line flows and the role of system operator into the Game. Finally, a case study has been demonstrated to verify the proposed cooperative game.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.6
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• pp.333-339
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• 2003

Competition among electric generation companies is a major goal of restructuring in the electricity industry. In electricity market, a huge volume of commodities will be traded through competitive bidding. The choice between uniform and pay-as-bid pricing for electricity auction has been one of most important issues in deregulated electricity market. This paper proposes a constrained Bertrand model for analyzing the electricity auction market of price competition model. The issue of the two pricing rules of uniform and pay-as-bid is studied from the viewpoint of consumer's benefit. This paper also shows that transmission congestion depends on the pricing mechanism. Pay-as-bid pricing gives less possibility of transmission congestion by price competition, and less burden to consumers in the simulation results.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.6
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• pp.340-346
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• 2003

This paper presents a game theory application for an analysis of uniform price auction in a simplified competitive electricity market and analyzes the properties of Nash equilibrium for various conditions. We have assumed that each generation firm submits his bid to a market in the form of a sealed bid and the market is operated as a uniform price auction. Two firms are supposed to be the players of the market, and we consider the maximum generation quantity constraint of one firm only. The system demand is assumed to have a linear relationship with market clearing prices and the bidding curve of each firm, representing the price at which he has a willingness to sell his generation quantity, is also assumed to have a linear function. In this paper, we analyze the effects of maximum generation quantity constraints on the Nash equilibrium of the uniform price auction. A simple numerical example with two generation firms is demonstrated to show the basic idea of the proposed methodology.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2003.07a
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• pp.670-672
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• 2003

The market participants make plans of bidding and transaction strategies to maximize their own profits in competitive electricity market. Also, It is concerned with transmission congestion in power market. Two methods are generally used for congestion management;nodal pricing and uplift. The participants will have different strategies for their profits in the two methods. This paper analyzes their equilibrium strategies by using the supply function model and congestion methods.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2009.07a
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• pp.569_570
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• 2009

This paper presents a methodology to find the profit maximized Nash Equilibriums of each generator(or GenCo), which considers the Ramp-rate of each generator under a competitive market environment. The ramp-rate of a generator is one of the physical or technical constraints of a generator and means the ability to increase or decrease the output instantaneously. In this paper, we found several Nash Equilibriums of the generation allocation problem through Dynamic Programming in a competitive market. Individual generators participate in a game to maximize its profit through competitions and play a game with bidding strategies of its generation quantities in a spot market.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.59 no.7
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• pp.1226-1231
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• 2010

This paper looks at the influence of Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) on the market value(Social Welfare; SW) in the competitive electricity market. The transmission line constraints make it difficult to compute the Nash Equilibrium (NE) due to causing a mixed strategy NE instead of a pure strategy NE. Computing a mixed strategy is more complicated in a multi-player game. The aim of this paper are to compute a mixed strategy NE and analyze SW in power transaction with FTRs. This paper introduces a formula and a technique for solving NE of multi-player game with FTRs. In addition, it analyzes the influence of holding of FTRs by generation company on SW and it proposes the SW at NE is influenced by Power Transfer Distribution Factor (PTDF) where holder of FTRs are located. The assertion is verified by calculating the mixed strategy utilizing the Cournot model widely used for studies on FTRs.