• Journal of KIISE:Information Networking
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• v.37 no.4
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• pp.312-316
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• 2010

In this paper, we propose a game theoretic channel sharing model that allocates resources of a base station between MNO(Mobile Network Operator) and MVNO(Mobile Virtual Network Operator) in a fair and efficient manner. Considering the input traffic loads of MNO and MVNO, the proposed model uses the bargaining game theory to allocate channel resources between MNO and MNVO. When the input loads of the carriers are asymmetric, the proposed model increases the resource utilization by allocating more channel resources to the operator with high input load. In addition, the proposed model prevents the quality of service of an operator from degrading even if the input load of the other operators increases excessively.

• Korean Business Review
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• v.1
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• pp.115-134
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• 1987

The increased number of organized employees and amount of collective bargaining in the public sector has caused many industrial relations students to pay attention to the compulsory arbitration mechanism. Some of these have criticized the compulsory arbitration on the grounds that it tends to replace collective bargain ing itself. They argue that each party lacks the incentive to concede and compromise that is so necessary in reaching agreements as long as the threat and/or use of strike is unavailable to them. On the other hand, the proponents of the compulsory arbitration maintain that compulsory arbitration carries out a strike like function by imposing the cost of disagreement. This paper is primarily concerned with these contradictory issues. More particularly, an attempt is made to analyze the impact of the compulsory arbitration mechanism upon the collective bargaining process by developing a bargaining model with explicit considerations of the determinants of the concession behavior of each party as a function of the cost of disagreement and the risk willingness relationship between the parties. The analysis in this paper leads to a synthesis of the above competing arguments, and shows that those contradictory views on the effect of the compulsory arbitration are mainly due to their failure to con sider the concession process.

• KIPS Transactions on Computer and Communication Systems
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• v.5 no.3
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• pp.47-54
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• 2016

In this paper, we propose a new opportunistic routing scheme based on timed bargaining game. The proposed algorithm effectively formulates the opportunistic routing mechanism as an repeated bargaining model using timed learning method. Additionally, we formulate a new contention window adjusting scheme for reduce collision rate. Simulation results indicate that the proposed scheme has excellent performance than other existing schemes under widely diverse VANET environments.

• East Asian Economic Review
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• v.21 no.2
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• pp.167-197
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• 2017

I build a small open economy (SOE) dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model to investigate the effect of a heterogeneous wage contract between regular and temporary workers on a macroeconomic volatility in a financially fragile economy. The imperfect financial market condition is captured by a quadratic financial adjustment cost for borrowing foreign assets, and the labor market friction is captured by a Nash bargaining process which is only available to the regular workers when they negotiate their wages with the firms while the temporary workers are given their wage which simply equals the marginal cost. As a result of impulse responsesto a domestic productivity shock, the higher elasticity of substitution between two types of workers and the lower weight on the regular workers in the firm's production process induce the higher volatilities in most variables. This is reasoned that the higher substitutability creates more volatile wage determination process while the lower share of the regular workers weakens their Nash bargaining power in the contract process.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.51 no.7
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• pp.311-316
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• 2002

It has been a basic model for the present electric power industry that more than two generators compete, and thereby the market clearing price and the generation schedules are determined through the bid process. In order for this paradigm to be applicable to real electric power systems and markets, it is necessary to reflect many physical and economic constraints related to frequency and transmission in the dispatching schedule. The paper presents an approach to deriving a Nash bargaining solution in a competitive electricity market where multiple generators are playing with the system operator who mitigates the transmission congestion to minimize the total transaction cost. In this study, we take the effect of the line flows and the role of system operator into the Game. Finally, a case study has been demonstrated to verify the proposed cooperative game.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference
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• 2016.10a
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• pp.189-190
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• 2016

This study explores how bargaining power and influence effect on the information quality and the SCM main performance namely SCM flexibility, SCM agility. Especially it was considered differences in perspective of suppliers and buyers. The 140 data sets collected, which companies use SCM, were tested against the model using SPSS and SmartPLS. The result of this study is when buyers have bargaining power, information quality had most effect on the SCM performances.

• ETRI Journal
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• v.34 no.3
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• pp.341-351
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• 2012

We deal with a resource allocation problem for multimedia service discrimination in wireless networks. We assume that a service provider allocates network resources to users who can choose and access one of the discriminated services. To express the rational service selection of users, the utility function of users is devised to reflect both service quality and cost. Regarding the utility function of a service provider, total profit and efficiency of resource usage have been considered. The proposed service discrimination framework is composed of two game models. An outer model is a repeated Stackelberg game between a service provider and a user group, while an inner model is a service selection game among users, which is solved by adopting the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution. Through simulation experiments, we compare the proposed framework with existing resource allocation methods according to user cost sensitivity. The proposed framework performed better than existing frameworks in terms of total profit and fairness.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.34 no.5
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• pp.171-189
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• 2015

On the SCM network, there are two type of company, the one which has the powerful position in the decision process is called the leader, and the other company which reacts to the leader's decision is called the follower. This relationship structure effect on the partnership. Therefore this study suggested a research model which would explain the relationship among the bargaining power, partnership, information quality, SCM features. The 116 sets of data collected, which companies use SCM, were tested against the model using SPSS 23 and smartPLS 3.2.3. The results of this study are as follows. First, Bargaining Power had an effect on Influence, Partnership, Information Quality. Second, Influence didn't have an effect on the Partnership and Information Quality. Third, Partnership had an effect on the Information Quality and SCM Flexibility, Agility, Uncertainty Control. Forth, Information Quality had and an effect on the SCM Flexibility, Agility.

• The KIPS Transactions:PartC
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• v.17C no.4
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• pp.385-390
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• 2010

Fair and efficient bandwidth allocation methods using the coalition game theory and the bargaining game theory following the axiomatic approach have been proposed when sending nodes with different traffic input rate try to share the bandwidth. These methods satisfy the axiomatic fairness provided by the mathematical ground of the game theories. However, since the axioms of the two game models are different from one another, the allocated bandwidths to each sending nodes become different even in the same communication environments. Thus, in this paper, we model the bandwidth allocation problem with these game theories, and quantitatively compare and analyze the allocated bandwidth and loss rate of each sending nodes in various communication environments. The results show that the bargaining game allocates relatively less bandwidth to a node with a higher sending rate than that with a lower sending rate while coalition game allocates bandwidth according to the sending rate of each node.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.18 no.3
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• pp.484-492
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• 2016

Smart grid (SG) technology is now elevating the conventional power grid system to one that functions more cooperatively, responsively, and economically. When applied in an SG the demand side management (DSM) technique can improve its reliability by dynamically changing electricity consumption or rescheduling it. In this paper, we propose a new SG scheduling scheme that uses the DSM technique. To achieve effective SG management, we adopt a mixed pricing strategy based on the Rubinstein-Stahl bargaining game and a repeated game model. The proposed game-based pricing strategy provides energy routing for effective energy sharing and allows consumers to make informed decisions regarding their power consumption. Our approach can encourage consumers to schedule their power consumption profiles independently while minimizing their payment and the peak-to-average ratio (PAR). Through a simulation study, it is demonstrated that the proposed scheme can obtain a better performance than other existing schemes in terms of power consumption, price, average payment, etc.