• Journal of Information Technology Applications and Management
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• v.29 no.2
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• pp.17-25
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• 2022

Although the two types of currencies compete, the possibility of a virtual currency price bubble is diagnosed by assuming an economic model with currencies (won, virtual currency) that are intrinsically worthless. The won is supplied by the central bank to achieve the price stability target, while the supply of virtual currency increases by a fixed number. According to the basic price theory equation, as a simple proposition, cryptocurrency prices form a Martin Gale process [Schilling and Uhlig, 2019, p.20]. Based on the existing theoretical proposition, we applied the variance ratio verification method [Linton and Smetanina, 2016] and a simple technical chart method for empirical analysis. For the purpose of this study, the possibility of a bubble was empirically analyzed by analyzing the price volatility formed in the Korean virtual currency market over the past year, and brief policy implications for this were presented.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.39 no.6
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• pp.562-576
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• 2013

Power TAC (Power Trading Agent Competition) is an agent-based simulation for competitions between electricity brokering agents on the smart grid. To win the competition, agents obtain electricity from the electricity wholesale market among the power plants. In this operation, a key to success is balancing the demand of the customer and the supply from the plants because any imbalance results in a significant penalty to the brokering agent. Given the bidding on the wholesale market requires the price and the quantity on the electricity, this paper proposes four different price estimation strategies: exponentially moving average, linear regression, fuzzy logic, and support vector regression. Our evaluations with the competition simulation show which strategy is better than which, and which strategy wins in the free-for-all situations. This result is a crucial component in designing an electricity brokering agent in both Power TAC and the real world.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.60 no.2
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• pp.257-265
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• 2011

As the competitive market system has been introduced to the electrical power trade, the priority concern would be that the price of electrical power should be reasonable. It is because, when this rule is solid, we can avoid the distortion of competition and assure the greater efficiency in management. LMP(Locational Marginal Price) means marginal price at each bus. This components consist of energy, loss and congestion cost. At this point, the LMP result that is calculated by traditional model is changeable by the location of the slack and can not be used in bilateral Transaction. This paper proposed algorithm is proved its rationality and credibility by comparing the result of the simulation of virtual 6_bus system that is calculated by traditional method, and showed that the LMP components are changed according to the Transaction Strategy. Furthermore, It shows the effect of additional congestion cost on the transmission line that has bottle neck frequently by simulation.

• Journal of Information Technology Applications and Management
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• v.19 no.2
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• pp.217-231
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• 2012

In the past, companies should make enormous facility investment and acquire a right to do business in order to join communication markets, but now they can do business without important facilities, such as communication networks. Such a movement to ease regulations about companies which want to newly join the communication industry is expected not only to change a competition frame of the mobile communication market but also to greatly affect the entire communication industry. Through this study aiming to look into a way to calculate a reasonable wholesale price related to the government's introduction of the Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO) system, I came up with a following result. I applied the operating profit percentage and the ratio of operating gain to cost to the cost plus model and retail minus model, respectively, to calculate the wholesale price and found that when I calculated with the cost plus model applying the operating profit percentage, I could get the highest wholesale price. On the other hand, I got the lowest wholesale price with the retail minus model by applying the operating profit percentage. Division of expenses and calculation of profit percentage are important factors in calculating the wholesale price and such results are expected to help accurate calculation of the MVNO wholesale price.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.32 no.4B
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• pp.234-245
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• 2007

There are lots of controversies over the introduction of MVNO(Mobile Virtual Network Operator) policy to Korean mobile telecommunications market. MVNO is a kind of service-based competition in mobile market. This paper attempts to analyze the ripple effect of MVNO regulation and also desirable ways of implementing the policy. Based on Laffont, Rey and Tirole(1998), Armstrong (1998) model, theoretical MVNO model is defined and derived implications of price, quantity in the market. According to the model, the fact that MNOs have one-way access profit leads the static efficiency by lowering its market price. In regarding the most desirable way to enhance social welfare is revealed as 'two MNOs conduct MVNO' other than 'One MNO does' or 'Structurally divided network'.

• The Journal of Society for e-Business Studies
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• v.5 no.1
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• pp.135-158
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• 2000

In recent years, many retail businesses jumped on the Internet auction bandwagon and paid substantially high fees to learn and develop proper business strategies for this new environment. Unlike what most businesses in the real world presume, this research shows that discriminatory-price ascending-bid auctions in a digital economy might be not very beneficial for the sellers on the Internet, if sellers sell the identical digital products through both a typical posted-price market and an auction. Using an extensive technology infrastructure along with suitable incentives and rules for market agents, we found that a discriminatory-price ascending-bid auction, which is the most popular auction mechanism on the Internet, serves consumers better than it does the sellers or producers in the digital economy. That is, the average prices for digital goods in these auctions are substantially lower than the prices in a posted-price market. This shows that it is not so wise for sellers to jump on the bandwagon of Internet auctions, if there is a market place with posted-price mechanisms which sells comparable items, or if a seller does not have special advantages or strategies in this new market institution. Electronic market mechanisms provide powerful means of understanding and measuring consumer characteristics including willingness-to-pay and other demographics for sellers or producers. Many concern that sellers may extract the entire surplus from the market by using customization on the Internet, thus consumers will be worse off in this digital economy. We found that these sellers who can customize their products and prices fail to capture the whole consumers surplus and cannot exercise a monopoly. One major explanation for this phenomenon is that the competition among the sellers prohibits them from charging prices according to customers demand for each product, where switching from one seller to another is not so difficult for the customers, and reselling products among the buyers are prohibited.

• International Journal of Naval Architecture and Ocean Engineering
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• v.3 no.3
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• pp.181-192
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• 2011

Recently, the speed of change related with enterprise management is getting faster than ever owing to the competition among companies, technique diffusion, shortening of product lifecycle, excessive supply of market. For the example, the compliance condition (such as delivery date, product quality, etc.) from the ship owner is getting complicated and the needs for the new product such as FPSO, FSRU are coming to fore. This paradigm shift emphasize the rapid response rather than the competitive price, flexibility and agility rather than effective and optimal perspective for the domestic shipbuilding company. So, domestic shipbuilding companies have to secure agile and flexible ship production environment that could respond change of market and requirements of customers in order to continue a competitive edge in the world market. In this paper, I'm going to define a standard shipbuilding production management system by investigating the environment of domestic major shipbuilding companies. Also, I'm going to propose a unified ship production management and system for the operation of unified management through detail analysis of the activities and the data flow of ship production management. And, the system functions for the strategic approach of ship production management are investigated through the business administration tools such as performance pyramid, VDT and BSC. Lastly, the research of applying strategic KPI to the digital shipyard as virtual execution platform is conducted.

• KSCE Journal of Civil and Environmental Engineering Research
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• v.37 no.6
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• pp.1053-1061
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• 2017

The study is concerned with providing the improvement method on making a reasonable and scientific decision on the damages accrued from the bid rigging in the construction work. According to the review on the precedent studies and decision cases on the damages caused by bid rigging, the representative problems include the insufficiency of the classification system on the damage calculation method and the omission of the necessary stage in the damage determination process. First, the improved classification system on calculating the damages caused by bid rigging is presented with the application to the bid rigging in the construction work by adding the ratio factor in addition to the damage calculation parameters such as price and cost. Second, the standard procedures organized with six stages is presented as the process required for determining the damages if the indemnification for bid rigging is claimed. The study becomes the foundation for resolving the problem with the undue burden on a party and for preventing the opportunity loss by resolving a dispute early through the improvement classification system and standard procedures presented in the study.

• KSCE Journal of Civil and Environmental Engineering Research
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• v.38 no.5
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• pp.741-749
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• 2018

The purpose of this study is to propose a rational and scientific damage calculation model in relation to damages caused by bid rigging in construction projects. Previous studies and precedents in relation to calculating damages from bid rigging suggest that the main issue was the lack of consideration in standards for deciding successful bids, selection of inadequate standard comparative markets, insufficiency in analyzing the appropriateness of competitive bid price influence factors, and absence of calculation model verification. In order to improve on these issues, a damage calculation method on alternative tenders for construction projects was proposed. For this calculation model, first, a standard market adequate to the successful bid selection standards was determined, second, an appropriate factor was selected by analyzing the correlation between competitive bid price influence factors, and third, a regression analysis was conducted on the selected factor. Lastly, this was demonstrated through verification of appropriateness, significance & normality of the proposed model and application of actual bid rigging cases. Through the proposed calculation model, this study seeks to serve as a base to prevent opportunity damages for parties involved in related court cases by early resolution of disputes and relief from issues of unfair damage burdens on a particular party.